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1Introduction
~^The subject of the study is regime change understood as the modification of broadly defined
««
political institutions and practices governing domestic politics. Democratization is a possible 
outcome o f such a process if  the modification o f political institutions and practices reflects 
convergence with a particular set o f liberal ideas and norms. During the last 25 years the 
interest o f  political scientists in such processes has steadily grown. Democratization spread 
from Southern Europe in the 1970s to Latin America in the 1980s and finally reached Eastern 
Europe and the other continents in the late 1980s and early 1990s. More recently, some have 
diagnosed an 'ebbing' o f .the wave. While the empirical record of the 'third wave* is mixed, its 
profound effects on the way the academic community studies democratization are undeniable. 
The new cases o f democratization led during the 1980s to a paradigm shift away from struc­
turalist explanations towards more contingency-driven and agency-based approaches. 
Challenges to the modernization school or cultural explanations of democratic change 
highlighted cases of regime change under structurally unfavorable conditions and called for 
greater attention towards the role of political actors, institutions, and contingencies.
While the regime changes in Southern Europe and Latin America opened in the 1980s a new 
intellectual terrain, this literature received a major boost as a result of the 1989/90 events in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The 'third wave' (Samuel Huntington) now affected 
many countries o f the world posed not only a serious puzzle for structuralist approaches, but 
challenged also the separation of international and domestic politics, both in theory and 
practice. Concepts such as 'contagion* or 'diffusion' were now introduced into the debate to 
account for the new phenomenon. However, the reference to the international realm remained 
largely rhetorical. In light o f the new research agenda within comparative politics and the 
abundance of cases, an additional set o f international factors looked to most scholars much 
less attractive. Such a view was compatible with disciplinary boundaries and the academic 
training o f many scholars.
This position further solidified when much of the initial clamor for fundamental political 
change in many parts of the world was lost in the mid-1990s. The temporal and directional 
uniformity implied in the picture o f the 'third wave' gave way to the reemergence o f regional 
and individual diversity. Some countries completed the transition within weeks or months and 
can even be considered as consolidated democracies today. In other cases, the process has
2been much slower, stopped or was even reversed. In the worst cases, countries returned to 
authoritarian rule or even plunged into civil war. As a result, the emerging global picture with 
regard to democratization seemed to vindicate the regional and domestic bias within the disci­
pline.
This study contributes to this literature by presenting a comparative evaluation o f the recent 
regime changes in Kenya and Uganda. The thesis follows the recent emphasis within the 
democratization literature on the role o f political actors and institutions in bringing about and 
shaping regime change. It adds to this literature a specific concern for international human 
rights institutions and actors as potential sources o f change. I argue that the international 
institutionalization o f human rights norms represents an opportunity structure for international 
and domestic human rights actors. They use those norms and institutions to challenge the 
prevalent norm o f state sovereignty and succeed in delegitimizing human rights violating 
regimes.
The thesis evaluates the role of those international factors, first, in causing regime change and, 
second, in shaping the subsequent transition path. Variation in the results expressed by the 
mode o f initial transition is explained for the onset of regime change by the dominant form of 
neopatrimonial rule . Whereas cohesive clientelist networks solidified in Kenya over almost 
20 years, the bases for such a system in Uganda were destroyed by the Amin dictatorship and 
subsequent civil war. The dominance o f positive integration by resource allocation in Kenya 
contrasted with a prevalent logic of violence and indiscriminate mass killings in Uganda. 
When transnational human rights mobilization affected both countries, the international- 
domestic interaction produced in Uganda a revolution from below (1986) and in Kenya 
limited reforms from above (1990/1991).
Variation in subsequent transition paths is mainly accounted for by the named initial mode o f  
transition which affects the international and domestic mobilization. When the Kenyan gov­
ernment chose an electoralist transition path international human rights pressure remained 
strong and slowly eroded the governmental efforts to limit the effects of the reform process. 
By contrast, the new Ugandan government initially emphasized a different transition path and 
engaged in elaborate constitutionalist reforms. A decline in human rights activism explains 
why this reform process was delayed and the government was able to extend its rule for more 
than 13 years. Rather than limiting institutions to the role of constraints upon actor’s choices,
3this argument highlights the enabling role of institutions and identifies the potential conflict 
between norms embedded in different institutional settings as a source o f social and political 
change. Before further elaborating on the main argument, the next section will define regime 
change and democratization.
Regime Change and Democratization
The dependent variable(s) o f the study is the initiation and the subsequent process o f regime 
change in Kenya and Uganda. The definition for democracy used in this study follows the 
narrow interpretation suggested by Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl. It is understood as an 
institutional framework and a method or procedure of government rather than being commit­
ted "to any particular set of social and economic objectives" or any "society with particular 
characteristics" (Weiner 1987: 5). "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote" (Schumpeter 1942: 269). Still, even such a 
narrow procedural perspective does not solve all definitional issues (Leary 1979; 
Merritt/Zinnes 1991: 209), because "democracy is not a quality of a social system which 
either does or does not exist, but rather a complex of characteristics which may be ranked in 
many different ways" (Lipset 1959: 73).
In defining regime change as democratization the study relies on a modified version of Dahl's 
concept o f polyarchy (Dahl 1971: 3-20) which included (1) contestation over policy and 
political competition for office, (2) participation o f the citizenry through partisan, associa- 
tional, and other forms of collective action, and (3) accountability of rulers to the ruled 
through mechanisms of representation and the rule o f law (Svensson 1993: 251-266). 
However, the realities of many incomplete or reversed transition processes have led scholars 
to return to these definitional issues and to add new aspects, Karl rightly highlighted the 
civilian control o f the military (Karl 1990) as a crucial question. Guillermo O’Donnell called a 
checklist o f democracy as still insufficient even if it included (1) elected officials, (2) free and 
fair elections, (3) inclusive suffrage, (4) the right to run for office, (5) freedom o f  expression, 
(6) availability o f  alternative information, and (7) associational autonomy. Considering the 
experience with the 'third wave', he added that (8) the terms of elected and appointed officials 
should not be terminated arbitrarily, (9) elected authorities should not be subject to severe 
constraints, exclusions or vetoes, especially from the military, (10) "there should be an
4uncontested national territory that clearly defines the voting population”, (11) "the generalized 
expectation that a fair electoral process and its surrounding freedoms will continue into an 
indefinite future", and finally (12) "horizontal accountability" between various state agencies 
has to exist (O'Donnell 1996: 35-37 and 44).
While these definitional efforts are still largely within the mainstream which favors a "proce­
dural or minimalist conception o f  democracy over a substantive or maximalist conception 
embracing economic equality and social justice" (Shin 1994: 142), the limited understanding 
of democracy is also not without problems. This is already indicated by the various sugges­
tions to extend the list o f possible impediments to democracy and democratization. It is often 
not sufficient to diagnose that "democracy is the only game in town" (Linz 1990: 156), but we 
>Tieed to understand what kind o f  "games [are] played inside the democratic institutions" 
(O'Donnell 1996: 41). In focusing on the 'games' within those democratic institutions, various 
structural factors (gender, economic relations etc.) influencing, for example, the extension o f 
the rule o f law over the country's geographic and social terrain are being brought into the 
picture. Claus Offe argued (Offe 1994) that decisions made under formally democratic rules 
might be normatively non-acceptable because they leave sections o f the population below 
certain social and economic standards (Merkel 1996: 36) which would enable them to support 
democratic procedures in the first place. Such reminders about the broader environment o f 
democratic processes are necessary and should supplement a more narrow study o f  regime 
change in a given country.
A slightly different approach was taken by Schmitter who suggested to analytically break 
down the meta-regime 'democracy' into five different 'partial regimes', including a pressure, an 
electoral, a representation, a concertation, and a clientelist regime (Schmitter 1992). He 
argued that these sub-regimes organize relationships between social actors and aggregate to 
constitute the national democratic regime. Schmitter pointed to the ethnocentric character o f 
the recent literature on democratization epitomized by its pre-occupation with parties and the 
electoral system. "I believe it is preferable to assume that today's citizens (...) have quite 
different organizational skills, [and] are less likely to identify so closely with partisan symbols 
or ideologies..." (Schmitter 1992: 426).
By pointing to different regimes within democracy, including existing clientelist networks 
(but also new networks of social movements), Schmitter raised an important issue which also
5applies to the African context and the selected case studies. Academics or other professionals 
might not only be mistaken about a process of democratization because of an incomplete 
checklist of democracy. Much m o^fundam entally, students of post-independence African 
politics agree that any kind of political system on the continent is likely to be completely 
pervaded by the "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1989) and the logic o f neopatrimonial rule 
(Bratton/van de Walle 1997: Ch. 2). Hence, even if a model process o f democratic change 
occurred, this might not or only marginally affect the underlying clientelist networks and 
deeply personalized rule from the top down.
The issues of minimalist vs. more extended definitions of democracy as well as the pervasive 
character of neopatrimonialism in Africa leads me to conclude that for the purpose o f this 
two-country comparison it is particularly useful to divide the dependent variable into the two 
dimensions constitutionalism and electoral democracy. This strategy enables me to concen­
trate on core aspects of democracy without turning a blind eye on possible broader structural 
or cultural limits to its evolution. Constitutionalism includes the principle o f legality based on 
a constitution (1), the presence of the rule of law (2), some form of separation o f powers (3), 
the independence o f the courts and their ability to review legislation (4), and the respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms (5). Hence, constitutionalism includes all issues that limit 
governmental and in particular presidential powers used to sustain a patrimonial system. 
Electoral democracy is characterized by a representative government that emerged from free 
and fair elections based on universal suffrage (1). Various governmental institutions have 
decision-making influence through a legislative process and are linked by checks and balances 
(2). I argue here that the property space created by these concepts can be used to capture 
different paths towards democracy.
A number o f authors and institutions, including the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), have addressed the issue of how to actually measure "democracy" 
(Coppedge/Reinicke 1991; Gastil 1990; Hadenius 1992; United Nations Development 
Program 1991). These efforts have drawn considerable methodological and theoretical 
criticism (Bollen 1991; Elklit 1994). Whereas an overall comparison o f democratization in 
various countries is certainly possible, difficulties arise if  one attempts to weigh single 
indicators against each other and over time. Therefore, I will use a qualitative approach to 
evaluate the indicators of the dependent variable which reflect Dahl's concept o f polyarchy. I
argue that this is the most compelling approach to the selected dependent variable, because the 
concept o f  democracy cannot be separated from its indicators, such as elections, political 
rights, or separation of powers (Alford 1998: 52). While the concept of'power' within a realist 
paradigm is linked to distinct and more independent indicators such as military and material 
capabilities, democracy cannot be validated by an empirical test. Elections simultaneously 
represent the concept of democracy as well as one of its (here chosen) empirical indicators.
Case Selection
Two countries affected by the recent wave o f democratization are Kenya and Uganda. Like 
many other African countries, they are not obvious success stories of the 'third wave1. Within 
the two selected cases, the study compares the role of international factors with respect to two 
distinct phases o f the transition process. The first part focuses on the role of international 
factors in successfully challenging authoritarian rule in Kenya and Uganda. The period 
stretches in Uganda from the mid-1970s to late 1985 and in Kenya from 1984/85 to 1990/91. 
The second comparison investigates influences by transnational human rights actors on the 
transition path. In Uganda, this covers the period after the military victory of the NRM in 
January 1986, while in Kenya the onset o f regime change is marked by the réintroduction o f  
multipartyism in late 1991. In Uganda, the transition began with a revolution 'from below'. In 
Kenya, the challenged government instituted limited reforms 'from above' and survived two 
subsequent multiparty elections.
In terms of Bratton/van de Walle’s modal regimes of neopatrimonial rule in Africa 
(Bratton/van de Walle 1997: 78 and also Figure 4), Kenya moved from a (semi-) competitive 
de facto one-party system under Kenyatta and during the first years of the Moi presidency 
towards a plebiscitary de jure one-party system in the mid- to late 1980s. Between 1982 and 
1989, government repression steadily increased and the 1988 general elections were little 
more than an exercise in rubber stamping the almost total dominance of the executive and the 
president. In contrast, Uganda moved from a despotic tyranny under Idi Amin followed by 
manipulated multi-party elections in 1980 towards a de facto one-party system. However, the 
crucial difference between both countries was not variation with respect to one-party rule, but 
the means and extent o f violence used to secure control. President Milton Obote was unable or 
unwilling to prevent indiscriminate mass killings perpetrated by the military against the civil­
ian population. In contrast, governmental repression in Kenya was, by and large, more
7circumscribed and focused on known representatives of the political opposition. Hence, in 
supplementing Bratton/van de Walle's conceptualization o f neopatrimonial rule in terms of 
positive integration under a presidentialist system, I emphasize here the issue of negative inte­
gration represented by differences in the use of violence alleged domestic opponents.
Table 1. Authoritarian Styles in Kenva and Uganda
Modal regimes o f neopatrimonial rule/dominant form o f  governmental
repression
Prior to the initiation of regime change After the initiation o f regime change
K enya Positive integration:
De jure one-party system with a 
dominant presidency and strong 
clientelist networks
Positive Integration:
De jure Multiparty System with a 
dominant presidency and strong 
clientelist networks
Negative integration: 
Repression o f political dissent
Negative Integration: 
Repression of political dissent 
combined with ethnic violence
U ganda Positive Integration:
De facto one-party system with weak 
clientelist networks; military 
uncontrolled
Negative Integration: 
Indiscriminate mass killings of civilians
Positive Integration: 
'Movement' system with elements of a 
competitive one party system
Negative Integration: 
Repression of political dissent outside 
the Movement System
In Uganda, the transition process towards democracy set in when the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) under the leadership o f Yoweri Museveni won in early 1986 a prolonged 
civil war. For the first time since the first constitutional crisis in 1966 relative peace and secu­
rity returned to most parts o f Uganda. In Kenya, a process o f political liberalization was set in 
motion in 1991/92, after the réintroduction of multipartyism.
Despite the structural and cultural similarities uniting both countries, the respective processes 
of regime change have taken different paths. In order to capture this variation, I split the 
political transition process into the two distinct areas o f  constitutionalism and electoral 
democracy. Political reforms in Kenya and Uganda have initially focused on either o f those
8areas. Moreover, the political transition process in Uganda was largely smooth and controlled 
by the government, while in Kenya all reform gains had to be pushed upon an adamantly 
resisting*ruling elite. The Ugandan government embarked since 1986 on a lengthy constitu­
tional reform process and simultaneously banned parties from participating in elections. 
Nation-wide elections for parliament were held in 1992 and President Museveni faced the 
electorate for the first time in 1996. The Kenyan government (re-)introduced multiparty ism in 
1991, but refused to enter a constitutional reform process until after the second multiparty 
elections in late 1997.
The Ugandan leadership extended the initial four year ban on party activities to almost 15 
years until 2001. With the introduction of a grassroots model o f democracy, the participation 
of the Ugandan population in local affairs sharply increased. Following the military victory o f  
the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the system o f local resistance councils which had 
been partly established during the civil war, was extended to the whole country. The aggrega­
tion of political interests on the national level was now channeled through this movement 
system which replaced the previously dominant Western model o f party competition. All 
politically active Ugandans were automatically member o f the National Resistance Movement 
and were allowed to run for office only in their individual capacities. Within the logic o f  
Robert Dahl's basic distinction between participatory and competitive aspects of democracy, 
the Ugandan government after 1986 chose the path o f extending participation and inclusive­
ness rather than competition and contestation.
In contrast, Kenya represents a more 'classical' case o f democratization. In 1991, the authori­
tarian leadership agreed to the réintroduction of multipartyism. Prior to the concession, a 
coalition o f  international and domestic human rights critics had successfully reconstructed the 
international image o f Kenya. Between 1984 and 1990, international perceptions o f  the coun­
try had radically changed from "a stable Western ally" to "a human rights violating dictator­
ship". This ultimately resulted in the rare occurrence o f joint aid cuts by the donor community 
in late 1991. In late 1992 and 1997, multiparty elections twice returned the authoritarian 
leadership to power. While both elections cannot be labeled as free and fair, the 1997 contest 
was more democratic than the first round in 1992. However, the progress in the area o f  
electoral democracy was accompanied by continued repression of the opposition and a  
stubborn refusal o f  the government to enter serious talks about constitutional reforms. In
91997, the government again tried to delay substantive political reforms until after the 
elections. Only strong combined domestic and international pressure finally led to a compro­
mise on minimal reforms between the government and the opposition that mainly addressed 
issues o f electoral democracy. Thus, the selection o f Kenya and Uganda offers variation with 
regard to the degree of human rights mobilization over time.
Table 2. International Human Rights Mobilization
International Mobilization/NGO pressure
prior to the initiation of regime 
change
after the initiation o f regime 
change
Kenya High High
Uganda High Low
The A rgum ent
The main task o f  the thesis is a systematic integration of international factors into a state of 
the art explanation o f regime change in Kenya and Uganda. Such an approach conceptualizes 
those international factors as sources of change and assumes that international interventions 
are subsequently mediated by domestic factors. In order to avoid the use of often cited but 
rather fuzzy mechanisms such as 'contagion' or 'diffusion' as linkages between the interna­
tional and domestic realm, the study focuses mainly on international human rights institutions 
and transnational human rights organizations as possible influences on domestic regime 
change. These influences are traced with respect to the onset (1) and the specific path (2) of 
regime change in both countries. Hence, the comparison o f the two selected countries evalu­
ates the role of international factors as a cause of and influence on regime change.
^With respect to the initiation o f regime change I argue that international human rights norms, 
the mobilization by transnational non-governmental actors and the responses o f world public 
opinion play a crucial role in efforts to successfully challenge authoritarian rule. Hence, these 
factors merit not only greater attention but a prominent place in explanations o f early stages in 
regime change. Domestic actors challenging authoritarian rule are no longer confined to the 
domestic realm but can draw on international institutions and mobilize transnational actors in 
their support. I f  a potential domestic audience for mobilization is controlled by the govern­
ment, international public opinion can serve as an almost equivalent substitute.
10
Such principled challenges meet with country-specific domestic conditions expressed in 
different forms o f  neopatrimonial rule. The case selection provides no significant variation o f  
international human rights mobilization as the explanatory variable, but significant variation 
with respect to the existing domestic conditions. Hence, it is not claimed here that interna­
tional factors make domestic variables spurious. While the international mobilization accounts 
for the fact that regime change becomes an option in the first place, the interaction between 
outside intervention and existing domestic institutional arrangements determines the options 
of the challenged elites and the opposition in making the first move towards regime change. In 
the Kenyan case, a well-entrenched elite with still sufficient control o f material resources 
agreed to the introduction o f multipartyism and was subsequently able to regain control by 
resorting to still intact neopatrimonial practices. In Uganda, the despotic rule o f Idi Amin, the 
protracted civil war after 1981, and Obote's adherence to early structural adjustment programs 
until 1984, largely disabled the system o f neopatrimonialism.
Moreover, both countries did not only display differences in respect to the positive integration 
under neopatrimonial rule, but, more importantly, authoritarian regimes differed markedly in 
the use o f violence as a means o f negative integration. While the destruction of the bases o f  
neopatrimonialism beginning with Idi Amin's dictatorship introduced a pervasive preference 
for violence into the domestic political discourse in Uganda, in neighboring Kenya increasing 
levels o f repression remained always limited to a clearly circumscribed group o f known oppo­
sition figures. Hence, the principled international mobilization elicited in both cases by 
increasing governmental repression accounts for the initiation o f  regime change. The variation 
in respect to positive and negative integration under authoritarian rule explains the difference 
between bottom-up revolution and top-down reform.
Table 3. Positive and Negative Integration under Authoritarian Rulet
Positive Integration Negative Integration
K enya, 1978-89 High Low
U ganda, 1981-85 Very Low Very High
11 use here the more generic term 'authoritarian rule' because the basis for neopatrimonialism was destroyed in 
Uganda between 1971 and 1985. In Kenya, the emphasis shifted after 1982 towards negative integration.
11
The combination o f international and domestic non-governmental pressure led to a recon­
struction of Kenya’s international image and proved to be an important factor in the 1991 
donor decision to temporarily freeze aid. However, the donor intervention and the govern­
ment's reaction tilted the transition process towards electoralism. Hence, the pressure did not 
lead to the removal of the authoritarian government which successfully consolidated its posi­
tion after the first multiparty elections in late 1992. In Uganda, the mobilization against the 
second Obote regime ended with the military victory of the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) and a complete replacement o f existing government elites. In both cases, the princi­
pled transnational human rights mobilization was a crucial factor in initiating regime change. 
The difference with regard to the initial mode of transition —  in the Ugandan case 'revolution' 
from below and in the Kenyan case limited liberalization from above —  is explained by the 
preexisting form o f neopatrimonial rule.
Figure 1. The Challenge to Authoritarian Rule
International Norms Mobilization
Authoritarian Rule Onset of Regime Change
I
Domestic Opposition
The case studies Kenya and Uganda represent no significant variation in respect to interna­
tional mobilization prior to the initiation of regime change (see Table 2), but significant 
differences regarding the modes o f domestic rule (see Table 1 and 3). Hence, I rely on the 
counterfactual argument that in the absence of the transnational human rights mobilization the 
political development in Kenya and Uganda would have taken a different path. In Kenya, a 
lack of transnational mobilization would have left the government with greater international 
and domestic legitimacy. Without the highly publicized human rights abuses and the inter­
pretative frames provided by transnational human rights actors, the donor community would 
not have been united in making Kenya an exemplary case for good governance. While the 
principled transnational mobilization accounts for the fact that regime change was initiated, 
the specific form of neopatrimonial rule in Kenya determined the mode o f  transition. A
12
largely intact clientelist system dominated by a strong presidency allowed the ruling elite to 
maintain influence and ultimately recapture control of the transition process.
Figure la. The Case o f Kenya
International Norms Mobilization
î
De jure One-party System/ 
Limited Repression Reforms from above
t
Civilian Opposition
In Uganda, a lack o f  mobilization would have seriously diminished the strength o f  the 
National Resistance Movement and the relatively clear-cut elite turnover in 1986 would have 
been very unlikely. The difference to Kenya was not so much variation in neopatrimonial rule, 
but the destruction o f the bases for such practices of positive integration. The differentia 
specifica between both countries was not the variation in one-party rule, but the uncontrolled 
military killing thousands of Ugandans between 1981 and 1985. The lack of neopatrimonial 
institutions necessary to positively integrate society as opposed to the abundant availability o f 
arms accounts for the predominantly violent mode of domestic conflict resolution in Uganda.
Figure lb. The Case o f Uganda
International Norms Mobilization
De facto One Party System/ 
Indiscriminate Repression Revolution from below
»
Armed Opposition
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The second part o f the study shifts attention from the initiation o f regime change to diverging 
transition paths. For the subsequent reform process and the international mobilization, the 
differences in the mode of initiating these reforms matter greatly. While this phase ended in 
1986 Uganda with a complete change o f guards, the government as the main target o f mobili­
zation survived. The international influences identified as causally relevant for the onset of the 
regime change continue to matter but the mode of transition leads to changes and variation in 
the level o f international mobilization.
Figure 2. Transition Paths
International Norms
As a result of the Kenyan government adamant resistance to substantive political reforms, the 
transnational network on Kenya remained in place while the freedom and organizational 
capacities o f domestic civil society groups expanded significantly. While domestic factors 
became now more prominent in shaping the individual transition path, continued transnational 
mobilization between 1992 and 1998 was crucial in keeping up the pressure for constitutional 
reforms. Those sections of civil society which had during the 1980s appealed for international 
support against governmental repression, were now the main force behind a coalition of 
domestic non-governmental organizations. However, the Kenyan case study also shows that 
such principled opposition is often accompanied by more or less openly expressed power 
interests. In this case, the transnational mobilization was mainly used by Kikuyu which had 
previously lost most of their political influence because Daniel arap Moi brought in 1978 a 
competing ethnic coalition to national power. Moreover, a  long-term reliance on outside 
support as a substitute for domestic democratic legitimacy has potentially detrimental effects 
on a democratization process.
Figure 2a. The Case o f Kenva
International Norms
Constitutional
Reforms
In contrast to the Kenyan situation, mobilization decreased sharply in Uganda after 1986 and 
was almost insignificant between 1992 and 1995/96. A domestic network of non-go vemmen- 
tal human rights groups only slowly emerged during the 1990s. When the 'third wave* reached 
Africa in 1991/92, both the Kenyan and Ugandan government rejected the idea o f multiparty- 
ism, but the international community treated them quite differently. This can only be 
explained with reference to the transnational human rights activism and the subsequent de- 
and reconstruction o f state images on the international level. While the actual government 
policies on the ground were similar, the international reactions to them were almost the 
opposite. Moreover, international norms are also an insufficient guideline, even at such 
historical moments as the 1989/90 breakdown of communism because such a perspective also 
fails to offer sufficient variation.
Neither the norms nor the domestic situation alone, but the presence and absence o f inten­
tional efforts by transnational human rights actors to link both levels account for the 
differences in outcomes. While the transnational human rights network had mobilized for 
years against Moi, his neighbor Museveni got away with de facto one-party rule because he 
was essentially accepted as part of the global liberal community. The actual material side of 
the story can also not provide a satisfactory explanation. Internationally, the United States 
relied on both governments for its fight against Islamist fundamentalism in Sudan (Uganda) 
and the Gulf War (Kenya). Domestically, both governments wanted to sustain the dominance 
o f a single political force.
Most recently, transnational human rights mobilization shifted its main attention towards 
gross violations perpetrated by rebel organizations in the Northern and Western part of
MMlUULXPiJUWÌlLfd? m
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Uganda. The general insecurity in the Great lakes region puts the sustainability o f any regime 
changes within Uganda at much greater risk than in fairly insulated Kenya. At the same time, 
the Museveni government was rewpded for its regional policies by almost unconditional 
financial and military support from the US government. Although the NRM government's 
general commitment to human rights fostered the domestic institutionalization as a character­
istic of Uganda's specific transition path, the lack of non-governmental mobilization and 
regional warfare reinforced a governmental top-down approach and led to a general slow­
down of the reform process.
Figure 2b. The Case of Uganda
International Norms
Decreasing Mobilization Congo Crisis
Revolution from 
Below
1
Constitutionalism Referendum
Elite Turnover
How do these results contribute to an improved understanding o f processes by which interna­
tional norms become institutionalized on the domestic level (see Checkel 1997)? The cases 
provide evidence for several paths, the initial and dominant one being the discursive 
empowerment o f  domestic actors defending specific human rights against an authoritarian 
government. This is the case for Uganda prior to 1986 and Kenya throughout the period under 
investigation. Hence, the evidence supports here a bottom-up process. However, in Uganda 
after 1986 and in Kenya since the mid-1990s this initial pressure was also responsible for 
starting a more top-down institutionalization of human rights norms. The new Ugandan 
government entered a bureaucratic-legal process of human rights institutionalization from the 
start. In Kenya, moderate parts o f the government began in the mid-1990s to negotiate with 
the opposition on human rights issues. This indicates that these actors have changed their 
preferences over time and sought to incorporate the issue into their calculations o f  interests. 
Both cases also provide no evidence that human rights norms became for any of the domestic 
groups a principled issue in the sense that they would forego substantive material interests.
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Hence, a dichotomous understanding o f norms and interests often pervading theoretical 
discussions on human rights has little value for concrete empirical case work. The question is 
not which of the two prevails upon the other, but how actors relate both to guide their behav­
ior.
In sum, the study advances the argument that international human rights norms and their 
promotion by transnational actors play an increasingly important role for the initiation o f 
regime change. Pre-existing institutional and power configurations matter, but it is the effec­
tive use o f international norms as an alternative set of institutions which forces authoritarian 
regimes into an initial opening. Subsequently, the manner in which such an opening takes 
place shapes not only the transition path, but affects the outside intervention which had been 
crucial for change in the first place. Ideally spoken, there are two alternatives. First, if the 
authoritarian regime remains in power and political reforms prove to be little more than 
window-dressing, transnational human rights groups will continue to mobilize. Second, if the 
authoritarian regime is replaced and/or reforms are implemented, this will lead to a decline o f 
the initial transnational network and a shift o f emphasis towards the reinforcement o f the 
reform process. In terms of Robert Dahl's basic distinction between participation and compe­
tition, Uganda emphasized the extension o f  the former while Kenya focused on the latter 
issue. Hence, regime change in both countries has produced what O'Donnell has recently 
called "informally institutionalized polyarchy" (O'Donnell 1996: 44).
Contribution to Current Research
The thesis merges recent scholarship within international relations theory on the role o f  norms 
and ideas with a comparativist's perspective on processes of democratization. Hence, the 
thesis adds to current debates in international relations and comparative politics by synthesiz­
ing particular strands within both sub-disciplines of political science. With regard to interna­
tional relations theory, the thesis advances the understanding about the role of norms and 
ideas in processes o f  domestic change. More specifically, it provides comparative evidence on 
the interaction process between international norms as well as their entrepreneurs on the one 
hand and the domestic context, on the other hand. Recent scholarship emphasizing the role of 
non-material factors such as norms and ideas has taken much inspiration from the work o f 
John Meyer and his collaborators (Meyer et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 1987). These authors 
describe a global trend towards institutional homogenization which cannot be accounted for
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by material and functional needs. Moreover, according to this school o f thought, mainly 
norms and values emanating from the Western tradition are being successfully diffused into 
other ¿ultural contexts.
While this structuralist approach has been successful in uncovering a significant correlation 
between internationally based norms and the subsequent establishment o f corresponding 
domestic institutions, it is not only largely mute on the exact process of diffusion but also fails 
to account for differences in final outcomes. The research interest ends when such institutions 
are identified on the domestic level, but is less interested in understanding how they were 
established and i f  they actually deliver the expected goods. In the area o f human rights and 
democracy I argue that the manner in which certain institutions come into being on the 
domestic level crucially matters for their subsequent performance. Hence, it is necessary to 
supplement the valuable insights generated by sociological institutionalists about the role of 
the world polity for domestic change with an equal recognition o f agency both on the interna­
tional and domestic level. In this thesis I identify non-govemmental human rights organiza­
tions as the main carriers of norms contained in the world polity. They are crucial for the 
process of diffusing these ideas into a given domestic context. Beyond adding the agency side 
to the international normative framework of state actors, I will also model the domestic estab­
lishment o f democratic institutions as a struggle between concrete actors. Here, I cross into a 
set of literature usually identified as part o f comparative politics.
With respect to comparative politics the thesis contributes to the thriving literature o f  democ­
ratization studies. Following the major study by O'Donnell/Schmitter/Whitehead in the mid- 
1980s, formerly prominent structuralist approaches to issues o f  political development were 
increasingly challenged by more situative and agency-oriented explanations. Transitions to 
democracy were seen as contingent outcomes of power struggles between rivaling domestic 
elites, rather than the natural result o f modernization and economic development. By intro­
ducing agency to the field of democratization studies, political development was effectively 
delinked from changes in the economic sphere. While the earlier publications in the agency- 
tradition literature decisively broke with the structuralist bias o f the modernization school, 
they initially reproduced the domestic bias of this tradition. In retrospect this was quite under­
standable because bringing agency into the picture produced already many empirical and theo­
retical complexities. Moreover, the effects of international factors were notoriously hard to
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trace and their inclusion would have required a determined effort to go outside of the narrow 
confines o f comparative politics. In sum, international factors were regularly recognized and 
mentioned, but not systematically integrated into agency-based explanations o f  political tran­
sitions.
The negative attitude towards international effects on domestic change was only modified 
when the regionally limited occurrence o f  political transitions turned in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s into a global wave. While O'Donnell and Schmitter had maintained in Transitions 
from  Authoritarian Rule that "domestic factors play a predominant role in the transition", the 
more current research on democratic transitions moves towards a  greater recognition o f those 
factors. In bringing together international and domestic perspectives, this thesis follows the 
general direction taken by Robert Jackson (1990) and Christopher Clapham (1996) in 
suggesting that the normative part o f  the post-war international order plays an important role 
in shaping current forms of statehood. "What has changed is not the empirical conditions o f  
states but the international rules and institutions concerning those conditions" (Jackson 1990: 
23). However, I challenge both author's predilection for negative or juridical sovereignty as a 
means to increase domestic control and fend o ff outside intervention. While Jackson is correct 
in asserting that the decolonization process led to a decoupling o f positive and negative sover­
eignty, I maintain that ideas concerning the domestic conduct o f  state actors can ultimately 
not be divorced from the claim to international sovereignty.
If rulers buy into the logic of negative or juridical sovereignty on the international level in 
order to secure domestic rule, they have - at least rhetorically - to acknowledge that the idea o f 
national sovereignty is build on a specific type of liberal statehood. This acknowledgment 
provides a window o f opportunity for non-govemmental actors to mobilize for political 
change intended to narrow the gap between negative and positive sovereignty. The thesis adds 
to this literature a particular concern for the process by which international norms enter the 
domestic realm as well as the actors involved in contesting the significance of those norms (or 
indeed expressing a process o f norm competition). While both Jackson and Clapham 
acknowledge the role o f  such human rights organizations, they remain ultimately pessimistic 
about their influence (Clapham 1996:192). I complement those studies and show under which 
conditions human rights promoting actors can successfully challenge the sovereignty regime.
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In sum, the thesis contributes to current debates within international relations theory and 
comparative politics. With respect to the study of international relations it follows the more 
recent "constructivist turn" (Checkel 1998) by exploring the role of norms and non-govern­
mental entrepreneurs in processes o f political change. The thesis adds to this literature a 
concern for the concrete process of norms diffusion into a domestic context and explores how 
international norms affect not only strategic choices but also the interest formation o f domes­
tic actors. This is done in two steps. First, I show how international norms and transnational 
human rights actors are instrumental in successfully challenging authoritarian rule and starting 
a process o f regime change. Second, I focus on the subsequent path of regime change and the 
continued importance but changing role of these international actors. Regime change marked 
by an incoming government with a credible reform agenda will feedback on the international 
level and reduce mobilization (Uganda). More restricted openings where the old guard 
remains in power will be answered by continued mobilization (Kenya). In both stages, such 
international mobilization is crucial for initiating and further pushing reforms. It does not 
make domestic factors spurious, but creates in interaction a specific path of regime change.
Roadmap of the Thesis
Chapter 1 presents a discussion of the underlying theoretical puzzle. I discuss the current state 
of the art in the study of regime change arguing that along with the 'third wave' a profound 
and paradigmatic shift within this research tradition occurred. This shift is represented by 
studies which recur in their explanations of democratic transitions to strategic choices of 
actors and contingent events rather than impersonal structural or cultural forces working 
behind the back o f  agents. Earlier efforts to firmly link political and economic development 
failed to yield satisfying results, mainly because the causal path between both issues remained 
unclear. The emergence of newly democratizing countries in the mid-1970s and the subse­
quent recognition o f  the 'third wave' became a catalyst for the emergence of an alternative 
agency-based challenge. This approach began to explore the possibility o f the emergence of 
'democracy without democrats.'
Within this burgeoning new literature, uncertainty as a prevalent context condition for agent's 
choices plays a crucial role. Cases o f  fast and seemingly unproblematic transitions from 
authoritarian rule towards full-fledged democracy have led authors to identify intrinsic 
features (not values!) o f democracy as possible reasons for its success. With regard to Eastern
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Europe it has been argued that democratization became a rational choice because the "winner" 
are abstract institutions (not the opposition) and the "looser" can always hope to return to 
power ill the future. However, many still incomplete and protracted transition processes have 
led authors to re-focus on more stable features of the actor's environment, albeit this did not 
necessarily lead to a resurgence o f  the earlier modernization arguments. Instead, the current 
state of the art combines an agency-centered perspective on regime change with a recognition 
o f institutions as constraints on the range o f alternatives available to political actors. However, 
most of the agency-based and institutionalist arguments reproduce the domestic bias which 
had been introduced by the modernization perspective.
Following the arguments of the agency-centered institutionalism I give two reasons for the 
systematic inclusion o f international factors into the analysis of regime change. First, towards 
the literature emphasizing contingencies and actor's choices I claim that any full explanation 
o f democratic change must explore where uncertainty as an impetus for changing preferences 
originates in the first place. The existence o f uncertainty and a shifting power distribution 
cannot be taken for granted. Second, towards the institutionalist literature I claim that institu­
tions do neither exist solely on the domestic level, nor should they only be understood as 
constraints on actor's choices. I argue that a systematic recognition o f international human 
rights institutions and transnational human rights actors helps to solve the puzzle why 
authoritarian leaders could possibly feel threatened and consider a power transfer to demo­
cratic institutions. Only if  one includes an analysis of the activities designed to delegitimize a 
regime, one can begin to understand the role o f uncertainty in actor's choices. Otherwise, the 
uncertainty assumption is merely an ex post rationalization, while a domestically biased 
institutionalist analysis fails to recognize the enabling role o f  international institutions which 
create a potential conflict between the norms they espouse and the domestic practice.
As a result o f this critique, I propose the systematic recognition o f insights generated by 
sociological institutionalists working in the field of international relations. The agency-based 
critique o f the earlier structuralist scholarship was correct in so far as it rejected the materialist 
bias contained in this perspective. However, in order to advance our understanding of political 
transitions, we need to give equal recognition to actors and their structural environment. Here 
sociological institutionalism offers answers because it simultaneously directs attention to the 
international context and highlights within this context non-material factors such as norms and
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ideas. While the current democratization literature highlights the role o f concrete agents, 
sociological institutionalism introduces the global ideational realm as a structural framework 
into the analysis.
In chapter 2 I present evidence on the process of regime change in Kenya and Uganda since 
the early 1980s. The comparison reveals that Kenya and Uganda do not only differ with 
respect to the mode o f transition, they have also taken distinctively different transition paths. 
Whereas the Ugandan transition set in with a revolution from below in 1986, regime change 
in Kenya commenced with reforms from above in 1991/92. I show that neopatrimonial rule 
dominated state-society relations in Kenya prior to the regime change, while dictatorship and 
civil war largely destroyed its base in Uganda. This difference in the availability of neopatri­
monial institutions to positively integrate society accounts for the predominantly violent mode 
o f domestic conflict resolution in Uganda. Apart from describing the dependent variables of 
the study, the chapter challenges an overly economic view o f neopatrimonialism. While the 
literature emphasizes very much the top-down channeling o f state resources via clientelist 
networks, I explicitly add its 'dark side* of negative integration represented by systematic 
human rights violations.
I capture the variation in subsequent transition paths by differentiating between constitution­
alism and electoral democracy. The former draws attention to the preconditions of a meaning­
ful democratic contest on the national level, such as the rule o f  the law, the separation of 
powers and respect for basic human rights. The latter focuses more narrowly on the election 
process and the ability of voters to make informed choices. The empirical puzzle o f the study 
is represented by three observations. First, despite unfavorable material conditions both coun­
tries have experienced significant regime changes. Second, the Ugandan transition process has 
been dominated by a preference for constitutionalism, while the Kenyan transition empha­
sized mainly electoral democratization. Third, democratization in Kenya was essentially a 
matter o f pressuring the adamantly resistant ruling elite into concessions. In contrast, the 
process in Uganda was largely top-down and controlled by the government.
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 present the main empirical evidence about the process of norm diffu­
sion into the domestic context o f Kenya and Uganda. Chapter 4 offers a brief historical 
introduction which focuses on the first period of the independence struggle in the early 1960s. 
The chapter will elaborate the emergence o f neopatrimonial rule in both countries within a
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few years after political independence. While the situation in Uganda deteriorated further 
when Idi Amin staged a coup d'etat in 1971, the Kenyan political system remained stable and 
comparatively open until the early 1980s. Following a mutiny within the armed forces in 
August 1982, the Moi government increasingly resorted to repressive means of domestic 
conduct.
Chapter 4 covers the period from the time when international non-governmental groups began 
to raise alarm about deteriorating human rights conditions until the accused governments were 
either forced out o f power (Uganda) or had to make significant concessions to their critics 
(Kenya). In Uganda this process lasted from 1974 to 1985. During this period five govern­
ments were removed from power and a civil war in the early 1980s almost led to the complete 
disintegration o f the country. About one million Ugandans lost their lives as a result o f the 
systematic misuse o f state power to commit gross violations o f  human rights against the 
opposition and allegedly hostile ethnic groups. In Kenya, the period of initial mobilization 
lasted from 1984/85 to 1989. In contrast to Uganda, increasing human rights abuses were not 
accompanied by a breakdown of national institutions and civil war, but resulted from govern­
mental efforts to bring the societal realm and most o f its independent organizations under 
direct state control. The resistance to this usurpation was met with open but not indiscriminate 
repression.
During both periods, international human rights actors began to enter the domestic and inter­
national discourse on both countries. The accused governments showed considerable sensitiv­
ity to the issue, but rejected the claims and developed strategies to counter the efforts to 
undermining their international image. The repeated public statements by high level govern­
ment officials testify to the prominence of the human rights issue. While the mobilization 
during that period failed to have visible positive results for the domestic human rights situa­
tion, it had important long-term effects on the international and domestic level. On the inter­
national level, the international human rights movement was strengthened throughout the 
whole period between the early 1970s and late 1980s. When Amnesty International received 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 it had become a credible source of information on human rights 
all over the world. In turn, this growing reputation became an increasingly effective tool to 
delegitimize human rights violating governments. This process also affected the domestic 
level by simultaneously narrowing the range o f options for the government and extending
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those of the opposition. Moreover, human rights became in Uganda after 1981 as well as in 
Kenya after 1986 a crucial basis for the formation o f  the opposition. Hence, international 
human rights norms constituted and protected during this period domestic actors and strength­
ened the opposition against a continuously repressive government.
Chapter 5 discusses the period when Kenya and Uganda begin to break with the past and enter 
a process o f regime change. In Kenya this covers the period of aggravated regime crisis 
between 1989 and 1991. In Uganda, the chapter includes the period after the military victory 
o f  the National Resistance Movement in 1986 and 1992, when international human rights 
mobilization took a decisively different course. It is shown that human rights mobilization is a 
necessary condition for sustainable change, not only when the criticized government remains 
defiant (Kenya), but even when a change of guards brought a government to power which is 
rhetorically committed to human rights and makes consistent efforts to implement this 
commitment domestically (Uganda). While further change in Kenya required full-fledged 
domestic and international mobilization as well as the catalytic donor intervention in 1991, the 
Ugandan government positively responded to non-governmental human rights criticism in a 
more direct fashion in the early 1990s.
The chapter further elucidates how both countries entered the process of political transition on 
diverging paths. Whereas the Kenyan government chose in 1991/92 the introduction o f  multi­
party ism as the first major concession, its Ugandan counterpart had been engaged in a 
prolonged process of constitutional reforms since 1986. Change in Kenya continued to be a 
hard to win power struggle with well entrenched ruling elites. In this process, not the donor 
pressure and subsequent multiparty concession by the government proved to be crucial for 
sustainable change, but the reestablishment of a civil society sector which was capable o f sup­
plementing reform pressure from above with pressure from below.
In Uganda, the non-governmental pressure from outside had contributed to a change in 
government in 1986. The revolution from below led to decreasing international mobilization. 
The subsequent reform process was controlled by the NRM leadership and remained largely a 
top-down affair until the early 1990s. Despite its hardly contested role in the domestic realm, 
the NRM failed to push through one o f its main reform goals represented by the attempted 
complete replacement of a Western-style party system by an indigenously developed form of 
grassroots democracy. At the end of this period, the NRM slowly returned to a more repre­
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sentative model o f democracy and began to openly compete with the surviving old parties 
from its position o f strength. The lack of international attention towards the Ugandan human 
rights situation and the further entrenchment o f the NRM elites accounts for a slow-down of 
the reform process.
In chapter 6 I assess the political transition process taken in Kenya and Uganda since 1992. 
Both governments only reluctantly supplemented their original preference for either a 
constitutional or electoral path of regime change. The fact that both countries have taken 
different transition paths is explained with reference to the initial period of regime change and 
its feedback on international mobilization. While in both countries international norms and 
transnational actors were a necessary condition for bringing about regime change, the 
government as the main target of this mobilization was replaced in Uganda but not in Kenya. 
In Kenya, the government continued to resist and delay change, while the opposition further 
split along ethnic lines. However, the continued activism of those individuals and groups 
which had been in the 1980s the domestic collaborators o f international human rights mobili­
zation on Kenya ultimately led to sustainable constitutional reforms. After 1995/96 these 
groups forced the government to finally agree on a minimal reform package prior to the 1997 
general elections and a comprehensive constitutional reform process under the full participa­
tion o f civil society groups. This was the most significant long term effect of the non-govern­
mental human rights mobilization in the late 1980s. In this period, continued mobilization was 
crucial to force the government further down the road of tangible political reforms.
In Uganda, the government completed the constitutional reform process in 1994 and called 
nationwide presidential and parliamentary elections for 1996. Despite the electoral victory of 
Museveni and the NRM, the movement system faced a serious crisis o f  legitimacy, because it 
had completed most o f its original agenda and failed to sustain popular mobilization. At the 
same time, the ban on party activities survived all reforms and was extended until the year 
2000. Meanwhile, transnational human rights activism with respect to Uganda targeted rebel 
groups in the North rather than the government in Kampala. The greatest threats to the NRM 
dominance in Uganda emerged out o f  the regional crises in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo as well as Sudan which led to a resurgence of rebel activities directed against the 
Ugandan government. These factors contributed to the further entrenchment o f the NRM 
government and endanger the continuation and sustainability o f political reforms.
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The conclusions review the argument about the role o f international human rights norms and 
entrepreneurs in processes o f domestic regime change. Human rights norms and actors 
promoting these are crucial throughout the process o f political transition. However, they do 
not fully account for the results, but intervene in a domestic context with pre-configured actor 
and power constellations. The results o f this study show that interdependence between 
international and domestic realm is highly dependent on concrete actors crossing the divide 
and creating linkages through their conscious action. The results are discussed with respect to 
the current literature on regime transitions in Africa and more general theories o f regime 
change.
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1 Structure and Agency in the Study of Regime Change
Almost ten years after the peak of the 'third wave' scholarly agreement on even some of the 
most basic questions relating to political transitions remains a distant goal. Theoretical and 
methodological disagreement have even increased considerably since a distinct agency-based 
literature emerged to fundamentally challenge the longstanding academic preoccupation with 
issues of functional differentiation or cultural and economic requisites for democracy and 
democratization. Agents, and particularly elites, were brought into the debate not simply as 
incumbents o f social positions or systemic imperatives, but as actors whose choices defied 
structural constraints and determined final outcomes. Democratization emerged as a new sub- 
discipline in political science and invited explanations based on a micro perspective, notably 
rational choice, which now rivaled macro-structural and functionalist accounts of political 
change (Bates 1997; Remmer 1997: 50).
However, remaining adherents of the modernization paradigm used the same evidence gener­
ated by the ’third wave' to argue for a convincing comeback in the 1990s. Not only did many 
countries with significant economic advances since World War II democratize, but others with 
still low levels o f national income either failed to join the 'third wave' or soon returned to the 
authoritarian camp (Luckham/White 1996). For many, this seemed to vindicate a basic 
structural and economic explanation o f political change. Thus, by the early 1990s, the study of 
regime transitions began to replicate the debate between 'structure' and 'agency'2 known from 
other areas o f the social sciences.
After evaluating the merits of the modernization paradigm and the emerging agency-based 
alternative, I introduce a focus on the role of domestic and international institutions as a way 
o f  bridging the gap between structure and agency. I argue that international norms are notori­
ously overlooked as possible sources o f domestic change and show how various authors have 
recently sought to remedy this lacunae. However, depending on the selected features o f the 
international realm, this literature is sharply divided about the effects of the international 
system on domestic change. While sociological institutionalism developed the idea o f an
2 Merkel distinguished systemic (Parsons, Easton, Lipset), structural (Moore; Rueschemeyer et. al) and agent- 
based approaches (Merkel 1994), Kitschelt structural versus process-driven explanations (Kitschelt 1992). In 
this chapter, I follow Kitschelt because of a greater interest in the possible role of agency rather than the more 
subtle differences between a functionalist and a structuralist approach.
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homogenizing global culture based on Western values, another branch of this norm-driven 
literature arrived at almost the opposite conclusion and emphasized the role o f sovereignty in 
protecting state leaders from outside intervention. Again, I evaluate both perspectives and use 
their contributions for the development o f an explanation of regime change. On the basis of 
this discussion, 1 propose at the end a model of regime change.
1.1 The T raditional View: Economic Development leads to Democratic Change
Various authors have claimed that the recent global surge for democracy has verified the 
causal link between economic development and democracy. According to Lipset et al„ the 
correlation between both trends has strengthened and is "more pronounced in the early 1980s 
than in the late 1950s" (Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung, and Torres 1993: 157; see also Diamond 
1992: 110).3 Additional support for this position has also been gathered by pointing to an 
ebbing of the 'third wave'. This recession seemed to vindicate the (pre-) requisite literature and 
question the general applicability o f agency-based explanations beyond a geographically more 
restricted context such as Eastern Europe or Latin America. Hence, important representatives 
o f the structural paradigm understood a concern for agency either as complementary or only 
secondary (Diamond 1996; also Lipset 1994: 16). Adrian Leftwich represents this position 
most forcefully by stating, that "what the West should do is to support only those dedicated 
and determined developmental elites which are seriously bent on promoting economic growth, 
whether democratic or not (emphasis in the original). For by helping them to raise the level of 
economic development it will help them also to establish or consolidate the real internal 
conditions for lasting democracy" (Leftwich 1996: 329). Thus, not only in the heydays of 
modernization theory, but still today, some tacit understanding about the "deeper layer" of 
socio-economic conditions enjoys considerable support. However, within this research tradi­
tion a growing number o f authors have questioned a strong version of the modernization 
paradigm.
3 "We are convinced that the main finding of the cross-national statistical work - a positive, though not perfect, 
correlation between capitalist development and democracy - must stand as an accepted result. There is no way of 
explaining this robust finding, replicated in many studies of different designs, as spurious effect of flawed 
methods. Any theory of democracy must come to terms with it" (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 
1992: 4); see also Londregan/Poole who claim that "the democratizing effect of income remains as a significant 
factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions" (Londregan/Poole 1996: 28).
2 8
As a response to empirical and theoretical challenges two broad variants have developed 
within the quantitative scholarship on the relationship between economic growth and political 
change. Both claim the use of improved statistical methods and data sets, but consistently 
arrive at contradictory conclusions. While some authors continue to apply Lipset's original 
causal claim to the emergence of democracy (Burkhart/Lewis-Beck 1994; Helliwell 1994; 
Moore 1996), others have considerably qualified the relationship and causality between 
economic development and democratization (Arat 1988: 30; Gonick/Rosh 1988; Hadenius 
1992; Vanhanen 1990). Over time, the claim that economic growth is the most significant 
factor in explaining democratization has come under increased challenge, while the exogenous 
interpretation o f Lipset that "once a democracy is established the more well-to-do a nation, the 
more likely that it will survive" was upheld (see Przeworski/Limongi 1997). As a result, a 
number of scholars working with quantitative methods in this area can no longer be labeled as 
modernization theorists, because the dynamism o f  the economic modernization did not evenly 
translate into a similar process in the political sphere.
Authors following the first variant are mainly concerned with (1) improving statistical 
methods, (2) explaining "outliers", and (3) identifying those issues within the broad process of 
modernization which have the strongest impact on democratic change. Whereas factors such 
as urbanization or mass media have lost prominence over time, education stands today as a 
major link between both processes (Hadenius 1992; Helliwell 1994). At the same time, 
middle classes are still held to translate economic change into effective demands for democ­
ratization. Thus, it is argued that countries which do not democratize despite economic well­
being lack a developed middle-class (oil-producing countries), where state revenue is decou­
pled from societal support (Moore 1996: 59).
In contrast, authors of the second variant have questioned the validity o f broad-ranging con­
clusions based on Lipset's original claim and the implied causal path. Somewhat between both 
positions are Londregan/Poole who maintain "a small but statistically significant democratiz­
ing effect" o f increases in income (p. 2). Hadenius argued that "60 per cent of the variation 
concerning the level o f democracy" in his selected 132 countries can be explained by seven 
structural factors (literacy, commodity concentration, trade with the USA, capitalism, percent­
age o f Protestants, military expenditure, and average fragmentation). In concluding he admits 
"that other things too probably have an impact on democracy, and that these factors could be
either o f a structural or an actor-oriented nature" (Hadenius 1992: 146). More skeptical is 
Arat, who maintained that "on the basis o f these findings it can be concluded that increasing 
levels tif economic development do not necessarily lead to higher levels o f democracy, even 
for the less developed countries" (Arat 1991: 30). Vanhanen argued from his study that socio­
economic development "is only an intervening variable that correlates positively with democ­
ratization because various power resources are usually more widely distributed at higher level 
than at lower levels o f  socio-economic development" (Vanhanen 1990: 191). Finally, Larry 
Diamond has relegated economic growth to one among many "facilitating and obstructing 
factors". He concluded, that "[t]here are strong methodological and theoretical grounds for 
inferring that this relationship is indeed causal (without precluding the very real possibility of 
reciprocal causation)" (Diamond 1992: 110). In order to avoid the dead end o f inconclusive 
statistical evidence and causal confusion, a brief discussion on the issue o f reversed causality 
will present a change o f perspective.
1.2 Reversed Causality: Can Democracy Cause Economic Prosperity?4
Only when the 'third wave' slowly gathered momentum in the mid-1980s, studies suggesting a 
possible reversed causality between economic growth and democratic emerged. Until then 
conventional wisdom held that authoritarian regimes generate greater economic growth than 
democracies. These studies argued that a democratic state was not able to insulate itself suffi­
ciently from particularistic interests in order to implement efficient economic policies.5 In 
democracies, necessary investments for future economic stability and growth would be sacri­
ficed for consumption.
However, these ideas had been under challenge for some time because many authoritarian 
regimes did everything else except for increasing the wealth o f their nations. More often than 
not a small elite section profited while the economic situation o f  large parts o f the population 
remained unchanged or worsened. Despite this early evidence, it took until 1987 for the first 
study to be published that proclaimed that democracy was a better promoter of economic 
growth than authoritarianism. Przeworski/Limongi argued consequently, that the globally
4 In 1977, Arend Lijphart argued that "to the extent that it (the correlation between economic development and 
democracy, HPS) indicates a causal relationship, it may well be that democracy rather than economic develop­
ment is the cause" (Lijphart 1977: 230f).
5 For a summary of arguments see Przeworski/Limongi (1993: 52f).
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dominant ideological trend was more important in predicting the results of such quantitative 
research than the actual empirical evidence (Przeworski/Limongi 1997: 60).
Sirowy/Inkeles identified three perspectives on the role of democracy in generating economic 
growth (Sirowy/Inkeles 1990). First the traditional view follows the above mentioned ration­
ale and holds that their relationship is conflictual. Here the best way to promote democracy is 
to promote authoritarianism which will eventually disappear thanks to its successful economic 
policies (see Leftwich above).6 The opposite argument claims that democracy institutionalizes 
competition within the political sphere and, thus, complements a strategy of economic growth 
based on a free market ideology (Olson 1993). In this view, not the (negative) direct effect o f 
increased consumption makes a difference, but the (positive) indirect effects o f institutional­
izing complementary structures in the economic and political sphere. Finally, a third perspec­
tive argues that evidence showrs no significant relationship between the political system and 
economic development. So far, the empirical results have yielded a "perfect stalemate" o f nine 
supporting a conflictual position, nine in favor of a complementary understanding, and six 
undecided (Moore 1996: 48).7
1.3 Critique of the Modernization Paradigm
The results from the quantitative analysis of the relationship between economic development 
and democracy are disparate and do not lend themselves to a clear conclusion about causality. 
This is true even if one ignores some o f the self-inflicted inconsistencies and tautologies o f 
modernization theorists which have been largely introduced to avoid the falsification o f their 
basic claim. Whereas a significant positive correlation between economic well-being and 
democracy stands as relatively undisputed, the conclusions drawn from that result with regard 
to causality and the exact process o f  change fail a critical evaluation.
First, even improved data sets and statistical methods have not yielded more consistent 
results. There is still a lack o f general agreement on the case selection and the indicators 
chosen for measuring economic development and democracy. The example o f Hadenius* 
study is particularly instructive. Hadenius ended up with a relatively weak correlation between
6 "Political development must be held down, at least temporarily, in order to promote economic development" 
(Huntington/Nelson 1976: 23).
7 Thus, Feng argued that both sides could be right "depending on the balance between the direct and indirect 
effects of democracy on growth" (Feng 1997: 414; see also Przeworski/Limongi 1993: 61).
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economic development and democracy, because he used an unprecedented large number of 
132 states in his study, including 15 states which are comparatively small, poor, and fairly 
democratic. Moore argued that this selection bias negatively effects the result o f the study and 
that small states are more likely to be democratic because o f outside influences (Moore 1996: 
43). At the same time, Mark R. Thompson made reference to an argument that relatively rich 
but authoritarian Singapore with 2.8 Mio. inhabitants could not be used to disqualify the mod­
ernization theory because "a repressive political system is more easily established and main­
tained in a country o f small size” (Thompson 1997: 65). Thus, contradictory evidence is often 
explained away by equally contradictory and arbitrary statements which are designed to avoid 
falsification of the underlying claim. Causality can also not be proven if one analyzes the 
relationship of economic growth and democracy separately for different world regions. Even 
if one concludes that the nexus is also significant outside o f the Western context, this does not 
mean that (predominantly) wealth breeds democracy. If it is true that the democratizing effect 
of income in Europe is higher than outside, then questions about the proper independent vari­
able are pressing.'
Second, the literature is unable to separate causes for democratization from causes for the 
survival of democracies. The significant correlation between levels of development and 
democracy allows for two interpretations: On the one hand, that democracy emerges out o f 
economic development or, on the other hand, that both are unrelated, but democracy is more 
likely to survive in wealthy nations (Przeworski/Limongi 1997: 156). Often, arguments for the 
latter are interpreted as prove for the former claim. Structural accounts notoriously fail to shed 
light on the exact process by which cause and effect are connected.* 9 Attempts to fix this 
problem by alluding to 'middle-classes’ as principle agents of change are problematic for 
methodological and empirical reasons. The record o f  middle classes with respect to supporting 
demands for democratization is mixed. Most recently, Rueschemeyer et al. have questioned 
the democracy-promoting role of the middle classes and re-emphasized the contributions of 
lower sections o f society to the consolidation of democracy.
* For the income claim see BurkhartfLewis-Beck (1994); Londregan/Poole (1996:22); Rowen (1995: 56).
9 "In this formulation the outcome is uniquely determined by conditions, and history goes on without anyone 
ever doing anything" (Przeworski 1991:96).
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Additionally, many studies face measurement and definitional problems (Bollen 1991; Bollen 
1993), which seriously diminish their explanatory value. "The central finding o f the cross- 
national statistical research (...) [does] not validate the theoretical accounts that have often 
been associated with [it], in particularly modernization theory. Nor does cross-sectional 
correlation allow us to make adequate inferences about causal sequence" (Huber, 
Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993: 72). Moreover, the issue of democratic change invariably 
involves complex social systems with a prevalence of interdependence and multi-causality. 
Przeworski/Limongi argued that quantitative research in this area can not reveal any proper 
results because it will always be based on endogenous case selection. "Whenever observations 
are not generated randomly, quasi-experimental approaches yield inconsistent and biased 
estimates of the effect of being in a particular state on outcomes" (Przeworski/Limongi 1997: 
63). Therefore, cause and effect are often hard to separate and "the values our explanatory 
variables take on are sometimes a consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent 
variable" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 185).10 1In the absence o f a control over the 
independent variable, the direction of causality becomes doubtful, or, at least, the researcher 
can never be sure to have included all relevant explanatory factors. This would even apply if  a 
variety of other improvements like a common definition o f variables would be introduced. 
Therefore, it is o f crucial importance that the theory "not only relates variables but gives 
immediate insight into the motivational forces which link them" (Eckstein 1966: 285).”
Third, the evolutionary bias o f the modernization paradigm has also been challenged by an 
alternative structurally-based theory o f  societal change. Sociological institutionalists have 
pointed out that newly created institutions might not always reflect functional necessities, but 
rather processes o f  an ever expanding "world culture" (Finnemore 1996b: 329; Meyer et al. 
1997). Thus, international organizations play an increasing role in "teaching" states about 
their roles and identities. This supply-driven approach potentially creates domestic institu­
tional settings which do not correspond with existing demands for problem-solving capacities. 
I f  modernization processes do not always follow functional requirements but reflect an adap-
10 In citing David Laitin King/Keohane/Verba make this point in reference to Max Weber’s attempt to explain 
capitalist economic behavior as a result of the Protestant ethic. They argue that individuals "who already had an 
interest in breaking the bonds of precapitalist spirit might well have left the church for precisely that purpose" 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 186f; see also Collier/Mahoney 1996: 60),
11 "Correlation is evidently not the same as causation - it provides at best a clue to some sort of causal connection 
without indicating its direction" (Rustow 1970: 342).
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tati on to the outside world, then it becomes unlikely that the institutional arrangements created 
in such a process fulfil the same kind of functions as their predecessors originally developed 
in other cultural and social contexts.
In sum, quantitatively based research has revealed a significant correlation between economic 
well-being and democratic forms of governance. However, the exact path and the direction of 
causality remain uncertain, even when more advanced statistical methods and improved data 
sets were applied. In the end, the quantitative analysis of the relationship between economic 
growth and political change failed to adequately capture the inherent dynamism o f this proc­
ess. Hence, I conclude with Sorensen that there is "no clear answer to the trade-off question" 
because "countries move very fast between the regime categories" and "each time they make a 
stop in one of the categories, they lend their economic performance data, often covering only 
a few years, to a different argument in these investigations (Sorensen 1998: 68-69).
1.4 Changing Perspectives: The Role of Contingency and Human Agency
The shift from either systemic or structuralist analysis to agency-oriented approaches in the 
mid-1980s had a number o f intellectual predecessors to build on. In order to fully appreciate 
the intellectual history of the Agency literature^ I will briefly discuss four contributions which 
offered —  each in their own way —  early intellectual openings beyond the beaten path of the 
modernization paradigm. In 1965 Samuel Huntington's article Political Development and 
Political Decay was centrally concerned with the "erosion o f democracy" (Huntington 1965: 
392) as a result o f the economic modernization processes. He diagnosed a prevalent "deterio­
ration o f political institutions" (p. 405) and argued that political development had to be 
separated from modernization. Provided his underlying structuralist framework and the 
accompanying domestic bias, Huntington had little choice but to conclude in a rather pessi­
mistic scenario for democratic change. Still, by systematically integrating the role o f  political 
institutions in the analysis o f democratic change Huntington not only provided an answer to 
the pressing questions of institutional decay and failing development. At the same time, 
Huntington moved analysis away from abstract macro-structural issues towards the inclusion 
o f institutions as arbitrators between the macro- and the micro-level of political development.
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In 1970, Dankwart Rustow’s Transitions to Democracy. Toward a dynamic Model funda­
mentally broke with the structuralist paradigm. Rustow rejected the idea of any cultural or 
economic prerequisites (except for national unity) for democracy to flourish and his article 
serves today as an important inspirational source for agency- and process-based explanations 
of democratization.12 In 1971, Robert Dahl's Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition and 
Albert O. Hirschman's A Bias fo r  Hope. Essays on Development and Latin America provided 
additional food for thought concerning processes o f political change and democratic govern­
ance. Based on the previous work o f Schumpeter, Dahl developed a procedural and minimalist 
definition of democracy, which was not only a pragmatic answer to the seemingly unsolvable 
problem of defining democracy in any substantive terms. Dahl and Hirschman held that 
democratic change was most likely to be successful if  managed by moderate sections o f  both 
the old regime and the opposition (Dahl 1971: 33f.; Hirschman 1972: 37). Hirschman addi­
tionally echoed Rustow's skepticism about the implied causality o f the modernization 
paradigm and held that what has been often seen as a precondition for democracy is often its 
consequence.13
Whereas the intellectual predecessors of an agency-based approach to democratization 
expressed many o f the underlying theoretical ideas fairly early on, they entered the academic 
mainstream only in the 1980s when several authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and 
Latin America broke down. Based on these cases, Transitions from  Authoritarian Rule 
(O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986) presented new and compelling empirical 
evidence that supported many of the theoretical insights expressed by Dahl, Hirschman, 
Linz/Stepan and Rustow. However, the break with past research traditions was not as clear-cut 
as the rhetorical claims o f  many authors would lead one to believe. Indeed, while structural­
ism was rejected, many o f  the conclusions about the likelihood o f sustainable democratization 
derived from the modernization paradigm were retained. As a result, the authors offered a 
minimalist program arguing for the possibility o f the emergence o f democracy even in the 
absence o f socioeconomic and cultural prerequisites (Karl 1987). rather than the inevitability
12 See Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow, Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 29, no. 3, April 1997.
13 A fifth predecessor of the agency-based school is the volume The B reakdow n  o f  D em ocra tic  R eg im es , edited 
by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (Linz/Stepan 1978). The authors explained the breakdown of democratic 
regimes with reference to specific choices made by the ruling elites (see Bermeo 1990: 360; Martz 1997:106).
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of either democracy or authoritarianism (Przeworski 1991: 37 and 50; Schmitter 1994: 16).14 
This also meant that research carried out in this area mainly focused on the role o f elite 
factions in negotiating so-called 'pacts' o f democratic transition. While a fimdamental and 
empirically driven shift from the focus on the inevitability o f authoritarianism to the study of 
"possibilism" (Hirschman) occurred, the authors remained generally skeptical about the 
sustainability o f the changes (see Karl 1987).
The newly found preference for agency over structure was not used to identify the former with 
positive change and contrast it with immutable structural forces. Assumptions about human 
nature in general and the motivations o f important agents for change were quite sober and 
demanded little normative commitment from the readership (Shapiro 1993: 126). This led to 
the development o f a curious theoretical tension between a new optimistic view o f democrati­
zation and the simultaneous emphasis on the difficulties such a process is confronted with 
from the start. Nonetheless, the theoretical challenge to the modernization paradigm remained 
profound and expressed itself mainly in the replacement o f structural determinism by models 
based on strategic choice and voluntarism (Collier/Norden 1992). What has been previously 
seen as a prerequisite for democracy was now conceived as its result, former independent 
variables turned into dependent ones. Uncertainty, elite actor's concern with future reputation, 
"passions" (O'Donnell/Schmitter 1986: 25), or the art of "crafting democracies" (Di Palma) 
replaced the prior probabilistic determinism generated through quantitative data processing.
Following the publication of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule several distinct approaches 
within the agency-based school were elaborated.15 In comparing those different approaches, I 
focus here primarily on efforts to develop a consistent and rigorous micro-based interpretation 
o f democratic change. Whereas O'Donnell/Schmitter argued that "normal science methodol­
ogy" was not applicable in situations, "where (...) parameters of political action are in flux" 
(O'Donnell/Schmitter 1986: 4), Przeworski endeavored to show precisely that this was still 
possible by establishing a conventional hypothesis-testing approach build around an explicit 
rational choice perspective. O'Donnell/Schmitter were not concerned with developing such a 
parsimonious research design and preferred an inductive approach where issues like the 
trauma o f dictatorship or the "world wide market place of ideas" explained (and indeed over­
14 For general reviews see Levine (1988); Shin (1994); Smith (1991).
15 For overviews see Bos (1994) and Desfor Edles (1995).
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determined) the actions o f agents. "Yet while this approach focused on strategic analysis, it 
shied away from adopting a formalistic, ahistorical approach inherent in the abstract theory of 
games. Given that the macrolanguage o f classes, their alliance, and 'pacts of domination' was 
the dominant vocabulary o f the time, the result was an intuitive micro approach often couched 
in macro language" (Przeworski 1991: 97). In contrast, Przeworski conceptualized transitions 
as a series o f  games among changing (elite) actor groups, whose behavior is directed at 
maximizing their respective utilities. I will focus here mainly on his elaboration o f an agency- 
based explanation o f democratic change in general and the initial phase of liberalization and 
the extrication o f authoritarianism in particular.
Whereas O'Donnell/Schmitter assumed that a recognition o f  the "consensus o f this period of 
world history" initially separated hard- from softliners within an authoritarian regime (p. 16), 
Przeworski simply claimed that potential liberalizers (often mistakenly) assume that the 
controlled inclusion o f  some sections o f the opposition would strengthen their own position 
within the ruling elites. This leads to a mutually reinforcing process o f popular mobilization 
’from below' and partial interest in liberalization generated 'from above'. Przeworski explicitly 
rejects the functionalist idea that authoritarian regimes break down as a result o f a legitimacy 
crisis.16 Individual discontent will remain meaningless as long as avenues for collective action 
are missing. If such projects of counter-hegemony are available and credible, the perceptions, 
strategies and actions o f relevant actors determine the process and the outcome of change. 
These strategies are dictated by cost-benefit calculations o f the collective actors ’opposition' 
and ’regime elites'. I f  the expected gratifications for the opposition (more freedoms, material 
well-being and political participation) are higher than the risks (danger to life, imprisonment 
etc.) then it will continue to press for change.
In turn, the regime elite is likely to split into hard- and softliners over the question of liberali­
zation. Successful transition is most likely when soft-liners continue to ally with the opposi­
tion and become reformers in this process. The incentives for potential liberalizers to separate 
themselves from the rest o f the ruling elite and resist further repression increase with growing 
societal mobilization. In turn, the threshold for individual participation in societal mobiliza­
tion lowers with growing visibility o f  splits within the regime (Collier/Norden 1992: 234;
16 "What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but 
the presence or absence of preferable alternatives" (Przeworski 1986: 52).
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Przeworski 1992: 108). As subjective perceptions become increasingly relevant and choices 
for action increase, naturally, reliable knowledge about other's intentions becomes a scarce 
resource. The possibility for an alliance between the moderate opposition and the liberalizers 
increases not because the legitimacy o f the existing regime declines, but because the "moder­
ating spiral" produces ideas about viable alternatives.17
According to Przeworski, democracy with its intrinsic value o f  institutionalized uncertainty 
and minimal protection against arbitrary rule emerges as a viable option precisely when no 
one wants to really give up power, but someone previously outside of the game successfully 
demands a fair share. Democracy is attractive for outgoing authoritarians because there is no 
need to transfer all powers to another group for good. Instead, abstract and formal institutions 
are endowed with those powers. Hence, it is not the substantive but the procedural and repre­
sentative side o f democracy, highlighted by Robert Dahl, and the very measures intended to 
improve its operation (e.g. the separation of powers) that makes it a likely choice in such a 
situation. "Political forces comply with present defeats because they believe that the instimi 
tional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit them to advance their 
interests in the future" (Przeworski 1991: 19). In this intriguing scenario, democracy emerges 
in the absence o f any positive material or cultural developments and reflects merely the inter­
est maximization strategies o f powerful actors. Hence, old guards are either confronted with 
an external shock that creates a power stalemate or they don't realize that they are on a 
slippery slope towards irreversible change. In both cases, democratic transition is not an end 
in itself but a means to a seemingly universal strife for maintaining and maximizing one's 
economic or power position vis-à-vis other societal groups.
1.5 Critique of the Agency-centered School
The prospects for democracy in a rational or strategic choice perspective are severely limited 
by the fact that everyone desires more control over power and resources. This is reflected in 
an implicit tension between Hirschman's 'possibilism' and the pessimism contained in many 
agency-based explanations. Whereas the low probabilities for democracy generated by quan­
titative studies are disputed up front, they reemerge in the games describing the interactions
17 "This is why they (authoritarian leaders, HPS) are so afraid of words, even if these words convey what 
everyone knows anyway, for it is the fact of uttering them, not their content, that has the mobilizing potential" 
(Przeworski 1992: 107).
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within authoritarian regimes and the opposition forces. How do we account for the confidence 
into the power o f not even designed democratic institutions, if  agents are expected to trust 
nothing but their own self interest? This makes the step from authoritarian rule to democracy 
so hard to explain: If  someone was in control o f power, why would he or she endanger his or 
her position with highly risky political maneuvers? Even if  one assumes that different elite 
sections compete for power, one would expect them to exhaust other possibilities before 
embarking on a more risky strategy o f including outside forces. What is missing from such a 
perspective are the reasons why elites are suddenly led to believe that a fundamental change 
o f course is unavoidable. I argue here that non-material factors such as norms do play an 
important role in shaping actor’s perceptions o f their decision-making environment. Political 
transitions are critical junctures where actors will invariably be challenged to justify their 
goals and engage in a discourse that goes beyond the mere exchange o f  strategic information.
The application o f economic models to the political sphere has limits which are particularly 
relevant for the study o f democratic transitions. In such a situation, the very axioms used by 
an economic model to make sense to political behavior are at stake. In the process, actors 
decide not only about their preferences within a given menu of choices but about the menu 
itself and the overall attitude of the individual or group towards democracy as a normative 
concept.1* This is not to argue that actors in such situations do not attempt to maximize their 
interests. Instead, I argued that the parsimonious assumption of interest-maximizing behavior 
is an insufficient basis for explanation. Assumptions about stable and ordered preferences as 
well as the insignificance o f  communication force analysts to assume issues as unproblematic 
which are really highly contested and fluid in processes of regime change. The question is not, 
if  actors engage in interest-maximizing behavior or not, but what kind of normative frame­
work informs the very process o f interest formation.
When Przeworski argued on the one hand that "resources of political forces are given" 
(Przeworski 1991: 39) before the interaction and on the other hand that those resources 
contain highly arbitrary issues like "persuasion" (p. 11). This contradiction can only be solved 
by relaxing the first assumption and analyzing how exactly actors use material and non-mate-
11 Similarly, Shapiro argued that "strategically powerful players may develop normative commitments to 
democracy, or they may become persuaded that the ancien régime was unjust or illegitimate in ways that will 
cause them to accept frustration of their interests to a degree" (Shapiro 1993: 131).
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rial resources to attain certain goals. Hence, I will focus the following section more explicitly 
on the role o f institutions and actors which challenge the very political framework agents 
previously used to base their interest calculations on.
It was the purpose o f this review to describe and discuss some of the underlying assumptions 
guiding structural and agency-based explanations of political transitions. Structure and agency 
are not only two sides of the same story, but they reflect different methodologies and theoreti->^^ 
cal commitments. Structural explanations have mainly focused on the material side o f regime 
change and initially extrapolated from the Western experience. The issue of agency was 
discounted because democracy seemed to emerge across cases with vastly different historical 
circumstances. In retrospect, the accumulated research does not support the initial assump­
tions. Moreover, attempts to identify particular actor groups as agents o f change and, thus, 
supplement a structural perspective failed as long as those actors were only conceptualized as 
incumbents of a given social position.
This conclusion is not intended to ignore the process of sophistication within the moderniza­
tion paradigm, stretching from Barrington Moore's Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and 
Democracy (1967) to Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992) by Rueschemeyer, 
Huber Stephens and Stephens. Instead, 1 used a structure-agency perspective to explicate and 
contrast two ideal-type approaches to the study o f the link between economic and political 
development. The critique o f a structuralist perspective focused on the strong materialist as 
well as domestic bias and doubtful conclusions about causality. More qualitatively oriented 
studies are usually more cognizant of agency, but often fail to explicate a consistent theory on 
the micro-level. Authors developing such a distinct agency-based perspective successfully 
challenged structural explanations by showing that the paths to democracy and the actors 
involved as well as their choices matter for the final outcomes. Structures are not necessarily 
conceptualized as determinant, but as constraints on actor's choices. Moreover, agents can 
develop politically potent strategies to defy those constraints.
For all their differences, however, the majority o f agency-based explanations have retained a 
material and rationalist orientation. Whereas the strategic choice perspective has turned 
frustratingly low probabilities for change generated by quantitative research into significant 
windows of opportunities for agents, the motivational structures of those actors seemed to 
remain largely unaffected by the profound changes around them. Agency-driven approaches
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see democracy "emerge out of mutual fear among opponents" (Levine 1988: 379), rather than 
processes which would indicate the emergence o f mutual trust and positive agreement about 
the future mode o f interactions. Thus, like structural accounts, most agency-centered 
approaches ignored the possibility that actors begin to value and construct democracy for its 
own sake. It is appealing to extract the possibility for democracy from the narrow base of self- 
interested behavior under specific circumstances of perceived uncertainty. However, this 
should not lead to a premature exclusion of other possible avenues, in particular as a further 
exploration o f the exact circumstances of uncertainty promises additional and important 
insights.
The situation o f uncertainty or power stalemate is not a given, but in itself a situation emerg­
ing from specific interactions among relevant actor groups. Depending on the specific 
reasons, actors are likely to develop varying responses. Only one o f  the possible responses is 
represented by a rational calculation o f future interests leading to the institutionalization of 
democratic procedures. Other possible responses could be based on historical experience, the 
specific social or economic situation of leaders, or simply the situation emerging from 
unfolding interactions and other events. As democratic governance is not a fixed state of 
affairs, but an ongoing process, actors will develop changing attitudes and expectations 
towards this very framework. International norms or other agents can play a crucial role in 
modifying the decision-making environment o f those actors to a degree that it affects their 
calculations o f self-interest.
1.6 Domestic Institutions and International Opportunities
Taking agency seriously entails a recognition and systematic conceptualization o f  the actor's 
structural setting. Agency as a meaningful concept only emerges from the analysis o f its envi­
ronment. Following the literature review above I will now turn to the question of how to 
conceptualize the structural environment o f actors. In this endeavor I will draw on two 
specific debates which have sought to move our understanding o f 'structure' away from an 
overly materialist and positionalist understanding. Increasingly authors refer to the role o f 
non-material factors such as norms and ideas in shaping actor's interests and behavior. Within 
international relations theory this set o f  literature usually argued against both, materialism and 
utilitarianism and was partly influenced by sociological institutionalism (Finnemore 1996a; 
Katzenstein 1996; Kier 1997; Klotz 1995).
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A related debate mainly within sociology questions the mainstream effort to link structure and 
agency mainly through the assumption o f 'objective' social conditions. It is argued that the 
conventional positional perspective is ultimately unable to advance our understanding of 
processes o f social change because it perceives of agents as mere "incumbents of social posi­
tions or systemic imperatives" (Macy/Flache 1995: 74). In such a view the actor's behavior is 
mainly determined by the material conditions and 'agency' is little more than a reflection of a 
powerful all-encompassing 'structure'. In contrast, a relational perspective offers a less static 
conceptualization o f structure and is more likely to be compatible with the idea o f  mutual 
constitution postulated above. "From the network point of view, analytical approaches that 
direct attention to the 'intrinsic characteristics', 'essences’, attributes, or goals o f individuals, as 
opposed to their patterned and structured interrelationships, are all inherently suspect” 
(Emirbayer/Goodwin 1994:1416).
— £>fhe social position o f an actor does not in itself teach its occupant how to define his or her 
self-interest and how to take further action. Such perceptions as a pre-condition for action 
form only as a result o f interactions with other actors and the non-material environment as a 
source of ideas about one's own position. In a process of appropriating outside ideas, actors 
define their own identity and interests in an environment which simultaneously enables and 
restricts action. The relationship between 'structure' and 'agency' is one of interpretation rather 
than determination. Hence, the assumptions underlying relational sociology go hand in hand 
with the "constructivist turn in international relations theory" (Checkel 1998) where norms 
and ideas have attained the status of independent factors in the explanation o f processes of 
political and social change.
In order to bridge the perceived gap between 'structure* and 'agency', an increasing number of 
contributions to the debate about political transitions emphasize an institutional meso-level. 
Institutionalism is also commended as a new opportunity to overcome regional specialization 
and fragmentation within the comparative field (Remmer 1997: 49). I follow here an under­
standing o f institutions which is not limited to formal norms, rules, and procedures, but also 
recognizes the role of informal routines and conventions "embedded in the organizational 
structure o f the polity" (Hall/Taylor 1996: 938; see also Thelen/Steinmo 1992). While the 
analysis o f such informal rules plays an important role in understanding the domestic system 
o f neopatrimonial rule, I argue that the transnational challenge to this system is backed by
highly formalized norms embedded in human rights treaties and conventions. Hence, I agree 
with a broadening of the institutional analysis to include informal procedures and rules, but 
reject a move to analytically collapse 'institutions' and 'culture* as suggested by sociological 
institutionalism (see also Hall/Taylor 1996:938 and 947).19
Domestic Institutions as Intermediaries between Structure and Agency
With a focus on democratic change, an institutionalist perspective is widely used to account 
for the variation in transition processes. Karl/Schmitter labeled such an approach "structured 
contingency" and maintained that "even in the midst o f tremendous uncertainty provoked by a 
regimes transition the decisions made by various actors respond to, and are conditioned by, 
socio-economic structures and political institutions already present, or existing in people's 
memories" (Karl/Schmitter 1991: 271). Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argued in their most 
recent assessment of political transitions in Southern Europe, South America and Eastern 
Europe, that prior regime type is one o f seven independent variables crucial for an under­
standing of democratization and further consolidation (Linz/Stepan 1996).
For Africa Bratton/van de Walle held that prior regime type was the most important variable 
accounting for the sustainability of democratic change (Bratton/van de Walle 1997). The 
authors used the concept o f neopatrimonial rule to describe as a set o f weakly institutional­
ized practices which nonetheless shape actor's interests and behavior. From their comparison 
o f 42 cases on the African continent they conclude that socioeconomic and international 
factors are less relevant to transition processes than domestic institutions shaping actor's 
choices. Their politico-institutional approach classified different forms o f neopatrimonial rule 
(modal regimes) in Africa in order to predict outcomes o f transition processes. While the 
authors remained generally pessimistic about the prospects o f democracy in Africa, they hold 
that countries with a highly authoritarian history (e.g. a military oligarchy) tend to democra­
tize more quickly, but are likely to fall behind again in the long run. In contrast, regimes with 
some prior democratic experience (e.g. a competitive one-party system) will make more 
modest, but also more sustainable advancements towards democracy.
19 Some might be dissatisfied with such a broad understanding of institutions, but, as Immergut put it: "A 
standard definition of'institutions' is (...) not desirable; the common research agenda is the study of institutional 
effects wherever, or however, the occur" (Immergut 1998: 25).
Table 4. The main Foci of major Approaches to the Study of Democratization
Regime Change
Initiation Path Result
S tructuralism Yes No no
Contingency/Agency No Yes Yes
Institutionalism No Yes Yes
In the preceding discussion I argued that earlier structuralist accounts of regime change linked 
the possibility for democratization to economic and social prerequisites. More recently, 
agency-centered explanations rejected the search for prerequisites and emphasized the role of 
contingent events and actor's choices. While these approaches represented an important 
advancement in the research on regime change, they also shifted the focus away from the 
causes of regime change towards questions of transition and consolidation. With a host of 
countries joining the 'third wave' and developing diverging paths of transition, the question of 
initiating regime change seemed less urgent than the issue of 'crafting' democracy. The section 
following this discussion on the role o f domestic institutions will advance the argument that 
international institutions and transnational actors are important factors in an explanation o f the 
imitation o f regime change. In this period, domestic institutions representing authoritarian 
rule are usually the subject of mobilization from above and below.
With regard to the transition path , international factors remain part of an explanation which 
takes the mode o f  transition as starting point. Based on the democratic transitions in Latin 
America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Karl/Schmitter proposed to focus on the modes of 
transition as a central variable for explaining subsequent transition paths and results. "Not 
only is the mode o f transition a principal determinant of whether democracy will emerge, but 
it may also be a major factor influencing the specific type o f democracy that will eventually 
be consolidated" (Karl/Schmitter 1991: 282). Depending on the dominant actors (elites or 
masses) and strategies (compromise or force), the authors predicted more or less successful 
outcomes o f  regime transitions.
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Table 5. Modes of Transition
#1 Strategy
C om prom ise Force
Actors
E lites PACT IMPOSITION
M a sses REFORM REVOLUTION
Based on Karl ( 990: 9)
Karl/Schmitter concluded from the cases generated during the 'third wave' in Latin America, 
Southern and Eastern Europe that elite-driven transitions are most likely to be sustainable. 
Within this class, pacted transitions are most promising, albeit both paths "are likely to 
produce restricted types o f democracy" (282). Contrary to Barrington Moore Jr. and his 
seminal study on the emergence o f democracy in Britain, France and the United States, 
Karl/Schmitter concluded "that where authoritarian incumbents have been removed by force 
and replaced by a new elite representing mass constituencies, the subsequent emergence o f 
political democracy is unlikely" (280). Worst case scenarios are situations with "mixed 
elements o f several modes of transitions and from which no dominant winning strategy or 
coalition could emerge"(282).
In principle, Karl/Schmitter's property space o f modes of transitions is sufficiently universal 
to be applied to other regions of the world. Recent examples of African transitions confirm 
that the distinction between mass- and elite-driven as well as multilateral and unilateral strate­
gies adds valuable analytical tools to the analysis. More importantly, Karl/Schmitter establish 
the mode of transition as a potential independent variable for an explanation of the transition 
path. In contrast to Bratton/van de Walle's more rigid institutionalist argument this allows for 
a greater recognition o f the possible role o f actor's choices in shaping transition processes.
Based on these agency-centered as well as institutionalist explanations, it is now possible to 
integrate the international context into the analysis o f regime change. I argue here that inter­
national institutions and the activities o f  transnational human rights actors represent a crucial 
variable in the process leading up to the initiation of regime change. While a materialist 
explanation was rejected above, existing alternative agency-based and institutionalist
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approaches are generally mute on this issue. Why members o f an authoritarian regime should 
suddenly feel a pressure to liberalize is hard to explain if either previously existing domestic 
institutions or actor's choices are identified as the main independent variable(s) for regime 
change. An institutionalist perspective remains puzzled with respect to the question why a 
solid authoritarian institutional arrangement would suddenly fall apart. A sole focus on agents 
and their choices begs the question, how and why actors change their preferences and inter­
ests. Hence, representatives o f both approaches tend to employ ad hoc explanations for the 
initiation o f  regime change and seem more interested in the transition path and the possible 
results.
In contrast, I argue here that understanding the initiation is crucial for an overall explanation 
of regime change. The source for successful challenges to authoritarian rule is to be found in 
the potential conflict between domestic and international institutions which becomes virulent 
if transnational human rights groups pick up the contradictions and begin to confront political 
actors in and outside o f the target country. Those principled actors introduce international 
human rights norms into a given domestic context and, thus, modify the power relations 
between authoritarian rulers and opposition.
TThis perspective remains within an agency-centered institutionalism, but has two major 
advantages over earlier scholarship. First, it offers a dynamic institutionalist perspective X t 
which does not fall into the deterministic traps of putting institutions where previous scholar­
ship identified solid and immovable social structures. Here, institutions are a possible source 
for change and not merely a constraint for actors. Second, the range of significant actors is 
also broadened to include not only predominantly self-interested, but also principled groups 
and individuals. Conflicts about the proper mode of domestic rule are always about ideas and 
norms in as much as they reflect more narrow material interest calculation. I do not introduce 
norms and ideas as alternative explanations to interests and preferences, but claim that regime 
change represents a situation where actors are forced to argue on the validity of their interests 
within an explicitly present framework o f competing norms.
In regard to the transition path as the second phase, agency and institutions both on the inter­
national and domestic level remain the central categories o f analysis. In this central field of 
concern for recent scholarship on regime transitions a wide range of hypotheses were gener­
ated to account for the various regime types emerging from the 'third wave'. While
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Bratton/van de Walle emphasized the previous regime type as main independent variable. 
Karl/Schmitter prefer a more contingent approach and focus on the modes of transition. As 
many transition processes o f the 'third wave' are still ongoing, an argument emphasizing the 
role of stable international institutions and human rights actors generates the expectation that 
those influences will continue to be relevant for regime change. However, depending on the 
mode of transition the interaction between the international and domestic realm is now likely 
to be different from the earlier period. In the following, I will discuss some of the theoretical 
underpinnings o f such an explanation.
f International Institutions as Opportunities for Rulers and Ruled
Although an institutionalist perspective confined to the domestic context offers a theoretical 
solution which equally avoids excessive structuralism and voluntarism, it is unlikely to shed 
sufficient light on the causes o f change. By definition, domestic institutions represent stability 
rather than change and are likely to restrict rather than enable action. Profound political 
change is, however, about changing or even destroying previously existing and dominant 
institutions. This doesn't mean that a institutionalist perspective is necessarily confined to the 
explanation o f the status quo. Discourses about the domestic conduct o f states are no longer 
confined to the domestic level, but are increasingly brought up onto the international level.
While the domestic institutions usually reflect the internal power relations between govern­
ment and opposition, norms about human rights and democracy present on the international 
level a claim to universal applicability. If  principled actors explicitly refer to such norms or 
institutions to comment on other's behavior they want to convince the other that those institu­
tions are not simply restrictions but should serve as the basis for interaction and interest 
formulation. "Norms are therefore not only 'guidance devices', but also the means which allow 
people to pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and 
justify actions" (Kratochwil 1989: 11). A difference between domestic conduct and interna­
tional norms represents a window of opportunity for domestic or international actors to 
expose the apparent contradictions, in particular if  the government had previously acknowl­
edged these norms by signing international conventions or treaties.
In contrast to the mainstream of the agency-based literature and its focus on self-interested 
behavior I argue here that the growing relevance and visibility of international norms trans­
forms the domestic competition for national power. This is not simply about self interested
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elites negotiating a transition process, but about the ability to use (and adapt to) opportunities 
offered in the international realm. The reference to universal values represents a necessary 
condition for the creation of uncertainty and power stalemates in the first place. Hence, the 
analysis o f current processes o f democratization must go beyond the domestic bias o f both 
agency-based explanations and the modernization school. "At this stage the problem is less 
one of identifying ways in which the international system may impinge upon domestic politi­
cal choice than o f  integrating international forces within the framework of comparative 
theory" (Remmer 1995:108).
In order to better understand international factors influencing domestic change as suggested 
above, it is necessary to develop an idea about how to complement the current state o f the art 
in democratization studies with a theory o f the global realm. I argue that sociological institu­
tionalism offers a solution which does not only reintroduce structural and institutional context 
conditions into an agency-based analysis.
Theorizing the International Context o f States
The state o f the art in the democratization literature is represented by the systematic develop­
ment of an agency-oriented perspective which opened whole new avenues for the explanation 
of political transitions. In the earlier works of this emerging literature, the international 
context was mentioned in passing, but not systematically integrated. When the early 1990s 
witnessed a global wave of democratization, agency-oriented authors began to review their 
prior negligence o f the international realm. Today, the need for a more systematic and 
theoretically meaningful integration o f international factors into the analysis o f  political 
transitions is widely accepted (Whitehead 1996).
I will concentrate in my endeavor to integrate international factors into explanations of 
domestic change on the recent contributions of sociological institutionalism to the field of 
international relations theory. I argue that insights generated in this debate are particularly 
suitable because they emphasize the role of non-material issues such as norms and ideas in a 
process o f global institutional homogenization. This corresponds with the rejection o f  materi­
alism implicit in the agency-based literature on democratization discussed above. On the one 
hand, agency-oriented approaches within the field of democratization studies are supple­
mented with a distinct structural framework which integrates the international context. On the 
bther hand, the suggested design adds concrete agents both on the international and domestic
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level to the predominantly structural analysis provided by sociological institutionalism. I 
argue that the way in which actors appropriate universal values which have been at the center 
o f the analysis o f sociological institutionalists matters for understanding processes o f domes­
tic change.
' “^ ’Sociological institutionalism claims that the international social system and its embedded 
norms represent a powerful force influencing actor's preferences and behavior. The majority 
o f authors in this emerging tradition assumed a spreading Western-type world culture as a 
source for political change (Finnemore 1996a; McNeely 1995). This culture, in turn, "creates 
and legitimates the social entities that are seen as actors" (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1987: 12). 
Hence, change in the system and its parts is not driven by internal functional needs but in 
correspondence with existing external cultural norms (Hall/Taylor 1996: 946). As Finnemore 
argued, bureaucratic organizations spread in many countries much more quickly than markets 
and technology development would have demanded (Finnemore 1996a). It is not the modern­
izing force o f internal socio-economic development that creates sufficient preconditions for 
bureaucratic rationalization, but the existence o f such norms in the international system. 
"Many features o f the contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed 
and propagated through global cultural and associational processes" (Meyer et al. 1997: 144).
This argument essentially repeated the skepticism about the material side of modernization as 
the ultimate mover of political development contained in the agency-based democratization 
literature discussed above. While the later chose to give up on structuralism altogether, 
sociological institutionalism resorted to 'world culture' as alternative, non-material structure.50 
"Culturally and historically contingent beliefs about what constitutes a 'civilized' state (...) 
exert a far greater influence on basic institutional practices than do material structural condi­
tions, ..." (Reus-Smit 1997: 583), In bringing here both perspectives together, I seek to 
advance debates within sociological institutionalism as well as the agency-based literature of 
democratization. With respect to sociological institutionalism I point at the activities o f 
concrete agents in transporting international norms about the proper conduct of a state into the 
domestic context. With reference to the agency-based democratization literature I suggest to 20
20 "It is problematic when they [actors, HPS] invoke and rely on cultural accounts to define their actions as 
matters of individual choice and decision, filled with individual motives and perceptions and involving such 
legitimated resources as individual property" (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1987:13).
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use the structural framework provided by sociological institutionalism to better understand 
where actor's preferences and interests come from.
Meyer et al. argued that the emergence and success of the state system itself has created the 
preconditions for more rapid processes of ideational diffusion between nation-states. Nation­
states are understood as "constructions o f a common wider culture, rather than as self-directed 
actors responding rationally to internal and external contingencies" (Meyer et al. 1997: 152). 
While traditional societies displayed a wide variety of dissimilar purposes, modem nation­
states are formally equal entities and share rationalized identities and purposes. Hence, formal 
similarity is the basis of comparison between two or more entities in the system. Rather than 
arguing that similar material conditions lead to similar outcomes, this perspective assumed 
similar underlying ideational conditions which influence all units of the system.
^Nation-states will continue to be exposed to pressures for adaptation to world cultural exam­
ples even when they seem unable or refuse to live up to those requirements. Their identity, 
purpose and legitimization are intrinsically linked to the models they have originally based 
their existence on and other international and domestic actors can use these models to pressure 
for change. "If a particular regime rhetorically resists world models, local actors can rely on 
legitimacy myths (democracy, freedom, equality) and the ready support of activist external 
groups to oppose the regime" (Meyer et al. 1997: 160). Thus, sociological institutionalism^-— 
challenges a rational choice perspective o f democratization by conceptualizing this process as 
a norm-driven enterprise of perfecting nation-states to match the original (Western) blue-print 
they draw their legitimacy from. Rather than in the best interest of the actors involved, it is 
assumed that the more "highly idealized" and "internally consistent" (Meyer et al. 1997: 154) 
a feature within the overall world culture the more likely it is to be adopted. However, other 
authors have drawn very different conclusions from their studies on the effects o f internation­
ally based norms.
State Sovereignty and the Survival of'Quasi-States'
With respect to the southern hemisphere in general and Africa in particular, Robert H. Jackson 
and Christopher Clapham have recently advanced a version o f sociological institutionalism 
which squarely challenged the idea o f an homogenizing Western culture. Clapham and Jack- 
son argued that sovereignty as an idea firmly established in the international realm after 1945 
represented an effective norm protecting authoritarian leaders from domestic and outside pres-
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sure (see also Krasner 1993). In turn, this has important domestic ramifications. "Where a 
state comes into existence, or at the very least is able to survive, only as the result of interna­
tional conventions, this has very significant consequences for that state itself' (Clapham 1996: 
20).
Basic to this idea is the claim that sovereignty today is a Janus-faced regime. Jackson and 
Clapham distinguish between negative/juridical (freedom from intervention) and posi- 
tive/empirical (freedom to control) sovereignty (see also Thomson 1995) in order to highlight 
a gap between internationally protected legal claims and hardly existing real capabilities on 
the domestic level. "Never have disparities between the outward form and the inward sub­
stance of sovereign states been any greater than they are today" (Jackson 1990: 24/5).11 For 
Jackson the decolonization process has led to a normatively driven abandonment of positive 
criteria o f self-government and their replacement by a 'negative sovereignty regime’ which 
represents "a basic change o f mind about how the international system ought to operate" (8). 
The regime today sustains many 'quasi-states’ those "elites are beneficiaries of non-competi­
tive international norms" (24). Moreover, the regime directly "impinges on human rights and 
socioeconomic development" (1), because it is an 'insurance policy' for authoritarian leaders 
against outside intervention.
Hence, in this perspective international norms do precisely the opposite of bringing Western 
values to the farthest comers of the world. Just as the Meyer school does, Clapham and Jack- 
son emphasize the role o f non-material factors prevalent on the international level, but they 
arrive at opposite conclusions. By focusing on the prevalent norm o f sovereignty they claim 
that "what has changed is not the empirical reality o f states but the international rules and 
institutions concerning those conditions" (Jackson 1990: 23; see also Clapham 1996: 15-24). 
These institutions are biased in so far as they support political elites against their people as 
well as homogenizing pressure from above. States and their leadership today are no longer 
part o f a formal hierarchy, but treated equally on the international level. This norm glosses 
over all the existing socio-economic and political differences and fundamentally reshaped the 21
21 Clapham rightly emphasized that this distinction should not be translated into a dichotomy of ’real’ and ’quasi’ 
states. Rather, all states in the world float constantly somewhere along a continuum expressing different levels of 
effective government and shared understandings about the existence of that state (Clapham 1996: 15). This 
avoids the assumption that positive or empirical sovereignty invariably means a b so lu te  control of activities 
across and within borders.
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way we think today about international society. As Jackson put it, “the juridical cart is now 
before the empirical horse" (Jackson 1990: 23/4).
Critique
Both, the Meyer school as well as Robert H. Jackson and Christopher Clapham have claimed 
that international norms and institutions are factors in shaping domestic political change. 
However, they arrive at opposite conclusions. My critique will begin with Jackson/Clapham 
and then move to the Meyer school. The main argument o f Jackson and Clapham (as well as 
others) revolves around the Janus-faced concept of sovereignty. However, the seemingly clear 
distinction between two opposite concepts such as negative/juridical and positive/empirical 
sovereignty is difficult to apply empirically. Whereas Clapham avoided the issue and focused 
on how rulers can take advantage o f these international conventions, Jackson took Isaiah 
Berlin’s famous distinction o f positive and negative freedom (Jackson 1990: 26-31) as a point 
of departure. While he recognized the limits of transferring a concept from the individual to 
the state level, his definition remains unsatisfactory, mainly because positive sovereignty (or 
’freedom to' in Berlin’s terms) is a hodge-podge o f capabilities. It includes not only the provi­
sion of political goods to the population as a way o f generating domestic legitimacy, but also 
the capability to enter military alliances and treaties. Jackson does not attempt to define which 
of these capabilities are more important or to what degree they must be realized in order to 
count as a 'developed' state.
Moreover, while negative or juridical sovereignty has indeed helped many leaders to establish 
and sustain authoritarian rule, this international recognition was always linked to the expecta­
tion that the initial gap between outside recognition and domestic legitimacy would eventually 
be narrowed. There were specific and contingent reasons at the time when many countries on 
the southern hemisphere became independent which led to a widening rather than a narrowing 
of the gap. Besides the logic o f superpower rivalry during the Cold War era, the most impor­
tant impediment to narrowing the gap was the dominant international perception that the lead­
ers in the newly independent countries did indeed enjoy sufficient domestic legitimacy and 
would now be mainly occupied with the task of'nation-building*.
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These explanations account for the observations made by Clapham and Jackson, but there is 
no reason to believe that negative sovereignty will remain indefinitely the dominant feature 
within the international legal order shaping inter-state relations and domestic political change. 
While Clapham and Jackson did acknowledge the growing significance of human rights 
norms on the international level, they ultimately limited their perspective of international- 
domestic linkages to the use and misuse of sovereignty by authoritarian leaders. However, 
today the international legal order offers a wide variety of norms to an equally wide variety of 
governmental and non-govemmental actors.
I f  Jackson is right in his observation that the juridical cart is indeed today before the empirical 
horse, then this fundamental shift can be exploited by various groups and its benefits can not 
only be reaped by the ruling elites in the Southern hemisphere. Moreover, it is precisely the 
language of sovereignty which offers a window of opportunity for actors pressing for human 
rights and political change. In the short run, authoritarian rule can use the former principle to 
ignore the latter, but in the long term external sovereignty is only sustainable if accompanied 
by stable domestic political legitimacy. The very myth o f formal equality generated by the 
negative sovereignty regime generates the possibility for mobilization in favor o f other recog­
nized international norms. If leaders regularly claim to be sovereign on the international level, 
they will ultimately also have to face the question o f positive or empirical sovereignty. 
Depending on the strategies chosen by those international and domestic actors interested in 
making this linkage, this leads to the process I describe in the empirical chapters.
With regard to the Meyer school, the critique revolves mainly around the issue o f how to 
actually trace the effects o f international institutions on domestic change. First, most o f  the 
claims are based on mere correlation and quantitative analysis rather than process tracing. It 
remains to be shown how exactly a "common wider culture" affects certain individual features 
o f  nation states. Sociological institutionalism is more concerned with similarities than with 
differences. The research assumes a constant independent variable and is mainly interested in 
tracing its homogenizing effects. Finnemore calls this an advantage, because sociological 
institutionalism offers an idea of "the substantive content o f  social structure" that "permeates 
all aspects o f political and social life in all states" (Finnemore 1996b: 327). However, a lack 
o f  variety on both ends o f the equation is not helpful in identifying the process by which 
domestic change is causally linked to international norms. Here the question arises, how and
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when mere presence translates into significance. "Rapid global changes across dissimilar units 
suggest structure-level rather than agent-level causes. They do not, however, prove them. One 
also n'6eds to specify the mechanism of change and show the common source of the new pref­
erence and behavior" (Finnemore 1996a: 22).
Second, the very general conceptualization of the independent variable (e.g. ideas like democ­
racy and economic progress) generates the danger of tautological reasoning. Meyer et al. 
searched for similarities in form, not so much in substance. They remained on an abstract 
level which allows for the inclusion o f  a wide variety of institutional settings and concrete 
policies under the label of 'world culture'. Thus, they argued, even nationalist and fundamen­
talist movements follow 'world-society scripts' and intensify isomorphism (Meyer et al. 1997: 
161). However, this argumentation only increases the immunity o f the theory, not its 
explanatory power. While it is correct to point out that a nationalist ideology ultimately relies 
on universalistic principles enshrined on the supranational level, this argument is o f  little help 
if we want to understand how and why actors come up with contradictor)' concepts and which 
one ultimately wins out in the domestic struggle.
Finally, sociological institutionalism can not offer a sufficient basis for understanding regime 
change as long as it fails to develop a corresponding conceptualization o f agency. Without 
agency the effort to establish a production site of values and norms outside of the nation state 
lacks both origin and purpose. Norms are relevant only in so far as they are reproduced as 
values by actors. Structural analysis is necessary and should certainly include a systematic 
recognition of non-material issues, but it is limited if we remain theoretically disinterested in 
the actors which are supposed to follow those norms and ideas.
1.7 Models of Regime Change
In building on the literature review above, I argue here that explanations o f democratic change 
should indeed be highly skeptical towards the determining power of material factors and focus 
instead on unpacking the role o f agency. However, rational choice offers no sufficient basis to 
capture the complexity of agency level processes, because it substitutes agency with ahistori- 
cal assumptions about rationality without recognizing the role of norms in framing interest- 
driven behavior. This insight reopens the discussion about the role of the structural 
environment as a site for the production of values and meanings actors might identify with.
LL
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"^Sociological institutionalism offers a first cut in theorizing the role o f the international context 
in processes o f domestic political change. In combination with insights generated within the 
agency-based democratization literature it is possible to develop a model of regime change 
which offers a number o f advantages compared with the existing state of the art. Within the 
agency-based literature the model gives an answer to the puzzle why a power stalemate and 
political uncertainty occur in the first place. With respect to sociological institutionalism it 
fills the gap between the abstract world culture and concrete processes o f domestic change. 
Finally, with regard to an institutionalist perspective confined to the domestic realm it adds 
international institutions as potential sources o f  dissonance. If  domestic or international actors 
recognize such a conflict and begin to mobilize, this perspective can offer a compelling 
account for the initiation o f regime change, but also the subsequent path of transition. Institu­
tions are not only seen as "restrictions on the range o f alternative available to political actors" 
(Bratton/van de Walle 1997: 276), but can equally have an enabling effect for actors attempt­
ing to challenge authoritarian rule. However, as Clapham and Jackson remind us, the norms 
embedded in the international system are contradictory and can be used for different purposes. 
This reinforces the argument for an explicit analysis of'agency' in promoting certain norms by 
specific strategies of mobilization.
Figure 3. Different Approaches to Regime Change2 
Rational Choice (Przeworski 1991)
Power Stalemate Regime Change
Sociological Institutionalism (the Meyer school and Clapham/Jackson) 2
World Culture 9 Regime Changer w
22 Question marks do not indicate actual gaps in explanation, but a tendency to underspecify important mecha­
nisms or factors. The following approaches have different, but not incompatible dependent variables. Meyer et 
al. would probably prefer 'institutional homogenization' instead of 'regime change*. 1 argue here that the per­
spectives are compatible if one assumes that homogenization is as a precondition for sustainable regime change. 
Clapham/Jackson are included in the chart labeled ’sociological institutionalism', although they arrive at opposite 
conclusions. The basic structure of their argument is similar to the Meyer school.
_____________ _________ ___________
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Institutionalism (Bratton/van de Walle 1997)
- CD
_____ , I
Neopatrimonial Rule Regime Change
Combining Perspectives
In the following, I will account for the regime change in Kenya and Uganda during the last 10 
to 15 years. This will serve as a basis for the main empirical part of the thesis, which elabo­
rates on the role o f international institutions and transnational human rights networks in 
processes o f regime transitions.
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2 Neopatrimonial Rule in Kenya and Uganda
This chapter will give an overview o f  the dependent variable(s) represented by the initiation 
o f  regime change (1) and the subsequent transition path (2). Emphasis is given to the more 
complex latter issue. I will compare the political development o f both countries using the 
established literature which focused on the neopatrimonial character of post-independence 
African rule. For the period prior to regime change, I argue that the combination of interna­
tional principled mobilization (in both cases: high) and differences in certain aspects of 
neopatrimonial rule explain the variation in the results o f initial regime change. Hence, the 
character of neopatrimonial rule represents an independent variable with respect to the initia­
tion o f regime change. For the subsequent period, the changes in the character o f neopatrimo­
nial rule is the main dependent variable, while the initial mode of transition and international 
mobilization (Kenya: high; Uganda: low) account for the differences in the transition path.
In the following, I will argue that both countries have taken distinctively different transition 
paths. With reference to Robert Dahl's basic distinction o f participation and competition 
defining the property space of polyarchy, the Ugandan process is characterized by an empha­
sis for the extension o f participation and constitutional reforms. In contrast, Kenya took an 
electoralist path which extended competition on the national level, leaving everything else 
largely unchanged. Nonetheless, both paths have led to substantial changes of the previously 
existing neopatrimonial character of domestic rule. Patrimonial political systems are ruled by 
an individual who treats the state as his or her personal possessing. The people living under 
such a system are not citizens protected by a set of laws, but directly dependent clients o f the 
ruler. As African states do resemble some but not all features of patrimonial rule, scholars 
resorted to neopatrimonialism to indicate the co-existence o f traditional and modem forms o f 
authority (Eisenstadt 1972).
While such systems seem to resemble Western-type bureaucratic organization, their opera­
tions are pervaded by the logic of patrimonialism. Personal relationships expressed in patron­
age, clientelism, and corruption rather than rational efficiency are the main features o f these 
institutions. Hence, neopatrimonialism is itself an institution which "is internalized in the 
formal institutions (...) and provides essential operating codes for politics that are valued, 
recurring, and reproduced over time" (Bratton/van de Walle 1997: 63). Shortly after political 
independence, the paternalism present in many African societies and a perceived necessity to
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consolidate the newly independent entities in a process of 'nation-building' formed the basis 
for a strengthening o f the executive vis-à-vis all other formally independent democratic insti­
tutions such as the judiciary or the parliament. The distribution of state resources became a 
major tool in establishing the clientelist networks which underlay or substituted formal 
bureaucracies.
Neopatrimonial systems are not only integrated by the strategic top-down allocation of 
resources, but also based on the use o f open or hidden repression. Often, both means are 
combined in a carrot-and-stick strategy. For two reasons, I argue that the aforementioned 
conceptualization o f patrimonial rule overemphasizes the aspect o f positive integration via the 
build-up o f clientelist networks, and neglects the equally important mechanisms o f  negative 
integration expressed by the governmental use of violence. First, principled human rights 
actors mobilize mainly against the aspect of repression and not on the issue o f clientelist 
networks. Assuming that their activities matter, I will give greater attention to neopatrimonial 
rule as a form of negative integration than the mainstream of the literature. Second, comparing 
different forms o f positive integration is not a viable strategy for the two selected cases, 
because the bases for neopatrimonial rule in Uganda were largely destroyed by the establish­
ment of the Amin dictatorship and the following protracted civil war. Hence, the contrast is 
not between two different forms of neopatrimonial rule, but between a country with a largely 
intact neopatrimonial system (Kenya) and a country where this system was virtually destroyed 
(Uganda). This led in Uganda to a situation where the logic o f violence (negative integration) 
was almost ubiquitous, whereas in Kenya positive integration under neopatrimonial rule 
always remained the dominant authoritarian mode.
I have split the chapter in two main sections. The first part will describe changes in the realm 
of constitutionalism (2.1) whereas the second will move attention to the issue o f  electoral 
democracy (2.2). I argue that the former broadly corresponds with the previously identified 
question o f negative integration while the latter focuses attention on neopatrimonial rule as a 
form of positive societal integration.
2.1 Constitutionalism: Establishing Limits to Negative Integration
Constitutionalism is about the limits to arbitrary rule. It features various institutional rules 
about the relationship between different parts o f the government and the protection of 
individuals from state repression. Following Zoehout (1997) I distinguish four characteristics:
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(1) the existence of the rule of law : , :
(2) separation o f powers
(3) independence of the courts
(4) the effective protection of individual rights and freedoms
I will add the recognition of international human rights norms in domestic jurisdiction as 
another indicator, because of the specific concern here for the role o f international institutions. 
Within a system of democratic governance based on some form o f  representativeness consti­
tutionalism both restricts and enables majority rule. More precisely, the restrictions to major­
ity rule are responsible for its effectiveness, in so far as minorities would be likely to resort to 
other than democratic means of competition if  they were not protected from the majority and 
had no chance to eventually gain majority themselves at some point in the future. This 
arrangement puts constitutionalism at the center of research concerned with processes of 
regime change towards democracy. In the following, I will discuss the development o f  the 
human rights situation on the ground (4) separately from the constitutional safeguards 
designed to protect individual rights (1-3). As basic threats to human rights I have identified 
disappearances, torture, extra-judicial killings, and detention without trial. I add freedom of 
expression in general and press freedom in particular as an important means for exposing 
human rights abuses.
2.1.1 Human Rights Conditions in Kenya and Uganda
Systematic human rights abuses became a common feature o f Ugandan domestic affairs in the 
late 1960s when Milton Obote used the military to depose of potential competitors for 
national power. When Idi Amin took power in 1971, torture and murder of members from 
Obote's ethnic group became widespread. Over time, the murders ordered by Amin became 
more and more random and extended well beyond the groups originally targeted. Amin 
suspended all constitutional safeguards and ruled by decree. After Amin's violent removal in 
1979 and general elections in 1980, Obote returned to the presidency. The human rights 
situation even worsened under his rule from 1981 to 1985 (Amnesty International 1985b; 
Hooper/Pirouet 1989: 20), because Obote's undisciplined army was soon engaged in a civil 
war with an increasingly successful National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A). In their
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efforts to avert Obote's second downfall, the military committed countless atrocities against 
the civilian population, killing between 300 and 500,000 Ugandans.51 After the military 
victory of the NRM/A under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in 1986, the spiral of 
violence was stopped and the security situation improved dramatically. However, human 
rights abuses were not completely eradicated and continue to be a problem especially in the 
insurgency areas o f the North and Hast.
In Kenya, an aborted coup attempt by air force officers in 1982 caused a continuos deteriora­
tion of human rights conditions (Howard 1991). President Daniel arap Moi systematically 
strengthened internal security units* 24 which became notorious for severe human rights abuses 
(Oloka-Onyango 1990:25). At the same time constitutional safeguards for human rights were 
weakened.25 Only in 1991/1992, when consistent internal and external pressure finally pushed 
the government to partial retreat, some improvements were attained. However, the record 
remained mixed until the second multiparty elections approached in late 1997. After the US 
State Department claimed for 1995 that "the government’s human rights record worsened" 
(U.S. Department o f State 1996: 1), it held in January 1998 for the previous year that "begin­
ning in late September, however, there was a visible improvement in the human rights 
situation, as the bipartisan Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) brokered a package of 
wide-ranging political reforms, which the Government enacted in early November" (U.S. 
Department of State 1998: 1).
In the following sections, I will describe in greater detail how human rights conditions in 
Kenya and Uganda changed over time. I have selected 'torture', 'extra-judicial killings’, and 
'arbitrary arrests’ as indicators, because reliable information about these abuses is available for 
both countries and the whole period under investigation.
13 A list of massacres and a few names of the victims, both in the Amin and second Obote period, are contained 
in A.B.K. Kasozi's overview of the Ugandan history of violence between 1964 and 1985 and Francis Bwengye's 
assessment of the Obote II regime (Bwengye 1985:357-368; Kasozi 1994:240-274).
24 These include the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), the para-military General Services Unit (GSU), 
and the Directorate of Security and Intelligence or Special Branch (see Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 
1991: Ch. 5).
25 In his detailed analysis of the Kenyan human rights situation between 1982 and 1988 Howard concludes, that 
"while the extent of terror was minuscule compared to most Latin American examples, the causes and trends 
were similar" (Howard 1991: 94).
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Torture
With regard to torture, the situation dramatically improved in Uganda after 1986, while 
reporting on such cases from Kenya has increased until the early 1990s and remained stable 
until the mid-1990s. Apart from the intentional use of torture to repress political dissent, the 
mistreatment o f suspected criminals as a means to extract evidence remains in both countries 
a serious problem. For Uganda, Amnesty International maintained already in 1987 that "the 
incidences o f torture o f civilians by soldiers have diminished" (Amnesty International 1987a: 
169). The U.S. State Department asserted in 1994 that "no evidence for government- 
sanctioned torture" existed in Uganda (U.S. Department of State 1994b), while "credible 
allegations o f torture" persisted in Kenya even after the introduction o f multipartyism in 
1991/92 (U.S. Department of State 1994a).26 Moreover, rebel groups active in the Northern 
part of Uganda began in the mid-1990s to systematically abduct, kill, and torture thousands of 
Ugandans living close to the Sudanese border (Amnesty International 1997a). Hence, the 
main perpetrators of such human rights abuses in Uganda are today non-state actors.
Until very recently, Amnesty International accused Kenya for not taking any measures against 
the widespread use o f torture (Amnesty International 1997b). Speculations that international 
pressure at the end o f the 1980s has led to the dissolution o f a special torture unit were proven 
wrong (Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 1991: 99).27 The UN Special Rapporteur on 
torture, Nigel S. Rodley "advised the Government (on 18 September 1995, HPS) that he had 
received information indicating that the use o f torture by police to obtain confessions was 
almost systematic" (UN Commission on Human Rights 1996: 77). In December 1996, 
Amnesty International reported of at least one institution in Kenya which existed for the sole 
purpose of torturing politically suspect persons. "Despite all the evidence that torture of 
detainees is endemic and systematic throughout the country, the Kenyan authorities prefer to 
deny that these abuses take place..." (Amnesty International 1995c: 5).
Until 1997/98 there were no similar allegations made against the Ugandan government. None 
o f  the international observers accused the government o f tolerating or instigating systematic
26 For an exemplary account on the conditions in Kenyan police stations and prisons see Nairobi Law Monthly, 
No. 14,1989, p.17-19.
27 These speculations were based on a public statement by President Daniel arap Moi who publicly declared that 
torture was not permitted (Andreassen 1993:215).
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torture, although reports about individual torture cases continued to surface. The International 
Committee o f the Red Cross and local NGOs have regular and uninhibited access to all 
Ugandan prisons, police stations, and military barracks (U.S. Department of State 1994b). The 
main exception to this rule are the insurgency areas, although the Ugandan military does allow 
for visits of journalists and independent observers. More recently reporting on torture cases 
even outside the insurgency areas increased again. In 1997, the UN Special Rapporteur for 
Torture, Nigel Rodley submitted for the first time one case of alleged torture to the Ugandan 
government. The victim was a UPC activist who was suspected to support a rebel group 
(E/CN.4/1997/7, Section III). Following the August 1998 bomb attacks on US embassies in 
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam dozens of suspects were detained and some of them tortured in 
euphemistically called ’safe houses' (New Vision, 27 October 1998), After press reports, the 
government acknowledged and ended the practice (New Vision, 11 February 1999).
To conclude, torture and mistreatment of persons by security personnel are still a serious issue 
in both countries. However, there are crucial differences when it comes to the intentional 
mistreatment of government critics. The Ugandan case is characterized by significant 
improvements and torture is no longer systematic and government-sanctioned. In Kenya, 
torture was systematically used during the 1980s and even the 1990s to silence opposition 
voices. Only very recently, sustainable improvements are noticeable. Most recent reports from 
Uganda indicate an increase o f mistreatment cases with a pattern of repression against 
individual members o f the opposition. However, the main international attention shifted since 
1994 to the insurgency areas, where rebel groups killed and tortured thousands of Ugandans.
Extra-judicial Killings
In regard to extra-judicial killings, Amnesty International acknowledged a dramatic reduction 
o f cases in Uganda after 1986 and again after 1991/92 when a number of rebel groups ended 
their activities. Nonetheless, Amnesty International maintained that extra-judicial killings 
were one o f the major human rights problem in Uganda even after 1986 (Amnesty 
International 1991: 15-21), although it equally named the Ugandan army and rebel groups as 
perpetrators.21 Despite the drop in numbers after 1992, cases o f extra-judicial killings continue
2* In one of the most serious cases 69 people died in July 1989 after being locked up by the army in a railway 
wagon near Mukara (Oloka-Onyango 1992: 332). After an official inquiry one of the responsible officers was 
convicted and compensation was paid to the families of the victims.
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to be reported from insurgency areas (Amnesty International 1996). Outside o f those areas, 
extra-judicial killings are very rare and isolated incidences.
In Kenya, cases of extra-judicial killings increased during the 1980s and early 1990s. In 
contrast to Uganda, where most of the recorded cases were linked to counter-insurgency 
operations of the army, extra-judicial killings in Kenya occurred during this period as part o f a 
generally increasing police brutality (Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 1991: Ch. 17; 
Kenya Human Rights Commission 1995), governmental persecution o f  the opposition, and 
’ethnic clashes' instigated by high-level government officials (Africa Watch/Human Rights 
Watch ). Following the announcement o f the return to multiparty rule, about 2,000 Kenyans 
were killed as a result o f violent attacks against members of ethnic groups suspected to 
support the opposition (Young 1996: 61). These attacks ended shortly after the First multiparty 
elections and resurfaced at the following elections in 1997/98 (killing again several hundred 
civilians). Despite official denial, these systematic acts o f extra-judicial killings were the 
responsibility o f government officials. "Leurs actions commandos s'effectuent à partir des 
fermes gouvernementales d'où ils sont transportés par de camions sur les lieux de leurs exac­
tions." Moreover, "les assaillants kalenjin (...) sont souvent en réalité des forces paramilitaires 
déguisées" (Lafargue 1996: 241). A parliamentary investigation into the 1992 clashes named 
prominent KANU politicians in connection with the violence (Republic of Kenya 1992), but 
its results were shelved as KANU prevented a vote on the official acceptance of the report.
Various prominent and government-critical individuals were also killed at the height o f  the 
regime crisis in 1990/90 and after the introduction of multipartyism. Such mysterious deaths 
include the Foreign Minister and potential Moi successor Robert Ouko in February 1990, 
Anglican Bishop Alexander Muge in August 1990 (Nairobi Law Monthly 1990), a member of 
the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) in 1994, and the General Secretary of Release 
Political Prisoners (RPP), Karimi Nduthu, on 24 March 1996. In early 1997, Stephen Muruli, 
a student at the University o f Nairobi was killed and his dormitory room set on fire. A few 
days earlier he had identified a high-ranking police officer as one o f  the persons who had 
tortured him before. To date, the investigations in all these cases remained without tangible 
results.
A decisive change of the situation occurred in late-1997 when the government and the oppo­
sition reached agreement on minimal constitutional reforms. As a result, the police force was
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now explicitly restrained from breaking-up political rallies. During the 1998 electoral 
campaign, the number of extra-judicial killings as part of violence against ethnic groups 
alleged to support the opposition decreased in comparison to 1992. In sum, cases o f  extra­
judicial killings increased sharply in the early 1990s and following the introduction o f multi- 
partyism. After September 1997 and in 1998 the number of extra-judicial killings decreased 
significantly. Sustainable improvements became visible as the government entered serious 
talks about constitutional reforms in mid-1997. In contrast, the development in Uganda is 
generally positive and shows a continuous decrease both in the mainland and the insurgency 
areas.
Detention Without Trial and the Practice o f Arbitrary Arrests
Since independence the practice of detention without trial was widely used in both countries 
to silence opposition voices (Conboy 1978; Kabudi 1995:227; M’Inoti 1990). As a reaction to 
domestic and international criticism, the Kenyan government shifted its strategy between 
1990 and 1997 from simple detention without charges or trial to misusing criminal charges 
against government opponents (Amnesty International 1995a). A number o f the more promi­
nent opposition members (namely Koigi wa Wamwere) were simply charged with capital 
offences and held in prison using on fabricated evidence and judicial consent. "From a politi­
cal perspective, activists charged with capital criminal offences are therefore effectively held 
under detention with trial" (African Rights 1996: 131). Since 1992, about half of the opposi­
tion members of parliament (36 in 1993, 15 in 1994) have been detained for different reasons 
(usually for holding unlicensed meetings and subversion) in a systematic effort o f intimida­
tion. Usually they were released after a short period o f time and the charges were dropped. 
After 1995, this practice subsided. In late-1997, detention without trial was deleted from the 
Preservation of Public Security Act. These changes confirm a slow improvement of the 
human rights situation.
In Uganda, the previously widespread practice o f detaining political opponents without 
charges ended, although such human rights abuses remained a problem in the insurgency 
areas (Amnesty International 1992b: 41-50). In 1988, the Ugandan government reported to 
Amnesty International that its army currently held about 4,000 persons as part o f its military 
operations, most o f  them in preventive detention (Amnesty International 1992b: 44). Amnesty 
International estimated that from 1987 to 1989 several thousand people were temporarily
64
detained as part o f these operations, while these numbers dropped significantly until 1991.:iJ 
After 1992, AI reported between 100 and 200 cases a year, which indicated an improving 
situation.10 Occasionally, government critics were intimidated by arrest warrants, but the cases 
remained isolated. The most serious case of political arrests occurred in 1993 when more than 
a dozen politicians from the North were arrested and charged with treason (Amnesty 
International 1994). After a court order, the suspects had to be released.
In both countries serious problems within the administration of justice (Africa Watch/Human 
Rights Watch 1991: Ch. 9) and extensive corruption cause long delays in court rooms and put 
many detainees in pre-trial detention for months or years. For Kenya, the U.S. State Depart­
ment concluded, that "suspects of all types are often held incommunicado for two to three 
weeks before being brought before a court" (U.S. Department o f State 1994a). In Uganda, the 
police regularly detains suspects beyond the limit o f 48 hours before releasing them again or 
charging them in court. The Uganda Human Rights Commission (independent government 
body established in 1995) identified in 1997 this practice as the main human rights problem 
(The Monitor, 13 June 1997). The average time of pre-trial detention after a charge was 
brought against the suspect in court is estimated at two to three years. Out of 11,527 prisoners 
at the end of 1996 7,401 were on remand, only 4,126 convicted.29 301 In many cases the period o f 
remand exceeded the constitutionally prescribed limit of 120 days (360 for a capital offence) 
after which a suspect has to be brought to trial or released. However, several Ugandan court 
decisions during the last year seem to indicate a growing adherence to time limits for pre-trial 
detention (U.S. Department o f State 1997: 5).
The review o f this set o f  human rights abuses confirms the general trend observed with regard 
to Kenya and Uganda. Increasing numbers o f government-sponsored abuses from the mid- 
1980s until the early 1990s mark the situation in Kenya. It follows a mixed record between 
the two multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997. After late-1997, sustainable positive change 
occurred and paralleled the negotiations between the government and the opposition. In 
Uganda, sustainable change occurred when the NRM took power in 1986. Afterwards, the
29 AI reported the release of 5,000 detainees from military barracks (Amnesty International 1992b: 11).
30 With increasing rebel activities in the North at the end of 1996, the Ugandan Army has taken up again its 
practice of summary detentions and euphemistically called this 'protected villages'.
31 In a July 1997 workshop organized by UHRC Justice Egonda Ntende held that today "arrest (was] equivalent 
to conviction, and remand [to] punishment” (cited in New Vision, 25 July 1997).
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improvements were most visible in the mainland while abuses continued to occur in the 
insurgency areas. After 1992, reporting on such incidences slumped due to an overall decrease 
o f rebef activities. More recently, the number of press reports on human rights abuses by 
government agencies increased again. However, it is not clear whether this reflects a new 
trend or whether improved monitoring capabilities o f the press and the various domestic 
human rights bodies ensure now that more cases are becoming public. At the same time, 
thousands o f Ugandans were tortured and killed by the remaining and increasingly violent 
rebel groups in the North.
Table 6. Human Rights Situation in Kenva and Uganda. 1986-1998
Kenya Uganda
Torture Widely used until 1992, both as a 
method of police investigation and 
a means to intimidate the 
opposition;
After 1996/97: reporting decreases
No government sponsored 
incidences; continued reports of 
individual cases in army barracks, 
police stations, and in connection 
with military operations in the 
North
Extra-judicial Killings Continued reporting on 
government-sponsored cases; 1992: 
sharp increase as a result of'ethnic 
violence'
No reports on government- 
sponsored incidences; problems 
persist in the insurgency areas
Detention without Trial/ 
Arbitrary Arrests
Until 1992 used against prominent 
opposition politicians;
After 1992 substituted by a strategy 
of detention based on false, non- 
bailable charges
After late-1997: reporting decreases
No systematic use against the 
opposition, but high numbers of 
questionable detentions in 
insurgency areas;
After 1997: reporting increases also 
for the mainland
2.1.2 Constitutional Safeguards o f Human Rights
The degree o f self-commitment by governments to the cause of human rights serves as a 
crucial indicator for this study. It is hypothesized that growing declaratory adherence to 
international norms precedes decreases o f in human rights abuses, even when government 
officials initially employ such a rhetoric in a purely instrumental manner. In particular, it is 
argued that NGOs and international institutions can use such government rhetoric as an entry 
point for the further promotion of human rights in a domestic context. Therefore, the
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commitment o f the Kenyan and Ugandan government to human rights is measured by 
surveying (1) the respective position towards pertinent international human rights treaties, (2) 
the extent of their application in domestic law, (3) the existence o f individual complaint 
procedures, (4) the independence of the judiciary/separation o f powers.
International Human Rights Law
As members o f the United Nations both countries acknowledged the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights from 1948. They are also party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), Kenya since 1976 and Uganda since 11 May 1995. Kenya and 
Uganda are members o f the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.32 Kenya (in 
February 1997) and Uganda (in 1986) signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Both countries have generally neglected 
their duty to report under the respective international human rights treaties.33 Overall Kenya 
has a slightly weaker record than Uganda, because it did not sign the First Optional Protocol 
o f the ICCPR allowing for individual communications to the UN Human Rights Committee. 
In contrast, Uganda has done so on 22 September 1995 (Republic o f Uganda 1995b).
International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Law
In both countries it is the prerogative o f  the president to sign international treaties. Following 
the British common law tradition, international law can only be applied domestically if  a 
corresponding act of parliament exists (Kabudi 1995: 27; Ojwang/Otieno-Otek 1988: 29).34 
The application o f international human rights norms is inhibited by several repressive laws, 
which were originally introduced by the British colonial authorities to suppress nationalist 
movements. These include the Preservation o f Public Security Act, the C hief s Authority Act, 
the Public Order Act, sedition and treason provisions, and provisions in the Penal Code and 
the Societies Act (Kenya Human Rights Commission 1994: Appendix). Whereas the Kenyan
32 For the role of the International Commission of Jurists in creating this charter see (MacDermot 1992: 182).
33 After twelve reminders commencing in 1986, Kenya still failed to report under Article 40.2 of the ICCPR 
which asks the governments to "indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the 
present Covenant" (see Andreassen 1993: 185). During the 1997 visit of an Amnesty International delegation, 
Vice-President Saitoti acknowledged the issue and promised that Kenya would improve its reporting habits. 
Uganda failed to submit its initial report to the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights for nearly 
ten years (Oloka-Onyango 1996:373).
34 However, without such an act of parliament, domestic courts can still invoke international law as long as there 
is no contradicting national regulation or law (Kabudi 1995: 29).
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government and local authorities under its control made extensive and systematic use o f those 
laws until late-1997, the Ugandan government shows more restraint in using such provisions 
against opposition voices.
In Kenya, the central government's control extends to the local level. The President appoints 
not only Provincial and District Commissioners as his representatives outside o f Nairobi, but 
also other important civil servants such as the Attorney and Solicitor General or the Chief 
Justice. For a long time, this ensured the uniform application o f repressive laws across the 
country. Redress for abuses by the central government and its representatives was almost 
impossible to get because the judiciary invariably relied on repressive sections o f the consti­
tution rather than the Bill of Rights (Chapter V). The Chief Justice refused to establish 
guidelines for the application of the Bill o f Rights in court proceedings, thus, effectively 
preventing their operation altogether (M'Inoti 1991). In his famous 1989 High Court decision, 
Justice Norbury Dugdale held that without such guidelines the Bill o f Rights was unenforce­
able (Maina 1991).
In a speech on New Year's Eve 1992, Moi announced a comprehensive constitutional review 
o f all repressive laws. Only in July 1993, the Attorney General announced the creation of 
eleven task forces to be charged with revisions of different sections of the constitutions. 
Nothing happened (Macharia 1996) until the second multi-party-elections approached in 1997 
and Daniel arap Moi declared that reforms would not take place before election date. A 
coalition o f domestic critics threatened to take control of the reform process and forced the 
government into compromise. Hastily, a working group of parliamentarians negotiated a 
package of minimum reforms to be implemented prior to the elections. The changes relating 
to human rights issues included the abolition o f detention without trial (1), greater freedoms to 
hold public meetings (2), the explicit prohibition of torture in the Police Act (3), and extensive 
restrictions o f powers previously conferred to local authorities by the Chiefs Authority Act 
(4). After the December 1997 elections, the constitutional review process continued with 
disagreements about the formal composition of the review body, especially with regard to the 
representation of the opposition and societal groups.
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Uganda made considerable progress in formally establishing human rights standards domesti­
cally. Most recently, this has led to the promulgation of a new Constitution in October 1995” 
which included a substantially extended Bill o f Rights.35 6 This development was preceded by 
other measures, including the first time promulgation and enforcement o f a Code o f Conduct 
for the Ugandan Army (Amnesty International 1989: 15). The sincerity of the Ugandan 
government's commitment to constitutional reforms is further highlighted by the fact that 
exceptional efforts were made to involve large sections o f the population and all major 
societal actors in the constitution-making process. A 21-member Constitutional Commission 
had visited since 1989 all 870 sub-counties to collect views from the ordinary people. In the 
end, about 25,000 written proposals from individuals, villages, grassroots organizations or 
other groups were solicited and transformed into a draft constitution (Harvey/Robinson 1995: 
9). Afterwards, the population elected the Constituent Assembly (CA) as a separate body to 
debate and decide on a new constitution.
Individual Complaint Procedures in the Human Rights Area
Both countries have shown some activities with respect to the establishment o f  domestic 
human rights bodies. Progress was much more substantive in the Ugandan case, while 
measures taken by the Kenyan executive still convey the image o f mere window-dressing. 
The debate about creating the position o f an Ombudsman in Kenya was introduced by the 
opposition subsequent to the 1992 General elections. However, the ruling party KANU 
prevented any movement into that direction. Instead, the first official human rights body was 
created by Moi two days before a donor meeting and disappeared from the scene within weeks 
after being announced. In May 1996 the President decided to establish a Standing Committee 
on Human Rights and selected ten persons for this body (East African, July 29-Aug 4, p. 11). 
According to the chairman, Onesmus Mutungi, the body was created under section 23 (1) of 
the constitution, which vested executive power upon the President to create any office as and 
when he deems fit (African Rights 1996: 236). The committee has no established mandate and 
is completely dependent upon presidential goodwill. In December 1998, the committee
35 Oloka-Onyango and Bossert/Sager provide a critical review of the constitutional process and the final product 
(Bossert/Sager 1996; Oloka-Onyango 1995).
36 In an important ruling, High Court Judge Justice Egonda-Ntende upheld in 1993 the right of any person to 
invoke the Bill of Rights even if "parliament or the rule-making authority" fail to "make specific provisions as to 
how that access was to be gained" (cited in Stevens 1996: 111).
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presented for the first time a report to the public. However, the report was dominated by a 
general overview o f existing human rights law and definitions. Only the section on the ethnic 
violence in the Coast region in August 1997 showed that the committee had conducted own 
investigations.
Apart from these executive initiatives, the Kenyan parliament established in the 1990s several 
temporary committees and commissions to investigate human rights abuses. These included 
most prominently, the Parliamentary Select Committee appointed to investigate the ethnic 
clashes in 1992 (Republic of Kenya 1992) and the Akiwumi commission investigating all 
ethnic clashes since the early 1990s. While the executive succeeded to shelve the 1992 report 
without further discussion, it failed to prevent the creation of the Akiwumi commission in 
1998. Its daily hearings in the areas previously affected by the ethnic clashes represent an 
important, although temporary opportunity for individual complaints on human rights issues.37
In Uganda, the government took several steps to institutionalize individual complaint 
procedures, both for past abuses as well as for current human rights problems. These include 
the establishment o f (1) a Commission of Inquiry into Violations o f Human Rights before 
1986, (2) the Office of the Inspector General of Government, (3) a Human Rights Desk in the 
Ministry o f Justice, and (4) the Human Rights Commission under the new Constitution of 
1995. The Commission of Inquiry, led by Justice Arthur Oder, selected exemplary cases of 
severe human rights abuses, toured the country, and heard witnesses. For the first time in post­
independence history, this gave the Ugandan population the opportunity to debate openly on 
the past gross violations o f human rights. The final report detailed on almost 700 pages the 
abuses o f the Amin and Obote regimes (Republic o f Uganda 1994).
In 1987, the NRM government established the Office of the Inspector General o f Government 
(IGG) to fight corruption and human rights abuses under the present government. Positive 
aspects o f  the office’s work in the field of human rights included its role as de facto 
Ombudsman during the last years. The office received human rights complaints from the 
public and occasionally helped individuals. The IGG also served as a gateway for foreign 
human rights education programs by organizing seminars for local administrators and politi­
37 The director of K.HRC and widely respected academic Alami Mazrui refused in early 1999 to appear before 
the Akiwumi decision and declared the commission was not independent (Daily Nation, 12 February 1999).
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cians together with the Raoul Wallenberg Institute (Lund, Sweden). However, the IGG 
generally shied away from going beyond isolated cases and expanding its agenda to issues o f 
national significance (Andreassen 1993: 323; Oloka-Onyango 1993). Additionally, forces 
within the NRM government successfully limited the impact o f the IGG, and removed Waswa 
Lule, a staunch supporter o f the human rights mandate, from the post o f Deputy IGG in 1992. 
Under the new constitution, the mandate of the IGG in the human rights area were transferred 
to the newly established Uganda Human Rights Commission. The latter enjoyed expanded 
jurisdiction, including prison visits and stronger investigative powers.
In sum, Kenya is still lacking any sustainable mechanisms to address the issue o f human 
rights abuses which are independent from executive influence. However, the parliamentary 
investigations o f human rights abuses in the 1990s indicate a growing emancipation and 
effectiveness o f such procedures. Uganda has established several avenues open for 
complaints, but the government’s willingness to unequivocally support their tasks had been 
ambiguous. Compared to Kenya, these mechanisms enjoy greater independence from the 
executive.
Judicial Independence
Judicial independence deteriorated in Kenya in the mid-1980s with increasing executive 
control of the one-party system and society at large. In Uganda, judicial independence was 
largely respected after 1986, but the third power is generally weakened by insufficient funding 
for its work. On the local level, the new government introduced in 1986 a system of popular 
justice represented by the Resistance Council (RC) system. The elected RC on the village 
level now replaced the hierarchical Chief system and had legislative, executive, as well as 
judicial powers. As resistance courts they were restricted to civil cases and crucially supple­
ment the generally corrupt and failing magistrate courts. In the short term, the measure was 
popular because the RC system represented a fast and appropriate way of reconstructing the 
Ugandan state from the local level. In the long term, however, the emergence of parallel 
systems o f justice raised concerns about the separation o f powers (Barya 1993). Hence, a 
number o f donor governments channeled during the 1990s significant resources into the 
rehabilitation o f the magistrate court system.
At the height o f  executive dominance, the Kenyan parliament abolished in August 1988 the 
tenure for all judges in the country (Constitutional Amendment No. 25). Even prior to that
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decision, the judiciary had never been an equal power. First, a pervasive doctrine in favor of 
judicial restraint claimed that the judiciary as the third branch was not elected by the people 
and had to could not interfere in political affairs (Ojwang/Otieno-Otek 1988: 49). Second, the 
Head of State and his decisions were considered as untouchable. In May 1991, the Attorney 
General and internationally recognized human rights lawyer Amos Wako declared in his 
inaugural speech that "a characteristic o f  the rule of law is that no man, save for the President, 
is above the law" (Wako 1991). Third, the system of hiring expatriate judges on short term 
contracts had effectively removed security of tenure (Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 
1991: 148-153; Days et al. 1992; Schofield 1992) even before the 1988 decision. In numerous 
cases contracts were not renewed by the Kenyan government because the judges upheld 
opinions independent of or even in contradiction to the executive branch.
Fourth, important members o f the judiciary such as the Chief Justice are appointed by the 
president and usually served the interests of the executive branch, e.g. by allocating sensitive 
cases to 'reliable' judges. Fourth, corruption is generally regarded as a major problem of the 
Kenyan administration of justice (African Rights 1996: 62). Critics observed an executive 
inclination to appoint lawyers to the bench who previously had financial or other problems. A 
prime example for this practice is Moi's policy in appointing the Chief Justice.
Although parliament reinstated the formal independence o f judges in late 1990, many domes­
tic and international observers remained critical o f the situation (African Rights 1996; 
International Bar Association 1997). In 1995, the US State Department repeated its criticism 
o f judicial ignorance towards the Bill o f Rights contained in the constitution and the famous 
1989 Dugdale ruling. "In spite of legal challenges that the ruling effectively subsumes the 
judiciary under the executive branch, his decision has not been overruled" (U.S. Department 
of State 1995).
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Table 7. Constitutional Safeguards in Kenva and Ueanda. 1986-1998
K enya U ganda
International Human Rights 
Treaties
UDHR
ICCPR (1976, but not the First 
Optional Protocol) 
Torture Convention (1997) 
African Charter (1992)
UDHR
ICCPR (1995)
First Optional Protocol (1995) 
Torture Convention 
African Charter
Domestic Application o f 
Human Rights Law
Strongly inhibited by continued 
repressive domestic legislation 
and existing colonial laws; some 
minimum reforms in late-1997
Generally applied; occasionally 
inhibited by existing colonial 
laws; new constitution with 
extended Bill of Rights (1995)
Complaint Procedures Yes, formally established, but 
controlled by the executive
Yes, formally established, but 
largely donor-supported and 
weak
Judicial Independence Serious executive interventions 
into the judiciary persist
Judiciary is generally 
independent, but weak
2.1.3 Conclusions
Constitutionalism failed to take sufficient root after independence in Uganda as well as 
Kenya. In Uganda, the negative consequences for the overall human rights situation became 
already apparent under the rule of Milton Obote. After the coup d'état in 1971, Idi Amin 
suspended the constitution altogether and ruled by decrees. Although constitutional safe­
guards were reinstated after Amin’s ouster, the return of Obote to presidency between 1980 
and 1985 did not improve the situation. To the contrary, an intensified civil war fought by 
untrained government forces caused even greater loss o f life and systematic abuses of human 
rights than under Amin. The situation only improved when the National Resistance Move­
ment under the leadership o f Yoweri Museveni came to power in early 1986.
In Kenya, constitutionalism deteriorated more slowly as some checks and balances to the 
executive survived the shift towards personal rule under Jomo Kenyatta. However, the end of 
his rule was marked by growing state harassment against opposition figures. After a brief 
period o f liberalization, Kenyatta's successor Daniel arap Moi increasingly resorted to uncon­
stitutional means in order to consolidate his position. After a failed coup d’état in 1982, 
Kenyan security forces turned openly against the opposition. The separation o f powers was
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undermined by a shift o f public decision-making away from the parliament to closed circles 
within KANU. Direct executive interventions into the judiciary became routine as parliament 
scrapped tenure forjudges and other civil servants. Colonial laws such as the Preservation of 
Public Security Act are regularly used to intimidate the opposition. Torture and other forms of 
degrading treatment o f suspected government critics became widespread. Only very lately 
some sustainable positive changes occurred.
For Uganda, I claim continuous and consistent improvements in both formal institutions and 
practices. Their extent does not merely reflect the end of the civil war after 1986. For Kenya, 
the record shows a period o f consistent growing repression until 1989/90, a mixed record 
between 1990 and 1997, and finally some signs of sustainable improvement in late-1997 and 
1998. Therefore, I conclude that significant variation between the two countries exists with 
regard to the dependent variable constitutionalism as one dimension of the transition path.
2.2 Electoral Democracy: The Neopatrimonial Logic of Positive Integration
Democracy is understood here as "a political system, in which the people, positively or nega­
tively, make, and are entitled to make, the basic determining decisions on matters o f  public 
policy" (Holden 1993: 3). This definition reflects a largely formal understanding that lacks 
substantive attributes. Apart from the constitutional prerequisites for democracy discussed in 
the previous chapter, democracy is characterized by two basic and simple criteria, elections 
must be free and fair and the institutions emerging from elections must make a difference in 
the subsequent policy process:
(1) the existence o f regular and popular elections, free and universal suffrage as well as unre­
stricted entry of citizens to candidacy for offices,
(2) decision making influence o f (representative) institutions through a legislative process 
(from Zoehout 1997: 216).
"Given a regime in which the opponents of the government cannot openly organize into 
political parties in order to oppose the government in free and fair elections, what conditions 
favor or impede a transformation into a regime in which they can?" (Dahl 1971). This opening 
statement o f Dahl's seminal work on polyarchy is followed by three necessary (although not 
sufficient) conditions of democracy. Dahl holds that citizens should be able to "formulate their 
preferences" (1), "signify their preferences to fellow citizens and the government by individ­
ual and collective action" (2), and "have their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of
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the government" (3). Political parties are no longer explicitly named as carriers o f the people’s 
will.
Uganda represents an interesting case because political parties are prohibited from proper 
functioning while significant efforts are made to increase citizen's ability to formulate and 
signify preferences. According to Dahl it is a case with "least favorable conditions for polyar­
chy" (Dahl 1971: 203) because, in Dahl's analysis of historical sequences, inclusiveness 
(participation) always preceded competition (contestation). In contrast, Kenya is a 'classical' 
case where regime change took off with advances in terms o f  competition while the inclusive 
nature o f the political system initially decreased. In the following I will show how inclusive­
ness dominated democratization in Uganda after 1986, while Kenya initially chose the 
extension of party competition. The description is divided in two sections. In the first I focus 
on elections in both countries and in the second on press freedom as a prerequisite for 
informed electoral decisions. I will first narrate the changes taking place in Kenya and Uganda 
and later summarize the performance based on indicators Elklit recently developed based on 
Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (Elklit 1994).
2.2.1 Elections
\ ■
Kenya
The dissolution o f the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) in 1964 ended multiparty- 
ism in Kenya shortly after political independence. Attempts to found new parties challenging 
the dominant Kenya African National Union (KANU) were not tolerated by the Kenyatta and 
Moi governments. Within the one-party system, regular elections on the national level were 
held every four years. Thus, outside observers concluded that the Kenyan political system 
under Kenyatta was "semi-competitive" (Barkan 1992: 162). However, during the 1980s 
Members o f Parliament increasingly lost their independence to a revitalized KANU controlled 
by the executive (Widner 1992b).3* At the height of executive dominance in 1988, KANU 
replaced the secret ballot in its primaries with a so-called queue voting procedure. Voters were 
now asked to openly line up behind pictures o f  their candidates, a method which greatly 
increased the ability o f  party officials to control the overall process. In 1990, this practice was
3* In 1985, the first party elections since 1966 took place. In 1988, KANU threatened several dissenting mem­
bers with expulsion in order to secure absolute executive dominance.
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abolished and in late-1991, the Kenyan government reintroduced multipartvism. Two elec­
tions were held in December 1992 and 1997, respectively. On both occasions, the President 
and parliament were elected separately but on the same day. Moi and KANU won both elec­
tions, but the parliamentary majority decreased to four seats in 1997. Consequently, KANU 
entered a de facto  coalition government with the opposition parties FORD-Kenya and 
National Development Party of Kenya (NDP).
In 1992, parliament hastily agreed on legislation mainly designed to prevent the success of 
opposition candidates, but also limited executive powers. This included the prohibition of a 
coalition government and a requirement for all presidential candidates to gain at least 25 per 
cent of the votes in five out of the eight administrative provinces of Kenya. The terms of 
office for the President and Parliament were extended from four to five years, while presiden­
tial tenure was simultaneously limited to a maximum of two terms. As a result o f the 
minimum reforms agreed upon in 1997, executive interference in the electoral process 
decreased between 1992 and 1997. Most importantly, the Electoral Commission (EC) was 
enlarged by ten members nominated by the opposition, while the remaining ten members and 
the chairperson were still appointed by the President. The EC was now also charged with 
ensuring the fair coverage of all parties in state-controlled radio and television programs. 
Moreover, the government could no longer interfere with opposition campaigns by refusing 
licenses.
Despite progress in terms of a 'level playing field' between 1992 and 1997, erratic measures of 
repression caused continuous criticism. Although the government registered a total number of 
21 parties for the 1997 elections, it initially refused registration for the Safina party, which 
represented prominent and internationally well-known lawyers and opposition politicians such 
as Richard Leakey, Kivutha Kibwana, and Paul Muite. Safina was finally registered three 
weeks ahead of the elections. Instances o f direct manipulations o f the counting also decreased, 
but remained an issue. The same can be said about the use o f 'ethnic violence' to intimidate 
and displace potential voters for the opposition (Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 1993), 
the manipulation o f constituencies ('gerrymandering'), and the 'neglect' o f opposition areas in 
the process of voter registration and delivery of ballot boxes on elections day.
Hence, I claim that the following statement by the 1992 Commonwealth Observer Group is 
actually more realistic for the 1997 than the 1992 elections. "Despite the fact that the whole
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electoral process cannot be given an unqualified rating as free and fair, the evolution o f the 
process to polling day and the subsequent count was increasingly positive to a degree that we 
believe that the results in many instances directly reflected, however imperfectly, the expres­
sion o f the will o f the people” (Commonwealth Observer Group 1993:40).
Uganda
Multipartyism ended in Uganda four years after independence with a coup d'état by the Prime 
Minister Milton Obote on 24 February 1966. Obote used the army to depose the President of 
the country and king o f  Buganda Mutesa II. On 19 October 1969, political parties except for 
Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC) were banned and the whole country was put under a 
state of emergency. In 1971, Obote was himself deposed from power by the Army General Idi 
Amin Dada. During the Amin dictatorship from 1971 to 1979 no elections were held. The 
multiparty elections in 1980s were manipulated in favor o f UPC, but still legitimated Obote's 
return to the presidency (Bwengye 1985). Yoweri Museveni, a looser of these elections, 
justified his violent rebellion with reference to the electoral fraud. After the end o f  the 
protracted civil war in late 1985, the new government under the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) declared party politics as one o f the main evils responsible for the past 
chaos in the country. Parties were not banned as organizations, but their activities sharply 
restricted. They were prohibited from opening offices outside of Kampala, supporting candi­
dates in elections and holding public rallies. All party members were asked to join the 
movement in their individual capacities. After an initial four year period the NRM extended 
this ban on party activities twice (and now for 15 years) until the year 2001.
At the same time, the government established the Resistance Council (RC) system as an 
alternative form of popular participation. The introduction o f the RC system revolutionized 
politics on the local level as it effectively replaced hierarchies dominated by chiefs with 
periodically elected officials (Brett 1994; Tidermand 1994). Moreover, two positions in the 
nine-person village level Resistance Committee (RC I) were reserved for a women and youth 
representative, respectively. In turn, the village level council elected a representative for the 
parish level (RC II). This process continued upward to the sub-county (RC III), the county 
(RC IV), and the district level (RC V). The National Resistance Council (NRC) as the 
equivalent of a national parliament topped the pyramid. However, with every extension o f the 
NRM rule the RC system was increasingly marginalized in national politics (Mamdani 1996:
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209). In the end, the effort to replace a Western-style and corrupt party system with a 'grass­
roots democracy’ failed. "Provided that socioeconomic and political realities in Uganda 
perpetuated existing fundamental inequalities and injustices, the law by itself can do little to 
implement a regime o f genuine grassroots democracy" (Oloka-Onyango 1989: 478).
The first elections for all RC levels were held in February 1989. The main purpose was to 
broaden the basis o f the NRC beyond the current membership o f Museveni's comrades during 
the bush war. The new, from 98 to 278 members expanded NRC included thirty-eight ’histori­
cal' NRM/A members, elected members from the RC II and III level, twenty presidential 
nominees, ten army representatives, as well as town, women and youth representatives 
(Ddungu/Wabwire 1991: 12). There were no further provisions as to the relationship between 
the new NRC and the rest of the RC system. In 1992, similar elections for various RC levels 
were conducted.
In March 1994, the population directly elected 214 delegates for the Constituent Assembly 
(CA), the remainder of 74 were appointed by the President, the army (ten each), youth-, 
women-, disabled-, and other societal groups. Additionally, the parties contesting the 1980 
elections were also given two seats to fill. Although this reflected an implicit recognition of 
the government that the old parties could not be ignored, the ban on their activities was upheld 
throughout the election period. With close to 90 per cent voter turnout about two thirds o f the 
seats went to movement candidates. International observers criticized the treatment o f  parties 
but commended the elections as generally free and fair. After one year of deliberations the CA 
further extended the no-party rule until 2001 and decided to hold a referendum on multiparty- 
ism at the end of this period. In 1996, the Members o f Parliament and the President were for 
the first time since 1986 directly elected by the Ugandan people. On 9 May, Museveni won 
Presidential elections with more than 74 per cent o f the vote. Two weeks later, NRM  candi­
dates also clearly dominated parliamentary elections(see Ottemoeller 1998: 100-104). Each of 
the elections in 1989, 1994, and 1996 reflected a growing openness to political competition, 
but an openness which was always rhetorically subordinated to the dominant value o f  inclu­
siveness.
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2.2.2 Freedom of the Press
Freedom of expression and press freedom in particular represent an important safeguard for 
human rights and democracy. They are 'early warning systems' for abuses o f fundamental 
freedoms, supplement possibly existing constitutional mechanisms charged with protecting 
individuals, and enable informed electoral choices. Freedom of press is protected by interna­
tionally recognized norms promoted by a sub-set o f the transnational human rights 
movement.39 Hence, I briefly discuss here the development o f press freedom in both countries, 
although the abuses are also covered by the description o f other human rights issues above. I 
have decided to discuss the issue under electoral democracy rather than constitutionalism. 
This emphasizes the role o f the press in giving a platform to political actors and educating the 
public about electoral choices, without neglecting its potential monitoring function in the 
human rights area.
Kenya
Both electronic and print media were under firm control o f  the executive until the late 1980s. 
Since then, the situation has changed mainly with respect to newspapers and journals and to a 
lesser extent radio and television. Most importantly, the Daily Nation, as the leading daily 
newspaper in possession o f the Aga Khan Group, transformed itself from a rather uncritical 
paper to a fairly independent forum. A whole new set o f  weeklies (e.g. The East African, 
Weekly Review, Finance, Society) also appeared on the streets after 1989 and greatly 
improved diversity o f opinion and professionalism. Reports by Amnesty International, the US 
State Department, the Kenya Human Rights Commission, or other international or domestic 
critics are extensively covered in the press and often reprinted in full length.
Before 1989, the catholic and protestant churches represented the only organized and materi­
ally significant independent domestic organization to challenge the government. Beyond, a 
publication o f the National Council o f Churches in Kenya (NCCK) began its criticism of 
government policies in 1986 and was banned in March 1988. In 1987, the Nairobi Law
39 They include many international organizations representing journalists, but also groups such as Article 19 in 
London and the International Freedom of Expression Exchange Clearing House (IFEX). The Action Alert 
Service of IFEX reports daily and globally on the situation of journalists. IFEX is a 'supra'-NGO founded by 
other NGOs in 1992 (including Human Rights Watch and Article 19) and has today about 40 member organiza­
tions (http://www.ifex.org).
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Monthly appeared as the second significant challenger o f human rights abuses on the streets of 
Nairobi. After 1989/90, journalists practiced less self-censorship and more critical reporting 
on the Moi regime appeared on the streets. The government resorted now to open repression. 
In May 1990, the Nairobi Law Monthly was banned and its editor Gitobu Imanyara arrested. 
A few weeks later, a court ruling revoked the ban. Charges o f  publishing seditious articles 
against Gitobu Imanyara were dropped after three months arrest. The harassment o f the 
independent press came to a peak around the multi-party elections scheduled for December 
1992.
Although direct attacks on journalists became now more visible, most of the intimidation still 
took place behind closed doors. In June 1998 the prominent political commentator Kwendo 
Opanga quit his job at the Daily Nation after admitting that he had been pressured by KANU 
members during the electoral campaign in 1992 (Daily Nation, 22 June 1998). Opanga was in 
a crucial position not only because of his prominence, but also because he belonged to the 
Luhya community. The Luhya were a crucial ally of the ethnic coalition supporting the Moi 
government. Thus, Luhya leaders profiting from their delivery of loyalty to the Moi 
government were the first to target the journalist. The campaign started as relatives and 
'friends’ from his Luhya community offered him to join the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting or other more independent research opportunities. Later, Opanga also received 
death threats from KANU supporters and finally agreed to work for a KANU think tank 
without disclosing this information to his editor.
In May 1992, six members of the journal Society were arrested and only released more than 
one year later on 19 May 1993. No charges were brought against them (US State Department 
1994). In April 1993, the police confiscated the printing press o f Fotoform Limited where 
many of the critical publications were produced. Over the summer, various charges were 
brought against the owner, but the evidence was too weak for court proceedings. "On Septem­
ber 24, the Government withdrew all charges against Fotoform but did not issue an order to 
return the press parts. In the meantime, the Government's various actions had put Fotoform 
out of business" (U.S. Department o f State 1994a). In 1995, the state-controlled Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) censored world television news reports by the BBC if  the
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subject related to the Kenyan human rights situation.40 The same year, the government 
attempted to introduce two bills into parliament, the Press Council o f Kenya Bill and the 
Kenya Mass Media Commission Bill, which were designed to increase its control over the 
media (Wamae 1996). However, after sustained resistance from the public they were 
withdrawn.
On 10 July 1998 the government o f Kenya refused three publications official registration and 
effectively banned them from the streets. Those included were Finance Magazine, Post on 
Sunday, and The Star. All three had been highly critical o f  corruption within the government 
and singled out individuals for their attacks. Finance had been in trouble for many years and 
is owned by the opposition member o f parliament Njehu Gatabaki. The editors of the Star 
Magayu Magayu and Francis Mathenge Wanderi were simultaneously arraigned in a Nairobi 
court on 29 June 1998 and charged with disseminating an "alarming" publication which talked 
about a possible coup against Moi. The Nation commentary "Government Smashes its own 
Credibility" published as a reaction to the ban held: "To use any extra-legal means to muzzle 
the press is a heinous, intimidatory and retrogressive tactic used only by undemocratic 
regimes with a guilty conscience and dirty hands" (Daily Nation, 11 July 1998). On 14 July 
the Nation Group management publicly condemned a recent upsurge o f "hostility" against its 
operations. These included systematic attacks on newspaper vendors, general intimidation of 
journalists investigating corruption cases, specific attacks on the Nation’s Internet journalists, 
and an open threat by 17 MPs of the National Development Party (NDP) "to advise our 
supporters countrywide to stop advertising and buying ’ The Nation’, or to commence 
hostilities against the paper" (Daily Nation, 9 July 1998, p. I).41
Despite the continued harassment, executive interference in the media sector decreased during 
the 1990s. By the mid-1990s a number of government-critical publications had established 
themselves in the political arena. The government slowly got used to their efforts to expose 
corruption and misconduct on a weekly or monthly basis. The Daily Nation remained firmly 
established as the leading daily newspaper on the market. Its circulation was significantly 
higher than the government-owned Kenya Times. The situation is still very different in the
40 IFEX Action Alert Service (http://www.ifex.org/alert/00000787.html).
41 "These efforts (...) support the well known perception of a hostile attitude by certain elements within the 
Government towards us and the existence of an independent media" (Daily Nation, 15 July 1998, p. 1).
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area of electronic media, although significant change towards more diversity are imminent.
The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) with two channels is owned by the government, 
while the Kenya Television Network* (KTN), Stella Television (STV), and Cable Television 
Network (CTN) are somewhat more independent, but have little ambition to address political 
issues. Only KBC can be received nationally, while most of the other stations (also radio) are 
restricted to Nairobi. Two new FM stations, Metro 101.9 and Capital 98.4 started broadcast­
ing in Nairobi in 1996. The program is largely oriented towards leisure themes such as music 
and sports coverage. In 1991, the Nation Group also applied for a radio and TV license. The 
government delayed the process and, in the meantime, awarded broadcasting licenses only to 
KANU members. In May 1998, The Nation Group finally received a license, but it was 
restricted to Nairobi and still lacked an allocation of frequencies (U.S. Department o f State 
1999a). In mid-December 1998, the government finally allocated frequencies (Daily Nation, 
17 December 1998).
Uganda
Press freedom is generally respected in Uganda, but harassment o f journalists continued to 
pose an item of concern throughout the period under investigation. The leading paper 'New 
Vision' was founded in 1986 by the British journalist William Pike who had previously 
covered Museveni's bush war in the early 1980s. Although close to the government, the 'New 
Vision' can not be classified as an organ of the movement. Several other newspapers quickly 
appeared on the streets after 1986. The main competitor o f the Vision, the Monitor emerged in 
1992. The Monitor is usually highly critical o f the movement system. With respect to 
electronic media, a number of private television and radio stations have began operations and 
compete with the government-owned Uganda Radio and Television (UTV). The latest State 
Department report held that the government media "were of a fairly high quality and some­
times included reporting critical o f the Government" (U.S. Department of State 1999b: Sect. 
2a). Internet access is not limited by the government.
The most serious recent governmental action against journalists occurred in August 1995. On 
25 August the editor o f the islamic weekly Shariat Haruna Kanaabi and the editor o f the 
islamic bulletin Assalaam  Al-Haji Musa Hussein Njuki were arrested and the first journalists 
to be charged with sedition since 1986. Njuki had called for the death o f Museveni by 
commenting "unless Museveni dies, Uganda will never be peaceful". Kanaabi called Rwanda
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"an extension o f Uganda" and claimed that the leaders in Kigali were "the lackeys of 
Museveni". Three days later Njuki died in police custody and accusations of torture were 
brought against the officers. However, the international NGO Reporters sans Frontieres (RSF) 
held "that it is likely the journalist died o f natural causes".42 Kanaabi was charged in a magis­
trate court and found guilty of sedition and publishing false information on 19 December. 
Magistrate Flavia Munaaba reduced the sentence from ten years to five months. On 28 
December the High Court ordered a review o f Kanaabi's sentence. One day earlier prison 
authorities had released Kanaabi after four months citing "good conduct". In 1998, several 
critical journalists were charged in courts for allegedly "disseminating false information" or 
"promoting sectarianism" (U.S. Department of State 1999b: Sect. 2a).
Table 8. Electoral Democracy in Kenya and Uganda. 1986-1998°
K enya U ganda
Elected Officials Yes, until 1992 four-year term, 
since then five-year term; in 
1992 12 MPs were appointed by 
the President, in 1997 half of 
those were proposed by the 
opposition parties
Yes, recently implemented; 
President elected since 1996; 
Parliament for the first time 
directly elected in 1996; 
President, Army, Youth-, 
Women- and other organizations 
appoint their representatives;
Electoral Fraud 1992: Yes, 1997: Yes Yes, but little information
Access to Mass Media 1992: No, 1997: No Yes, limited by ban on party 
activities
Election-Related Violence 1992: Yes; 1997: Yes No, but occasional threats by 
NRM-officials
Registration Voluntary; 1992: Massive 
discrimination of opposition 
areas
1997: less, but still considerable 
problems in opposition areas
Voluntary; 1996: civil war in the 
North inhibited participation of 
local population
Freedom o f Speech 1992: Yes; Iate-1997: Yes Yes
Freedom o f  Assembly 1992: No; late-1997: Yes Yes, not for parties
12IFEX Action Alert Service (http://www.ifex.org/alert/00001416.html).
131 highlight changes over time using weaker (yes, no) or stronger (yes, no) notions of the respective indicator.
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A ll political parties allowed to 
contest in elections
Yes, in principle, 21 contested in 
1997 elections;
Openly religious parties are not 
allowed; Safina was only 
registered three weeks ahead of 
1997 elections
No; party members can run as 
individuals;
National referendum on 
multipartyism in 2000; Parties 
are tolerated by the government
Alternative Information 1992: Yes; 1997: Yes 
Compromised by continued 
harassment of journalists and 
ban of three newspapers in 1998
Yes
2.3 Conclusions
This chapter elaborated on the main dependent variables o f  the study, namely the 
circumstances o f initial regime change (1) and the subsequent transition path (2). In respect to 
the former the comparison revealed a significant difference expressed by the violent revolu­
tion from below in Uganda and the reluctant reforms from above in Kenya. At the same time, 
the survey of neopatrimonial rule in both countries showed variation in respect to the type o f 
neopatrimonial rule expressed as the mix of negative and positive integration prior to and after 
regime change. Indeed, one could argue that the bases for neopatrimonialism in Uganda were 
destroyed by arbitrary rule, civil war and massive human rights violations during the 1970s 
and early 1980s (Bratton/van de Walle 1997: 63). Uganda returned to the neopatrimonial 
'family' as a de facto  one-party system only after 1986 when the "politics o f the belly" (Jean- 
François Bayait) replaced the practice of mass killings. In contrast, Kenya remained always a 
m ember of the neopatrimonial 'family', developing from a semi-competitive one-party system 
(before 1984) to a plebiscitary one-party system (1984-1991) and now representing a de facto  
multiparty system (1992-today). The crucial difference between both countries prior to the 
initiation of regime change was not so much the formal side of the political system, but the 
fact that the neopatrimonial logic underlying Kenyan politics was largely absent in the Ugan­
dan context.
In  the subsequent period of regime transition both countries continued to display significant 
differences. The Ugandan process was marked by a clear preference for constitutional reforms 
and the extension of grassroots participation over the promotion o f greater electoral competi­
tion  on the national level. In contrast, the Kenyan transition process was jump-started by the
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réintroduction of multipartyism but lacked for a long time flanking constitutional reforms. 
The Kenyan government has granted its population the formal right to change the Government 
via elections since 1992, while Ugandans will vote on this right not before the year 2000. 
Using Bratton/van de Walle's classification o f different neopatrimonial regimes in Africa one 
can now visualize the markedly different directions regime change in Kenya and Uganda has 
taken. While Uganda only reentered this 'family' in 1986 and then moved mainly from the left 
to the right, domestic rule in Kenya remained always within this logic and moved in a vertical 
direction.
Figure 4. Modal Regimes in Kenya and Uganda. 1980s and 1990s44
Are those differences substantial enough to warrant further investigation? Is the Ugandan 
government's ban of party activities not better understood as a constitutional issue o f denying 
full freedom of speech and assembly? Can we talk about inclusiveness and greater respect for 
human rights if  the Northern part of the country remains a war zone and at the fringes of 
domestic politics? Are the cases not really different forms of'virtual democracy'? 4
44 SO: Settler Oligarchy (e.g. South Africa before 1989); MO: Military Oligarchy; PS: Plebiscitary One-Party 
System; CS: Competitive One-Party System; MS: Multiparty System (adapted from Bratton/van de Walle 1997: 
78, Figure 5).
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There are a number o f reasons why I contend that the differences between Kenya and Uganda 
are significant and deserve further investigation. First, I do not argue that each o f the two 
countries has exclusively focused on either a path of increasing political competition or a path 
o f securing inclusive participation and constitutional reforms. I also recognized that much 
remains to be criticized about the respective accomplishments in both fields. However, Dahl's 
work on polyarchy allowed me to identify a dominant mode o f transition for each country. As 
the discussion above shows, the Ugandan government emphasized inclusiveness and 
constitutional reform while introducing elements of political competition at a later stage and 
always restricted by the dominant mode. It remains to be seen at the time o f the 2000 referen­
dum if the Uganda will move more boldly towards political competition as the second 
important dimension o f democracy. The Kenyan government's decision to open the political 
arena for other parties was indeed preceded by a number of significant concessions in the area 
o f constitutional safeguards. However, these were isolated and once the Moi government had 
secured electoral victory it continued to delay serious constitutional reforms. The "ethnic 
clashes" since 1991/92 are but the most violent sign o f putting political competition ahead of 
safeguarding human rights and securing inclusive participation. Only after the second 
multiparty elections in December 1997, the Kenyan process o f democratization reflected a 
more balanced recognition of both dimensions.
Second, an evaluation of the current state o f democratization in Kenya and Uganda requires a 
closer look at the motivations for and effects of certain reform measures. What are their short- 
and long-term effects? Is it possible to manipulate constitutional reforms to the same extend 
as elections? Hence, in order to evaluate the crucial question o f sustainable reforms versus 
mere tactical maneuvering it is important to give a detailed picture o f the current human rights 
situation and constitutional affairs. As the case of Kenya shows, the executive does resort to 
new, previously unknown forms o f repression. At the same time, the process o f limiting the 
space for maneuvering apparently moves the government towards more sustainable policy 
change. Third, comparing different paths of change helps to evaluate possible factors 
intervening between the level o f international norms and their domestic effects. Different 
paths towards democracy indicated different institutional conditions, actor constellations and 
choices.
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3 The Establishment of Authoritarian Rule
An institutionalist argument requires some understanding o f the historical political develop­
ment. If domestic institutions matter for regime change it is necessary to analyze and 
understand their emergence. In the previous chapter I have focused on the more recent history 
o f the transition process in Kenya and Uganda which expressed itself in various important 
changes of institutional practices. I have put these changes into the context using analytical 
tools to distinguish various modes o f neopatrimonial rule. I have argued that the literature on 
neopatrimonialism has usually focused on aspects o f positive integration, such as the deliber­
ate allocation o f state resources to maintain clientelist networks. However, when principled 
human rights actors from abroad begin to focus on a country, they are mainly interested in 
neopatrimonial rule as a form of negative integration expressed by denial of basic human 
rights. This aspect of neopatrimonialism tends to be ignored in the literature.
I will now turn to the question of how repressive institutional practices emerged in the first 
place. This chapter will describe in more detail the immediate pre-independence period and 
the emergence o f neopatrimonialism in Kenya and Uganda after political independence in the 
early 1960s. I argue that differences in the strength o f domestic coalitions vying for national 
power at the eve o f independence accounts for the specific character o f  emerging neopatrimo­
nial rule. In Kenya, a relatively weak opposition to the nationalist movement led by Kenyatta 
was soon after loosing the first national elections positively integrated into the neopatrimonial 
system. In Uganda, domestic conflict resolution mechanisms failed from the beginning, even 
though all significant domestic actors were represented in the first independence government. 
The underlying conflict between Obote's efforts to strengthen the national government and 
Buganda's strife for greater political autonomy ultimately led to Obote's fateful mobilization 
o f the military and established a logic o f violence as dominant mode o f domestic conduct for 
almost 20 years.
3.1 At Independence 
Kenya
Kenya was declared a British protectorate in 1895, mainly because Britain wanted to secure 
permanent and easy access to Lake Victoria and the neighboring kingdoms which later formed 
parts o f  Uganda. In contrast to its policy towards those kingdoms, Britain turned Kenya into a
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settler colony and created a legislative council as early as 1907. The Asian community and the 
indigenous population were not represented in the council which became an important vehicle 
for the settler community to consolidate their de facto control of Kenyan domestic affairs. In 
the 1940s the dominance of white settlers provoked resistance among more educated members 
o f the African population, especially among the Kikuyu and Luo. Whereas the pre-colonial 
discourse in Uganda was dominated by the Buganda elites and their focus on separatism 
rather than nationalism, Kenyan intellectuals developed a more genuine nationalism based on 
concrete economic grievances blamed on settler dominance. Although this meant that building 
broad-based indigenous nationalism was an easier task in Kenya than in Uganda, the emerg­
ing dominance of the Kikuyu in the independence struggle alienated smaller groups4* much in 
a similar way as the smaller kingdoms in Uganda were always wary o f Buganda privileges.
In Kenya, the resistance against colonial rule turned violent when the colonial administration 
refused to give land titles to Africans living for decades as squatters on white settler's land 
(Hamischfeger 1994: 267). These settlers had previously taken over large sections o f  the Rift 
Valley owned largely by the Maasai and Kalenjin groups and allowed squatters to move in to 
dwell on the land. About two-thirds of the estimated 300,000 migrants were Kikuyu (Throup 
1987: 7 and 52). In 1947 Jomo Kenyatta became the leader o f the Kenya African Union 
(KAU), a nationalist movement demanding official ownership for the squatters. From 1952 to 
1956 a radical wing o f this movement staged violent attacks against the colonial administra­
tion.
In October 1952, the British authorities declared a state of emergency as a reaction to the so- 
called Mau Mau rebellion (Edgerton 1989). Subsequently, many of the repressive laws still 
serving the Kenyan government today were enacted. Kenyatta was imprisoned and KAU 
banned. At the end o f the rebellion 32 Europeans and about 13,000 Africans were dead. With 
Kenyatta in prison, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga became popular national leaders who 
attained also international recognition. As a consequence of the increasing domestic resistance 
and international pressure for decolonization, the British authorities began a process of 4*
4i The Kikuyu account for about 21 per cent of the Kenyan population, the Luhya for 14 per cent, the Luo for 13
per cent, the Kamba and Kalenjin for about 11 per cent each. The Kisii and Meru follow with between 5 and 6
per cent. All of these groups are heterogeneous and formed rather recently as a result of political struggles. The
Kalenjin consist of seven ethnic groups (Elegyo, Kipsigi, Marakwet, Nandi, Ndorobo, Pokot, and Tugen), which
were brought together by their leadership to strengthen their position in national politics.
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political liberalization largely against the will o f the settler community. In 1957, the first 
African members of the legislative council were elected and about 60 per cent o f the African 
population were able to participate in the electoral exercise. The state of emergency was 
revoked in January 1960. It followed a constitutional conference in London which ended with 
the legalization of political parties and the recognition of African dominance in the legislative 
council. Upon returning to Kenya, the nationalist leaders formed the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) led by Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, and Jomo Kenyatta.
When self-government became an option for the indigenous leadership, differences between 
the larger tribes and the smaller ethnic groups became more and more prominent. In the wrake 
of political independence, the Kikuyu claims to land titles came into conflict with the interests 
of the Maasai and Kalenjin demanding the return to the status quo ante. As KANU was domi­
nated by the Kikuyu and Luo elite, the smaller groups feared that it would enforce land 
redistribution. Consequently, two other prominent politicians during the independence, the 
Kalenjin Daniel arap Moi and Ronald Ngala, refused to join KANU and established the Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KADU). As the white settlers had lost their strong influence on 
domestic affairs, they lend some support to KADU. However, in the subsequent 1961 
elections KANU won a majority of votes and refused to form an administration until Kenyatta 
was released from prison. In August 1961 Kenyatta was freed and assumed the presidency of 
KANU. The party won also the following elections in M ay 1963. Kenya attained internal 
sovereignty in June and official independence on 12 December. Final constitutional negotia­
tions led to the establishment of distinct federal features such as a second chamber (Senate) 
and extensive local autonomy (majimbo).
Uganda
Prior to the arrival o f European missionaries and military expeditions, indigenous kingdoms 
dominated since the 14th century the Southern part of what was initially called ’Equatorial6 In 
contrast, the North was mainly inhabited by nomadic ethnicities (Acholi, Iteso, Langi) with 
more egalitarian societal structures. As the British slowly extended their influence from 
Buganda into the Northern areas, the kabaka (Bugandan king) became an important ally for 46
46 The first outside interest in the territory arose when European explorers searched for the source of the Nile 
River in the mid-19th century. In 1877 and 1879, respectively, the first Protestant and Roman Catholic mission­
aries arrived in the area.
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colonial expansion. While the British had initially forced the kabaka to agree on some institu­
tional reforms, including the establishment of a sort o f  parliament (lukiiko), they eventually 
decidfcd to use the existing indigenous hierarchies instead of penetrating the polities with their 
own and more costly administrative structures. In 1890, Buganda and the United Kingdom 
entered the Ugandan Agreement which acknowledged British sovereignty over the Buganda 
kingdom.47 In return, Britain agreed to preserve Buganda's traditional ruling hierarchy. This 
special relationship secured the survival o f the Buganda kingdom and solidified its dominant 
role within emerging Ugandan politics. The British government declared United Kingdom the 
kingdoms o f Buganda (in 1894), Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and Busoga (all in 1896) a protec­
torate.
In the 1950s, Buganda separatism intensified as the new British colonial governor Andrew 
Cohen made efforts to democratize the Buganda kingdom and the protectorate at large. He 
sought to strengthen the lukiiko, the Buganda parliament, by increasing its powers against the 
kabaka. During the so-called kabaka-cnsis in 1953 the Buganda leadership rejected demanded 
a transfer o f its affairs from the Colonial to the Foreign Office and insisted on a timetable for 
Buganda's independence separate from the rest of the protectorate (Ofcansky 1996: 35). After 
unsuccessful talks, Cohen ordered in October the deportation o f the kabaka Mutesa II to 
England. Although further negotiations led to the abandonment o f most o f Buganda demands 
and even the introduction of a constitutional monarchy, the clash was eventually a victory for 
Mutesa II who returned in 1955 triumphantly back to his kingdom (Tumusiime 1992: 25). 
Subsequently, Buganda emerged with a strengthened domestic and international position and 
served as a major source for local identity in the ongoing struggle for independence.
Parallel to the conflict about Buganda's position within the protectorate and its relation to the 
United Kingdom, political parties emerged as significant actors in the domestic field (Low 
1962). Most of them were founded by members of the educated Buganda elite. Encouraged by 
the British authorities, a number o f non-BUgandan intellectuals challenged this separatism and 
began to embrace the idea of a united Uganda. The emerging party system split along relig­
ious and ethnic lines as well as the basic North-South division (Tumusiime 1992: 26). 
Whereas, the Democratic Party (DP), established in 1956, represented predominantly catholic
47 The British concluded similar arrangements with Toro (1900), Ankole (1901), and Bunyoro (1933).
and conservative Baganda, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) created in 1960 a reservoir 
for mainly Protestant voters (Church of Uganda) but also the emerging progressive intellec­
tual elite. Consequently, the churches were drawn into domestic political conflicts and proved 
incapable o f transcending the party competition (Ward 1995).
In preparation for independence, the British authorities held in 1961 Legislative Council 
elections which were contested by UPC and DP. The lukiiko had called for a boycott and 
unilaterally declared independence on 31 December 1960 because Buganda feared being 
marginalized by a strengthened national assembly. Nonetheless, the elections were also held 
in Buganda, where only about two per cent o f the eligible voters defied the lukiiko's call for a 
boycott. DP emerged as the winner with 43 seats (about ha lf came from Buganda), followed 
by the UPC with 35, and two smaller parties with a total o f three seats. Benedicto Kiwanuka, 
the DP leader, was subsequently named head o f the Legislative Council. In September 1961, a 
Constitution Conference in London made final decisions about the political institutions after 
independence. These were based on recommendations by the Muster Constitutional Commit­
tee. During the deliberations, Buganda's delegates continued to demand a autonomous federal 
status for their kingdom (Ssekandi/Gitta 1994: 195).
On 1 March 1962, the Legislative Council was transformed into a unicameral National As­
sembly, Kiwanuka became Prime Minister, and Uganda attained internal independence. While 
the DP and the colonial authorities favored continued direct elections to the new National 
Assembly, the lukiiko insisted on a preservation o f its autonomy and indirect elections of 
Buganda's representatives to the national parliament. This disagreement became the basis for a 
strategic alliance between the traditional Buganda elite and the nationalist UPC which only 
served the purpose of removing DP from power. The Buganda elite created the Kabaka Yekka 
(King Alone, KY) party and won 65 out o f 68 seats in the February 1962 lukiiko elections. 
Hence, KY controlled all 21 Buganda seats for the General elections (as opposed to DP 
getting almost all in 1961) held in April. Outside o f Buganda UPC won 37 and DP 24 seats. 
UPC and YK agreed on forming a coalition government and the UPC leader Milton Obote, a 
Langi from Northern Uganda, became the first post-independence Prime Minister. The kabaka 
became President as well as Commander-in-Chief o f the Uganda Armed Forces. The political 
system was semi-federal and united eleven districts as well as four kingdoms. Buganda 
retained a special status, raised its own taxes, passed laws, and maintained local courts.
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3.2 After Independence
Human rights conditions deteriorated in Kenya and Uganda after independence as a result of 
intensified domestic competition over the control o f state power. Democratic and federal 
conflict-mediating mechanisms which had been put into place at the eve o f independence 
failed to take sufficiently root in the domestic arena and gave way to centralization and 
executive preponderance in the name o f nation-building. In both cases, deteriorating human 
rights conditions were preceded by a process of excluding formerly politically as well as 
economically dominant sections o f society from national politics. In Uganda, the main victims 
were the Baganda, while in Kenya a similar fate was experienced by the Kikuyu after 1982. 
As a result o f intensified domestic conflict, the executive branch of government in both 
countries dominated other democratic institutions and increasingly defied limits set by the 
existing constitutional framework and the rule of law.
Kenya 1963-1982: Establishing Neopatrimonial Rule
KADU dissolved shortly after loosing the first post-independence elections in 1964 and its 
leadership, including Daniel arap Moi, joined KANU in return for public or parastatal 
positions. One year after independence, Kenyatta declared Kenya a republic. In 1967, Moi 
was appointed to the post of the Vice-President. During the next two years federalist 
provisions (majimbo) and other safeguards against executive dominance in the independence 
constitution were abolished. Executive control over other governmental and societal actors 
slowly increased, although limited political competition within KANU was possible. Until the 
early 1980s the ruling party was weak and mainly used to organize the immediate pre-election 
period. Consequently, Joel Barkan generally qualified the Kenyan political system during the 
Kenyatta years as ’’accountable authoritarianism" (Barkan 1993: 87) and "semi-competitive" 
(Barkan 1992:162). However, challenges to the all-dominant position of Kenyatta from either 
within or outside KANU were strongly repressed and often led to the death of the alleged 
perpetrator. In 1966, the original Kikuyu-Luo coalition began to disintegrated when Vice 
President Oginga Odinga left KANU with his fellow Luo Tom Mboya. Odinga and Mboya 
established the Kenya People's Union (KPU) and distanced themselves from Kenyatta's 
Western-leaning economic and social policies. Kenyatta's tolerance of political dissent on the 
national level ended abruptly in 1969 when KPU was banned. Tom Mboya was murdered 
under mysterious circumstances the same year.
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In the early 1970s de facto  single-part)' rule and increasing powers in the President's office 
marked the Kenyan political system. Kenyatta reacted to decreasing support from the original 
KANU'independence alliance with a strategy o f elite rotation which also allowed leaders from 
smaller ethnicities to enjoy the system of personal favoritism. At the third general elections in 
October 1974 close to 90 out of the 158 parliamentary incumbents were defeated. Many 
prominent former KPU members succeeded now on KANU tickets. However, political 
reforms were inhibited by Kenyatta's growing inability to rule the country. In 1975, an 
outspoken critic of corruption and the most popular political leader apart from Kenyatta, 
Josiah M. Kariuki, was found murdered. Like in the case o f Mboya (and 15 years later 
Foreign Minister Robert Ouko), the killers are still not known. Following immense public 
pressure, the government agreed to an official investigation o f the murder. Kenyatta deleted 
two prominent names from the final report and no one was charged for the crime.
During the last years o f Kenyatta's rule, his cronies opened a debate about his possible succes­
sor and sought to delete from the constitution the automatic succession of the Vice President 
in case of the President's death (Karimi/Ochieng 1980). The succession question led to deep 
divisions within the dominant Kikuyu elite. Constitutional efforts by one section to prevent 
the non-Kikuyu Moi from to taking over the presidency were thwarted by competing elites 
within their own community,4® including the prominent leaders Charles Njonjo and Mwai 
Kibaki (for details see Widner 1992b: 110-118). In order to silence any further discussion on 
the issue, Njonjo declared in front o f the parliament that "it is a treasonable offence punish­
able by mandatory death sentence for anyone to encompass or even mention the possible 
death o f the head of state" (wa Wamwere 1992: 24).
The stalemate was finally resolved when Kenyatta died at the age o f  82 on 22 August 1978. 
Vice President Daniel arap Moi was now President o f Kenya for three months. He immedi­
ately rewarded his Kikuyu supporters and appointed Charles Njonjo as Attorney General and 
Mwai Kibaki as Vice-President. Moi also released all political prisoners and pledged to 
address issues o f corruption. At the same time, Moi engaged in a more open pro-Western 
foreign policy by appointing Robert Ouko as Minister for Foreign Affairs and allowing the 48
48 During the Kenyatta presidency divisions between the Kiambu faction and other Kikuyu centers, such as 
Nyeri (Mwai Kibaki’s power base) or Mu'ranga, played only a marginal role in national politics. However, since 
1978 those divisions were systematically exploited by Daniel arap Moi.
93
US army to use military facilities close to Mombasa. In the following months. Moi was able 
to consolidate his position, although he still remained heavily dependent on Njonjo, the 
eminence grise o f the early Moi regime. In June 1980 Njonjo won a parliamentary seat in by- 
elections and Moi appointed him as Minister of Home and Constitutional Affairs.
Below the surface o f liberalization, Moi engaged in a  policy o f consolidating his power 
position by slowly removing potential threats to his presidency. While he claimed to continue 
in the footsteps of Kenyatta (*Nyayo') he promoted members of his own Kalenjin tribe or other 
smaller ethnicities as more reliable allies into public offices. Potential critics o f the new 
regime were offered a choice of either accepting their inclusion under Moi’s terms or open 
repression. The Luo Oginga Odinga and other former KPU politicians were simultaneously 
barred from running in the 1979 general elections and offered a parliamentary seat including 
life membership in KANU. However, these efforts to pacify Odinga failed in April 1980 after 
the Odinga failed to give up his public criticism of US military presence without parliamen­
tary consent (ACR, Vol. XIV, B 187) and continued to demand investigations of Kenyatta's 
corruptive presidency/9 Consequently, strong resistance within KANU prevented Odinga 
from standing unopposed on a KANU ticket in by-elections. In July 1980, all societal 
organizations "with a tribal bias" were banned. This measure was mainly directed against the 
Kikuyu-dominated Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA) which remained a threat to 
neopatrimonial rule in the economic sphere. Prior to the decision, the Minister for Information 
and Broadcasting, Peter OIoo-Aringo had accused GEMA of having set itself up as an alter­
native government. The organization was also said to be behind the demands for a change of 
the constitution to prevent Moi from succeeding Kenyatta after his death. During the follow­
ing two years Moi's position remained fragile as Odinga was expelled from KANU on 20 May 
1982 and wrangles between the Vice-President Mwai Kibaki and Charles Njonjo about who 
was "more Nyayo" (ACR, Vol. XIV, B 191) threatened their unequivocal support for Moi. 
After three years in office, Moi faced in mid-1982 a serious crisis o f his presidency.
On 9 June 1982, parliament turned Kenya into a de jure  one-party state after less than an hour 
o f debate and earlier rumors that Odinga was about to announce the creation o f a new opposi- 49
49 In response to Odinga's challenge Moi stated: "I am the only 'father* of or Head of Government in this country. 
If over the last three or so years you have not mended your ways, you are too late. Time is not on your side" 
(ACR, Vol. XIV, B 184).
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tion party. Student unrest at Nairobi University and other colleges had increased steadily 
during the year and provoked security organs to arrest student leaders and lecturers (ACR. 
Vol. XV, B 177). After three years o f political liberalization, the government reintroduced the 
practice of detention without trial to silence the opposition. On 20 July, the well-respected 
editor-in-chief o f The Standard, George Githii, published an editorial titled "Detention with­
out Trial" where he claimed that the continued harassment of university personnel signified 
that Kenya was moving from an open to a closed society. The same day he was removed from 
his position and the Standard apologized in public to the President for the views expressed in 
the paper. Consequently, the International Press Institute (IPI) declared that Kenya "is now 
becoming one o f the worst offenders against free speech” (cited in: ACR, Vol. XV, B 179).
On 1 August, Air Force officers staged a coup attempt and controlled for several hours parts 
o f Nairobi, the airport and the radio station. Immediately, hundreds of students filled the 
Nairobi streets in celebration. However, the majority of the Kenyan army remained loyal to 
Moi and ended the coup. The official death toll was put at 159, but student organizations 
claimed a much larger number. As a result, Moi disbanded the Air Force, closed the universi­
ties and ordered the arrest of about 2,000 officers and 1,000 civilians (mostly students and 
lecturers). After the government declared that many Luo were involved in the coup attempt, 
Odinga was put under house arrest from March to November 1983 and his son, Raila, was 
charged with treason. The Luo information minister Oloo-Aringo had already been dropped 
from the Cabinet shortly after the coup. The independence o f the parliament was also signifi­
cantly curtailed as its members lost several privileges usually enjoyed by MPs in their 
relations with the executive (Widner 1992b: 146).
For the first time in Kenyan history since independence, the international public took notice of 
human rights demonstrations staged by prominent exiles such as the writer Ngugi wa 
Thiong'o in front of Kenyan embassies. The government denounced the activities in an offi­
cial statement: "The attempt to portray the government of Kenya as undemocratic and blood­
thirsty will no doubt fail. Those who have nothing to say against the way the Government 
handled the disturbances and the subsequent treatment o f those found to have been involved 
should face the truth and desist from backing the few cowardly, unpatriotic elements now bent 
on discrediting their motherland" (cited in ACR, Vol. XV, B 183). The Nairobi offices o f 
Associated Press were briefly closed by Special Branch officers and the representative for the
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Ford Foundation was harassed for producing a report on the coup. Domestically, ongoing 
conflicts between the government and the more or less independent press led KANU to 
announce on 5 April 1983 the publication of its own newspaper. In the first edition of the 
Kenya Times Moi promised that the paper would not be "a mouthpiece or propaganda 
machine for KANU and the government, but will be guided by press freedom, which has been 
recognized in the Kenya system" (cited in ACR, Vol. XV, B 194).
Moi also used the situation to depose o f the Kikuyu faction which had been instrumental for 
his ascendancy to presidency. On 9 May 1983, Moi ominously referred during a speech in 
Kisii to an alleged Msaliti50 within the government who was supported by an unspecified 
foreign power. One week later he announced general elections for September, one year earlier 
than constitutionally required. Within days back-benchers in parliament, led by Martin 
Shikuku and Elijah Mwangale, took advantage of the license given to them by Moi and named 
Njonjo as the politician co-operating with the South African apartheid regime to take over the 
presidency in Kenya. Njonjo denied all charges, but was removed in July from the Cabinet 
until an official inquiry was complete.
Moi was returned to presidency unopposed in September and the purge of Njonjo's followers 
within the government was completed. The leading figures of this campaign were generously 
rewarded by the President. Shikuku was appointed Assistant Minister for State in the Office 
o f  the President, while Mwangale was promoted from the insignificant 'Ministry o f Tourism 
and Wildlife' to 'Foreign Affairs'. All ministers of the new government (about 40 per cent of 
all MPs!) were forced to sign a letter saying that they would not criticizes government policy 
in public. In August 1984, Moi declared that he would pardon Njonjo before the lengthy 
hearings o f the special commission of inquiry were finished. "The effect was to discredit 
Njonjo, while Moi himself emerged as a leader showing tolerance" (ACR, Vol. XVII, B 
261).51 Consequently, Njonjo announced his withdrawal from public life. After this period of 
repression, Moi used 'carrots' again and announced in October the release several dissidents, 
including Willy Mutunga and Vincent Otieno. Other critics who had been detained after the 
1982 coup, such as the Kikuyu Koigi wa Wamwere and Edward Oyugi, were released after 
treason charges against them had been suddenly dropped. At the same time, Moi accused
50 The Swahili word means “dirty*' or "untrustworthy" person.
51 One of Njonjo's defense lawyers was Paul Muite, later a leading human rights advocate.
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Amnesty International o f interfering in the internal affairs o f  Kenya and held that detainees 
would not be released because of demands from Amnesty but because they had qualified by 
changing their attitudes (cited in: ACR, Vol. XVI, B 168).5-
By 1984/85, the university was the last remaining center o f  significant societal autonomy 
which resisted the various strategies o f governmental take-over. In March 1985, the US 
political scientist Michael Schatzberg (Schatzberg 1987) was ordered to leave Kenya. An 
official from the President's Office claimed that he had "overdone his research" (ACR, Vol. 
XVII, B 271). Following various police attacks and closure from February to April 1985 and 
March to May 1986, the government finally identified students and lecturers as a major 
recruiting source for an alleged underground conspiracy referred to as MwaKenya. The 
mounting repression caught the attention o f the Western public after international human 
rights organizations published the information available from Kenyan dissidents.
Uganda 1962 to 1974: The Destruction of Neopatrimonial Rule
At independence, an odd alliance o f Buganda monarchists (KY) and Northern nationalists 
(UPC) effectively shut out the Democratic Party (DP) as the strongest single political power 
representing the catholic and more Western oriented population in the South,” The Baganda 
elite feared the modernizing DP as competitor for the control o f  Buganda, while the UPC 
contested DP over national power. Beyond these short-term interests, the coalition had no 
common agenda. Worse, their basic interests (separatism vs. national control) were highly 
conflictive in the long run. Mutesa II had little respect for Obote”  and was sure that the main 
profiteer o f the alliance was Buganda, Initial signs o f a  deteriorating relationship became 
apparent when UPC began to establish political branches in Buganda. In early 1964, the 52
52 In his famous 'parrot1 speech on 13 September 1984, Moi demanded from "all Ministers, Assistant Ministers 
and every other person to sing like parrots in issues I have mentioned. During Kenyatta's period I persistently 
sang the Kenyatta tune until people said: 'This fellow has nothing to say except to sing for Kenyatta’. I say: '1 
didn't have ideas of my own. Who was I to have my own ideas? I was in Kenyatta's shoes and, therefore, I had to 
sing whatever Kenyatta wanted. (,..)Therefore, you ought to sing the song I sing. (...) The day you become a big 
person, you will have the liberty to sing your own song and everybody else will sing it" (cited in: ACR, Vol. 
XVII, B 262).
” In a crude way, one can distinguish a population of predominantly Bantu people in the Southern and Western 
part of the country (e.g. the Baganda) and a predominantly Nilotic population (e.g. the Acholi, Iteso, and Langi) 
in the North and East. This cultural division tends to structure Ugandan politics until today (see also 
Nzita/Mbaga 1993).
u  In his writings Mutesa explained that Obote was a "herd boy" who decided that "life was too vigorous to him" 
(quoted in: Martin 1974:101).
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kabaka lost a referendum about returning two counties to the kingdom o f Bunyoro. but 
refused to sign the results into law. Obote and the central government had supported the 
return. By November 1964, Obote was no longer dependent on the alliance because defections 
from YK and DP gave UPC a comfortable absolute majority in parliament.
Within less than a year, UPC and Baganda leadership were openly accusing each other of 
plotting assassinations and coups. Both groups attempted to win over parliamentarians from 
the other side. On 4 February 1966, a Buganda friendly UPC-MP introduced a successful 
motion in parliament that sought the suspension o f second-in-command of the army Idi Amin 
Dada for alleged gold smuggling and an investigation o f Obote's role in the affair. Obote 
countered the attack with a coup from above, suspended on 24 February the constitution and 
declared as null and void the posts o f the President and Vice-President. A new interim 
constitution, nick-named ‘pigeon-hole’, made Obote in April Executive President and removed 
all federal privileges for Buganda. Subsequently, the Baganda representatives demanded the 
withdrawal o f the central government from Buganda and civil unrest broke out in Buganda. 
The Ugandan Army took advantage of the situation and took over control o f the kabaka's 
residence sending Mutesa II into exile (Ofcansky 1996: 40). "The victory over Mutesa II 
institutionalized violence as the main instrument of political control" (Kasozi 1994: 88). In 
September 1967 Obote abolished all kingdoms.
Obote banned all political parties, except for the UPC, after another attempt to assassinate him 
in October 1969 (Nsibambi 1994). Obote had made extensive use of military means to 
consolidate his position in national politics. Military expenditure rapidly grew from 4.4 per 
cent of the budget in 1964 to 12.3 per cent in 1967. New para-military organizations such as 
the Special Force and the General Service Unit (GSU) as an internal secret service increas­
ingly used violence against the opposition, in particular in their attempts to remove the 
Buganda elite as a political force from national politics. Outside o f  the army Obote relied on 
the support o f the 70,000 members of the Asian community which commercially competed 
with Buganda and dominated the industrial sector, trade but also government services. 
However, Obote's short-term use o f the army against his civilian opponents contributed to the 
long-term demise o f his power position (Khadiagala 1995: 36).
With conservative Buganda effectively shut out of national politics, UPC embarked on a 
program called "move to the left" by announcing in May 1970 the nationalization o f major
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firms and a ban on strikes. Buganda also lost its influence in the Ugandan Army where an 
increasingly independent commander Idi Amin began to recruit his private army from the 
West Nile. When cabinet ministers linked the growing autonomy o f Amin with the coup 
attempt in December 1969, one of the fiercest critics of Amin, Brigadier Pierino Okoya was 
killed under mysterious circumstances. Prior to his departure for the Commonwealth Summit 
in Singapore in January 1971, Obote ordered Amin to disband any army units personally loyal 
to him and requested explanation for nearly 30 per cent overspending.
On 25 January 1971, Amin used Milton Obote's absence and took over the control of govern­
ment. Apart from the military, Amin relied on the initial support from his home area West- 
Niie, the disenfranchised Baganda, and the benign neglect or disguised support by Western 
governments. The latter welcomed Amin because he promised an end to Obote's increasingly 
socialist-leaning economic policies (Clapham 1996: 188), Obote had also requested an end to 
the close military cooperation with Israel which had used Uganda and Idi Amin to channel 
military support to South Sudanese rebel groups. Moreover, The Ugandan president had also 
begun to attack the British government for selling arms to South Africa, and "it was a 
certainty that Obote would be a sharp thorn in the flesh o f Britain. While Obote was at the 
conference, the coup took place, and there have been many suggestions that it took place with 
the connivance not only of Israel but o f  Britain also" (Furley 1989: 276; Martin 1974: 158- 
163). Both, Britain and Israel immediately recognized the new regime. Although colonial 
attitudes of superiority towards the African continent were no longer 'politically correct’ they 
remained deep seated and informed the British public's perception of Uganda in 1971/72. 
"Amin's obvious lack o f  education, his love o f showmanship, his self-awarded decorations 
and his claim to be the 'conqueror o f the British Empire' caused the British public to see him 
in amiable light as a clown and figure of fun: hence the long-running series about him in 
Punch and the many cartoons in British newspapers" (Furley 1989: 277).”
Domestically, the coup was initially greeted by many Ugandans in spontaneous street demon­
strations. The Baganda hoped for a restoration o f their kingdom and its autonomy. Indeed, 5
55 The Daily Telegraph wrote on 26 January 1971 that "one good reason that might be advanced for holding 
Commonwealth conferences more often is that the number of undesirable rulers overthrown as a result of their 
temporary absence, as has now happened to Dr. Obote in Uganda, would thereby be increased". The Spectator 
held on 30 January that "if a choice is to be made between quiet military men and noisy civil dictators then I 
prefer, in Africa at least, the military" (quoted in: Martin 1974: 61).
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Amin initially freed about one hundred political prisoners, most o f them Baganda adopted by 
Amnesty International, and arranged for the return o f the late ¡tabaka Mutesa II to Uganda. 
However, the systematic killings of former supporters and tribal kinsmen o f Obote (Acholi 
and Langi) within the Ugandan army and the police forces began already in July 1971 while 
Amin himself was soliciting arms and cash in London (Kyemba 1977: 46; Seftel 1994: 1 OS- 
135). Within months after Amin took over power, gross violations o f human rights targeted 
whole section of the population.54 Soon, even minimal formal protections of human rights 
disappeared as Idi Amin assumed dictatorial powers and ruled by decree (Kasozi 1994: 114). 
The whole country was brought under the jurisdiction of military tribunals. The National 
Assembly was dissolved and the Cabinet was effectively substituted by a so called Defense 
Council. Spending on "state security" skyrocketed with the creation of new agencies such as 
the infamous State Research Bureau which had 3,000 employees alone. With growing repres­
sion, international and domestic support faded. Neither Britain nor Israel were willing to 
finance Amin's egregious plans for the further expansion of his military capabilities. Amin 
reacted with open aggression and shifted to the Arab world for financial aid.
In early 1972, Israeli military advisers were replaced by instructors from the German Demo­
cratic Republic (GDR) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In August 1972 
Amin announced publicly that he had had a dream in which God instructed him to expel 
50,000 Asians within 90 days, including 30,000 holding British passports. The British 
government was completely taken by surprise and did little more than setting up camps in 
Britain to process the incoming flood of refugees (Furley 1989: 294; Humphrey/Ward 1974). 
Both, Israel and Britain now temporarily severed diplomatic relations and imposed a  trade 
embargo. The US government closed its embassy in Kampala in fall 1973. Amin retaliated by 
seizing British assets in Uganda and recalling the High Commissioner in London. In 
September 1972, pro-Obote guerrillas under the command of Yoweri Museveni launched a 
military attack on Uganda from neighboring Tanzania. The invasion failed miserably and 
Amin retaliated with air attacks on two Tanzanian towns. Libyan leader Muammar el Qadhafi 
had provided troops and military equipment to Amin's disposal. In December Amin 
nationalized all British companies without compensation. In 1974 press reports about 56
56 Until 1971 between four hundred and one thousand people were killed for political reasons, while 
to 1979 estimations range from 300,000 to half a million. From 19S0 to 1985 between 500,000 and oneSnil]
^4
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massacres and public executions in Uganda dominated the Western press. Prominent victims 
were the Chief Justice and former DP leader Benedicto Kiwanuka and the Vice-Chancellor of 
Makerere University Frank Kalimozo (Melady/Melady 1977). By March 1974 the British 
community in Uganda had lost 6,000 out of the estimated 7,000 members. By 1975, virtually 
all foreign aid came either from the Soviet Union (about $50 million) or Arab countries which 
honored Amin's break with Israel. In June 1976, PLO terrorists hijacked an Air France plane 
and redirected it to Entebbe where Amin and the Ugandan army made only little efforts to 
disguise their support for the terrorists. An Israeli commando eventually freed all but three 
hostages, killing all terrorists and many Ugandan soldiers.
International human rights organizations provided since 1974/75 reports about the atrocities 
committed in Uganda. In 1974, David Martin published the book "General Amin", which 
detailed on 250 pages the deadly dictatorship under Amin.57 Hence, it is certainly puzzling 
how long it took until these widely available reports and their monthly additions changed 
Uganda’s international image. Despite the continuous non-governmental mobilization, the 
Amin dictatorship continued another five years until 1979. Chapter 4 will elaborate how 
international norms o f state sovereignty helped Amin to stay in power, while human rights 
norms and institutions were simultaneously significant in delegitimizing authoritarian rule in 
front of the world public opinion.
3.3 Comparison
Kenya and Uganda were no exception to the general rule o f establishing neopatrimonial rule 
in Africa. Despite the establishment o f democratic institutions at the eve of political inde­
pendence, both political systems were soon dominated by the executive branch headed by a 
strengthened president. However, differences in the institutional strength o f main opposition 
groups and early failure o f conflict-mediating mechanisms in Uganda accounted for the 
increasing autonomy o f the military and more frequent use to violent means (negative inte­
gration) in domestic affairs. While the Buganda kingdom remained after independence a well- 
integrated entity within the new Ugandan state, KADU as main opposition force in Kenya was 
too weak to withstand the establishment o f the Kenyatta state.
Ugandans were killed (Kasozi 1994; 4).
57 The last sentence in Martin's book reads: "Uganda has suffered the most and will continue to suffer until the 
removal of the man who holds the bloodstained knife at her throat - Idi Amin Dada" (Martin 1974:249).
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The KADU leadership soon gave up its opposition role and was co-opted into the emerging 
neopatrimonial system, whereas the Baganda —  being already part o f the national government 
—  challenged Obote's efforts to centralize national power. This led to the counterintuitive 
result that the smoother transition to political independence in Uganda was ultimately respon­
sible for the failure o f still weakly developed domestic conflict resolution mechanisms. All 
domestic actors vying for national power prior to and at independence were in Uganda 
included in a fragile arrangement of formally democratic institutions, whereas the more 
violent anti-colonial struggle in Kenya decidedly tipped the balance for Kenyatta and KANU 
after political independence. The weakness o f the opposition in Kenya enabled the establish­
ment of a prevalent mode of positive integration under neopatrimonial rule, whereas the 
strength of the Baganda and Obote's reaction to their resistance set Uganda —  despite much 
better economic indicators than Kenya at that time —  on the path of violence. In Kenya, 
violence against individual members of the opposition was not absent under Kenyatta, but 
increased significantly after Daniel arap Moi led the original KADU coalition (save the now 
politically insignificant white settlers) to national power. However, the institutional legacy 
prevented Kenya from Uganda's experience of recurring indiscriminate mass killings, because 
the logic of positive integration under neopatrimonial rule had been successfully established 
over almost two decades in Kenya, whereas during the same period dictatorship and civil war 
destroyed the basis o f neopatrimonialism in Uganda.
In the following chapter, I will show how international human rights groups became aware of 
human rights abuses in both countries and began to mobilize. This principled challenge of 
authoritarian rule had important international and domestic repercussions and was an impor­
tant causal factor for the initiation of regime change. The differences I described here with 
respect to the emergence of neopatrimonial rule accounts for the subsequent variation in the 
mode of transition. This fact and the growing strength o f the human rights movements in the 
1980s explains why mobilization took much longer to have an effect with regard to Uganda in 
the 1970s and 1980s, than in the late 1980s against the Moi regime.
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4 Mobilization
In the previous chapter I have argued that variation in the paths o f establishing authoritarian 
rule in Kenya and Uganda after political independence have led to significant differences in 
the use o f violence as a means of securing national cohesion from the top. Milton Obote 
already planted the seeds o f  violence and his own removal from power in the mid-1960s when 
he mobilized the military to contain Buganda's demands for greater autonomy. Subsequently, 
his rule increasingly relied on violent means. After the coup in 1971 the situation worsened, 
when Idi Amin established a military dictatorship and removed all constitutional limits to 
executive dominance. The expulsion o f  the Asian population and increasing violent attacks on 
supporters of the former Obote government were early signs of the violent path Ugandan 
politics took.
In contrast, the Kenyan situation turned into a almost text-book version o f neopatrimonial rule 
with the establishment o f  strong clientelist networks from the presidential center. While 
Kenyatta's rule surely contained elements of repression, it mainly relied on means o f positive 
integration. This conclusion appears even more compelling if  one contrasts his rule with the 
Amin dictatorship in neighboring Uganda during the same period. However, the neopatrimo­
nial system only temporarily glossed over the underlying domestic divisions while the pre­
independence ethnic coalitions were hardly affected. When Kenyatta died in 1978, the new 
president Daniel arap Moi promised to follow the footsteps o f his predecessors ("Nyayo"). 
However, his ascendancy to power brought the former KADU coalition into power and led to 
an almost complete elite turnover at the national level. While means of positive integration 
remained an established part of the political culture, Moi increasingly resorted to open repres­
sion against the groups which had formerly build the base of the Kenyatta state.
The increasing repression in Uganda after 1972/73 and in Kenya about ten years later was the 
reason for international human rights mobilization whose early stages are the main subject of 
the following chapter. I will show how transnational human rights created highly visible 
campaigns against the authoritarian governments and affected domestic and international 
perceptions about them. These challenges ultimately contributed to sustainable regime 
change. The comparison also reveals differences with respect to the time it took until signifi­
cant changes occurred. While the Ugandan situation deteriorated for still more than a decade 
after human rights groups raised their concerns in the United Nations, the human rights
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conditions in Kenya never matched the level of atrocities committed in Uganda.
Despite the much worse conditions in Uganda, mobilization took much longer to have an 
effect than in Kenya. The evidence shows that three issues were responsible. First, the extent 
o f violent repression in Uganda and its comparatively greater isolation from the outside world 
made mobilization a more time-consuming effort. Kampala was just another African capital, 
whereas Nairobi hosted not only various United Nations bodies, but also dozens of Western 
journalists. Second, Idi Amin was much less vulnerable to outside pressure than Daniel arap 
Moi. Amin mobilized other African states and successfully framed the issue as part o f the 
anti-colonial struggle. Daniel arap Moi was to repeat that strategy, but with much less success. 
Third, the international human rights movement itself enjoyed greater international recogni­
tion and material support in mid- to late 1980s than ten years earlier. Campaigns such as the 
one against the Idi Amin dictatorship lay the groundwork for the success story 'Amnesty 
International'. When Kenya wras caught up in the limelight o f international human rights 
campaigns, Amnesty International was already a household name in the Western world.
From a theoretical perspective, the chapter reveals how international institutions —  albeit not 
always human rights norms — played an important role in shaping international perceptions 
o f Kenya and Uganda during the period under investigation. In particular, the chapter 
confirms the arguments about the role o f state sovereignty in insulating materially weak 
authoritarian leaders from effective international pressure (see Clapham 1996; Jackson 1990). 
However, such a perspective neglects processes of transnational human rights mobilization 
which might not have immediate and measurable policy effects during this period, but 
crucially contributed to slowly shifting international public opinion and domestic power 
relations. Revealing these seemingly marginal processes is the main subject of this chapter.
4.1 Uganda 1974-1985: The Killing Fields
In their efforts to raise international attention about deteriorating human rights conditions in 
Uganda, Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) were 
initially keen to use mechanisms provided by the United Nations system. On 27 May 1974, 
the ICJ send the first letter concerning the human rights situation in Uganda to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations (International Commission of Jurists 1977: 3). The application
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was based on ECOSOC resolution 1503s* and forwarded to the Sub-Commission on the 
Protection of Minorities and the Prevention of Discrimination. One week later the report was 
released*to the press and received world-wide publicity, especially in the British media. Idi 
Amin threatened to expel all British nationals, i f  the BBC would continue to report on these 
issues (Tolley Jr. 1994: 207). Amin also announced the appointment o f a Ugandan Commis­
sion o f Inquiry to investigate the allegations, while the practice o f public executions and 
genocidal attacks on selected ethnic groups continued unabated. Consequently, the ICJ added 
three additional communications on 16 June, 26 July and 23 August 1974.
i
The Failure o f UN Human Rights Mechanisms
Despite the urgency o f the situation, the UN Commission on Human Rights decided in early 
1975 to postpone its decision on the further treatment of the matter for one year. The commis­
sion had only looked at the first ICJ communication because the three others were not 
received within six weeks prior to meetings o f the Sub-Commission. There was also consider­
able irritation because ICJ had published the same information it had provided under the 
confidential 1503 procedure. The commission appointed by Amin acknowledged in June 1975 
that human rights problems persisted. However, it maintained that the President was free o f 
any responsibility. No further action was taken. The same month Amin threatened in a letter 
to the Queen Elizabeth II. that the author Dennis Hills would be executed, if the British 
Foreign Minister, James Callaghan, would not himself come to Kampala within ten days time 
and ask for a pardon (Furley 1989: 278). Again, the British government accepted the terms set 
by Amin (Hills 1992).
On 1 October 1975, Amin declared in front o f the United Nations General Assembly that 
Amnesty International was "fed on rumors and concoctions from discredited criminals and 
exiles"; Amin also accused Amnesty of having "taken no trouble to investigate or send a team 51
51 Exactly four years earlier (27 May 1970), the Economic and Social Council of the General Assembly had 
voted for resolution 1503 which enabled the UN Commission for Human Rights to investigate cases "which 
appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” Each year in August a working group of the Sub-Commission on the Protection of Minorities and the 
Prevention of Discrimination considers communications by states, non-governmental organizations or individu­
als to the UN which fall under the 1503 procedure. Together with a first response by the accused government (if 
received) the independent experts of the Sub-Commission decide which cases should be forwarded for discus­
sion at the next meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights (usually six months later in February/March). 
The whole procedure is confidential. In 1978 the commission began to announce the names of states those 
human rights situation had been under investigation.
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to Uganda to see for themselves" (Amnesty International 1976: 104). The speech was a direct 
reaction to Amnesty's 1974/75 human rights report, which accused the Ugandan government 
o f gross violations o f human rights.59 Prior to the UN meeting, the former US ambassador to 
Uganda had urged President Ford in a letter on 3 September "to instruct the US delegation (...) 
to be absent when President Amin speaks to that body." Melady referred in his letter to "gross 
violations o f human rights as distinguished from repression" (Melady/Melady 1977: 62). The 
US administration decided that the Head o f its mission to the UN would not be present, but 
other members were to go.
In a subsequent press conference in New York, Amin invited an Amnesty delegation to 
Uganda. One month later, the Secretary General of Amnesty International, Martin Ennals, 
followed up on Amin's speech and requested a meeting with the Ugandan ambassador at the 
United Nations. The ambassador confirmed Amin's invitation to Amnesty International, but 
would not agree on a specific time period for the mission. Subsequently, the Ugandan 
government did no longer respond to further inquiries by Amnesty representatives.
During the 1976 meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights a large Ugandan delega­
tion participated in the deliberations. No information about their responses were made public 
or communicated to the ICJ. The commission now decided to end its investigation and took 
no further action. Idi Amin immediately claimed that his government had been cleared by the 
United Nations. The ICJ decided to prepare a second report and sent it to the UN on 2 June 
1976. In the following months, violence of security agencies became increasingly random, 
However, diplomatic relations with Western countries deteriorated only in mid-1976 as a 
result of the rescue operation by Israeli soldiers to free airline passengers held by Palestinian 
terrorists at Entebbe airport. The Israeli commando not only freed all but three hostages, but 
destroyed also Amin's air force. In retaliation, Amin's soldiers killed one of the hostages, Dora 
Bloch, who had been seriously ill and was treated at a hospital in Kampala at the time of the 
raid (Kyemba 1977: 166-178). On 28 July 1976, Britain broke off diplomatic relations with 
Uganda.
59 A.B.K. Kasozi provided a detailed list of massacres committed between 1971 and 1979 (Kasozi 1994: 249- 
253).
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Based on the second ICJ report on Uganda, the Sub-Commission decided on 25 August 1976 
to recommend to the Commission on Human Rights the resumption o f an inquiry into the 
Ugandan human rights situation. The Sub-Commission requested the Commission to "make a 
through study o f the human rights situation in Uganda, based on objective and reliably 
attested information." So far, similar studies had only been approved for South Africa, the 
Occupied Territories in the Middle East, and Chile. On 7 February 1977, Amnesty Interna­
tional supplemented the ICJ communication on Uganda under the 1503 procedure. However, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights was already in session (7 February-12 March) and 
failed to take the new material into consideration. Only in June 1978 Amnesty published its 
first comprehensive human rights report covering the period from 1977 to 1978 (Amnesty 
International 1978).
On 17 February, Archbishop Janani Luwum and two ministers were killed, probably by the 
hands o f Amin himself (Kyemba 1977: 179-192). During the same week, the Ugandan Attor­
ney General Godfrey Lule had to defend Uganda's human rights record in Geneva. It was now 
unnecessary for the Ugandan government to send an observer delegation, because it had been 
elected to the commission for a two-year period starting in 1977. According to Lule's account, 
Amin called him twice during that time. On one occasion he informed Lule about the death o f 
the Archbishop and added that "God has punished them". With regard to the UN investigation 
Amin told Lule to decline all knowledge about the accusations. Lule himself knew that he 
could not simply deny the burgeoning evidence, because "I would not have been taken seri­
ously." Instead he tried to further delay the procedures and told the UN Commission that more 
time should be given for the consideration o f the allegations. Knowing that he was now in 
danger for his life, Lule fled into exile to London right after the Geneva sessions (Lule 1977). 
There was no follow-up by the UN bodies on Lule's departure to London or the human rights 
situation in Uganda. The issue was to be taken up again in the following year.
The End o f Amin's Rule
It took until June 1977 until the Commonwealth o f former British colonies issued a warning 
o f possible action against the Ugandan government. The Head of States declared in a resolu­
tion that "cognizant of the accumulated evidence o f sustained disregard for the sanctity o f life 
and o f massive violation o f basic human rights inn Uganda, it was the overwhelming view o f 
Commonwealth leaders that these excesses were so gross as to warrant the world’s concern
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and to evoke condemnation by the heads o f governments in the strong and unequivocal terms" 
(Kyemba 1977: 237). However, no immediate action was taken. The same month, the US 
ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, came out with a clear condemnation and 
compared Amin's regime to Hitler's genocide o f the Jews.
In August 1977, Ugandan exile groups in Kenya, Tanzania, Great Britain and the United 
States formed an umbrella coalition and finally met in Lusaka (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 139). At 
the same time, exiles in London formed the Uganda Group for Human Rights (UGHR), began 
to intensify networking with organizations such as Amnesty International and raised their 
voices for sanctions against the Amin regime. Representatives from Amnesty International 
continued to ask for permits to visit the country, but such requests were not answered. Despite 
the additional evidence provided, the UN Commission on Human Rights decided in March 
1978 to take no action, but to merely continue its observation o f the Ugandan situation (Tolley 
Jr. 1994: 208). The commission had previously rejected a British proposal to further investi­
gate the human rights situation and, in particular, the death of Archbishop Luwum. On 3 April 
1978, Amin announced the creation of a national human rights committee composed o f mem­
bers of the security forces and other government agencies. It was charged with overseeing all 
contacts between the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the people o f Uganda 
(Amnesty International 1979: 166) and had no other raison d'etre, than to deflect further 
criticism without changing repressive policies.“
At the very end of Amin's rule (Smith 1980: ch. 14), there were only a few significant official 
responses to the human rights reports, which had little or no effect on the domestic situation. 
Following a hearing on the situation in Uganda in June 1978 (Committee on Foreign 
Relations 1978), the United States Congress demanded a trade embargo against the country. A 
majority o f votes was only secured after three communist countries (Cambodia, Cuba, and 
Vietnam) had also been added to the list (Forsythe 1988: 78). However, the embargo did not 
go into effect until Amin was violently removed from power. After the break of diplomatic 
relations between Great Britain and Uganda, the United States was the single largest 
purchaser o f Ugandan coffee. All airplanes used by Amin for his travels and imports o f  luxury 
goods continued to be serviced in the United States. After heated debates in the British press 60
60 See also the statement of Whitney Elsworth, former Chairman of the Board, US section of Amnesty Interna­
tional at a US Senate hearing in 1978 (Committee on Foreign Relations 1978: 25).
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and parliament, the government finally agreed to ban Amin from attending the Common­
wealth Summit in London in June 1979 (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 138). However, the Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, refused to consider a 
suspension o f Uganda from the Commonwealth arguing that Britain had to consider "how best 
to sustain and help the people o f Uganda as a whole" (cited in Furley 1989: 279).
Considering the eight years o f terror and the abundantly available documentation provided by 
NGOs at least since 1974/75, this response represented an instance o f complete foreign policy 
failure. "[The] British press in 1977-79 was full o f accounts o f atrocities - but various types of 
trade were allowed to continue, along with the activities of British banks" (Furley 1989: 279). 
In particular, British companies supplied the infamous State Research Bureau up until 1979 
with radio equipment and the army with night vision cameras and telephone tapping devices. 
In response to opposition queries, Prime Minister James Callaghan claimed that telecommuni­
cation equipment was provided "to detect television license dodgers" only. A British company 
involved in the deliveries explained that it only traded through a third party in Nairobi which 
was "not always aware o f the end-user application" (cited in: Furley 1989: 281).
In October 1978 Amnesty International sought to endorsed the human rights campaign with 
the release of Human Rights Violations in Uganda in cooperation with the UGHR. The report 
was widely published and repeated demands to cut off all trade in order "to create the 
conditions in which Ugandans themselves can remove the government" (The Guardian, 20 
October 1978). The British government still failed to take further steps and defended its 
position o f condemning the government, but refusing to "punish the Ugandan people". 
Despite growing demands for sanctions from Ugandans themselves, this justification was used 
to continue the supply o f luxury goods (so called 'whiskey runs'). Indeed, in the last two years 
of his rule these weekly supplies allowed Amin to 'buy' enough loyalty within the army 
(Kyemba 1977: 254) to secure the survival of his regime.
In 1978 British exports to Uganda totaled 19.4 million Pounds, including 300,000 Pounds for 
alcoholic beverages alone. Criticism o f  the in the House o f Lords was rebuked by Baroness 
Stedman by claiming that "we need to keep trade lines open for other things" (cited in: Furley 
1989: 280). The supplies were only stopped after Tanzanian troops had already invaded 
Uganda in March 1979. Certainly, the pervasive norm of state sovereignty alluded to by 
Christopher Clapham and Robert Jackson played a crucial role in explaining why there was "a
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time lag when it came to public absorption o f catastrophes or crises in Uganda" (Furley 1989: 
276). And even when this information could no longer be denied, the 'negative sovereignty 
regime' framed the options of Western policy makers in such a way that they failed to develop 
strategies against the ongoing gross violations of human rights. Nonetheless, in the end the 
transnational human rights movement succeeded in delegitimizing the Amin government as 
one o f the worst human rights violating regimes. Human rights norms were now established 
competitors of the sovereignty norm when it came to international debates on Uganda.
The end to Amin's rule was a result of internal divisions within his regime and the dictator's 
efforts to control those divisions by launching a military attack on neighbouring Tanzania. 
Various army factions openly competed for scarce financial resources and control o f  the 
political arena (Ofcansky 1996: 47). In order to defuse the mounting tensions within the 
military, Amin ordered the violent annexation of Tanzanian border territory. The Ugandan 
army briefly occupied Tanzanian territory but was quickly rebuked by Tanzanian forces in 
November 1978. In January 1979, Tanzanian troops and about 1,000 pro-Obote exiles invaded 
Uganda. Airlifted troops from Libya and several hundred Palestinian fighters could not 
prevent the downfall o f the Amin regime on 11 April 1979 (Sathyamurthy 1986: 513). Amin 
fled into exile to Libya and eventually to Saudi Arabia.
The Return o f Milton Obote
Following two short-lived governments, Milton Obote returned to the presidency after his 
party Ugandan People's Congress (UPC) had been declared the winner of multiparty elections 
held on 10 December 1980 (Bwengye 1985: Ch. 5). Prior efforts by the Tanzanian govern­
ment to form an all-inclusive exile government that would eventually take over power had 
already failed in the preparatory stages when a number of important representatives o f  the 
UPC were not invited to an important conference held in Moshi in March 1979. At this 
conference, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and its armed wing Uganda 
National Liberation Army (UNLA) were formed to support the fight against Amin. According 
to the Moshi agreements, the Muganda Yusuf Lule was sworn in as president41 on 11 April 
and a thirty-member National Consultative Council (NCC) entirely formed o f  exiles took over 
legislative functions. Great Britain reopened its High Commission and immediately recog- 61
61 In Moshi, the Obote supporter Muwanga had lost to Lule in elections for presidency among the participants.
110
nized the new government and sent an eight-man team o f  economic experts. The new 
president had already served as a minister for seven years under British rule in the 1950s.
Another significant newcomer on the Ugandan political scene was Yoweri Museveni who had 
started his political career within UPC, but left the party during the Amin period because he 
advocated a clear break with the existing Ugandan political establishment including Obote's 
UPC. Museveni came from Ankole which historically tended to side with UPC for fear o f the 
Baganda dominance. However, the Obote rule discredited the party for many intellectuals 
which now either tried to reform the UPC from within or sought new platforms of political 
activism. During the worst part of the first Obote regime in the late 1960s Museveni studied 
Political Science and Economics at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. He developed strong 
Marxist views and visited for the first time in 1968 FRELIMO rebels in Mozambique. After 
finishing his studies, Museveni worked initially in the Ugandan Foreign Ministry and later in 
the President's Office.
Between 1971 and 1979, Museveni became the leader o f a small guerilla group called Front 
for the National Salvation (FRONASA) and spent some time in guerilla training camps in 
Mozambique. In an interview in 1972, Museveni declared that FRONASA fought "to remove 
Amin's tyranny and when that is done questions such as leadership and ideology can be settled 
through a democratic process by the people of Uganda. In Africa we continuously talk about 
Sharpeville where 67 people were killed, but in terms of human waste that does not compare 
to Uganda. Life is so cheap in Uganda now, that it is useless to try to keep accounts" (cited in: 
Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. XVIII, B 474). After his return to Uganda in 1980/81, 
Museveni initially lacked a domestic power base outside his private army to defend his anti- 
Obote course (Sathyamurthy 1986: 663) and was left relatively vulnerable to attacks from 
Obote's representatives in Uganda, including Paulo Muwanga and David Oyite-Ojok.
The differences within the anti-Amin coalition surfaced as soon as Amin was in exile. Lule 
clashed on several occasions with the NCC as he tried to increase Buganda's influence on 
national affairs and reshuffled the Cabinet without consulting the NCC. Despite popular 
protests and a general strike, the NCC replaced Lule61 after only 68 days and appointed 61*
61 Lule fled to Tanzania and later formed, together with Yoweri Museveni, the National Resistance Movement
(NRM). He died in January 1985 in London.
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Godfrey Binaisa, a former Attorney General under Obote (Tumusiime 1992: 53). The British 
government did not recognize the new government as it feared that Binaisa was simply a 
transitory figure preparing the return of Obote. These fears were not entirely unsubstantiated, 
because non-UPC quarters within the fragile coalition only narrowly prevented the appoint­
ment o f the Obote follower Paulo Muwanga to the presidency.
In August 1979 Binaisa declared a two year ban on all party activities except under the UNLF 
umbrella. Two months later he restored the Public Order and Security Act o f 1967 which 
allowed for detention without trial (Ofcansky 1996: 50). In November 1979 Binaisa removed 
Yoweri Museveni from the post o f Defense Minister (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 147) when it 
became clear that Museveni, Oyite-Ojok, and Muwanga maintained personal loyalties within 
their "private armies" and effectively refused to build a truly national armed force. In Febru­
ary 1980, Binaisa tried to also remove Paulo Muwanga from the Interior Ministry. Previously, 
Muwanga had banned several newspapers, arrested several journalists and claimed that the 
action was a Cabinet decision. Binaisa refused to back Muwanga and ordered the release o f all 
journalists. However, Muwanga was supported by the NCC and rejected an offer to take up an 
ambassadorship in Geneva. At the same time, the Tanzanian President Nyerere and his 
Foreign Minister Ben Mkapa did not support Binaisa, but threatened to withdraw all 
Tanzanian troops from Ugandan territory if  the president ignored the wishes o f the NCC.
In the following weeks Binaisa lost the domestic power battle to the NCC. He failed with his 
plan to force all candidates for the upcoming general elections to run under a common UNLF 
umbrella.63 Even though Binaisa was able to mobilize some domestic popular support and 
switched from Nyerere to Kenya's President Moi as regional ally, his position did hardly 
improve. On 3 May two close aides of Binaisa, the editor Roland Kakooza and a former UPC 
youth winger James Namakajo, were arrested by the Ugandan military and tortured at Makin- 
dye military prison. Only the presence of Tanzanian troops in the prison prevented their 
execution. The powerful Army Chief of Staff David Oyite-Ojok denied any knowledge o f the 
affair. Binaisa retaliated on 10 May and appointed David Oyite-Ojok as new ambassador to 
Algeria, well knowing that this would be the end to his presidency (ACR, Vol. XIII, B 359). 
The same day, Oyite-Ojok ordered the army out of the barracks and took control of Kampala.
63 A few years later, Yoweri Museveni reintroduced that idea under his broad-based NRM government.
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Within the next hours, a military commission consisting o f Paulo Muwanga (chairman). 
Yoweri Museveni (vice chairman), Tito Okello, David Oyite Ojok, William Omaria, and 
Zeddi Maruru took over, placed Binaisa under house arrest, and scheduled multiparty 
elections for December. The commission declared in a statement that "whereas Ugandans and 
their Tanzanian allies who took up arms against Amin did so because they wanted and still 
want peace, stability and freedom re-established in Uganda, Godfrey Binaisa and most o f his 
close colleagues made the politics if  intrigue, greed for power and wealth and rampant 
corruption, their central concern and preoccupation. (...) Binaisa has made no attempt to build 
a clean government" (cited in: ACR, Vol. XIII, B 360). The commission appointed an entirely 
civilian Cabinet, declared that it did not act in the name o f  Obote and immediately send 
envoys to win the support o f Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere.
On 27 May 1980, Milton Obote returned from exile. In his first public statements he revived 
his anti-Western rhetoric o f the late 1960s and attacked Great Britain for having supported 
Amin. Western diplomats put their hopes on the upcoming elections and the Democratic Party 
(DP) which seemed to re-emerge as an equal rival to UPC. In June 1980, a party conference 
elected Paul Ssemogerere as the new DP leader, while Yusuf Lule was supposed to take over 
after his return from exile. However, the Military Commission refused to guarantee Lule's 
security and several DP supporters were shot dead when army personnel was send to disperse 
the crowds waiting for Lulers arrival. Consequently, Lule remained outside the country.
Despite early signs of pre-election manipulations in favor o f UPC, Western donor govern­
ments stuck with their initial decision to financially support the election process. In the end, 
Britain alone covered one-third of the total costs. Apparently, British government officials 
were quite convinced that Western ballot boxes and a Commonwealth observer team would 
not only ensure a fair process, but ultimately a victory of the Democratic Party. "It now seems 
clear that if  the West does not take some action to ensure a fair Ugandan election, yet another 
portion of former British Africa will be lost to the influences o f the Eastern Bloc. Kenya will 
stand alone as last bastion o f Western influence" (Daily Telegraph, 7 October 1980, cited in: 
Furley 1989: 283).
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Prior to the elections, Yoweri Museveni formally broke with his UPC past and launched in 
July his own party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). Along with other intellectuals 
and mdre radical former UPC members, Museveni argued that Uganda needed an entirely new 
political structure, ending the rule o f hopelessly discredited parties. The Conservative Party 
(CP) completed the four-party elections as a more liberal successor of the Kabaka Yekka 
party. The pre-election period continued with strong disagreements about election procedures 
between the UPC and the other three parties' representatives. Although all parties had 
delegates in the Military Commission and the NCC, "the effective leadership was in the hands 
o f  UPC supporters" (ACR, Vol. XIII, B 369). On 27 November, 14 candidates o f the DP and 
UPM  were disqualified and UPC could already count on 14 unopposed seats two weeks prior 
to the elections. DP and UPM also protested without avail the creation of additional constitu­
encies in the UPC-dominated Northern part o f Uganda. Moreover, the 1967 constitution was 
biased in favor of UPC because it spelled out that a party gaining at least 40 per cent o f the 
votes and forming the last government would automatically also form the new government. 
Despite these controversies, which were openly discussed in several daily and weekly 
newspapers, all parties finally agreed to participate in the elections.
On 10 December, voting commenced in 5,000 polling stations. In some areas, including the 
capital Kampala, the ballot papers arrived late for inexplicable reasons. When initial results 
showed a DP lead, its supporters took to the streets in celebration. In the midst o f the counting 
procedure, UPC leader Muwanga declared that the electoral commission was no longer in 
charge o f the process. Instead, Muwanga himself eventually announced the results. After this 
intervention, it came at no surprise that UPC gained absolute majority with 74 out o f  126 
parliamentary seats, leaving DP with 51, UPM with only one and CP with no seat.64 After a 
few days of deliberation, the Commonwealth observers held that "despite the imperfections 
and deficiencies to which we have drawn attention, and subject to the concern expressed on 
the question o f nominations and unopposed returns, we believe this has been a valid electoral 
exercise which should broadly reflect the freely expressed choice o f the people of Uganda" 
(ACR, Vol. XIII, B 370).
64 The British press criticized the "dubious triumph" {The Times, 15 December 1980) of Obote. The Sunday 
T elegraph  titled on 14 December "Observers Quit in Disgust as Obote ’Wins"'. The D aily Telegraph  wrote in an 
editorial on 13 December that Obote was returned to power "by whatever means". The Guardian on 12 Decem­
ber claimed that the "Military steps in as Obote loses elections".
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On 15 December, Obote was sworn in as President for the second time in Ugandan history, 
while Paulo Muwanga was rewarded with the vice-presidency and the Defense portfolio. DP 
representatives agreed in January 1981 to acknowledge the results and to form a parliamentary 
opposition. Within a few months seven MPs crossed the floor from DP to UPC. More radical 
DP representatives such as secretary-general and Muganda Andrew Kayiira left Uganda, 
formed an exile wing o f  the DP and were soon joined by Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa. 
The British government quickly accepted the doubtful victory o f  UPC and established 
diplomatic relations with the new government. Obote successfully courted the British 
government by publicly distancing himself from socialist ideas and appointing Shafiq Aram, a 
Ugandan of Asian origin as High Commissioner in London. In light o f  the nightmare Amin 
brought to Great Britain in 1972 with the expulsion of Asian citizens, this highly symbolic 
decision ensured goodwill for years to come. Arain became a crucial force in selling a "new'" 
Obote (Furley 1989: 284) and isolating the inter-governmental relations between Uganda and 
Great Britain from a generally hostile British press and reemerging human rights concerns 
soon to be expressed by Amnesty International.
The Deterioration of Human Rights Conditions
The domestic situation did not justify the optimism expressed by the British government. 
Yoweri Museveni abandoned his party and went underground to create the rebel group 
Popular Resistance Army (PRA) and soon thereafter the National Resistance Army (NRA). In 
August 1981, the NRM published its political program. It outlined that "after toppling the 
Obote regime, the NRM, in consultation with the other fighting and political groups working 
against the Obote dictatorship, will ask for a broad-based Interim Administration." In its effort 
to bring back a democratic government, "the NRM is anxious that this task should be 
approached with thoroughness at all stages, so as to ensure that democracy, once back in 
Uganda, will not be a temporary phenomenon. As part of laying the ground work for returning 
Uganda to democratic government, the Interim Administration shall see to it that a new 
Constitution, based on the popular will, is drafted and promulgated by a Constituent 
Assembly elected by the peoples themselves (emphasis added, HPS)" (cited in: Waliggo 1995: 
22).
Only one year after the elections, the NRA controlled already significant parts o f the country 
and enjoyed considerable popular support. In contrast, Obote’s army perpetrated gross human
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rights abuses throughout the country. Sensitized by the transnational human rights mobiliza­
tion against Amin, it took only weeks to convince the British public opinion that the Obote 
regime was about to repeat atrocities from the Amin era.65 Meanwhile the British government 
modified its approach only in so far as it now involved the Commonwealth as a whole in its 
support for an authoritarian regime. "The British press was [again] full of atrocity stories, it 
was now that the government responded to Uganda’s request for a Commonwealth military- 
training team to try to remedy the situation" (Furley 1989: 285). Hence, the Obote regime 
received support although the Observer held already on 15 November 1981 that "Britain and 
other Commonwealth countries would certainly hesitate to send troops to train an army set to 
crush a popular rebellion sparked by its own brutality."
In an effort to root out the rebels, the Obote government randomly recruited new army and 
police personnel which was only partly trained by the Tanzanian occupational force, the 
Commonwealth military training force and some North Korean advisers. The idea o f  the 
Commonwealth group "to train whose who would train the rest" (Furley 1989: 286) failed to 
have any positive effects on the conduct of the army in fighting the rebel insurgency.66 At the 
same time, the counter insurgency operations only strengthened Museveni's rebels which now 
controlled three BUganda districts (Luwero, Mpigi, and Mukono) and even began to attack 
parts of the capital Kampala. The guerillas systematically attacked police stations and military 
installations where they captured large quantities of arms and met with little or untrained 
resistance. Afterwards they retreated to the bush in order to avoid any large-scale confronta­
tions with government troops.
On 24 September 1981, leaders from the Anglican, Roman Catholic, and Orthodox churches 
as well as the Muslim community claimed in an open letter that "within three weeks, a total o f 
over 100 innocent citizens have been murdered, mainly by the gun and by people who are 
there to protect and defend the people of Uganda. (...) Road-blocks around the country have
65 A.B.K. Kasozi provides a detailed list of massacres committed between 1981 and 1984 (Kasozi 1994: 240- 
248).
66 During that time, the Uganda entry in the African Contemporary Record was heavily biased in favor of the 
second Obote government. However, even ACR had to admit gross violations of human rights perpetrated by the 
Obote regime as early as 1981/82. "Wherever they (Museveni’s rebels, HPS) struck, (...) the army was routinely 
send in to deal with them; this sometimes brought innocent villagers and peasants into conflict with the security 
forces, who did not always behave well and, on occasion, behaved very badly indeed. Obote might be held 
responsible for sending soldiers, not notable for their discipline in troubled areas, but what was his alternative? 
(see ACR, Vol. XIV, B 298-308,302).
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become places of torture” (ACR, Voi. XIV, B 307/310). The church leaders demanded that 
the government should restore the rule o f law, discipline the army and initiate round-table 
talks with the opposition. Obote countered the allegations and blamed the "incidents" on 
"bandits wearing army uniforms" (ACR, Voi. XIV, B 307).
By January 1982, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) had established itself as the 
main political body bringing together various anti-Obote forces, including Museveni's 
guerrillas, Binaisa, Lule, Kayiira, and also some former Amin supporters under the leadership 
o f Amin's former Finance Minister Moses Ali. London became the center of the growing exile 
community, while the National Resistance Army (NRA) became the official military wing o f 
the NRM inside Uganda. The same month, Obote invited a delegation o f Amnesty Interna­
tional to visit the country. Government officials denied allegations o f "systematic human 
rights abuses" and answered to 361 individual cases highlighted by Amnesty (Amnesty 
International 1983: 124). Amnesty remained unsatisfied and published in April an updated 
report which included another one hundred cases of torture and extra-judicial killings. 
Amnesty asked the government to create a commission for the thorough investigation o f the 
incidences (International Herald Tribune, 16 April 1982),
The government refused to follow this suggestion and Obote criticized Amnesty International 
for not discussing the content of the follow-up report with his government. Later, the High 
Commissioner in London, Shafiq Arain, presented a 26-page rebuttal and claimed that "my 
government has nothing to hide on human rights in Uganda." The Information Minister, 
David Anyoti, claimed that his country's reputation was being damaged by "irresponsible 
reporting" and by "second-rate yellow journalists" to whom "sensationalism and subjectivity 
become the rule o f their operations" (ACR, Voi. XIV, B 312). He added that only the 
Tanzanian (Shihata), the Sudanese (SUNA), the Soviet (TASS), and the Chinese news 
agencies were properly accredited and that new rules would make access for freelance 
journalists impossible (implemented in February 1982).
The Amnesty report of "widespread tortures and killings" sparked renewed debates about the 
British engagement in Uganda. While liberal and conservative papers more or less agreed on 
the dismal state o f human rights in Uganda, they drew very different conclusions from that 
analysis. The Times described human rights conditions today as even worse than under Amin, 
but concluded that "the task o f the Commonwealth training mission - disciplining the army -
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is all the more pressing and urgent." A standard argument repeated in this article also held that 
Obote had proven to be incapable o f unifying the country, but "yet it is not at all certain that 
anyone else could do it better" (The Times, 8 July 1982).
A November 1982 report by Sir Peter Archer for the Human Rights Group o f the British 
House of Commons commended the Ugandan government for being "cooperative to a degree 
far in excess o f what I have experienced from many governments in similar situations." The 
report identified the army as the main problem and recommended to Western observers to 
"temper their criticisms with a measure o f understanding, to recognize and encourage real 
attempts at improvements, and to attempt to lower the emotional temperature and diminish the 
feeling o f insecurity." Other independent observers invited by Obote in 1982 were the Roman 
Catholic Cardinal Emmanuel Nsubugu and the British Scholar Colin Legum. Both were 
allowed to visit Luzira Maximum Security Prison where they found conditions to be generally 
tolerable.
The main problem with these visits was their restricted character and the obvious attempt by 
Obote to counter negative international reporting on human rights conditions in Uganda. All 
military barracks were off limits although Amnesty International had for some time identified 
those installations as the main torture centers. Moreover, the ongoing massacres by UNLA 
soldiers in villages surrounding Kampala were completely ignored. When Colin Legum 
confronted Obote in an interview with his own experience (from visits in Kenya, Cyprus, and 
Algeria) on the differences between civilian and military prisons, the President admitted that 
"since liberation in 1979, something similar to what you have described has happened, but not 
on the scale you may have experienced elsewhere, or anything like that which was portrayed 
by our opponents or by the media abroad. The important point to note is that these happenings 
are now under control, and this is the great difference between the past and the present" (cited 
in: ACR, Vol. XV, B 312).
Despite Obote's efforts to uplift his government’s international image, international reporting 
became worse rather than better. In May 1982, the Guardian and the Los Angeles Times 
simultaneously published two stories by Charles Powers titled 'Horror Story from Africa’s 
True Heart of Darkness' and 'The Capitalist Lifeline that skirts Uganda’s Graveside’. On 16 
June the International Herald Tribune titled "Ugandans call Conditions worse than under 
Amin." Three weeks later The Times held in an editorial that despite some economic progress,
"very little progress has been made in the observance of human rights in Uganda" (cited in: 
ACR, Vol. XV, B 313). On 29 August the Sunday Times headline across eight columns held 
that "Obote's Uganda Plunges Back into Bloodbath." Hence, activities by human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International had put Uganda back on the international agenda 
very shortly after Obote took power for the second time.
Although reports on the deteriorating human rights situation were already abundant in late 
1981 and early 1982, the May 1982 donor meeting in Paris voted to give S557 million aid to 
the Obote government. Under a series o f stand-by agreements the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) borrowed Uganda a total o f $305 million until 1984 (Henstridge 1994: 53). In 
return, the Ugandan government agreed to follow fiscal measures proposed by the IMF. Only 
West German, Danish and Dutch representatives expressed some concern o f human rights 
issues by citing information provided by Amnesty International. There were two major 
reasons why the donor community largely ignored NGO input and failed to recognize the 
permanent instability emanating from the 1980 elections. First, donors were simply inclined 
to trust the 'elder statesman' Obote who was now supporting economic austerity programs 
developed by the IMF, including a sharp devaluation of the Ugandan Shilling and a privatiza­
tion program of state-run companies. Second, in neighboring Kenya the opposition began in 
early 1982 to openly challenge the rule o f Daniel arap Moi, who represented at that time the 
only reliable Western ally in the region. As one observer concluded, "the international 
community is lending support to Uganda because of its strategic significance, but it is 
ignoring a state o f internal chaos that amounts to disaster for most of its citizens" 
(Anonymous 1984b: 220).
The International Community
At the end o f 1982, the contract of the Commonwealth Military Training group was extended 
for another year and its strength doubled to 70 officers. At the same time, the Ugandan 
government hired the private British training group Falconstar to build a 5,000 men Special 
Force. Great Britain remained the largest provider o f foreign aid, followed by the Soviet 
Union, Italy, West Germany, and France (ACR, Vol. XV, B 323). The year 1983 was marked 
by a continued worsening o f human rights conditions, especially in the now infamous Luwero 
Triangle. Kampala remained insecure with reports o f at least 16 people shot dead within only 
one week in April. From June to August 1983, government troops killed thousands o f
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peasants and filled detention camps with more than 100,000 people (Ofcansky 1996: 55). The 
army unit charged with the intensive sweep was specially trained by former British Special 
Air Service (SAS) officers (ACR, Vol. XVI, B 295). In many cases, the attacks were also 
ethnically motivated, because the army was again dominated by soldiers coming from Obote's 
home region in the Northern part of Uganda (Langi and Acholi). These soldiers now killed 
and looted in the South, but also in Amin’s West Nile region as a revenge for the atrocities 
committed against the Northern population during the 1970s. In the South, the exile Banyar- 
wanda67 community became a major source for NRM recruits.
Videos taken by the NRA rebels documented the atrocities committed by the Ugandan army 
and were sent abroad to intensify international mobilization against the Obote regime (Kasozi 
1994: 172). Church leaders and the dwindling parliamentary opposition repeated their 
demands for round-table talks with the opposition. Obote refused and argued that 
"parliamentary democracy will never be established in Uganda and unity will be illusory if 
after every dispute, be it on elections or something else, Ugandans decide to take to the gun 
and are appeased by the so-called round-table conference” (ACR, Vol. XVI, B 292/3).
Despite the evidence for gross violations of human rights provided to the international public, 
official reactions from foreign governments were hardly different from the Amin era. Well- 
intentioned diplomatic efforts to continue a bilateral dialogue with the Ugandan government 
on the human rights situation were conducted without decisive follow-up. In August 1983, 
Obote invited the Australian, British, and Canadian High Commissioners to a tour o f the 
newly established detention camps in the Luwero triangle. During the visit he declared that 
"the people who had got displaced due to bandit activities were voluntarily returning to certain 
centers such as police stations, army posts, administrative headquarters and schools" (Kasozi 
1994: 184).
Despite the horrendous violations o f human rights committed by the army in early and mid- 
1983, the outgoing British High Commissioner Hillier-Frye commended the economic 
progress in the country and held that "Uganda's security position had improved considerably"
67 The Banyarwanda are an exile community originating from Rwanda. When the NRM rebels finally marched 
into Kampala they were the third largest group within the 14,000 man rebel army (following the Banyankole and 
the Baganda). On 1 October 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was supported by 4,000 former NRA 
soldiers in its attempt to overthrow the Rwandan government of Juvenal Habyarimana.
120
(ACR, Vol. XVI, B 307). Quite the opposite assessment was given by non-governmental 
sources also based in London. In response to Amnesty's continued criticism the Ugandan 
government accused the organization t in September 1983 o f "hostile criticism" and "rude 
behavior". In an interview with Financial Times the same year, Obote accused Amnesty o f not 
being able to distinguish between political prisoners and common criminals (quoted in: 
Sathyamurthy 1986: 673).
The ongoing civil war effectively paralyzed the legislature and the judiciary. DP decided to 
boycott by-elections for nine vacant parliamentary seats in November 1983. UPC now had 90 
seats (compared to 74 in 1980), while DP was left with 35 MPs (51). Moreover, several 
opposition MPs were imprisoned in 1983, one shot dead by an army soldier and another listed 
as disappeared. The remaining opposition press, largely controlled by DP supporters, came 
under growing pressure. The Vice-President Muwanga accused the press in July 1983 of "lies" 
and deliberate efforts to breed "antagonism among Ugandans." Despite all evidence, he 
refuted claims by the DP paper Munnansi that several thousand Ugandans had been killed in 
the Luwero Triangle. In his counterattack Muwanga alleged that Munnansi was financed by a 
"foreign source". He continued to warn the press that the government would not "sit and 
watch the country go to the dogs" (citations in: ACR, Vol. XVI, B 304). Despite the harass­
ment of the press, opposition papers continued to be published and Munnansi remained the 
most widely read paper.
The Military Success of the NRM
Museveni's rebels slowly extended their control o f the countryside and strongly enforced a 
code o f  conduct. The NRA became known for harsh disciplinary measures taken against its 
own members in case o f human rights violations committed against civilians. Apart from the 
vastly different treatment o f  the indigenous population, the main reason for the rebel's success 
was the replacement o f  the chiefs system by democratically elected resistance councils. 
Moreover, the NRM/A was the only rebel group with a coherent political program reflected in 
the so called Ten Point Program* (Tumusiime 1991: 5). In 1985, this program was officially 
adopted during a meeting o f  the NRM leadership in Austria. "The NRM believes that it is the 
inalienable right o f all peoples to freely choose their government and determine the manner o f 
that government. Rigged or manipulated elections are an insult to the people, and a sure recipe 
for instability, conflict and upheavals. Constitutions imposed on the people by guise, wile or
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force cannot be the basis o f stable and peaceful governance of men. It will be one of the 
primary duties o f the NRM government to effect a swift but systematic return to democratic 
government after toppling the Obote^regime" (National Resistance Movement 1985: 4).
While the Obote government further lost domestic and international legitimacy in 1984 and 
1985, the rebels slowly extended their domestic power base and international recognition. 
Even the NRM's Marxist ideology did not deter support. "Their theoretical analysis meant 
little to their wider constituency, but the sense of outrage (about Obote's regime, HPS) was 
shared by almost everyone" (Brett 1994: 63). At the same time, even the remaining moderate 
part o f DP had made human rights its main platform of parliamentary opposition. The 
downfall o f Obote was further accelerated when the Army Chief o f Staff David Oyite-Ojok 
died in a helicopter crash while visiting the Luwero war zone on 12 December 1983. The 
fellow Langi Oyite-Ojok had been together with Obote in exile during the Amin years and 
now represented the cornerstone of Obote's control over the army (ACR, Vol. XVIII, B 465). 
As a result of his death, different factions within the army reemerged and began to clash with 
one another, in particular along the lines o f the two dominant Northern tribes Acholi and 
Langi.
The Uganda Consultative Group meeting o f donors in Paris on 25-26 January 1984 passed 
without much criticism o f the human rights situation. Again, donors pledged a total o f $430 
million in aid money. The only contagious issue arose when the donors refused to cover a 
debt o f approximately $120 million incurred by Uganda in military contracts with Israel in the 
early 1970s. The debt was still open after Amin had abruptly ended diplomatic relations with 
Israel and turned to its Arabic enemies instead. Continuous input by Amnesty International 
only slowly changed perceptions o f foreign governments, the least in Amnesty's host country 
Great Britain. In March 1984, all Commonwealth countries except for Britain finally pulled 
out o f the military training program. This decision followed an unexplained massacre of 
several dozen Ugandans in Muduuma. While the other countries cited the massacre and other 
human rights concerns, the British Minister for Overseas Development, Timothy Raison, 
announced that Great Britain would continued its aid after being "satisfied that the Muduuma 
massacre had been carried out by gangs with an aim o f discrediting Obote’s government” 
(Furley 1989: 287).
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Only in May 1984 United States government officials, including the Assistant Secretar}' of 
State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams and the ambassador Allen Davis began to openly 
accuse Obote of systematic killings and torture. The diplomatic attacks followed a massacre 
o f students, teachers, and priests committed by the army at Namugongo Anglican Theological 
College close to Kampala. In August, another Congress hearing on the human rights situation 
in Uganda was held. Finally, the United States government accepted the numbers provided by 
Amnesty International. In his report to Congress, Abrams described the human rights situation 
as "horrendous" and "one o f the worst in the world." Without naming its sources the report 
claimed more than 100,000 deaths due to direct army action and following starvation mainly 
in the Luwero Triangle (see also Anonymous 1984a: 529). The Ugandan government reacted 
by expelling a US military attaché and canceling a training program for army officers in the 
United States. In its rejoinder Kampala dismissed the numbers circulating in Western capitals 
and claimed that about 15,000 Ugandans had been killed by both sides in the civil war since 
1981.
While Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands also distanced themselves from Obote, the 
British government continued its military and financial support. The British High 
Commission in Kampala declared that it had not found sufficient evidence for the allegations 
contained in the Abrams report (Furley 1989: 288). The British private firm Falconstar was 
even encouraged to complete its training o f a 3,000 man special force in 1984 (ACR, Voi. 
XVI, B 298). Not only the British, but representatives from various donor governments, the 
World Bank, and the IMF now preferred to emphasize the economic progress Uganda experi­
enced since Obote had agreed to follow a fiscal stabilization program in 1981. Indeed, credit 
ceilings imposed by the IMF led to a drop o f the inflation rate from 100 per cent in April 1982 
to 16 per cent in June 1984. However, the macroeconomic balance briefly achieved in 
1982/83 was immediately lost again when Obote discontinued the IMF agreement for the 
fiscal year 1984/85 in order to raise more money for the army and inflation rates increased to 
141 per cent by m id-1985 (Henstridge 1994: 53).
The non-governmental human rights pressure had finally also significant effects on the British 
government. In September 1984, British Minister o f State for African Affairs in the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Malcolm Rifkind, slowly retracted from the initial rejection o f the 
Abrams report. "This was quite a switch, and he was responding to strong criticism from the
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Cambridge group of Amnesty International, which had accused the Foreign Office of being 
'craven* and ’pussy footing* in its response to the Abrams claims" (Furley 1989: 290).
As a result of the continued transnational mobilization against the Obote regime, its domestic 
position was considerably weakened. Against Without Obote's explicit order, Defense 
M inister Paulo Muwanga began talks with the insurgent groups and started to plan a coup. In 
October 1984 Muwanga met secretly with senior NRA representatives (ACR, Vol. XVIII, B 
466). At the same time, the Northern coalition between the Langi and Acholi further disinte­
grated, when Obote was openly accused to favor his own Langi tribesmen over Acholis in 
military appointments. The dispute peaked in August 1984 when Obote named the Langi 
Smith Opon-Acak as new Army Chief of Staff and successor of the late Oyite-Ojok. Acholi 
soldiers and officers under the leadership o f Tito Lutwa Okello also began to plot a coup. 
From late 1984 until mid-1985, the executive was effectively paralyzed, while prominent 
members of the Obote regime prepared for a coup against the president.
Reacting to Amnesty International's report Six Years after Amin: Torture, Killings, Disap­
pearances published in June 1985, The British government finally "cautioned the Ugandan 
High Commissioner that if  the human rights situation in Uganda did not improve, Britain 
might terminate its (...) assistance program to Uganda (Furley 1989: 291; Ofcansky 1996: 
56).61 However, the British government did still not take any immediate action against the 
Ugandan government and maintained its military advisers in the country. On 20 June 1985, 
Obote defended his human rights record in his budget speech before parliament. He claimed 
that "no one here or abroad" should "entertain the false belief that this government is not 
interested in the rule of law, human rights, the unity o f the people o f Uganda, or in the 
promotion of democracy and democratic institutions" (ACR, Vol. XVII, B 396).
In his official response to the Amnesty report, Obote invited an Amnesty delegation to visit 
the country and also asked the British government as well as the European Community to 
send parliamentary delegations for on-the-spot investigations. He claimed that virtually all 
twelve demands for human rights improvements listed by Amnesty were actually government 68
68 "Malcom Rifkind, le sécrétaire d'État britannique aux Affaires africaines qui se rendit à Kampala peu après, 
contena d'exprimer sa "préoccupation". Ceci n'empêcha pas le renouvellement de l'aide britannique, y compris 
de l'aide militaire, l'argument en faveur de cette mesure étant que, si les Occidentaux ne le faisaient pas, le 
président Obote s'adrasserait de manière croissante au bloc communiste" (Prunier 1994:144).
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policy. Obote admitted that he was not sure if  Uganda had already accepted international 
instruments against torture, but would be anxious to do so: "This government is fully 
committed to the observance o f human rights in all parts o f Uganda. Members of this 
government led the struggle against the regime o f  Idi Amin and it is most painful and 
disheartening that this government should be equated, either here or abroad, with the atrocious 
regime o f Idi Amin. To do so cannot be supported by the facts o f the situation and borders on 
a deliberate campaign to undermine the image and the authority of the government. Even in 
the report of Amnesty International it is acknowledged, though indirectly, that peace has 
returned to the whole country, except in areas where we have had armed dissident activities. 
Members o f this government cannot negate the very objective - the enjoyment o f  human 
rights by all Ugandans - for which they fought and many of their colleagues lost their lives, by 
resorting to and condoning massive violations o f  human rights in Uganda." Obote sought to 
explain existing human rights violations in reference to the problems created by the Amin 
tyranny: "We inherited a most difficult security and economic situation. We inherited a very 
young army and a demoralized and depleted police force. (...) We have not banned or 
proscribed any political party, organization or institution" (citations in: ACR, Vol. XVII, B 
396/405). Before Amnesty International and other international observers could react to the 
invitations and defenses, Obote was deposed by sections o f his own military.
The Military Government
Following massacres of Acholi soldiers perpetrated by Langi army personnel in early July, the 
Acholi Brigadier Basilio Okello led his troops from Gulu to Kampala and seized the capital 
on 27 July 1985. Another Acholi and Army General, Tito Lutwa Okello became Head of State 
and declared in a  first radio message the "total end to Obote's tribalistic rule." He accused 
Obote o f having brought to Uganda "heinous murders, arsons, kidnappings, looting, robbery, 
destruction o f property, rape, corruption, arbitrary arrests, detention without trial, flagrant 
abuse o f human rights, contempt, disregard of the rule of law as testified by Amnesty Interna­
tional (emphasis, HPS), all based on ethnic, tribal, religious, political and regional 
considerations and groupings. (...) Our only aim is to put an end to Obote's despotic rule" 
(citations in: ACR, Vol. XVII, B 392). Consequently, parliament was dissolved, the constitu­
tion suspended and all ministers dismissed. Obote fled into exile to Kenya and later to 
Zambia.
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The new Military Council identified the formation of a national coalition government and 
negotiations with the rebels as its two most important tasks. The DP leader Ssemogerere was 
appoihted Interior Minister, Paulo Muwanga Prime Minister, and several close associates of 
Obote were also included in the Cabinet. Yoweri Museveni demanded half o f the seats in the 
Military Council and answered all attempts by the Council to bring in either prominent Obote 
or Amin supporters with continued military action. The failure of the Military Council to 
bring in Museveni did little to convince Western governments and media about the good 
intentions o f the new government. Instead, revengeful killings continued unabated. Whereas 
the Acholi and Langi soldiers had reduced Amin's West Nile region between 1981 and 1984 
to ashes, the Amin soldiers came now back and devastated Obote’s Langi provincial capital 
Lira.
At the same time, the NRM/A further consolidated its position in the Southwestern part of 
Uganda. This also included a functioning democratic decision-making system on the local 
level, the so-called Resistance Councils (RC). "The RCs were first organized to enlist 
sympathetic civilians in the acquisition o f food, recruits, and intelligence for the NRA war 
effort..." (Kasfir 1998: 55). However, after some time, and still during the bush war, the NRA 
leadership made them elective. Whereas independence in 1961 only secured formal external 
sovereignty for the Ugandan people, the NRM rebels were the first to bring the idea of a 
"citizen" to the countryside (Mamdani 1996: 200-203). This resulted in a "unprecedented 
degree of village level participation in decision-making" (de Waal 1997: 631) and reinforced 
growing international recognition of Museveni. Over time the rebel leadership was positively 
integrated into the transnational human rights network, or as Mamdani chose to put it, "bathed 
as it was in global ideological influences" (Mamdani 1996: 207). Yoweri Museveni frequently 
traveled to Western capitals and was invited by increasingly prominent hosts.
During 1984-85, Museveni and other NRM leaders made several semi-official visits to Euro­
pean countries in preparation o f their likely future role in Uganda and had continuous contacts 
with international human rights groups (Weyel 1995: 555). In August 1985, Museveni wrote 
in the Guardian about his movement, that "we have been labeled 'Marxist radicals’, but of 
course such labels do not matter. I would very much like to be a ’conservative' if I am shown 
something worth conserving. What should I conserve in the present situation? Intestinal 
worms, malnutrition, a high infant mortality rate, a low average life-expectancy, a low calorie
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and protein intake etc. in the population? Or the complete denial of basic human rights by the 
present regimes, including the security o f human life? (The Guardian, 23 August 1985). 
Domestically, Museveni strengthened local coalitions mainly with reliable anti-Obote groups 
such as the Baganda (Mamdani 1996:207-210).
The Military Council agreed to hold peace talks in Kenya, where Kenyan President Daniel 
arap Moi chaired the negotiations between 26 August and 17 December.69 Museveni also 
agreed in principle but stated that he considered the others at the table to be "part o f an endless 
system which has been responsible for the massacre o f one million Ugandans since independ­
ence in 1962" (ACR, Vol. XVIII, B 469). The NRA used the negotiations to extend its control 
to important areas such as Mbarara, Masaka, Kasese or Fort Portal. By the end o f November 
the NRA camped some 20 miles from Kampala and could have easily invaded Kampala. 
However, its leadership continued negotiations until mid-December and finally agreed on a 
peace accord guaranteed by Daniel arap Moi. This agreement included an immediate cease­
fire, the demilitarization o f Kampala, the dissolution of the local governmental structures 
created by the NRA in southwestern Uganda, the creation of a  Military Council representing 
all militarily relevant forces, and the establishment of an multinational force made up of 
Tanzanian and Kenyan troops. The peace accord was never implemented and the NRA seized 
Kampala on 26 January 1986. Three days later, Museveni was sworn in as new President.
4.2 Kenya 1983-1989: Executive Outcomes
By 1983/84, Daniel arap Moi had defeated all immediate threats to his presidency and began 
to increase his control over the political system and society at large. All spheres o f compe­
tence Moi deemed vital for his government were formally moved from ministries, parliament 
or the judiciary to a quickly expanding Office o f the President. Using a system of directly 
controlled Provincial and District Commissioners, the President's Office reached every comer 
o f  the country. While the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) had lost political signifi­
cance during the Kenyatta years, Moi now revived its structures to solidify his national 
position. In 1985 the government forced all members o f the civil service to become members 
o f KANU. At the same time, KANU created its own youth organization whose members 
served as de facto 'body guards' for party officials and often used violent means to intimidate
69 For the details of the six rounds of negotiations see ACR, Vol. XVIII, B 468-471.
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the political opposition (Widner 1992b: 153). By 1985, KANU experienced a significant but 
calculated revival for the purpose of serving as a ’'vehicle for transmitting the views o f the 
president to the grass roots and for controlling the expression o f interests within the country 
and their influence over policy. (...) And in that sense Kenya had become what some have 
called a 'no-party state’. The use of the party structures by the Office of the President had 
distinct consequences for patterns of political behavior..." (Widner 1992b: 158 and 161).
Establishing One-Party Rule
In the following years, executive tolerance for dissenting voices decreased sharply and the 
human rights situation deteriorated (Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 1991; Howard 1991). 
In 1985 and 1986, several hundred people were arrested, mistreated, and disappeared tempo­
rarily as part of the clampdown o f student protests in Nairobi (Anonymous 1987). In March 
1986 six university members, including a close friend o f Oginga Odinga were arrested under 
the Preservation o f Public Security Act and received sentences between 18 months and five 
years in prison. Moi claimed that they were part of the MwaKenya conspiracy which allegedly 
involved persons supporting the 1982 coup.
International human rights organizations now began to raise alarm about the human rights 
conditions in the country (Amnesty International 1987b). They reported also hundreds of 
killings and detentions in the North-eastern part of Kenya where security forces tried to 
control feuds between various Somali clans (Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 1991: xi; 
Amnesty International 1985a: 66). In one such incident in February 1984 government forces 
rounded up hundreds of members from the Degodia clan which they blamed for a recent 
outbreak o f violence. Many o f Degodia held for days on the Wagalla airstrip died o f  thirst, 
while others were killed when they tried to escape. A month after the massacre, the issue was 
raised in the Kenyan parliament and the government admitted that 57 people were killed as 
part o f an effort to disarm the Degodia. These numbers were widely disputed and local 
observers claimed that up to 1,000 were left dead by the security forces (see Daily Nation, 30 
October 1998).
The incident was also noticed outside o f Kenya. Similar to the Ugandan story, the first to take 
up the issue were individuals and non-governmental organizations whose perceptions were 
not framed by norms o f state sovereignty. Instead, they interpreted the incident in reference to 
universal human rights standards and soon came into conflict with their own government's
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diverging norms hierarchy. "Three Norwegian volunteers stationed in the area had witnessed 
the aftermath o f a massacre o f ethnic Somalis on the airstrip at Wagalla near the provincial 
capital of Wajir. Very upset about what they had seen, they reported the incident to the 
Norwegian ambassador to Kenya. His muted reaction, which they interpreted as hushing the 
matter up, disgusted them" (Baehr, Selbervik, and Tostensen 1995: 64). At the same time, 
Amnesty International demanded the creation o f  an independent commission to investigate 
the massacre. After returning back to Norway, the volunteers contacted the foreign ministry 
and the issue was raised in the Norwegian parliament. The issue was now established within 
the Norwegian domestic political discourse.
In September 1986, Norway granted political asylum to the former Kenyan MP and Cornell 
University student Koigi wa Wamwere, who had been jailed during the MwaKenya purges. 
With his charisma he became a crucial figure in the process o f moral consciousness-raising 
and redefinition o f Kenya’s image abroad. "Arguably, he was the most important opinion 
leader in Kenyan affairs in Norway in the late 1980s" (Baehr, Selbervik, and Tostensen 1995: 
68). The bilateral relations between Norway and Kenya slowly deteriorated as sections o f  the 
Norwegian public began to criticize the foreign ministry and the Norwegian embassy in 
Nairobi for allegedly suppressing information about human rights abuses in Kenya. Thus, 
Norway became the first Western donor country which was profoundly affected by the activi­
ties of the human rights network on Kenya. From there, long-held perceptions of Kenya 
changed in concentric circles starting in neighboring Scandinavian countries and moving to 
Continental Europe and the United States.
In November 1986, Moi declared the revival o f KANU a success and claimed that the party 
was now "supreme over Parliament and the High Court" (ACR, Vol. XIX, B 324). On 2 
December 1986, the Kenyan parliament further strengthened executive powers by curtailing 
the right to bail (24. amendment) and by abolishing constitutionally guaranteed tenure for the 
Attorney and Auditor General (23. amendment). The amendments passed parliament with 131 
votes in favor and 38 abstentions. KANU’s Governing Council was also empowered to 
discipline or even expel KANU members, including ministers and civil servants. Finally, 
KANU substituted the secret ballot in its primaries with a public queue-voting system, which
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also increased party control over the election process.70 Voters were now asked to line up in 
front o f the preferred candidate’s poster. Two MPs who dared to criticize the measures in 
public were briefly detained in January 1987.
The Emergence of Domestic Dissent
At this point, church officials and political dissidents began to raise concerns about the 
growing powers o f the executive. The National Council of Churches o f Kenya (NCCK) and 
the Law Society o f Kenya (LSK) sharply protested Moi's increasingly authoritarian style. The 
NCCK released in September 1986 an open protest letter in which the 1,200 signing pastors 
threatened to boycott elections as long as the secret ballot was not reintroduced (Sabar- 
Friedmann 1997: 33). Moi retorted in October 1986 in his usual ominous style by demanding 
that dissidents should "stop hiding behind a certain church" which now produced "subversive 
pamphlets" (cited in: ACR, Vol. XIX, B 328). In December, other ministers openly linked 
leading churchmen to the MwaKertya conspiracy and one of the NCCK employees, Dr. Walter 
Osewe, was arrested and charged with being a member of the alleged underground organiza­
tion (Throup 1995: 155).
In the following years, the NCCK became the only significant domestic actor which could 
preserve its institutional independence and consistently challenge government repression. 
During the 1950s and early 1960s the NCCK had emerged as an ecumenical organization 
supported by significant amounts of church donations from overseas to "meet the Christian 
challenge o f the post-Mau Mau reconstruction (,..). New missionaries were recruited, 
employed directly by the NCCK rather than its member churches. Their theology was liberal, 
their gospel as much social as individual. (...) The NCCK staff had no organic or historical 
connection with the local environment. (...) [It] was free to be 'alongside' the new African 
politics (...) in a way in which the local churches would have found difficult even if  their 
leaders had thought it desirable" (Lonsdale, Booth-Clibbom, and Hake 1978: 269/70). Conse­
quently, in the period right after independence the NCCK became the major "focus of 
cooperation between Church and State," while the organization continued to develop its
70 If. someone gained 70 per cent of the votes during this queue-voting procedure, he or she was elected to 
parliament. In all other cases the candidates reaching at least 30 per cent were allowed to contest the seat in the 
general elections and under secret ballot procedures. In 70 out of 188 constituencies a candidate attained the 
required 70 per cent during the primaries.
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international contacts. Lonsdale et al. point out that during that period "the presence of its 
expatriate staff bears witness to the fact that Nairobi is a suburb of Ecumenopolis, World 
City" (Lonsdale, Booth-CIibbom, and Hake 1978: 272/3). During the 1960s and 1970s the 
NCCK worked closely with government agencies mainly in areas o f education and health.
The brief history o f NCCK activism shows that the organization was an early transnational 
actor which transported liberal values into Kenyan society even prior to political independ­
ence. In the immediate post-independence period, it aligned with the government to improve 
the living conditions of the local population. However, this alliance and the NCCK work was 
already ethnically biased because the Kenyatta government itself tended to represent a Kikuyu 
dominance in national affairs. Once the Kenyan government turned more repressive under 
Moi, the close relationship between the NCCK and the state had already broken down because 
Kikuyu membership within the NCCK was relatively high. Church representatives became 
now major government critics not only as a result o f the adherence to principled human rights 
values, but also because the state was now captured by a competing ethnic alliance. Based on 
its reputation as a representative of various church organizations as well as the international 
contacts (Throup 1995: 160), the NCCK was able to defend its independence and even 
mobilize domestic and international resistance. Other representatives o f  societal 
modernization such as lawyers and university lecturers joined the dissident movement. Again, 
many of them were members of the now disenfranchised ethnicities, mainly the Kikuyu and 
Luo.
The Internationalization o f Human Rights
When Daniel arap Moi announced two state visits to Europe and the United States for 1987 
transnational human rights groups transformed the picture o f domestic dissent, repression, and 
initial international mobilization into a powerful human rights campaign. The Kenyan 
government contributed to this campaign by arresting prominent opposition members shortly 
before Moi's departure to the United States. One o f them, Gibson Kamau Kuria, a Oxford- 
educated defense lawyer in the MwaKenya trials, filed a lawsuit against the security organs 
accusing them o f  torturing the suspects. In anticipation o f the likely consequences, Kuria 
provided Blaine Harden, the Washington Post correspondent in Nairobi, with the compiled 
evidence. On 26 February 1987, Kuria disappeared.
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On 12 March, one day before Moi met with President Reagan in Washington, the government 
announced his arrest under the Preservation o f Public Security Act and accused him o f "disre­
spect o f  the President." At the same time, Congressman Howard E. Wolpe, chairman o f the 
US Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on Africa diagnosed during a press conference in Nairobi 
an "emasculation o f  the Kenyan parliament" and a "concentration of executive power". The 
US State Department took the Kuria case and other allegations seriously and its spokesman, 
Charles Redman, declared that human rights would be on the agenda for the talks between 
Moi and Reagan. "The allegations o f torture, apparently supported by signed affidavits from 
those in Kenya who claim to have been tortured, raise serious questions o f human rights 
abuses" (citations in: ACR, Vol. XIX, B 334).
The day after the talks between Moi and Reagan, the Washington Post subtitled a picture of 
both politicians on the front page with ‘Police Torture is Charged in Kenya’. The Kenyan 
government had clearly underestimated the international interest in the disappearance o f  Kuria 
whose fate immediately turned into a cause célèbre (ACR, Vol. XX, B 324). The same day. 
State Department officials and members of Congress demanded full explanation and an 
impartial investigation of the allegations (Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 1991: 374). 
Moi cancelled his planned visit to New York and a meeting with the Secretary General o f the 
United Nations and flew directly to less hostile Great Britain. Upon his return to Nairobi,71 
Moi declared that all torture allegations against his government were false. Moi dismissed 
allegations by the foreign press that torture existed in Kenya. He made specific reference to 
allegations that detainees were held in flooded cells. "Who could survive in water for two 
weeks? No one could survive 10 hours, let alone two weeks. The passengers trapped when a 
British ferry sank did not survive more than 30 minutes. (...) We know about a few detainees, 
ten or eleven, and their records from 1965 show that they have been in and out o f jail. In 
1978,1 personally released all o f them in the belief that they harbored good intentions toward 
this country. When they came out, they behaved like pigs who soil themselves even after you 
have washed them" (FBIS-MEA, Vol. 5, No.051, P. R l, 17 March 1987).72 Moi also denied 
that he was trying to solicit support from the United States and claimed that only the people of
71 On the day of Moi's return, Blaine Harden was notified that he had to leave Kenya within 48 hours. After 
protests of the US embassy and a personal meeting, Moi agreed to extend his license for another two years 
(Harden 1990:256).
72 All the domestic speeches of Moi are in Swahili. Words spoken in English are quoted in italics.
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Kenya could be addressed for that. He accused Wolpe of supporting "dissidents, crooks, and 
swindlers" and claimed that "Kenya was the freest country in Africa."
Throughout 1987 several journalists were briefly detained, whereas four Western journalists 
were beaten at police stations after they had reported about riots at Nairobi universities. The 
Minister for Information, Noah Ngala, alleged "a deliberate move by Nairobi-based foreign 
correspondents to disinform the world about events in Kenya." Moi himself threatened to ban 
the Daily Nation, the main independent news paper. A dozen US missionaries were rounded 
up and ordered to leave Kenya after a forged letter surfaced alleging that they were part o f a 
"Klu [sic] KIux Klan operation" to topple the Kenyan and other African governments. One 
missionary died o f a heart attack in police custody. After it became clear that the story was 
untrue, the Kenyan government withdrew the expulsion orders without explanation or apol­
ogy. It also refused a request by the US government to explain its wrongdoing to the general 
public.
As a result, even British newspapers began to report more critically about the situation in 
Kenya. In an editorial, The Times held that "suppressing student protesters, while treating 
Western correspondents and American missionaries as subversive elements, will do nothing to 
(...) strengthen the President's position" (cited in: ACR, Vol. XX, B 322). In April 1987, the 
Bishop of Nairobi (Anglican Church o f  the Province of Kenya, CPK), Rev. Alexander Muge,71 
told a congregation in Eldoret that "human rights abuses in Kenya were worse than those in 
South Africa." In May, the Catholic Bishops o f  Kenya openly joined the critical voices in the 
country. In a letter to the President they accused KANU o f "assuming a totalitarian role. (...) 
Officials of KANU were now unable to distinguish between constructive criticism and 
subversive conspiracy" (citations in: ACR, Vol. XIX, B 328).
In July, Amnesty International followed up on the Kuria affair and published the report 
Kenya; Torture, Political Detention and Unfair Trials (Amnesty International 1987b). The 
Kenyan government immediately denied all allegations contained in the report. Moreover, the 
Assistant Minister John Michuki demanded in parliament that Amnesty International should 75
75 Muge was the first Kalenjin Anglican Bishop. The CPK had always been dominated by Kikuyu, because the 
Christianization of its predecessor missionary organization focused on Kikuyu areas. Despite the ascendancy of 
an Kalenjin, this did not brig the church closer to the government. To the contrary, strong disagreements 
emerged when Muge became involved in an intra-KANU struggle for the local leadership (Throup 1995:157).
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be brought before the International Court of Justice because it allegedly financed a coup of 
London dissidents against the Kenyan government. Pressure by human rights groups contin­
ued throughout the rest o f the year and peaked again in fall when Moi planned to travel to a 
number of European countries. Contrary to his original plans, Moi only visited Finland and 
Romania, but decided to skip Sweden and Norway because of the negative press coverage 
prior to his visit (Baehr, Selbervik, and Tostensen 1995: 69). In Finland, members o f  his 
delegation met with representatives from Amnesty International. Upon his arrival back to 
Nairobi, he called the press reports "malicious and baseless" emanating from "a few criminal 
fugitives". He argued that South Africa was a much better target than Kenya for the Norwe­
gian and Swedish press and that the existence o f 150 foreign correspondents in Nairobi were a 
clear indication of peace and stability. He said this situation "had probably made envious 
outsiders become hostile to Kenya" (FBIS-WEU-87-172, 4 September 1987, p. 8). In his 
Independence Day speech on 12 December 1987 Moi called Amnesty International a "South- 
African agent", promised to "arrest all members of Amnesty International found in Kenya" 
and advised them "to go to hell" (Amnesty International 1988: 86).
The Kenyan government was from the beginning acutely sensitive to the human rights issue. 
International norms and their supporters were not simply ignored, even during the initial 
period between 1983 and 1987, where Western governments still preferred to ignore the non­
governmental reports from Kenya. From these early stages on government actors in Kenya 
continuously took notice of the issue and consciously devised strategies to deal with it. In 
their reactions, government officials made explicit reference to the competing norm o f state 
sovereignty. The emerging human rights discourse pitted mainly Western supporters of 
universal values against Moi whose reaction was not only influenced by the international 
norm of non-intervention but also by domestic values he himself regarded as constitutive to 
his rule. Moi had a very peculiar interpretation of the human rights issue and his reactions 
followed according to it. This interpretation was strongly influenced by the experience of 
national independence and cultural factors. As a leader of an African nation, Moi could 
neither accept the criticism leveled against his country from a mainly Western community nor 
was he willing to ignore the fact that the human rights criticism expressed fundamental 
disrespect for what he believed to be "African values". Consequently, his behavior did not 
follow a narrowly rational strategy that is guided by the desire to stay in power as the main 
preference.
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Protecting Domestic Human Rights Actors
While the international mobilization had still little effects on major donor governments, it 
protected individual members of the opposition and consistently challenged the Kenyan 
government and its allies on principled grounds. Occasionally, domestic dissent became even 
institutionalized, although government repression remained a constant threat. In September
1987, the first issue of the journal Nairobi Law Monthly was published, soon to be one o f the 
most important and influential independent journals devoted to human rights and the admini­
stration of justice. Until 1991, the journal was banned several times and government lawyers 
kept charging its editor, the lawyer Gitobu Imanyara, with sedition (see FBIS-AFR-90-147, 
31 July 1990, p. 6). In the virtual absence o f independent societal organizations, individual 
lawyers and church officials from both, Catholic and Protestant denominations, remained the 
main human rights critics o f the regime (Peters 1996:20-23).
Despite the increasingly successful efforts o f human rights groups to deconstruct Kenya's 
international image as a stable Western ally, domestic repression levels tended to increase for 
the time being. In late-1987 the University of Nairobi was again closed. One student leader, 
Robert Wafula Buke, was sentenced to five years in prison for "spearheading a Libyan-backed 
plot that had led to the closure of the university" (ACR, Vol. XX, B 329). At the same time, 
the judiciary was further streamlined in order to avoid embarrassing revelations or even 
defeats in court rooms. In October 1987, High Court Justice Derek Schofield resigned after 
the Chief Justice had removed him from a "sensitive case". After he had left Kenya, Schofield 
exposed and harshly criticized the executive interference injudicial affairs (Schofield 1992).
Outside relations with Western governments now became more strained, but decisive steps 
were only taken by the Scandinavian nations. Norway and Sweden temporarily halted their 
bilateral aid in 1987. During state visits o f German chancellor Kohl in November 1987 and 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in January 1988 the human rights issue was not 
raised. A British parliamentary delegation visiting the country in December 1987 also avoided 
any criticism and explicitly commended the state o f the Kenyan political system. In January
1988, several visiting members of foreign NGOs, including the Lawyers Committee on 
Human Rights and the American Association for the Advancement o f Science (AAAS) were 
temporarily detained in Nairobi. The government-critical journal Beyond, published by the 
National Council o f Churches o f Kenya (NCCK) was banned in March, because it had repeat­
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edly criticized the abolishment o f secret voting procedures for KANU primary elections 
(Widner 1992b: 191). In the following months several church officials and government 
representative openly clashed on the issue of queue-voting. The Kenya Times declared 
towards Alexander Muge that he was not "as you would like to be the country's answer to 
Archbishop Tutu" (ACR, Vol. XX, B 321).
A t the height o f his personal rule and after the General Elections in early 1988, Moi removed 
the moderate Kikuyu Mwai Kibaki from the post o f the Vice-President and appointed him to 
the position o f the insignificant Health Minister. Moi replaced Kibaki with another Kikuyu 
Josephat Karanja who had no substantial following in his own community. Only one month 
later Karanja was also removed and replaced by George Saitoti. Robert Ouko returned to his 
post as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Frequent reshuffles of the cabinet and the subsequent 
distribution o f material benefits remained an important means to secure loyalties from local 
communities. After his reelection Moi announced the release of ten political prisoners, 
including Raila Odinga. Amnesty International welcomed the step, but demanded the review 
o f  sentences given to other dissidents still in prison. In August 1988 new amendments to the 
constitution removed tenure for all judges in Kenya,74 while the period a suspect o f a capital 
offence could be held before brought to a courtroom was extended from 24 hours to 14 days 
(25. amendment).
Moi continued his attacks on the independent media and claimed that his critics were 
"disgruntled enemies with foreign masters." In another interview he demanded that KANU 
should set up branches in every hotel, because this is "where gossip is at its most open" 
(citations in: ACR, Vol. XXI, B 317). He also claimed that the Kenyan laws "had been 
inherited from Britain and, as such, were based on British traditions and customs." Hence, 
"our law is clear on the question o f human rights, the dignity o f men, and the sanctity o f life. 
This was indeed the main objective of our struggle for independence." However, the contin­
ued attacks also led to occasional rhetorical missteps such as admitting the use o f torture on a 
visit in London in March 1989: "Of course we torture people. But we don't torture everybody. 
We torture the ringleaders of MwaKenya; otherwise, how do we find out information from 
them?" (all quotes in: ACR, Vol. XXI, B 317).
74 The executive interference in judicial affairs was covered by a great number of publications (see African 
Rights 1996; Days et al. 1992; International Bar Association 1997; Kibwana 1992; Nowrojee 1995; Ross 1992).
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Mounting Pressure
Members of the human rights network answered the continued executive dominance with an 
intensification o f their transnational activities. The Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for 
Human Rights honored Gibson Kamau Kuria in March 1989 with its Human Rights Award 
during a ceremony held in Nairobi. Prior to that, Kuria was denied a passport which would 
have enabled him to receive the prize in the United States.75 Consequently, the board o f the 
Memorial Center decided to send a delegation to Kenya in order to hand over the award in a 
public ceremony. The delegation included the wife o f the later Robert F. Kennedy and their 
daughter. Surprisingly, the delegation's request for a meeting with President Moi (Nairobi 
Law Monthly 1989) was answered positively. The award, its presentation to Kuria in Nairobi, 
and the meeting at State House significantly contributed to the continued mobilization on 
human rights issues. On the international level, the general awareness of the political situation 
in Kenya further increased, while on the domestic level, international norms and the extend of 
their respect remained an important political topic.
The day following the delegation's departure, Moi flatly rejected the ideas expressed by the 
visitors during the talks. "A young person bom not long ago, bom after independence. She 
comes here, why? There are people in other parts of the world who are harassed, why don’t 
they go there? They even say Kenya should not hold people for 14 days for interrogation. We 
do not keep ordinary people for 14 days, it is the troublemaker who wants to kill, who wants 
to overthrow the government. [...] People should respect us, so that we can respect them. We 
are not children, to be told you have made a mistake here. You must do this, you must do that. 
We are no longer under colonialism. What we demand is equality, equality, and it is our right. 
It is not a d em a n d it is our right. We are equal with anyone, regardless. The thing I want to 
tell you is respect yourself. When you meet a person do not open your mouth wide telling 
everything. Such a person will despise you" (FBIS-AFR-89-063,4 April 1989, p. 8).
In June 1989, Moi announced a general amnesty during a public rally in Nakuru and declared 
that "problems affecting Africa were subtle and only Africans could understand them better, 
but not foreigners" (FBIS-AFR-89-107, 7 June 1989, p. 6). Two weeks later he addressed a
75 One year later, Kuria was awarded another human rights prize by the American Bar Association. Again, he 
was refused a passport to travel to the United States.
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KANU delegates conference at Nyayo Stadium on the issue of human rights. "All the propa­
ganda being spread about Kenya is completely baseless, because outsiders do not understand 
the Kenyan people. They do not know that Kenya is number one in propaganda. (...) Even 
this morning I received a strange letter from Amnesty International. It said: I am very 
concerned about the fa c t that Mr. Noah arap Too has been detained without charge 
[laughter] or trial under the republic security regulations o f  the Preservation o f  Public 
Security Act.... [Moi reads the whole letter in English]. Do you hear this filth? I do not know 
whether Too himself is here. The head o f CID is here. And this comes from West Germany, 
the Amnesty International People. This shows that all those people with all their lies, write 
filthy and non-existing stories. [...] When people are released from detention, they run to the 
BBC. Why don’t they run to the NATION or the KENYA TIMES and tell them ‘the mistakes 
I saw are such and such’. Instead you run to the BBC. Is the BBC mother? (applause). It is not 
mother. Is it not an imperialist? And if it is an imperialist, then it is the mother o f an imperi­
alist. You are afraid, but the settler was nothing but a settler. What I believe is equality 
(applause). I f  you believe you are number two it is your own affair" (FBIS-AFR-89-116, 19 
June 1989, p. 4/5).
By mid-1989, the continuous efforts of the human rights groups to reframe the domestic and 
international image o f the Kenyan government showed considerable effects. Targets o f these 
efforts, such as other state actors and the general public in and outside o f Kenya were 
increasingly willing to filter information coming from Kenya through the interpretative 
framework provided by transnational human rights organizations. However, until 1989 only 
the Scandinavian countries openly criticized the Kenyan government for its human rights 
policy. Denmark was the first country to commission as study on Kenya's past use o f foreign 
aid and the possible effects of human rights abuses on the proper use o f aid. Kenya lost its 
image of a relatively stable and reliable partner not as a result o f the changes in Eastern 
Europe, but following the continued activities of non-governmental organizations since the 
mid-1980s.
As a result, mobilization against the Kenyan government occurred now almost instantane­
ously whenever security organs were accused of committing human rights abuses. Moreover, 
the new interpretative framework provided by international human rights groups did not only 
cover the most apparent abuses, but even extended to cases where the responsibility remained
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initially unclear. Most prominently, in this respect, the violent deaths of Foreign Minister 
Robert Ouko in February 1990 and government-critical Bishop Alexander Muge in mid- 
August 1990 outraged the Kenyan public and many donors (Nairobi Law Monthly 1990). 
Although there was no immediate evidence that the government was directly involved in the 
deaths, dominant interpretations o f the events focused almost exclusively on the alleged 
responsibility of government officials. The gap between the outside perceptions o f Kenya and 
the Western-leaning self-image promoted by Kenyan government officials widened 
considerably. In the following chapter, I will describe how this reconstruction o f Kenya’s 
image abroad ultimately influenced donors and motivated the government to make significant 
tactical concessions.
4.3 Comparison
Uganda and Kenya came under scrutiny by international media and non-governmental organi­
zations soon after domestic patterns o f  human rights abuses became visible. Within a few 
years, human rights issues played a major role in the external relations of both countries. 
Transnational human rights groups had successfully changed the international image o f both 
countries and seriously challenged the legitimacy of the respective governments. Without the 
work o f organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists or Amnesty 
International, neither the United Nations nor the general Western public would have learned 
about the details o f ongoing human rights abuses. In both cases, individuals and non-govem- 
mental groups successfully challenged a dominant norm of state sovereignty which framed for 
a long time the perceptions o f the international public and Western governments. While it was 
certainly easier to target Norway on Kenya in the mid-1980s than Great Britain on Uganda in 
the 1970s, both stories show an initially strong norm-driven resistance and the success o f non­
governmental mobilization over time.
Domestically, the Amin dictatorship and the civil war under Obote contrasted sharply with the 
Kenyatta era, but also the first decade o f the Moi presidency. The violent death o f almost one 
million Ugandans during the period from 1972 to 1985 indicates the dominance of negative 
integration and the destruction of neopatrimonial rule. In Kenya, the system of neopatrimonial 
rule with an emphasis on positive integration essentially survived the transition from Kenyatta 
to Moi, but the main beneficiary of the system was now the ethnic coalition behind Moi. The 
subsequent expressions o f discontent by the now marginalized Kikuyu and Luo elites led to an
i
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increase o f government-sponsored human rights violations.
The effects o f human rights mobilization differed considerably, mainly because o f the 
variation in authoritarian rule but also because Uganda came into the international spotlight 
about ten years earlier than Kenya. During the Amin and the Obote era, non-governmental 
human rights reporting had little effect on the behavior of other states towards Uganda. Only 
shortly before both regimes were violently removed from power, serious actions on the part of 
the international community were considered. The widely available information and consider­
able mobilization since 1974 did affect the Western public, UN experts in the Sub- 
Commission on Minorities and the Prevention of Discrimination, and a number of individuals 
in Western foreign offices.
While the mobilization failed to elicit adequate responses from the UN Commission on 
Human Rights and major donor governments, it profoundly changed the international 
discourse on Uganda. The Amin and Obote regimes were sustained by outside material aid, 
but they were simultaneously delegitimized by transnational human rights mobilization. At 
the end of Amin’s rule, no one could any longer ignore the persistent principled challenges to 
the dominant 'negative sovereignty regime/ I argue that the changes in discourse as expressed 
by competing international norms is a crucial long-term factor in slowly reframing actor’s 
perceptions and interests. These changes are usually underestimated when the focus is solely 
on short term, material effects o f norms mobilization. I argue that Uganda between 1974 and 
1985 provides a prime example for the independent influence o f (competing) international 
norms. First, the norm of sovereignty protected the Amin government even when it broke all 
diplomatic conventions and directly challenged British national interests. The British 
government was initially guided in its behavior by norms of state sovereignty and diplomatic 
convention, rather than its material interests or human rights norms (see also Clapham 1996: 
189).
The gross violations o f human rights committed by the Amin regime also led to the formation 
o f non-governmental, norms-based resistance. While this resistance had hardly any short-term 
effect on the behavior of states or the domestic situation in Uganda, it successfully challenged 
the sovereignty discourse and forced state actors to justify actions they previously took for 
granted. The international human rights movement presented a  new and compelling frame for 
interpreting the Ugandan situation also based on international institutions. Moreover, in
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: the norm of state sovereignty, this set o f norms was now represented by a rapidly 
mg form of 'agency’ creating transnational networks which began to include individuals 
..uin government agencies.
Following the establishment of human rights in the international discourse on Uganda, the 
period after 1980 witnessed the diffusion o f this issue into the domestic realm. Similar to the 
previous period of international mobilization, the changes I refer to were initially mainly 
visible in the discourse rather than the human rights situation on the ground. Despite even 
worsening human rights conditions, I argue that these changes and their long-term effects 
merit greater attention. Since 1984, Museveni regularly traveled to Western countries and met 
with the media, NGO representatives, but also parliamentarians and even a number govern­
ment officials. The NRM's Ten-Point program was written during a retreat in Austria. In 1985 
he was the only credible Ugandan leader recognized by a concerned non-governmental part of 
international society. Museveni was certainly one o f the first African political leaders who 
understood and utilized the opportunity to use such international support. Even without the 
involvement o f UN human rights bodies, Obote lost domestic and international credibility 
much faster than Idi Amin. At the same time, due to the overall destruction of the infrastruc­
ture but also the IMF programs, his domestic material base was so weak, that he was unable to 
rebuild a system of positive integration under neopatrimonial rule.
In contrast to the Ugandan experience between 1974 and 1985, non-governmental human 
rights criticism with respect to Kenya diffused much faster and had more visible effects in a 
shorter period of time. This is remarkable because the human rights abuses under Amin and 
Obote were much worse than in Kenya throughout the whole period. When Daniel arap Moi 
visited the United States in 1987, the US State Department issued highly critical statements 
with regard to the Kenyan human rights situation based on only one available major human 
rights report. Domestic mobilization against the Kenyan government in Scandinavia also led 
Moi to cancel his visits to Norway and Sweden in the same year.
As a result o f the international mobilization, existing human rights defenders such as lawyers 
and churches representatives enjoyed greater personal protection and more opportunities to 
criticize the government. Within a short period o f time, they became 'celebrities' o f the 
international human rights movement on Kenya. The National Council o f Churches (NCCK) 
and the Law Society o f  Kenya (LSK) became in the 1980s the main organizations for the
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expression of dissent. Again, it was the international dimension which explains the relatively 
independent position o f both organizations despite increasing governmental repression. In 
contrast to other societal organizations, which were streamlined under KANU rule in the same 
period, these two groups had always exceptionally strong relations to the international arena 
and mobilized these connections to defend domestic independence. In contrast to Uganda, 
where church leaders were hopelessly divided and often co-opted by state authorities, the 
ecumenical NCCK enjoyed greater independence simply because it emerged as an organiza­
tion only in the 1950s and was not a direct outgrow of the missionary societies. Hence, its 
connections to the state were less established and it was theologically more liberal. However, 
ethnicity was not absent from the confrontation, as many o f the most outspoken government 
critics were Kikuyu or Luo.
Several other issues also question a bias for material interests in the explanation o f the Kenyan 
political development between 1983 and 1988. First, Kenya became a subject o f international 
human rights campaigns about ten years after Uganda. Meanwhile Amnesty International had 
received the Nobel Prize for Peace (1977) and Human Rights Watch (founded in 1978) as a 
second major transnational human rights actor had emerged on the international scene. 
Second, the levels o f repression were lower in Kenya than in Uganda. Communication 
between the inside and the outside was generally possible throughout the whole period. 
Despite frequent threats at the address o f foreign journalists, Nairobi always served as the 
base for all major international media agencies between Cairo and Cape Town.
Third, independent Kenya experienced relative political stability and comparatively positive 
economic development until the mid-1980s. The reservoir for politically active and Western- 
trained intellectuals remained intact and contributed to the sharp increase of mobilization 
between 1983 and 1988. By African standards, tourism and strategic Western interests kept 
the country continuously on the international agenda. Kenya is one of the most attractive 
tourist sites in Africa. Hence, it is more likely that an average European or US citizen is 
interested in the political affairs o f  Kenya, simply because he or she had been there on 
vacation. During the period, charismatic exiles such as Koigi wa Wamwere were successful in 
changing the international image o f  Kenya in Norway and also in other Western countries. 
Fourth, for all these reasons Kenya was an attractive target simply because reports on it 
promised to find more publicity than other, more remote countries. The very fact that Kenya
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was always portrayed as a reliable Western ally and stable country contributed to the success 
o f human rights organizations' efforts to replace this picture with the opposite. The greater the 
contrast to dominant perceptions in the international arena, the greater the expected attention 
from the targeted audience.
Finally, a considerable measure of path dependency with respect to network's activities also 
contributed to the fact that Kenya moved into the limelight o f international attention. Trans­
national human rights organizations gained mainly international recognition and prominence 
because they pointed their fingers at authoritarian regimes at the fringes o f the Western 
alliance. They exploited the tension between the rhetorical claim to be part of a liberal 
community o f states and ongoing violations o f constitutive liberal values internally. Target 
states included Portugal and Greece in the 1960s and South American dictatorships in the 
1970s. In the 1980s, Kenya became another case fitting this logic.
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5 Regime Change
International human rights organizations reconstructed the international image o f three East 
African governments in the 1970s and 1980s. Amin, Obote in his second term and Moi after 
1985 faced principled international challenges to their domestic rule. In all three cases, the 
initial effects o f these morally-based challenges showed significant similarities, but also some 
important differences. For some time, the human rights criticism did not elicit significant 
material pressure from fellow governments, mainly because non-governmental organizations 
had to initially remove the protective shield of state sovereignty. However, the mobilization 
—  even in the early stages —  had crucial consequences. Domestic actors in support of human 
rights emerged and were empowered. Even when the norm of sovereignty was still effective, 
the targeted governments did not simply ignore the challenge but were vulnerable to the 
published information and sought to counteract the efforts to delegitimize their rule interna­
tionally and domestically.
In Uganda, the military government following the second Obote regime was violently 
removed from power by the National Resistance Movement which had gained domestic and 
international recognition by enforcing human rights standards and presenting a political vision 
for the country. From 1986 to 1992, the new NRM government implemented much o f  its 
political program, but also met with significant violent resistance. Human rights conditions as 
a pre-condition for meaningful democratic participation o f the population improved in most 
areas of the country. In Kenya, the outside and domestic pressure further increased from 1989 
to 1991. The still unorganized opposition was able to extent the protests to the streets and 
mobilize not only discontent and politically active students, but increasingly also other 
sections of society. As a consequence, the government made several tactical concessions and 
loosened its control o f the press and civil society. However, intimidation and harassment o f 
the strengthening opposition continued. In contrast to the virtual breakdown o f legitimate 
domestic rule in Uganda between 1972 and 1985, the Kenyan government was not removed 
by a revolution from below, but was able to control regime change with reforms from above.
5.1 Uganda 1986-1992: Revolution from below
In his swearing-in-address on 29 January 1986, the new President of Uganda, Yoweri 
Museveni, announced that "no one should think what is happening today is a mere change o f
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guard: it is a fundamental change in the politics o f our country." He continued with the first 
three points o f the NRM program and declared that "the people o f  Africa - the people of 
Uganda - are entitled to democratic government. (...) In our liberated zones, the first thing we 
started with was the election of village Resistance Committees. (...) Later we shall set up a 
national parliament directly elected by the people. This way we shall have both committee and 
parliamentary democracy. We don't want to elect people who will change sides once they are 
in parliament. I f  you want to change sides, you must go back and seek the mandate o f the 
people who elected you. (...) Past regimes have used sectarianism to divide people along 
religious and tribal lines. (...) We want people to have different individualities, tribes, 
religions, but this must not be used in politics" (Museveni 1992:21/23).
On 1 February 1986, Yoweri Museveni converted the still existing Military Council into the 
21-member National Resistance Council (NRC). He also announced that the elections planned 
by Obote for 1985, were now postponed for four years. Parties were still allowed to exist and 
maintain headquarter offices as well as publish newspapers, but they were now prevented 
from holding public gatherings and rallies. Instead o f party competition, the new government 
invited all Ugandans to participate in a broad-based government. In his inaugural speech 
Museveni also emphasized the discipline of the NRA and the Code o f Conduct now applica­
ble to all national army units (Amnesty International 1989: 15). The code explicitly prohibited 
the killing of a civilian or prisoner, drinking o f alcohol during service, and taking anything 
from civilians without cash payment. All political detainees at Luzira prison were released 
until August 1986 and new judges were appointed to the High Court. A former member o f the 
East African Court of Appeal Samuel Wambuzi was named Chief Justice. Several former 
ministers o f Obote and Amin were arrested by the NRA and charged with human rights 
violations. On 3 November 1986 Uganda acceded to the UN Convention against Torture.
Museveni's double-edged strategy to simultaneously create a broad-based government and 
exclude or punish some o f the worst human rights offenders, led to a split of the opposition. 
While some UPC, DP, and even original Amin supporters where integrated into the NRM, 
many prominent representatives of those regimes who refused to support the new government, 
chose to go into exile. These individuals gradually regrouped in 1986/87 and formed either 
exile organizations in London or rebel groups, including the Uganda People's Democratic 
Movement/Army (UPDM/A, mainly Acholi), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM, mainly
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Acholi), and the Ugandan Freedom Movement (UFM, mainly Baganda). Over time, only the 
rebel groups forming in the Northern part o f the country (Obote's home area) survived and 
were able to find some indigenous support against an allegedly '’Southern"- and Banyar- 
wanda-dominated new government. All other rebel groups fell apart or joined the NRA after 
negotiations.
Political Reconstruction
The NRM government instituted a "truth commission" which was charged with the investiga­
tion of the human rights abuses committed between 1962 and 1986. The commission was 
initially supposed to complete its work within two years time, but the report was finally 
published after eight years in 1994 (Republic of Uganda 1994). At the same time, an Inspector 
General o f Government was appointed and his office charged with investigating current cases 
o f human rights abuses and corruption. The first NRM cabinet included the DP leader Paul 
Ssemogerere as Interior Minister and consisted of representatives from all major political 
bodies, including the NRM, DP, UPM, UPC, and CP. Immediate efforts o f the Baganda to 
reestablish their kingdom failed and Museveni declared that kingdoms could only be reintro­
duced as cultural not as political entities. However, one of the first major political initiatives 
by the new government was a proposal to draft a new constitution. The NRM now extended 
its idea o f grassroots democracy throughout the country and created a pyramid o f  about 
40,000 Resistance Councils on the village, parish, sub-county, county and district level 
(Tumusiime 1991: 15). On the national level, the main decision body o f the former rebel 
organization, the National Resistance Council (NRC, initially created in 1981), and its 21 
members now fulfilled legislative functions. In 1987, the membership in the NRC was 
extended to 96 members to also include district council representatives (RC V) and all 
government ministers.
The British government immediately recognized the new regime and declared that its 
"principal concern was to help Uganda establish security and to assist in its economic 
recovery" (cited in: ACR, Vol. XVIII, B 481). Little more than a month earlier the same 
government had announced that its further aid to Uganda was depended on strict adherence of 
all parties o f the December 1985 Nairobi peace accord. The small British Military Training 
Unit continued its work. US-Ugandan relations also improved dramatically in early 1986. The 
US ambassador in Kampala commended "the dramatic improvement in the security situation"
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(ACR, Vol. XVIII, B 481) and President Reagan claimed that Museveni had "ended the 
terrible human rights abuses of an earlier era" (ACR, Vol. XIX, B 484). American aid to 
Uganda was immediately restored.
The first Amnesty delegation visited the country in April 1987. A member of the delegation, 
Richard Carver, declared that Amnesty commended the appointment of a truth commission. 
He went on saying that the current problems identified by Amnesty should be seen "in the 
context o f a massive qualitative improvement in the human rights situation. (...) The past 
patterns of mass killings by the army and o f  torture had ended. The delegation found no 
indication o f "widespread use of torture" but alerted the authorities to the fate of more than 
one thousand detainees without trial, mainly soldiers o f Obote's UNLA (The Guardian, 1 May 
1987). On 15 April 1987, the government-owned Kenya Times published a summaiy o f a 17- 
page-report by the Ugandan Human Rights Activists and claimed that "human torturers in 
Uganda are said to have invented a host of other savage methods, quite a good deal have been 
tried by neo-fascists elsewhere in the world" (cited in: ACR, Vol. XIX, B 474). Apparently, 
the article reflected more accurately the indignation of Daniel arap Moi over the failed peace 
talks and Museveni's military victory, than the human rights situation in Uganda at that time. 
Relations with Kenya remained uneasy for the following years.
In order to bring rebel activities further down, Museveni announced in 1987 another amnesty 
for soldiers willing to lay down their arms. However, several groups in the Northern part of 
the country continued to engaged the NRA in serious military action. Consequently, the 
generally positive reporting on the human rights development in Uganda was questioned by 
continuous information on the NRA's efforts to fight the armed resistance (e.g. The Independ­
ent , 11 September 1987). The exile opposition tried to copy the successful NRM strategy to 
involve international societal forces into the fight against the government, but remained 
largely unheard in the Western world. A document named "Memorandum to the International 
Community" and published on 9 October 1987 in contained information about alleged atroci­
ties committed by the NRA in 1986-87 (cited in: ACR, Vol. XX, B 448). However, these 
attempts invariably failed as organizations such as Amnesty International refused to accept 
information provided by former members of the Amin and Obote governments. In contrast to 
the early 1980s, the new Ugandan exile community in Great Britain and the United States 
remained largely illegitimate representatives o f the Ugandan people.
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The international community maintained its positive attitude towards the NRM and gave the 
new government the benefit o f doubt. Museveni attended his first Commonwealth Summit in 
October 1987 and was invited by US-President Ronald Reagan the same month. In his first 
speech at the United Nations General Assembly, Museveni declared in October 1987 that ’’the 
Ugandan government under the NRM begins in the first place with an immutable commitment 
to guarantee human rights and the inviolability of human life" (cited in: Amnesty International 
1992a: 7). Museveni became a regular guest not only in governmental circles, but also aimed 
his public relations directly at the media and the non-govemmental world. During his first 
years as President he regularly met with international staff and editorial boards o f the 
Washington Post, Washington Times, USA Today, and Los Angeles Times. Museveni became 
also popular because he broke with taboos such as explicitly blaming Africans themselves 
(instead o f colonialism etc.) for much o f the economic failures since independence (Museveni 
1992: 51). These efforts were rewarded with increasing economic but also military aid 
programs.76 7
Domestically, the NRC was formally declared the national legislature in May 1988. In July 
the "Bill on Sectarianism" was passed and now regulated party activities. Party activities in 
public remained outlawed. As a result of the amnesty offer and decreasing rebel activities, the 
number o f NRA soldiers doubled within only two years time (at about 50,000 in 1990). While 
the security situation in the North and West did not improve until the early 1990s, the 
government succeeded in pacifying the Southern and Eastern part of the Ugandan territory. 
While the new leadership had come to power by military force, it actively sought to build its 
legitimacy on broad-based grassroots support and elite consensus.
Resistance Council (RC) elections in 1989
The first major nation-wide elections were held in February 1989. The proclaimed goal was to 
increase the membership of the National Resistance Council from 96 to 278.” Underlying this 
effort was a need to infuse the NRM government with new popular legitimacy because it 
approached the end the self-proclaimed four-year interim period (January 1990). Instead of
76 One of the Ugandan officers who was trained in the United States (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) was Paul 
Kagame. He led in 1994 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to military victory in Rwanda.
77 The expanded NRC consisted of 38 historical members (from the bush war period), 149 elected members, ten 
army representatives, 20 presidential nominees, as well as 34 women, 19 municipality, Five youth, and three
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secret ballot procedures, queue voting was used during the elections held for about one month 
in February and March (Ddungu/Wabwire 1991: 14). In a first stage, all adults over the age of 
18 elected the village council (R C I) with nine representatives. In turn, all village committees 
in a parish elected a parish committee (RC II). The same process applied to the next two 
levels, the sub-county and the county committees (RC III/IV). However, the powerful RC V 
as well as the NRC representatives were excluded from the system and directly elected by the 
RC III representatives. Additionally, candidates for the NRC were not required to go through 
the whole RC election process but stood directly at the RC III level for election.
International observers agreed after the elections that the exercise was largely free and fair. 
Prior to the exercise, domestic political parties were split about the appropriate election 
strategy. While the UPC headquarters had called for a boycott, other UPC members joined DP 
officials and advocated a strategy o f subverting the NRM from within (Ddungu/Wabwire 
1991: 28). In the end, a number of former UPC ministers o f  the Obote regime and many DP 
leaders were elected to the NRC. The elections showed that the old parties maintained control 
o f many of their former strongholds. Even though the opposition was weakened by the ban on 
party activities (Kasfir 1995:149), party allegiance remained surprisingly stable. A total o f ten 
Cabinet and four deputy ministers lost their positions because they did not win their respective 
constituency (Kasfir 1991: 261).
While the elections represented a step towards democracy simply because the national 
parliament was no longer dominated by non-elective ministers and veterans of the civil war 
period, the re-establishment of the legislature intensified the conflict between grassroots and 
representative democracy. There were no provisions as to what the relationship between the 
NRC and the RC system should be or how grassroots input on the national level could be 
extended beyond election day (Ddungu/Wabwire 1991: 15).7* Indeed, the top-RC V level 
representatives occasionally clashed with appointed District Administrators, in particular if 
the RC V was not a supporter of the movement system. While the NRC was gradually 
transformed into a genuine national parliament, the grassroots level became less and less *71
workers representatives (Tumusiime 1991: 19-23).
71 "Our findings suggest that there is an essential difference between Resistance Councils during the war and 
afterwards, following their countrywide establishment. (...) The legal and political conditions for the organiza­
tion of RCs were uniform throughout the country. Yet, RCs tended to mean different things in different parts of 
the country" (Ddungu 1994:402).
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significant. The executive did not directly gain power in that process, but it made sure 
beforehand that the exercise would not lead to a loss of control either.
The 1989 elections represented a skilled effort of the Ugandan government to slowly 
liberalize the political system from a position of strength. On the one hand, these were the first 
relatively free and fair elections in the country's history. Even the ban on party activities had, 
at least, one democratizing effect: "In practice the ban on campaigning succeeded in greatly 
reducing the opportunity for politicians to corrupt voters" (Kasfir 1991: 268). On the other 
hand, the elections were not about the NRM, the presidency, or the policies on the national 
level. It remained an open question if the RCs should primarily be viewed as checks against 
state dominance, represent the state on the local level, or even form the local arm of the NRM.
In March 1989, the government finally embarked on the promised constitutional reform and 
appointed a 21-member Constitutional Commission (Waliggo 1995) under the leadership of 
Judge Odoki. At the early stages there was considerable confusion within the NRM govern­
ment as to how the process of constitutional reform should actually proceed. The 
commission's mandate included the presentation of a draft constitution after having collected 
views of the ordinary citizens and stimulated "public discussion and awareness of constitu­
tional issues." A majority of its members were NRM-friendly, but a number of critics and 
independents were also appointed. There were no provisions as to how the new constitution 
would ultimately be promulgated, and "the appointing authorities, the Minister for Constitu­
tional Affairs and the President, were not in una voce on this matter" (Furley/Katalikawe 
1997: 247).79 Three o f the appointed members were given other government posts before they 
were supposed to be sworn in.
The commission did not commence its work until late 1990. In July 1989 Amnesty Interna­
tional criticized continued human rights problems in its first comprehensive report after 1986. 
Uganda: The Human Rights Record: 1986-1989 opened a series of four human rights reports 
on Uganda which came out annually until 1992. The main target were the armed forces and 
violations connected to operations in the insurgency areas. In reaction to the first report, 
Museveni pledged to investigate the individual allegations and convened a four-day NRA 
Council meeting in September. During that occasion he reiterated the government's commit­
79 For the terms of reference see: The Uganda Constitutional Commission Statute, 21 December 1988.
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ment to human rights and pointed out that several dozen NRA soldiers were in detention 
because of human rights abuses.
The Extension o f NRM Rule
In late September 1989, the NRM government tabled its motion to extend the term of its 
office from four to nine years until 25 January 1995. The Attorney General justified the 
motion on the grounds o f  several achievements o f the NRM rule since 1986. These included 
economic growth (1), the building o f a democratic mass movement (2), the restoration of 
Uganda's respectability abroad (3), the reestablishment o f the rule o f law, human rights and 
peace in almost all parts of the country (4), the rebuilding o f an ethnically diverse national 
army (5), and the elimination of a massive refugee problem the country had caused for many 
o f its neighbors (6). He noted that some o f those achievements were still incomplete and 
required an extension o f  the interim NRM rule and a continuation o f  the broad based national 
government. Most importantly, the extension should be used to complete rehabilitation 
programs (1) and the constitution making process (2), and stop the violence in the insurgency 
areas (3).10
Despite heavy criticism from the opposition, the NRC voted on 10 October 1989 unanimously 
in favor o f the extension o f the NRM mandate. Only one NRC member, Wasswa Ziritwawula 
(DP), resigned in protest of the extension. Still, the debate on the further extension o f the 
NRM rule exposed again the contradictory character of the movement and contributed to a 
narrowing o f its societal basis. The relationship between movement and parties remained 
unclear and tense. Paradoxically, the NRM was dependent on the political parties because 
only by contrasting a 'non-partisan' broad-based movement it was able to sustain the ban on 
party activities. Indeed, while this strategy potentially undermined the credibility o f the NRM 
government, it still continued to split the opposition before it could backfire on the movement. 
While the moderates accepted the conditions o f the political game set out by the NRM, more 
radical members o f the parties advocated a further boycott until the ban on their activities was 
lifted.
10 The proposed time table included a completion of the constitution making process until 1992, prison reform 
until 1993, police and civil service reform, professionalization of the army, and basic infrastructure rehabilita­
tion until 1994, and reform of the judiciary until 1995. Museveni himself claimed that the rehabilitation of the 
war-ravaged areas in the North had also priority (Museveni 1992: 64).
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The Constitutional Reform Process
After the 1989 elections, the NRM government sought to fulfil its promises and focused on 
the constitutional reform process, the continued rebel activities in the North and the rehabili­
tation of the infrastructure. Shortly before the Odoki Commission began its work, the NRA 
embarked on a major military effort to end the rebellion in the North. During the campaign, 
the army forced several thousand peasants out of their villages into guarded camps and held 
them as so-called "lodgers” (ACR, Vol. XXIII, B 407). Officially, the NRA declared that 
these measures were taken to protect the population from rebel attacks and massacres. 
However, critics argued that these camps served to hold suspected supporters o f the rebels 
without trial. After continued domestic and international criticism several thousand o f those 
"lodgers" were released in April 1990. In December, Amnesty International continued its 
series of annual human rights reports and published Uganda. Death in the Countryside. 
Killings o f  Civilians by the Army in 1990 (Amnesty International 1990). While the army 
succeeded in pushing the rebels back into Sudan, it failed to meet the original goal o f ending 
the rebellion.
The military campaign in the North contrasted with the deliberations on a new constitution 
which some observers called "an integral part of nation-building and a means o f establishing 
common values" (Apter 1995: 171). In the early stages, the Ugandan process o f drafting a new 
constitution was indeed exceptionally inclusive and broad-based. In late 1990 and throughout 
1991, the Odoki Commission traveled around the country, held dozens o f seminars and 
collected a total o f over 25,000 written suggestions for the reform of the constitution. "The 
most contentious issues with which the Commission was concerned were the form of 
government suitable for a democratic Uganda, the position of traditional rulers, and the role of 
political parties in the post-NRM era. Every effort was made to ensure that both the 'Guide­
lines' and the 'Guiding Questions’ were simple so that they were easily understood by the 
majority o f the people and the Commission was at pains to emphasize the neutrality and 
objectivity o f both documents" (Furley/Katalikawe 1997: 250). "Never before has 
constitution-making been so central and taken so long in the politics of and African nation. 
Never before have the Ugandan people been so actively involved at every level and placed so 
much hope for stability and democratization in the constitutional process" (Waliggo 1995: 
22). However, the bottom-up approach had its limits. In reality, the whole process remained
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'guided' in the sense that more often than not it was the commission which produced extensive 
materials and explanations. Moreover, in many rural areas, the process tended to be 
dominated by local elites. Finally, the commission collected not only popular views, but also 
received materials from donor agencies and reviewed foreign constitutions.
Even though the human rights situation in Northern Uganda remained problematic and 
Museveni openly defied some the emerging clamor for good governance, the donor 
community maintained its exceptionally friendly position towards the NRM government. 
Museveni had clearly passed other leaders in the region as the new "darling o f the donors". 
Like his predecessor, Milton Obote, Museveni ensured the fulfillment of economic conditions 
attached to the aid programs, including the privatization o f  parastatals, the return of property 
to the Asian community, and the reduction o f  government spending. In return, the donor 
community increased aid flows to unprecedented levels, covering more than 60 per cent o f the 
government budget in the early 1990s. The total aid committed by the Consultative Group 
rose from $550 Mio. in 1988 to $640 Mio. in 1989, and reached more than $800 Mio. 
annually in the early 1990s (Africa South o f the Sahara, Vol. 25, 1996, p. 1002). In 
meticulously fulfilling donor requests such as the return of Asian property, Museveni 
effectively prevented that the extension o f the NRM rule and the ban on party activities would 
surface as a serious donor concern.
Human Rights and the Civil War in the North
After it had become clear that neither the efforts to include the Northern and Northwestern 
Uganda into a broad-based government nor the military campaign o f the NRA were success­
ful, the NRM government briefly targeted political representatives o f the area in Kampala. In 
February 1990, the Minister for Culture, Youth, and Sports, Brig. Moses Ali was dismissed 
and charged with plotting a coup against the government. In January 1991, the government 
had to drop all charges except for the illegal possession o f ammunition. In mid-April 1991 
security organs arrested and mistreated 18 politicians from the North, including the Minister 
o f  State for Foreign Affairs, Daniel Omara Atubo, and two other members of the NRC. They 
were accused o f  high treason in connection with the rebel activities in their home areas. 
Again, the government eventually dropped all charges and the accused were released in 
January 1992. Similar arrests of leading DP and UPC politicians occurred in January 1992, 
but equally resulted in acquittals.
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The failure o f the government to integrate the North on equal footing into Ugandan politics 
did not strengthen the cause of the rebel groups active in the area. To the contrary, while the 
rebels used to enjoy some local support right after Museveni became president, the situation 
markedly changed in the early 1990s. Unlike Museveni's rebel movement, these groups failed 
to offer legitimate political alternatives, relied on support by the Islamist government in Sudan 
and increasingly resorted to terrorist methods against the rural Ugandan population. By the 
end of 1991 the Lord Resistance Movement (LRA) remained as the most visible rebel group 
in the North. It was led by Joseph Kony, the successor of the self-proclaimed mystic Alice 
Lakwena, who had initially led the so-called Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) against the 
Museveni's government (Behrend 1993).*'
The war in the North slowly turned from a rebellion against a new government into a 
protracted conflict where rebels and government troops fought a battle between Islamist 
Sudan and US-supported Uganda. While the Ugandan government supported the south- 
Sudanese rebel group Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) under the leadership o f 
John Garang, the Islamist regime in Khartoum retaliated by sheltering and supplying the 
LRA. When indigenous support for the rebels in the Northern part of Uganda waned, Kony 
shifted his strategy away from battlefield action to kidnappings, rapes and killings of innocent 
civilians (ACR, Vol. XXII, B 375).
At the time when the 18 Northern politicians were still incarcerated, Amnesty International 
published Uganda. Human Rights Violations by the National Resistance Army (Amnesty 
International 1991) on 4 December 1991. Two weeks later the Ugandan Minister o f Justice 
claimed that all individual abuses of human rights would be harshly punished and denied that 
the named abuses were sanctioned by the government. Despite the growing criticism, the 
government remained largely cooperative. During 1991, representatives from the International 
Committee o f the Red Cross (ICRC) visited a total o f 23 Ugandan prisons,” 26 police stations 
and 31 NRA barracks. Unlike Amnesty International the ICRC does not make its information 
public but discusses human rights issues directly with respective government agencies. 1
11 Kony proclaimed the "extension of the ten commandments across Uganda" as his main goal.
”  As a result of an ongoing dialogue with donors, domestic and international NGOs, the government took in 
1996 control of all local prisons in the country after a survey revealed that conditions at local prisons were on 
average much more prone to human rights abuses than in state-run facilities.
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In 1992, domestic critics tried to take advantage of the temporary international focus on 
Uganda as a result of the intensified military campaign in the North. The government critic 
and Deputy Inspector General of Government Waswa Lule claimed that the IGG was still to 
weak to go beyond isolated cases and had to avoid issues of national significance (Oloka- 
Onyango 1993). On 18 August 1992, Lule was removed from his post by NRM hardliners. 
This episode shows the obvious. In periods o f domestic crisis, governmental human rights 
agencies are likely to fail, if  they stand alone. The virtual absence o f an independent civil 
society especially in the area of human rights allowed the sections o f the Ugandan govern­
ment to get away with increasingly repressive policies. Although the Museveni government 
was generally inclined to take seriously issues raised by Amnesty International, such 'inclina­
tion* is not enough to produce the desired outcomes.
In September 1992, Amnesty International followed up and published Uganda. The Failure to 
Safeguard Human Rights (Amnesty International 1992b). The Ugandan government called the 
report "politically biased and outdated." Even though it was true that some of the issues raised 
in the report had diminished in significance due to decreasing rebel activities in the North, the 
fear that institutional safeguards for human rights in Uganda were insufficiently still 
developed had been vindicated by the recent events. Amnesty International took the 
information collected during the last three years to the United Nations where the Human 
Rights Commission decided in early 1992 to investigate the Ugandan situation under the 
confidential 1503 procedure. For the first time, the NRM government had to officially justify 
alleged human rights violations in front o f the international community.
This was certainly enough to raise alarm in the President's office. In direct response to the 
imminent threat o f international pillorying, Museveni ordered in late October 1992 by 
presidential decree the establishment o f a Human Rights Desk in the Ministry o f Justice. This 
measure clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with the performance o f existing governmental 
agencies charged with human rights issues. As another result of the human rights criticism the 
Ugandan government also temporarily changed its position towards the Lord's Resistance 
Army. The government, represented by the Minister for the North, Betty Bigombe, held secret 
negotiations with Joseph Kony in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. While the 
security situation improved for some time, the negotiations failed to resolve the underlying 
differences.
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Finally, the NRA leadership also agreed to a substantial reduction o f army personnel (ACR. 
Vol. XXIII, B 406), which had increased from about 20,000 in 1986 to close to 100,000 in 
199U92. Various offers of Amnesty and peace treaties with rebel groups represented a major 
source o f the increase, because the individual rebel soldiers were usually included in the 
payroll of the NRA. Donor governments had expressed for some time their uneasiness about 
this development and eventually covered almost all the costs o f the demobilization. As a 
result, the army was cut to about half its size and 40 to 50,000 soldiers were discharged. 
Although critics o f the NRM rightly argued that "Uganda's political grammar (...) has 
remained essentially the same: soldiers and not civilians form the backbone of those in power" 
(Omara-Otunnu 1992: 460; see also Ddungu/Wabwire 1991: 38-41), the crucial change 
occurred within this military regime. While many human rights problems after 1986 were 
directly related to the special status of the armed forces, the political reforms promoted by the 
NRM  profoundly changed civil-military relations in Uganda. However, in taking the rhetori­
cal leadership with respect to political regime change, the Museveni government faced the 
continuous challenge of living up to the self-proclaimed standards.
In 1991/92, a de facto truce as a result o f ongoing negotiations had greatly improved the 
security situation in the North. Amnesty International discontinued its campaign against the 
NRA and published from 1993 to 1998 only smaller reports or press releases on Uganda.” 
The ongoing demobilization, economic and constitutional reforms further contributed to 
positive outside perceptions of Museveni's rule. However, his reform agenda did not only 
contribute to his international and domestic reputation, but also offered mid- and long-term 
opportunities to challenge his rule. "The capacity of the state to restore security destroyed its 
principal reason for sustaining the essentially soft authoritarian pact with all political parties: 
the further he moved the country from the civil wars o f past decades, the greater the support 
for the resumption o f multipartyism" (Khadiagala 1995: 40). Although the political opposition 
remained weak, the remaining gaps between rhetoric and reality offered now more numerous 
opportunities to challenge the all-dominant movement system.
Although these challenges were no serious short term threat to Museveni's rule, the reactions 
to those arguments and the apparent effects o f global changes on Africa indicated a subtle but
”  Only in its most recent 1999 World Report, Human Rights Watch began to cover Uganda.
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significant shift in Museveni's position on regime change towards democracy. While the 
NRM started out with an alternative grassroots model o f democracy and rejected representa­
tional systems, the establishment o f the NRC and the increasingly unclear role of the RC 
system as a whole indicated a failure o f the grassroots model and a return to representative 
democracy as a model for regime change. The desire to increase control from above was a 
main reason why the NRM resorted to this strategy. It was simply easier to transfer powers to 
the NRC and control its members than to control grassroots elections throughout the country. 
However, in doing so, the NRM government unwittingly brought parties as main vehicles for 
societal interest formation back into the picture and created an additional tension between the 
theory of representational democracy and the reality of the ban on party activities. After 1992, 
this tension was more or less successfully exploited by domestic critics o f the movement 
system.
Facing those challenges and the profound global changes affecting now also Africa, Museveni 
himself resorted to the old modernization arguments and held that "some in Africa think if  we 
have multi-parties we will have prosperity. This is putting the cart before the horse. If we are 
going to follow Europe's lead, then let us first eliminate the peasants, industrialize and achieve 
the same level o f skilled manpower before embarking on multiparty politics. That is what 
Europe had to do, why should we be any different?" (cited in: Khadiagala 1995: 40). 
Interestingly enough, donors at that time forced Moi to reintroduce multipartyism while 
Museveni was hardly pushed to give up the movement system. This marked difference can 
only be explained with reference to the transnational human rights activism and the 
subsequent de- and reconstruction of state images on the international level. While the actual 
government policies on the ground were similar, the international reactions to them were 
almost the opposite. These differences are the main subject o f the following section on Kenya.
5.2 Kenya 1989-1991: Reforms from  above
During 1989/90 the NGO-led reconstruction o f the foreign and domestic image o f Kenya was 
completed. This had two major consequences. First, the domestic playing field became 
increasingly inseparable from the international arena. Domestic and international mobilization 
reinforced each other in critical ways. Although the rhetoric o f Kenyan government officials 
towards human rights critics was still outright hostile, the government had to accept a signifi­
cant increase in societal autonomy and resorted to tactical concessions in order to tame the
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mounting pressure. A whole array of new non-governmental organizations sprung up and 
began to reclaim political space, while parts off the press began to report more openly and 
even favorably about the emerging political opposition. When the mounting domestic pressure 
finally convinced parts o f the ruling elite that an imminent loss o f power was possible, these 
sections revived ideas o f ethnic segregation (majimbo) and fuelled violent clashes between 
different ethnic groups. Second, diplomatic relations with many Western governments 
worsened considerably. Within the previously rather quiet and supportive international donor 
community voices critical o f the Kenyan government's human rights record increased signifi­
cantly in number and strength. Cracks within the previously relatively closed ranks o f donor 
countries emerged as individual countries and their representatives in charge adjusted their 
images of Kenya at different speeds.
In October 1989, the conservative Republican and former journalist Smith Hempstone arrived 
as the new US Ambassador in Kenya. He was a political appointee and had no incentives to 
follow the beaten (and rather quiet) path o f a life as a career diplomat. During the next four 
years he became an outspoken supporter o f democratic change who was joined by his German 
counterpart Bemdt Miitzelburg in 1991. For Smith Hempstone this meant not only constant 
personal attacks by Kenyan government newspapers and KANU officials for allegedly 
defying the norm of diplomatic neutrality. Moreover, even within the US State Department he 
became soon isolated, because of his "undiplomatic” efforts to go beyond rhetorical support 
for democracy and match words with deeds.
The fall o f communist regimes in Eastern Europe reinforced the efforts of the international 
and domestic human rights activists to reconstruct the image the Kenyan government. While 
Moi (like Museveni) declared early on that the conditions in Africa were vastly different from 
Eastern Europe, his new image as an unrelenting authoritarian leader became increasingly a 
liability. From late 1989 on, street demonstrations against the regime became more frequent 
and better organized.*4 Right after the fall o f the Berlin wall, about 3000 students held a 
demonstration for democracy. Other major and increasingly violent demonstrations with 
several ten thousand participants followed in February 1990 and around Saba Saba in July 
(see below). 84
84 Lafargue listed the major street demonstrations from 1987 to 1994 (Lafargue 1996:250-253).
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The Death of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko
At the end o f 1989, Moi planned another official state visit to the United States in order to 
secure further international support. The White House and the State Department rebuffed this 
request and Moi was forced to declare his visit a private affair. Nonetheless, Moi traveled with 
his usual large entourage including his Foreign Minister Robert Ouko. The United States 
government had made clear for some time now that current circumstances in Kenya made it 
impossible to welcome Kenyan government officials in good faith. "Following his dressing 
down in Washington, Moi had returned to the Kenyan High Commission in London in a fury, 
refusing to have anything to do with Ouko, whom he blamed for the fiasco" (Throup/Homsby 
1998: 59). The Foreign Minister and staunch supporter o f Moi, Robert Ouko, was the only 
exception to that position and rumors in Nairobi had it that the United States government 
favored him as a possible successor o f the current President. Ouko had distinguished himself 
with a relatively moderate position within the Kenyan government and had just begun to 
confront some o f his Cabinet colleagues on the issue of corruption.
Upon arrival back in Nairobi, Moi declared that he "has received a proper hearing and our 
relationship with the U.S. Government has now improved." However, the rest o f the speech 
and the manner in which Moi repeatedly stopped short of certain remarks indicated that the 
results of the visit did probably not meet his expectations. "You know some people take me for  
granted sometimes because I  am a peaceful man. I have no need to quarrel with anyone. But 
all this...[changes thought] if  only people were patriots, who did whatever they were doing 
with the purpose of building their country. [...] All these bad things we hear about in this 
country are spread by those who have made it. Those experiencing hardship and who do not 
even know where there next meal will come from are not the type o f people who incite and 
bring about chaos. It is the rich ones who board planes and spread rumors to ruin the country, 
[applause] (FBIS-AFR-90-026, 7 February 1990, p, 7). Two weeks after the speech, the 
Foreign Minister Ouko was found murdered not far from his home. Immediately, rumors 
developed that Ouko died because he became a threat to some of his Cabinet colleagues and 
even the President.”
”  Widner held that "Moi was so furious with Ouko that he ordered his assassination" (Widner 1992b: 193; see 
also Hempstone 1997: 66-70). In 1998, the former District Commissioner, who had been charged with the 
murder but not convicted, published his own account of the mystery (Anguka 1998).
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The Challenge to One-Party Rule
Despite the difficult situation of the government, its security organs continued to arrest and 
harass opposition figures, close newspapers and, thus, provoked continuous violence on the 
streets. Encouraged by the global demise o f authoritarianism, the opposition answered the 
repression with growing defiance. On 3 May, the former Cabinet Ministers and successful 
business men Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba publicly demanded the end o f single-party 
rule in Kenya (Throup/Homsby 1998: 61). Prior to their press conference they ’’had been 
carefully coached by Paul Muite and Gibson Kamau Kuria on precisely how far they could 
go" (Throup/Homsby 1998: 64). Obviously, the political opposition tried to take advantage of 
the global changes and had selected two reputable former ministers to start its campaign for 
multipartyism. Incidentally, Smith Hempstone was invited to address the Rotary Club in 
Nairobi the same day on economic issues. Hempstone largely stuck to the original theme of 
his address, but made a few remarks on the overall political situation towards the end o f the 
speech. He reminded the audience that "a strong political tide is flowing in our Congress (...) 
to  concentrate our economic assistance on those of the world's nations that nourish democratic 
institutions, defend human rights, and practice multiparty politics" (Hempstone 1997: 91).
The Kenyan government and the media controlled by it subsequently alleged that there was a 
previous collusion between Hempstone and the emerging political opposition. In his reaction 
to the mounting political challenges, President Moi denounced Matiba and Rubia as traitors 
who were paid by foreign sources. Two weeks later the US Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs Hank Cohen clarified in a meeting with Moi in Nairobi that his government 
was not making multipartyism a condition for aid as of now.*6 He also refused to meet 
opposition leaders and left the impression that Hempstone was isolated within his own 
government (Clough 1992: 100). "From then on it was the Kenyan government's position that 
relations between the United States and Kenya were fine (...), but Hempstone was a maverick 
acting on his own" (Hempstone 1997: 95). On 10 May, Moi declared that "we have 
experienced the shortcomings o f having two or three parties in the 1960s. Many people were 
killed because we had many parties. As you know, when matters come to opposition, Africans
*6 Between 1962 and 1988 Kenya received a total of about one Biltion US-Dollar in aid. It had been the third 
largest recipient country following Sudan and Zaire. 63 per cent of the aid went directly to government sources 
(Clough 1992: 78). After 1990 aid packages were generally cut and redirected to the non-governmental sector.
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do not take things easily; they can not understand. Fighting each other, that is what Africans 
are. We saw hell. Why? Because tribalism is still deeply rooted" (ACR, Vol. XXII, B 287).
.1
The opening created by the Rubia/Matiba press conference led to intensified domestic mobili­
zation for democratic change. On 4 July, the Kenyan police detained Matiba, Rubia and 
others. Gibson Kamau Kuria took refuge at the US embassy and asked for political asylum. 
Subsequent street demonstrations in the capital Nairobi and provincial centers culminated on 
7 July 1990 when at least 29 civilians were killed during so-called Saba Saba}1 The interna­
tional response came almost instantaneously. The International Bar Association canceled its 
biannual meeting with more than 3,000 participants to be held in Nairobi in September 
(Muthoga 1990), citing the general insecurity in the country. Bringing the IB A conference to 
Nairobi would have been a major success for the Kenyan government in regaining some of its 
international reputation. Now, the opposite was the case: The cancellation reaffirmed outside 
perceptions about a serious domestic crisis.
President Moi remained unimpressed by the political developments. On 30 July 1990, Moi 
declared during a speech in Meru that "the only thing you hear from Voice of America and 
BBC are ugly things intended to stir up discord. They say there is war in Kenya. Is there war 
here in Meru? [Response: No] They say there is war in Meru and elsewhere but we don't 
disturbances here or anywhere else. I f  you Kenyans do not listen well and understand what 
people are saying, you could be misled by unfair reports. (...) If the citizens do what I have 
told them to do, no one will be deprived of his rights. If a certain law is not observed it is not 
my fault or the government’s fault" (FBIS-AFR-90-147,31 July 1990, p. 3). On the same day, 
34 Kenyan diplomats from Kenyan embassies abroad met in Mombasa in order to discuss 
ways o f improving the international image o f Kenya. Foreign Minister Ayah claimed that 
efforts to defend Kenya internationally need to be increased or otherwise it is left to "foreign­
ers to create views about Kenya" (FBIS-AFR-90-147,31 July 1991, p. 5).
On 25 August 1990 Moi attacked human rights activists at Jomo Kenyatta airport, upon 
returning from a state visit to Botswana. "Many people are using the concept o f human rights 
as their hiding place. They think that if  they do evil things, the human rights organizations 87
87 In the following years, the opposition movement used days with symbolic meanings to call for demonstra­
tions. Saba Saba is the seventh day of the seventh month in the year.
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will cover them, [laughter] I will get hold o f you. Even if  you find sanctuary in the human 
rights organizations, I will drag you out because if you breach Kenyan law you cannot expect 
to be protected by Amnesty International [applause]. The Kenyan government will never do 
anything which contrary to the country's constitutional laws. (...) If  you decide to hide 
yourself in such a place, we will allow them [Moi apparently refers here to foreign donors, 
HPS] to feed you but we will wait for you here at the airport and all the borders will be closed 
for you until you get tired and come out (FBIS-AFR-90-166, 27 August 1990, p. 8). The 
Kenyan executive came increasingly to the opinion that the "bid for democracy [was] a 
movement under the control of the rival Kikuyu ethnic group" (Widner 1992a: 216).
Diplomatic Crisis and Tactical Concessions
In October 1990, the Norwegian ambassador Niels Dahl, along with other international 
observers, attended another trial against Koigi wa Wamwere, after he had been allegedly 
abducted from Uganda by Kenyan security forces (Saulnier 1997: 30).*' On Kenyatta Day (20 
October) Moi complained that Norway had protested that "we arrested a criminal (Koigi wa 
Wamwere, HPS),... I suppose what he has been planning was at the behest of the Norwegian 
government. We are not a colony o f anyone, let them know that." In other speeches during 
1990 Moi claimed that "Marxists" were "plotting armed insurrection" (citations in: ACR, Vol. 
XXII, B 285). Consequently, Moi interpreted the actions of the Norwegian ambassador as 
another act o f foreign intrusion. Over the next weekend, the inner circle of Moi's personal 
advisers decided to severe diplomatic relations with Norway (Baehr, Selbervik, and Tostensen 
1995: 69) without involving the Foreign Ministry or other concerned government agencies. 
The decision was announced on 22 October. In turn, the Norwegian government ended all aid 
programs. Attempts by the Kenyan foreign ministry to downplay the issue and rescue the aid 
programs failed.
The outside relationships o f the Kenyan government were now openly strained as representa­
tives from Western donor countries had to react to the diplomatic stand-off between Kenya 
and Norway. For the first time in October 1990, US Congress attached human rights issues to *•
*• In 1975, Wamwere studied for one year at Cornell University. On 29 April 1977 he appeared for the first time 
on an Amnesty International list of jailed journalists published in the N ew  Y ork  T im es. He had been arrested 
under Kenyatta from 1977 to 1978 and won a parliamentary seat in 1979. After the 1982 coup he was jailed 
again for more than two years. In 1986 he fled to Norway (see chapter 4).
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foreign aid appropriations for Kenya.89 Within five years the transnational network had 
successfully completed its task of "re-mapping" (Brysk 1993: 268) Western perceptions of 
Kenya. At this point opposition figures like Gitobu Imanyara or Gibson Kamau Kuria were 
regularly invited to London, New York, and Washington D.C. by international human rights 
organizations and met with journalists, members of Congress and government officials 
(Human Rights Watch 1991: 43). The global discourse now associated the country with issues 
like corruption, torture, and insecurity instead o f stability and economic development. 
Moreover, these changes in perception were no longer checked by the norm of sovereignty (as 
in the case of Uganda between 1972 and 1984), but became increasingly relevant for policy 
decisions.
Apart from the growing international policy relevance o f  the transnational human rights 
mobilization and the increase in societal autonomy, the crucial period between the end of 
1989 and 1991 was also marked by significant governmental concessions. One o f the first ? 
victims was the Attorney General Matthew Greg Muli. On 22 March 1991, Hempstone asked 
Muli for an appointment to discuss the recently released US State Department Report on the 
Kenyan human rights situation and an Amnesty report. He complained to Muli about the 
prison conditions of recently detained opposition activists and the allegedly restricted access 
for visitors. Specifically, Hempstone demanded a list o f prison visits to the three most 
prominent detainees (Charles Rubia, Kenneth Matiba, and Oginga Odinga) for the last nine 
months. Muli promised improvements and provided the US embassy with the requested 
information, but generally held that "all nations at one time or another in their history 
employed detention without trial" (Hempstone 1997: 163).
Subsequently, the government-owned Kenyan press mounted its usual attacks on Hempstone 
and accused him of interfering in the internal affairs of Kenya. However, more independent ,
i
Kenyan newspapers used the opportunity to expose Muli's generally dismal performance as \
Attorney General (Weekly Review, 12 April 1991). Only two weeks later, Amos Wako, a !
Luhya and internationally well-known human rights lawyer, replaced Muli as Attorney 1
89 The US Congress asked the Kenyan government to "charge and try or release all prisoners, including 
detainees, stop the mistreatment of prisoners, restore the independence of the judiciary and permit freedom of 
expression (Human Rights Watch 1991: 42). Kenya continued to receive unconditional military aid amounting 
to $5 Mio. in 1991 and $3,73 Mio. in 1993).
t
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General.90 Another significant measure taken during that period was the reinstatement of 
tenure forjudges in December 1990 (Gathii 1994:19).
These developments only reinforced Moi's almost paranoid perceptions of his domestic and 
international environment at that time. When the opposition continued its pressure for change, 
he proved to be uncompromising. "Frequently, we hear that Kenya is a bad country. I can only 
say that Europeans are fools. When a lone African cries, they say he is being oppressed. They 
do not know the secrets o f an African. There are others who go abroad and demonstrate how 
people can be tortured using the television in those countries, and then take it to Europe 
claiming that Kenyans are being tortured. So they see people being tortured; however that is 
not happening here. It is portrayed as such to cause chaos in Kenya. (...) No one should shield 
himself behind human rights. AH that is said is being fabricated outside o f Kenya through 
television everywhere and then sent to Europe, America, and elsewhere under the pretext that 
this is what is happening in Kenya, while it is concocted outside Kenya by others, not even by 
Kenyans" (FBIS-AFR-91-087,6 May 1991, p. 4).
The End of One-Party Rule
Considering these frequent rhetorical attacks, the tactical concessions offered by the Kenyan 
government failed to make a lasting impression on the donors and other international and 
domestic observers. To the contrary, the human rights movement countered these efforts by 
publishing first comprehensive human rights report on Kenya (Africa Watch/Human Rights 
Watch 1991). On 30 July 1991, Africa Watch presented on 432 pages and in 22 chapters 
(including appendices) detailed accounts of human rights abuses committed by security 
agencies during the 1980s, discussed some of the background conditions and also criticized 
the recent official British and US attitudes towards the country. The report included extensive 
documentation concerning the murder o f Foreign Minister Robert Ouko and the regular use of 
sedition laws, detention without trial, and torture to suppress public dissent. It also criticized 
the lack o f judicial independence, horrendous prison conditions, open discrimination o f ethnic 
Somalis in the Northern part o f the country, and increasing police brutality.
90 Amos Wako was appointed UN Special Rapporteur for Summary and Arbitrary Executions in 1982. He was 
later an elected deputy chairman of the UN Human Rights Committee. In defying these credentials, he claimed 
in his inaugural speech that "no one, save the President, was above the law" (Kiai 1993).
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While the report contained little new information, it successfully re-emphasized that the 
human rights violations in Kenya were the result of systematic and intentional government 
policy rather than isolated acts of individuals. Hence, the report did not mainly alert people to 
new facts, but brought together the available information and, thus, supported the case for an 
actual policy change on the part of the donor governments. This move was again paralleled by 
domestic mobilization. On 2 August 1991, the opposition created a broad coalition called the 
Forum for the Restoration o f Democracy (FORD) which was "inspired by Civil Forum in East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia" (Throup 1993: 390).
The opposition was now strong enough to bypass the government's ban on political parties 
and represented a loose coalition of clergy, radical lawyers, and individual dissidents. While 
the National Council o f  Churches in Kenya (NCCK) and the Law Society o f Kenya (LSK) 
had been the main institutional bodies backing opposition dissent during the 1980s, the 
formation of FORD was a breakthrough in establishing a direct challenge to KANU and Moi. 
Initially formed as a pressure group, FORD's leadership was an ethnically broad coalition 
which included Oginga Odinga (Luo), Martin Shikuku (Luhya), Masinde Muliro (Luhya), 
Philip Gachoka (Kikuyu), George Nthenge (Kamba), and the Muslim Ahmed Salim Bahmariz 
from the Coast region. Many of the 'human rights celebrities' such as the former LSK 
chairman, Paul Muite, and the editor o f the Nairobi Law Monthly, Gitobu Imanyara, also 
joined FORD.
The formation o f  FORD was simultaneously inspired by the global changes and the Kenyan 
independence history. In contrast to prior unsuccessful attempts o f institutionalizing political 
opposition, FORD mobilized both international support but also revived the historic Kikuyu- 
Luo alliance. "The FORD of 1990 echoed the KANU coalition o f the 1960s, not only in its 
leadership but also in its middle class and urban base and its successful mobilization o f rural 
support from its 'ethnic areas.' FORD opposed a KANU that resembled the 1960 KADU 
coalition of minority groups led by largely middle- and upper class leaders whose base 
remained rural and who were unable to attract an urban following" (Ndegwa 1997: 609). 
However, in contrast to KANU in the 1960s, FORD was merely an opposition movement 
which lacked the resources to secure internal cohesion. Already shortly after its formation, 
internal conflicts about the future role of FORD and the leadership emerged. While one 
section o f FORD advocated the transformation o f the movement into a political party a second
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group wanted to keep FORD as a united opposition movement to press for reforms.
The government and its ‘new* KANU (former KADU) coalition reacted to the challenge with a 
revival of the Majimbo-agenda, which had already been part o f KADU’s political program in 
the early 1960s (see chapter 3). They demanded greater local autonomy and the réintroduction 
o f federal provisions in order to protect the smaller tribes from the dominance o f a coalition of 
the larger Kikuyu and Luo groups. Essentially, majimbo would institutionalize the idea of a 
'one-tribe party' and divide Kenya in autonomous regions. In September and October 1991, 
the minority coalition supporting the current government held five mass rallies in Kalenjin 
and Maasai areas (Ndegwa 1997; 609-610). During one of those rallies, one o f the prominent 
KANU hawks, Minister for Local Government and Maasai William ole Ntimama, warned the 
Kikuyu that they would be "cut down to the size like the Ibo" of Nigeria during the Biafra 
war.91 92Nicholas Biwott claimed that FORD members would be "crushed" by KANU youth- 
wingers. The main organizers o f the rallies called for a majimbo system as an alternative to 
political pluralism and threatened to push for such constitutional changes if multiparty 
activists would persist in their crusade. The meetings usually openly advocated 'ethnic 
cleansing* and held that under a new constitution "outsiders in the Rift Valley would be 
required to go back to their 'motherland’" (Republic of Kenya 1992; 9). Other resolutions 
included a ban on opposition politicians to enter the area. On 29 October this counter 
mobilization turned violent when the first instance o f 'ethnic cleansing' was reported from 
Nandi District in the Rift Valley. In the next months, the number of violent incidents in border 
regions between different ethnic groups increased dramatically and hundreds o f Kenyans were 
killed (Republic o f  Kenya 1992: 67).w Beyond the intimidation of opposition voters, the 
ethnic violence also aimed at closing the ranks o f the fragile KANU coalition 
(Throup/Homsby 1998: 199).
By late 1991, the Moi government had lost control over domestic affairs and even had prob­
lems to keep its own ranks closed. The consistent use o f violence in dealing with the
91 When the US journalist Bill Berkeley later asked Attorney General Amos Wako in 1995, why Ntimama or 
others were never charged in court for the incitements to violence, he replied: "If you arrest Ntimama, there 
would be riots" (Berkeley 1996).
92 Existing land conflicts between various ethnic groups represented the background for the violent attacks. The 
conflicts originated in the colonial period when white settlers took over large sections of the Rift Valley and 
allowed mainly Kikuyu squatters to move into areas previously owned by Maasai and Kalenjin groups (see 
chapter 3). Over the decades, the sharp population increase also intensified land pressure.
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opposition only strengthened the latter, although it was divided from the start. In early 
November 1991, Smith Hempstone brokered talks between the Kenyan government and the 
opposition in order to avoid further confrontation. However, the talks finally broke down on 
14 November and several members o f the opposition were arrested by Kenyan security organs 
during the following night. The next day, the opposition called for street demonstrations 
against the government. Mützelburg and Hempstone lodged their protests during a meeting 
with the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Bethuel Kiplagat. When the demonstra­
tions turned violent again, the group o f the most critical ambassadors (Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, Sweden, and United States) was summoned to the Foreign Ministry on 18 
November. They were accused of organizing the demonstrations and o f interference in the 
internal affairs o f the country. Hempstone was personally accused by the minister Ayah of 
being a "racist" and "trying to overthrow the Kenyan government” (Hempstone 1997: 252). 
The German foreign ministry recalled Mützelburg for consultations and instructed him to 
issue "the strongest of protests in the Foreign Ministry in Nairobi” on the human rights 
situation in the country.93
In a rare moment of unity, the international community reacted to this crisis by temporarily 
suspending on 26 November 1991. After the joint declaration on democratic governance at the 
Harare Commonwealth summit in October 1991, even Great Britain finally had joined the 
critical voices, although its High Commissioner Tomkys still refused to carry out the new 
directives.94 95Prior to the donor decision, last minute efforts by the Kenyan government to avert 
the crisis failed. Moi even ordered the arrest o f his closest aide, Nicholas Biwott, who was 
accused o f being involved in the Ouko murder.9* These efforts could not make up for the 
continuous and successful reconstruction of Kenya's international image by non-governmental 
human rights groups. "Kenya, the long-time favorite of the West, was being treated as one of 
Africa's pariah regimes" (Throup/Homsby 1998: 84).
Shortly after the donor decision, the Kenyan government through its Foreign Ministry
93 Foreign Broadcast Information Service/Daily Reports, 18 November 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-222, p. 17).
94 "Tomkys confessed that he had lost the battle over the direction of British policy towards Kenya when he 
visited London the week of November 16-23. (...) He said he had delivered a list of steps to Moi on his return to 
Nairobi" (Hempstone 1997:256).
95 A detective from Scotland Yard named Biwott as one of two prime suspects. Shortly before his death Ouko 
had challenged Cabinet Ministers, because of misappropriation of foreign aid (including the total Swedish aid 
package of 1989) for private use (Widner 1992b: 196). Biwott was released after 14 days, but lost his position in
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published a 85-page response to the July Africa Watch report titled "Nailing Lies" (Republic 
o f Kenya 1991). Most of the 13 sections directly addressed issues raised in the Africa Watch 
report. The defense also made reference to criticism contained in British media reports and 
recently expressed by some of the now internationally well-known Kenyan lawyers. It gave a 
lengthy (and at the point of publication outdated) justification o f "single-party democracy" 
and argued that "Kenya's situation is entirely different from those African countries now 
apparently turning to multi-partyism" (Republic of Kenya 1991: 13). The report reaffirmed 
Kenya's "commitment to the cause o f human rights" and claimed that "as Kenya's political 
system evolves, so greater attention is being paid to the rights and freedoms o f individuals (p. 
5). In the following sections, the authors cited the full respect for press freedom as a major 
democratic accomplishment in Kenya. They rejected accusations that the judiciary was not 
independent, torture was rampant, and refugees were mistreated.
Four days after the donor decision, on 30 November, Hempstone and the visiting US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Bob Houdek, met with President Moi and 
Foreign Minister Ayah. Houdek said that he had been instructed to pursue two essential 
issues. First, he wanted to know a precise date when the opposition could hold its first legal 
public meeting. Second, he asked Moi to announce publicly elections with non-KANU 
candidates. Moi flatly rejected both demands and complained instead about the alleged 
misconduct of donors and embassy personnel. He asked the US to "detach itself from the 
dissidents and follow diplomatic conventions" (Hempstone 1997: 257). On 2 December, 
however, Moi announced the end o f the one-party era in Kenya. FORD was officially 
registered as a party on 31 December.
+ T
5.3 Comparison
Successful transnational human rights activism requires intensive and sustained mobilization. 
This was obviously true for Kenya in the crucial period between 1989 and 1991, but also for 
Uganda between 1986 and 1992. Hence, international attention and mobilization are an 
important factor in processes o f regime change, no matter, i f  governments denounce such 
criticism or are generally open to it. Norms can take different paths o f diffusion, most 
basically like bottom-up or top-down. These differences were the subject o f this chapter and
the Cabinet. He returned as Minister in the Office of the President in January 1997 (see chapter 6).
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are understood as consequential for the sustainability of norms adoption. ;
During the 1989-91 period, the human rights situation in Kenya remained by and large 
unchanged. Although the breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe was a crucial 
reinforcement, the process of changing the image of the Kenyan government was already 
completed in 1989 and led now to the successful pressure for significant tactical concessions. 
The non-governmental mobilization since the mid-1980s provided a interpretative framework 
so that demonstrations and the repression by the Kenyan police further solidify the authori­
tarian image o f Moi. After 1989, the human rights mobilization on Kenya could no longer be 
controlled by the government. International and domestic events now reinforced each other on 
the basis of the work previously done by the transnational human rights network. In late 1991, 
tactical concessions and repeated references to the norm of sovereignty finally failed to 
protect the government from serious consequences.
Under the global pressure for multipartyism, KANU representatives now revived the idea of 
majimbo as an alternative to political pluralism. They sought to subordinate national to ethnic 
citizenship in an effort to counter the threat o f  a renewed dominance of the larger over the 
smaller ethnicities. As a result of this counter-mobilization, Kikuyu and Luo became the main 
victims of'ethnic cleansing' in areas neighboring the Maasai and Kalenjin heartland. Majimbo 
was the logical preference of the incumbent minority to secure their maximum control o f the 
political process. In contrast, representatives from the larger ethnic groups advocated national 
unity, liberal values, and majority rule not only for principled reasons but because such a 
position held the best prospects for their own access to power.
In contrast to Kenya, a  similar attitude o f the Ugandan government towards multipartyism had 
no negative repercussions for its international standing and aid flows. Unlike Moi and despite 
continuous human rights problems, Museveni was perceived as a "new breed" of African 
leadership and positively integrated into the international liberal community. Even the strate­
gic interests o f the United States as the last remaining super power can not account for the 
difference, because both countries were equally important to US global strategies at that point 
in time. After 1986, the impact of the non-governmental human rights activism on Uganda 
was mainly top-down. The repeated publication of human rights reports by Amnesty Interna­
tional between 1989 and 1992 and the official communication o f this information to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights caused the government to establish a Human Rights Desk
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within the Department of Justice and reinforced the consideration of an extended Bill of 
Rights and an independent human rights body in the ongoing constitutional reform process. 
At the same time, independent domestic pressure for human rights hardly existed.
Despite the virtual absence of either domestic or international pressure for regime change, the 
NRM establishment failed to complete its original reform agenda, in particular in trying to 
replace the old party structure with a grassroots movement system. While the lack of pressure 
accounted for the overall delay of reforms and the extension o f NRM rule, the domestic 
political opposition could, at least, exploit the rhetorical commitment of the NRM to the cause 
o f human rights and change. Although the political parties were in a very weak position after 
1986, they remained the most important political challengers and kept the issue of multipar- 
tyism firmly on the political agenda. The main reason for this was the de facto failure of 
taking grassroots democracy to the national level and the NRM’s (self-interested) decision to 
foster representational forms of democracy instead.
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6 Transition Path
The international human rights mobilization delegitimized in Kenya and Uganda authoritarian 
regimes during the 1970s and 1980s. The campaigns also empowered domestic actors with a 
convincing human rights agenda. Variation occurred with respect to the successful mobiliza­
tion of state actors and the ultimate outcomes of the campaigns. In the Ugandan case, the 
transnational human rights movement largely failed to mobilize Western states against Amin 
and Obote, mainly because of the competing norm of sovereignty. Nonetheless, the military 
victory of the NRM in early 1986 represented also a success for the transnational human 
rights network. The combined domestic and international mobilization led to a 'revolution 
from below' because the incumbent regime was left with hardly any means o f positive inte­
gration, except for the human rights violating army. Between 1986 and 1992, only Amnesty 
International continued its systematic work on Uganda. Its interventions led to a further 
domestic institutionalization of human rights norms in the early 1990s. However, the overall 
decrease of international attention contributed to an general slow down of the reform process. 
In particular, until 1992 the Ugandan government was never seriously challenged by interna­
tional actors to return to multiparty rule. Hence, the transition path put constitutional reforms 
and participation ahead o f electoral competition. In this chapter, I will show how those initial 
reforms only partly succeeded and how the government slowly included electoral elements in 
its reform agenda.
During the 1980s, the transnational human rights mobilization with respect to Kenya success­
fully reversed international perceptions of the country within a short period o f time. As a 
result o f the ongoing confrontation, donor governments decided to cut aid and the Kenyan 
president agreed to the réintroduction of multipartyism. Due to a functioning system of 
neopatrimonial rule, the outcome was not a 'revolution from below', but 'reforms from above'. 
More importantly, however, the international mobilization greatly expanded the autonomy of 
the societal sector, which became now a major force in promoting change from within. When 
the Moi government finally caved in to the pressure, it still controlled the transition process by 
choosing an electoralist path and rejecting simultaneous constitutional reforms aimed at 
expanding participation to the disenfranchised ethnic groups. This will be the main subject of 
the second part o f this chapter.
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6.1 Uganda 1993*1998: The End of Broad-Based Government
The Odoki commission presented its 700-pages final report on 31 December 1992 (Odoki 
Commission 1992). It recommended, inter alia, the convening o f a constitutional assembly 
for further deliberations, presidential elections and an extension o f the no-party' system until a 
national referendum would decide on the future shape o f Uganda's political system. The 
commission ascertained a majority within the population against the immediate introduction 
o f  multipartyism. The NRM government drew two lessons from the preliminary results o f the 
constitutional reform process. First, it announced the creation o f a Constituent Assembly (CA) 
based on nation-wide direct elections. This decision was in line with the shift away from the 
original grassroots approach and further side-lined the RC-system. "Oddly, after putting great 
energy into developing RCs in every village and at higher levels, the NRM quietly handed 
over the shaping o f Ugandan democracy to a state-appointed Constitutional Commission an a 
subsequent Constituent Assembly" (Kasfir 1998: 51).
Second, Museveni lost no time and immediately entered the campaign trail by announcing the 
revival of the traditional kingdoms as cultural (but not political) entities. This was a first 
concession to the Baganda those votes were a crucial factor in the upcoming CA elections. 
These moves were consistent with the NRM's preference for constitutional reforms and a 
reluctance to fully face the political competition with other parties. On the one hand, it is 
remarkable that the NRM government returned with the formation of a CA to one of its 
promises contained in its original political program o f 1981 (see chapter 4). This clearly set 
the NRM government apart from its predecessors. On the other hand, the NRM was left with 
few alternatives to legitimize its rule, after it had come to power and ruled for almost ten years 
unconstitutionally.
The CA elections as a symbol for a shift towards representational democracy transformed the 
movement system. Although much had changed on the grassroots level in many areas of 
Uganda, the NRM had ultimately failed to make the grassroots the real basis o f national 
politics. While the system had worked surprisingly well under the conditions of civil war, it 
proved exceedingly difficult to built up ongoing local mobilization beyond the realization of 
the original goals and into the peace time period. Hence, the original enthusiasm of this 
bottom-up perspective was increasingly substituted by a bureaucratic top-down approach. 
What was left intact was the other parts o f this policy, including the ban on party activities
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and the requirement that candidates had to stand in elections in their individual capacities. By 
early 1992, the Ugandan democratic experiment was basically abandoned. The parties, origi­
nally identified as 'the main problem' of Ugandan politics had survived. The political 
competition in the 1990s pitted now 'movementists' against 'multipartyists' even if all o f them 
had to be member o f the NRM.
On 14 July 1993 the NRC reversed Obote's constitutional ban on kingdoms from 1967. 
Although a total of four kingdoms were reinstated, the measure mainly benefited Buganda as 
the largest and still relatively well organized entity. Two weeks after the decision, the 
Buganda parliament (lukiiko) was reopened, Ronald Mutebi was officially named kabaka 
(king) and the property (palace and other buildings) was officially returned (ebyaffe). While 
the NRM and Museveni had always maintained that all questions o f national significance 
should be decided directly by the people, the crucial issue of Buganda's status within Uganda 
was suddenly de-linked from the whole process of constitutional reform. The NRM preferred 
to restore the traditional kingdoms in return for political support, rather than running the risk 
o f alienating the Buganda elites prior to the CA elections.
Still, this strategy entailed political risks. The sudden favoritism towards Buganda put a 
question mark behind the NRM's claim to promote a non-sectarian and anti-tribal policy. 
Moreover, the concession towards Buganda did also encourage the Baganda to mobilize for 
greater political autonomy as well and signaled a return to the situation of the 1960s where the 
conflicts between national and Baganda leadership were finally resolved by military means 
(see chapter 3). The Baganda leadership now began to lobby for a federal system which would 
increase the region's influence in national politics. However, the NRM rejected these attempts 
and maintained its preference for a process o f  decentralization.
The CA elections and the conclusion o f  the constitutional reform process
The CA elections were held in March 1994. Prior to the elections, the number o f constituen­
cies was increased by about 25 per cent. The geographical distribution of new constituencies 
was solely based on updated population figures and corrected the past overrepresentation of 
the North. One CA delegate represented about 70,000 residents (Kasfir 1995: 160).96 For *25
96 Buganda gained 55 per cent in its representation (59 instead of 38 seats). The West and the East gained about
25 per cent in seats, while the North rose only from 42 to 44 seats.
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many domestic but also an increasing number of international critics the ban on party activi­
ties was certainly the most contagious issue. However, the party ban not only failed to undo 
existing strong party allegiance, it also "allowed the parties to paper over the internal splits 
that have emerged in the last two to three years" (Geist 1995: 95).”  In the whole exercise the 
RC system was only used as a platform for the opposing candidate's non-partisan campaigns, 
who were required to tour in groups from parish to parish. "The electorate was encouraged to 
examine actively the candidates' views on important issues, in question-and-answer sessions 
which followed the candidates' addresses" (Geist 1995: 94).
The direct involvement of the population increased voters' interest,” but simultaneously 
revealed many misperceptions about the future role of the CA. While nation-wide 85 per cent 
o f  eligible voters registered and another 87 per cent o f them finally voted (Kasfir 1995: 156),” 
the population often raised in campaign meetings traditional concerns such as the construction 
o f  roads, hospitals and schools rather than more narrow constitutional issues. "The 
opportunity afforded to the electorate to question the candidates, both stellar political figures 
and unknowns alike, produced the most dramatic levelling o f  the playing fie ld  o f  the 
campaign, far more effectively than the presidential and Commission bans on use o f official 
facilities" (Geist 1995: 96).* 9100 10The NRM secured a comfortable victory with about 120-140 out 
o f the 214 seats, against 70 multipartyists and 10-20 'independents'. Despite an average 
number o f more than five candidates per constituency, 90 per cent o f the elected 
representatives gained more than one third of the respective vote.'01 The NRM lost in most
”  "The campaign method probably did not hurt the parties very much, all of their protestations to the contrary 
notwithstanding. They were the unwitting beneficiaries of a breathing space in which their party machinery's 
defects were not trotted out for much public inspection, and the non-partisan process provided a carpet under 
which the internal divisions could be conveniently swept" (Geist 1995:96).
”  Certainly, the remarkable effort of the Odoki Commission to reach as many Ugandans as possible in collecting 
popular views on the new constitution contributed to the exceptional interest in the CA elections. The 
Constituent Assembly Statute (section 7b) also encouraged participation because voters were allowed to either 
register where they were bom, where they currently lived or where they worked.
99 More importantly, there were no significant regional differences. Voter registration and turnout were invaria­
bly above 80 per cent, no matter if the area was NRM-friendly or not. Registration levels tended to be even 
higher in opposition areas (North and parts of the East) than in Western Uganda and Buganda. In Gulu and 
Kitgum 93 per cent of the eligible population registered and 89 per cent voted, in Apac and Lira the same 
numbers stood at 91 and 94 per cent, while in Kumi and Soroti they were as high as 97 and 90 per cent, respec­
tively (Kasfir 1995:157).
100 The total number of candidates was 1,120 for 214 constituencies, an average of over five candidates for each 
seat. Only in three constituencies candidates were elected unopposed (Kasfir 1995:159).
101 In Buganda, the West and the North, winners gained on average slightly more than 50 per cent of the total 
vote, in the East 42 per cent.
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constituencies o f the North, where its candidates were rejected in favor o f UPC's prominent 
multipartyists. A total o f nine Cabinet and assistant ministers lost in the exercise to competing 
candidates, 24 succeeded in the electoral race.102
Despite the dominance o f the NRM, one can attest a strengthening of representational 
democracy based on the high levels of registration and voter turnout, overall campaign 
conduct, and the fact that incumbency was hardly a safe ticket for office. The elections did not 
fully test "the rulers' commitment to democracy", but there was more at stake than "simply the 
preparation o f a new constitution" (Kasfir 1995: 151 and 154). Hence, the NRM government 
succeeded to hold reasonably free and fair elections, which enhanced the legitimacy of the 
ongoing constitutional reform process. Candidates were forced to prove their credentials with 
respect to substantive issues rather than resort to mere electoral campaigning. "This was an 
unprecedented development in political education. In previous Ugandan elections, party 
rallies had been the main form of public campaigning, making it virtually impossible for 
prospective voters to convey their issue preferences to candidates" (Kasfir 1995: 165). 
Although the CA elections were held as a means to constitutional reforms, the logic of 
electoral competition had important repercussions for the NRM. It not only suspended efforts 
to establish the RC system as an alternative to party politics, but was itself now slowly trans­
formed into a political party.
The newly elected CA appointed a close associate of Museveni, James Wapakhabulo, as its 
speaker. Within the first few weeks o f deliberations the original time table o f seven months 
was overturned to give more room for debate. In the end, the CA worked for seventeen 
months on the draft constitution. While smaller issues were open for debate, the NRM leader­
ship used its majority to decide the crucial questions of federalism versus decentralization and 
movement versus multiparty system in its favor. The 'constitutional' year 1995 began with the 
discussion o f Uganda's belated response to the allegations made by Amnesty International 
under the UN 1503 procedure (see chapter 5). After hearing the Ugandan representative, the 
UN Commission on Human Rights decided to discontinue the investigation. The 49-page 
response (Republic o f  Uganda 1995c) defended Uganda's human rights record (1) by pointing
102 85 per cent of the elected NRC members (a total of 140) competed also for CA seats, but significantly less 
from the specially appointed members. None of the NRC army representatives and only one third of the ’histori­
cal' members stood in the CA election.
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to the economic situation of the country, particularly after 20 years of civil war, (2) by attrib­
uting abuses to ignorance instead o f intention,103 (3) by blaming rebel groups or criminals for 
committing the abuses (Republic o f Uganda 1995c: 21), (4) and by questioning the full appli­
cation of international standards disregarding the peculiar situation of the country.104 105The 
report further highlighted the fact that the Uganda government had "accorded maximum co­
operation to Amnesty International" and that the NGO used to have a "proper appreciation of 
the country’s human rights situation" (Republic of Uganda 1995c: 2), but also admitted 
individual cases of human rights abuses, even torture, committed by government agencies and 
mentioned the payment o f compensation to victims and families (39f.).,M
In late May, the Ugandan government acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and in September it signed the first protocol which provided for an 
individual complaint procedure (Republic o f Uganda 1995b). In June 1995, the CA voted with 
199 against 68 votes against an amendment aimed at an immediate restoration o f multiparty- 
ism .106 Instead, the NRM majority within the CA secured another extension o f  the movement 
system until 1999/2000 (Article 273, Sect. 3). The final product detailed on almost 200 pages 
19 chapters and 287 Articles (Republic o f Uganda 1995a). Compared to the 1962 and 1967 
constitutions, the Bill o f Rights was significantly extended (Chapter IV, Articles 20-58).107 A 
newly created Human Rights Commission (UHRC) was charged with investigations "on its 
own initiative", "visits o f jails, prisons, and places of detention and related facilities", human 
rights education, and monitoring of the "Government's compliance with international treaty
103 "It is true that the army had problems with honoring writs of habeas corpus. (...) The army simply did not 
understand what habeas corpus  is all about. They did not know how to draw a return on writ of h a beas corpus  
to present to court" (Republic of Uganda 1995c: 45).
104 The Ugandan Government argued that it is unfair to judge, as Amnesty International does, Uganda and the 
United States against the same standards, because the latter "has experienced two hundred years of strong 
economy, political stability and human rights observance. (...) AI gives real credit when perfection is achieved 
and not when genuine efforts are being made as in the case of Uganda..." (Republic of Uganda 1995c: 23).
105 A few weeks later, the Minister of Justice, Joseph K. Ekemu, demanded in a speech at the second extraordi­
nary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights the creation of a "supra-national Court 
of Human Rights'* in Africa, "a court whose decisions will be binding on individual governments" (Ekemu 1995: 
4). In his speech he further maintained that "human rights have grown beyond the exclusive concern of individ­
ual states".
106 Amendments to the existing draft constitution required a two-third majority within the CA.
107 Art. 43 and 44 define freedom from 'political persecution', 'detention without trial', 'torture', 'slavery*, and the 
right to 'habeas corpus' and fair hearing as non-derogative rights under any circumstances, including a state of 
emergency. In Article 48 the Uganda Human Rights Commission is charged with reviewing detentions under 
emergency law "no later than 21 days after the commencement" and thereafter "at intervals of not more than 
thirty days." UHRC is empowered to release a person after it reviewed the case (Art. 48, Sect. 3).
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and convention obligations on human rights” (Art. 51). The UHRC "shall publish periodical 
reports" and provide an "annual report to parliament on the state of human rights and 
freedoms in the country" (Art. 52, Sect. 2). In order to fulfil these functions it was given the 
powers of a court (Art. 53).
Outstanding was also the effort to promote and protect the rights o f  women. The constitution 
held that "the state shall provide the facilities and opportunities necessary to enhance the 
welfare of women to enable them to realize their full potential and advancement". Further­
more, "women shall have the right to affirmative action for the purpose of redressing the 
imbalances created by history, tradition or custom" (Article 33, Sect. 2 and 5). Following the 
CA's rejection o f multipartyism, the almost model character of the Bill of Rights was partly 
contradicted by the constitutional provisions regarding party activities because the draft 
constitution reaffirmed the limits imposed by the government in 1986. In Article 269, political 
activities were sharply limited by outlawing the opening o f branch offices (1), the holding of 
delegates' conferences (2) or public rallies (3), the support for a candidate for any public 
elections (4), and any activities that may interfere with the movement political system for the 
time being in force (5). The constitution was promulgated on 8 October 1995.
The political opposition remained naturally dissatisfied with the results of the constitutional 
reform process. Although parliament and judiciary were given extended powers to control the 
executive, the alleged dominance o f the NRM on all levels of society provoked increasing 
dissent. "It is, in fact doubtful whether the multi-partyists' irrational suspicion o f anything to 
do with the NRM government could have been set at rest" (Furley/Katalikawe 1997: 250). 
Some of these suspicions were based on the still ambiguous relationship between movement 
and state institutions, whose separation remained incomplete. The NRA was now 'replaced' by 
the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and the RC system was to be integrated into a 
process o f decentralization aimed at further strengthening the local government (chapter 11).‘M 
However, the army only changed its name while its political wing, the NRM as a "transitional 
government" was to "continue in office until a new government is elected" (Art. 263). 
Although the new constitution required the NRM to develop some institutional contours to 
distinguish it more clearly from the state, there were no requirements for internal democracy 108
108 A separate law followed on 17 December 1995. The RCs were renamed as Local Councils (LCs).
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within the NRM. These issues were now carried over into the electoral campaigns of the 
upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections.
The constitutional process did not change the donor community’s generally favorable attitude 
towards the Ugandan government and the NRM. Despite the extension of the movement 
system and de-facto one-party rule, most donor representatives were contend with the eco­
nomic advancements and felt that the process as a whole was a step in the right direction. 
Open criticism with respect to the limits to freedom o f assembly and party activities came 
only from the British and the US embassies. The US ambassador called those sections o f the 
constitution a "serious defect" and a "blot on the face o f this constitution [...] which we urge 
Ugandans to correct at the earliest possible date" (released by the United States Information 
Service, 13 October 1995) Although this statement expressed the dissatisfaction of the US 
government, it also made clear that it was up the Ugandan people and not the donor 
community to bring about the desired changes. The US government had no intention to press 
its Ugandan counterpart on this issue. To the contrary, the United States even intensified a 
military training program which had been started in 1993.
The Resurgence of Armed Rebellions
During the CA deliberations, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) stepped up its attacks in the 
North, while a new rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), opened on 13 Novem­
ber 1995 a new front by attacking villages in South-Western Uganda from Zairian territory. 
Soon the rebel attacks caused a major diplomatic stand-off between the Ugandan and the 
Sudanese government. Since early 1994, the latter supplied the LRA with arms (Amnesty 
International 1997a: 6) and used the rebels as a militia to fight the South Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA) which controlled large parts o f Southern Sudan. After a massacre of 
the LRA in Atiak, 19 kilometers from the Sudanese border, the Ugandan government accused 
the Sudanese government of complicity and severed diplomatic relations.
The ADF in Eastern Zaire recruited mainly former Hutu soldiers (Interahamwe) who had been 
responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and were later defeated by the Tutsi-dominated 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). After the Interahamwe militia had regrouped in the refugee 
camps of the border region between Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire, it formed various rebel 
groups which now attacked Rwandan and Ugandan villages. One year later, the continued 
threat of a second front in the West became a major incentive for Museveni to support the
178
rebel movement led by Laurent Kabila against Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Museveni 
hoped (in vain) that Kabila would reassert Kinshasa's control o f Eastern Zaire and help 
Uganda in destroying the rebel hide-outs in the area (see below).
In the following three years, Uganda was drawn into regional conflicts and its domestic 
stability became increasingly threatened by this outside engagement. Not the results of the 
domestic constitutional reform process but the regional military situation had the most visible 
short-term effects on regime change in Uganda. This was most apparent in the border regions, 
which were effectively not controlled by any o f the neighboring governments. However, 
growing military threats in the Northern and Western part o f Uganda also adversely affected 
the rest of the country. After the completion o f the original NRM reform agenda, the Move­
ment now faced not only growing guerilla activities but also the task o f finding a new 
legitimate base for its continued domestic dominance. Hardliners within the NRM increas­
ingly linked both issues and called for less lenient treatment of the violent as well as civilian 
opposition.
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in 1996
After ten years in power, Museveni finally stood in May 1996 against other candidates for the 
president's office. In contrast to Kenya in 1992 and 1997, the main opposition parties UPC 
and DP were able to agree on one single challenger and presented the DP leader Paul Ssemo- 
gerere as joint candidate. He had been a minister in Museveni's cabinet and stepped down in 
late 1995 to focus on his electoral campaign. UPC and DP also formed the Inter-Political 
Forces Cooperation (IPFC) to break the NRM's dominance in previous parliamentary elec­
tions. The campaigns o f the presidential candidates were state-financed, but Museveni used all 
the privileges o f the incumbency. In his campaign, Museveni emphasized the accomplish­
ments o f his NRM government and promised free education for at least four children from 
every Ugandan family. Ssemogerere repeated the demands for multipartyism, but failed to 
offer a profound economic or social alternative.
Although Ssemogerere was a popular political leader and united the political opposition, 
Museveni clearly won the presidential race with 74.2 per cent o f the vote against 23.7 per 
cent. His convincing victory also affected the parliamentary elections two weeks later, where 
the NRM was able to maintain its overall dominance. The NRM made solid inroads in many 
parts o f the country, in particular in Buganda where Museveni won about 80 per cent o f the
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vote. Apparently, the bonus given to Museveni for his revival of the Buganda kingdom was 
still a strong enough incentive. Only the North remained solidly in the hands o f the opposi­
tion. Ssemogerere won the UPC strongholds Lira (85.5 per cent), Kitgum (88.4 per cent), and 
Gulu (90.5 per cent).
In late July 1996, the LRA launched a major attack on smaller villages in the Ugan- 
dan/Sudanese border region and killed more than 100 civilians and UPDF soldiers. After its 
virtual defeat in the early 1990s, the LRA now returned with a new tactic o f killing and 
abducting the civilians those interests it previously claimed to represent. Briefly, the LRA 
succeeded in cutting off virtually all roads to the main Northern city Gulu. The Ugandan 
government dispatched more than 10,000 soldiers to the area. For the first time since 1986, 
the army command, represented by Museveni’s brother, Maj. General Salim Saleh, imposed 
censorship on journalists reporting from the insurgency area. The UPDF succeeded in pushing 
the rebels back into Sudanese territory and began to (re)establish so called "protected 
villages". Museveni himself defended this measure in parliament as the only way of saving 
innocent Ugandan from abduction and rape. Despite the strong presence o f the UPDF, 
hundreds of civilians were tortured and killed by the rebels and thousands o f children were 
abducted after 1994. The issue soon was soon to become a new focus of transnational human 
rights activism.
The UPDF was also unable to contain the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Western 
Uganda whose headquarters were situated in the mountainous regions of Eastern Zaire. Zair­
ian president Mobutu Sese Seko did not respond to Museveni's request for a joint military 
campaign against the ADF. When the UPDF began to pursue ADF rebels across the border 
this provoked diplomatic irritations. Museveni's support for the anti-Mobutu coalition led by 
Laurent Kabila was linked to the hope that a new government would join with Uganda to 
flush out the rebels in this area.
The Formalization o f the 'Movement System’
In early 1997, the NRM government fulfilled the promise to formalize the movement as an 
all-embracing body. The National Resistance Movement was renamed and from now on only 
referred to as 'the Movement'. Article 69 of the constitution stipulated that "the people o f 
Uganda shall have the right to choose and adopt a political system of their choice in free and 
fair elections or referenda." In the second clause, three political systems were offered to the
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Ugandan people: the movement system (1), the multi-party system (2), and "any other demo­
cratic and representative political system" (3). Until the year 2000 this choice was 
hypothetical, because o f the extension o f the NRM rule until a popular referendum was held. 
Until then, the new constitution entrusted parliament with creating "organs under the 
movement political system" and prescribing "from time to time, any other democratic 
principle of the movement political system, as it may consider necessary" (Art. 70, Sect. 2).
The new act provided that every Ugandan was automatically member of the Movement. It 
also created movement organs for all administrative levels (Parish-, Sub-County, Municipal-, 
and District Movement Committees). The highest decision-making organ was the National 
Conference, which was to be convened biannually. For day-to-day decisions responsibility 
rested with the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the Movement Secretariat led by a 
National Political Commissar (NPC). Within the Secretariat several departments on issues 
such as "research", "mobilization", "external affairs", "information" and "economy" were 
created and headed by newly appointed directors. According the Movement Act, the NEC 
dominated the secretariat because the NEC chairman (Museveni) was empowered to remove 
the NPC and all directors at short notice and without giving reasons.
The formal institutionalization of the movement system paralleled the loss of its integrative 
force based on economic, social and political initiatives. The Movement experienced a serious 
crisis after all its major political initiatives had either been completed (e.g. the new constitu­
tion) or were never fully realized (e.g. the RC system). Critics o f the NRM accused its 
leadership that the formalization was an effort to cement the movement system and the 
dominance o f the old elite. Declaring automatic membership o f all Ugandans in the 
Movement was certainly a less convincing way o f securing a broad base than more competi­
tive and voluntary strategies to attain such a goal. The apparent conclusion o f the NRM 
agenda after ten years in power strengthened the arguments of the domestic civil opposition. 
Despite convincing electoral victories and strong outside material support, the sacrosanct 
refusal o f the NRM to allow party activities and its non-compromising attitude towards the 
various rebel groups came increasingly under pressure. Despite the humiliating electoral 
defeats and continued reliance on its old leadership, the civilian opposition gained rather than 
lost strength.
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For the first time, the NRM leadership lost control o f the political agenda because it could no 
longer offer new political issues for mobilization, but became increasingly corrupted by the 
acquired wealth and power positions. The opposition was now more successful in exploiting 
the gap between a rhetorical commitment to individual rights and the reality of banned party 
activities. At the same time, the NRM leadership became more defensive not the least because 
it had previously given up the vision of an alternative model of grassroots democracy. At the 
same time, younger members o f the opposition realized that a successful challenge to the 
movement system would have to originate outside the traditional parties. One such group, The 
Free Movement (TFM), circumvented the ban on party activities and presented a platform for 
m any multipartyists who saw their credibility compromised as long as they were still identi­
fied with DP and UPC. Additionally, the growing guerilla activities also strengthened critical 
voices because it questioned the NRM's claim that it had finally brought peace to Uganda.
W hile Museveni came under increasing domestic pressure, his international reputation made 
neighboring state leaders envious. In April 1997 Uganda was selected as the first country to 
profit from the World Bank's newly established Highly Indebted Poor Countries Debt (HIPC) 
Initiative. The total package reduced Uganda's debt by $338 million and ultimately exceeded 
$700 million (The World Bank, News Release 97/1324-S).109 10A wave of admiration for 
Museveni as a 'new breed' of African leaders hit the foreign media in early 1997.1,0 While the 
relatively free and fair 1996 elections were certainly helpful, the main reason for this interna­
tional publicity were his activities in the Great Lakes region. After the downfall o f Mobutu in 
May, many observers assumed (prematurely) the emergence o f enlightened leadership in the 
region. Museveni was seen as the first African leader in this tradition. This strength o f inter­
national support allowed the NRM leadership to ignore or to buy o ff domestic criticism.
In early July 1997 parliament rejected motions by the opposition to give parties direct repre­
sentation and influence in the NRM's supreme organ, the newly created National Conference. 
While movementists defended the principle o f "election based only on individual merit", one 
critic stated in a heated debate that the Movement is nothing but "state-level thuggery by
109 Total foreign assistance rose again from $622 million in 1995/96 to $720 million in 1996/97. This was four 
times more than the total debt service in that period.
110 See for example the telling headline: "Shaking up Africa. From the Great Lakes Highlands to the Red Sea to 
the revolution-racked Zaire, Ugandan President Museveni's Disciples are transforming the Lost Continent"; 
Time Magazine, 14 April 1997.
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which the people of Uganda are being held at ransom by a corrupt group who call themselves 
strugglists" (New Vision, 10 July 1997, p. 1). One day later, parliament finally passed the so 
called Movement Act which established its organs on all levels o f society. Most o f the multi- 
partyists boycotted the final debate and voting. DP representatives declared that they would 
also call for a boycott o f the 2000 referendum on the question of the political system.
Within the donor community, only US ambassador Michael Southwick took a principled line 
against the entrenchment of the movement system and the idea o f  holding a referendum to 
determine the fate of political parties. "You don’t have a referendum on religious or press 
freedom, so why have it on freedom o f association and assembly" (New Vision, 20 July 
1997). On the same occasion, Southwick ruled out that the US government would provide 
funding for the 2000 referendum and labeled the 1996 elections as "transitional" rather than 
"free and fair in the sense that they meet international norms". It remains to be seen, if the US 
government will stick to that position when the date of the referendum will approach. The 
newly elected Labour government in Great Britain declared in early October 1997 that it had 
no intention to press for multiparty reforms in Uganda. The British Secretary of State for 
International Development, Clare Short, clarified that the question o f  political parties was to 
be decided by Ugandans alone in the 2000 referendum. "I don't think it is necessarily right for 
Uganda to have the same kind of political system like Britain" (cited in: New Vision, 8 Octo­
ber 1997).
Shifting Targets: Human Rights and the War in the North
These domestic issues were pushed to the back when Museveni moved to Gulu to command 
the counter-insurgency operations against the LRA. He refused to open talks with the rebels 
on the grounds that he was not prepared to negotiate peace with rebels who had committed 
serious crimes against humanity. Such suggestions for talks were frequently made by local 
leaders and the political opposition in parliament. International human rights observers such 
as Amnesty International but also UNICEF had just begun to target the LRA for its practice of 
abducting children, forced recruitment and widespread rape. On 18 July 1996 Amnesty Inter­
national condemned "callous and calculated killings" by the LRA following a massacre of 
more than 300 civilians on 12 and 13 July in Northern Uganda (News Release, AFR 
54/14/96). In December 1996 and March 1997, the United Nations Department for Humani­
tarian Affairs/Integrated Regional Information Network published a report on the
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humanitarian situation in Northern Uganda. The report criticized the UPDF practice of 
'protected villages' in Gulu District and the rebels for committing indiscriminate atrocities 
against the civilian population.
International interest in Uganda solidly focused in early to mid-1997 on the situation in Zaire 
and the human rights abuses committed by the LRA. While the United States supported 
Museveni in his regional policies, the transnational human rights community supplemented 
that support by targeting the rebels for their widespread human rights abuses."1 In June 1997, 
a Amnesty International delegation followed up on its 1996 report and visited Northern 
Ugandan for two weeks. Afterwards, Andrew Mawson declared that he was "shocked at the 
systematic nature o f gross abuses the rebels are perpetuating." He added that the Ugandan 
army committed fewer human rights abuses than the rebels, but was still guilty o f  many 
violations committed in the course of military action (Daily Nation, 17 June 1997). During the 
rest of the year, international human rights groups compiled more comprehensive reports on 
the situation in Northern Uganda.
On 18 September 1997, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, domestic human rights 
groups and UNICEF presented their respective reports in a joined press conference in 
Kampala. Amnesty International claimed that the LRA abducted more than 8,000 children 
during the last three years (Amnesty International 1997a). Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch published simultaneously reports on the LRA's conduct in the North and 
accused Joseph Kony of gross human rights violations (Human Rights Watch/Africa 1997c). 
They also blamed the Sudanese authorities for supporting the LRA and failing to stop the 
violence. Amnesty International went also into the history of the conflict and questioned the 
current government's sincerity in helping the North and admitting to own human rights 
abuses. "An inquiry set up in 1988 into alleged human rights violations in Gulu District 
spluttered in and out of existence until 1991 when it produced a confidential work in progress 
report and asked government for more funds. Since then it has collapsed" (Amnesty 
International 1997a: 32). The Amnesty report requested a full investigation o f  abuses 
committed by all sides. "So far, there has not been a focused, public confrontation o f the 
human rights experience of people in northern Uganda during the 11-year long war" (Amnesty 1
111 At its bi-annual International Council Meeting in 1991, Amnesty International decided to also target opposi­
tion groups violating human rights.
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International 1997a: 33). The graphic description of torture methods used against children had 
an immense impact in the Western media."2
In light*of the new quality o f the Northern rebellion, local leaders in the North and domestic 
human rights groups stepped up their demands for a dialogue with the aim of ending the 
rebellion in the North (New Vision, 15 October 1997). Reports on secret talks between Kony 
and government representatives claimed that these had finally broken down after Museveni 
gave the rebels an ultimatum of seven days to turn in their arms. Some critics blamed ethnic 
animosities within the NRM for the deadlock and alleged that the government was unwilling 
to negotiate and the army unwilling to stop the rebellion because the North had overwhelm­
ingly voted for the opposition in the 1996 elections. The government rejected these claims and 
accused its critics of collaborating with the rebels. The conflict began to resemble the situation 
o f the early 1990s when similar accusations were traded between the NRM leadership and 
Acholi politicians from the North (see chapter 5).
The transnational human rights groups blamed both sides for human rights abuses, while the 
international public almost entirely focused on the atrocities committed by the LRA, in 
particular the abduction and abuse of children. The US government supported Museveni in his 
refusal to (re-)open talks with the rebel groups and took full advantage of the fact that this 
prominent international human rights issue could be exploited for narrow strategic interests. 
During an official visit to Gulu in December 1997, US Secretary o f  State, Madeleine Albright 
declared that "the US government will stand by the Ugandan government to contain the threat 
o f  Sudanese sponsored terrorism and improve security in the region, especially of children" 
(cited in: New Vision, 11 December 1997). Western support was easily mobilized because the 
concern for children nicely coincided with the fight against the Islamic fundamentalist regime 
in Khartoum. The same applied to Museveni's engagement in former Zaire, where he could 
claim that he was fighting the Interahamwe militia, the perpetrators o f the Rwandan genocide.
During his March 1998 visit to Africa, US President Bill Clinton reaffirmed the close 
cooperation between the US and the Ugandan government. The focus was clearly on 
questions of common interest in regional affairs rather than the United States position on 
multipartyism. In a join t statement with the presidents from Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, 12
112 See Washington Post, 14 October 1997, p. A14,
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Rwanda, and Uganda Clinton agreed that there was "no fixed model for democratic institu­
tions and transitions" (New Vision, 28 March 1998). In a speech at Makerere University, First 
Lady Hillary Clinton repeated attacks on the LRA and the Sudanese government. She told the 
audience that "when I met President Museveni he told me about the 10,000 children abducted 
by the LRA. One o f the children was Charlotte who has never returned. Her mother came to 
see me in Washington and told me what happened that night when she was abducted. They 
broke the windows, tied up the girls, beat them up as they cried and took them away into a life 
o f unspeakable horror" (The Monitor, 26 March 1998, p. 1). Mrs. Clinton promised financial 
support for indigenous children NGO's such as the Concerned Parent's Association (CPA).
In early 1998, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) brought the conduct o f the 
Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda to the attention o f  the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission in Geneva. UNICEF based its report on the information contained in non­
governmental reports and claimed that the rebels fought "a psychotic war on children" 
abducting 6,000 to 8,000 children over the last five years. The UNICEF representative in 
Uganda, Leila Takkala, declared that about half of the abducted children had returned home 
while the other half is still missing. She also estimated that about eighty per cent o f the LRA 
soldiers are abducted children. During 1997 and 1998, UNICEF representatives regularly 
visited Northern Uganda and cooperated with newly-established local NGOs such as the CPA. 
UNICEF's Executive Director, Carol Bellamy, said that the "world must take responsibility 
instead of taking cover" because "whatever the origins and complexities of these intricate and 
tragic crises [are], there is no ’just cause' for the death or torture o f a child."
A number of domestic and international NGOs, such as World Vision, set up health and 
counseling centers for traumatized children mainly in Gulu and Kitgum district (Muhumuza 
1997)."3 During that time, dozens of international TV teams, journalists and representatives 
from international organizations or governments passed through Gulu. The problem o f  child 
soldiers in general and the atrocities committed by the LRA in Northern Uganda continued to 
catch the attention o f mainstream international media (Rubin 1998). On 22 April 1998, the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission demanded "the immediate cessation o f  all abduc-
1,3 Since March 1995, more than 4,800 children have participated in programs at World Vision Children of War 
centers in Gulu and Kiryandongo. For a critique of the recent proliferation of such centers see (Bracken, Giller, 
and Summerfield 1997).
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tions and attacks on all civilian populations and in particular women and children, in northern 
Uganda by the Lord's Resistance Army" (Resolution 1998/75; 24 in favor, one against, 27 
abstentions). In a letter to the parents, Secretary General Kofi Annan promised in May that the 
"UN will do all in its efforts to rescue the children held in Sudan."
The LRA initially reacted to the international accusations by declaring all Western NGOs 
active in the North as "legitimate military targets because they support the Government policy 
o f extermination". A spokesman of the rebel group accused Western NGOs o f not condemn­
ing the practice o f setting up 'protected villages' which he referred to as "concentration camps" 
(cited in: New Vision, 13 April 1998). However, within weeks the international shaming 
changed the position o f the LRA and the supportive Sudanese government. In mid-May the 
leadership in Khartoum admitted for the first time that the LRA was indeed based in Sudan. 
The Sudanese government also promised that it would push for the release of abducted 
children.
The same month, the British Secretary of International Development Clare Short used the 
example of the LRA to attack international human rights pressure groups for spending too 
much time on "carping" about illegal arrests and torture while ignoring health, education and 
economic issues. In an interview for Amnesty International she warned that ignoring 
economic and social problems would ultimately result in "losing an audience in a large chunk 
o f the world." She specifically rejected a recent Amnesty report which "seemed to treat the 
LRA - which kidnaps children, and turns boys into soldiers and the girls into sex slaves - and 
the government o f Uganda as equally bad people" (The Guardian, 15 May 1998).
The international focus on the LRA's gross violations o f human rights reinforced the domestic 
hardline approach by the Ugandan government. While the Ugandan government maintained 
its offer of amnesty to individual rebel soldiers, it remained adamantly opposed to peace talks 
with the rebel leadership. Rather, it suggested that those leaders should be tried for their 
alleged crimes against humanity. During the whole period, Northern MPs repeatedly 
introduced motions into parliament which asked the government and rebels to immediately 
stop hostilities and open talks (New Vision, 4 September 1998). After watching the 
parliamentary debates for some time, an angry Museveni declared in mid-September that 
"these barbarians (rebels, HPS) are supported by some politicians here, receiving wonderful 
allowances from the state. But the NRM has got a very long hand, we shall one day get to the
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root cause o f the problem. (...) I want you (MPs, HPS) to visit the 30 mass graves in Luwero 
Triangle, each with 2000 skulls. There are skulls of small children and those who killed our 
people in cold blood are here” (cited in: New Vision, 17 September 1998).
In September 1998 the Ugandan government received additional international support for its 
counter-insurgency operations in the North and West. The World Bank accepted defense 
expenditures at ten per cent of the total public expenditure although this meant a 26 per cent 
increase for 1998/99 (from about $100 million to $131 million). "The [World] Bank's repre­
sentative in Uganda, Mr. Randolph Harris, told the East African, that although a reduction in 
the defense budget would be welcome, the current security threat cannot be ignored” (East 
African, 7 September 1998). At the same time, the World Bank offered Uganda additional 
financial support from a special fund set up in 1997 to enable peace initiatives and facilitate 
transitions from protracted violence to peaceful conflict resolution. Only a few days earlier, 
the Ugandan government had officially declared the rebels as terrorist organizations.'14
The ongoing mobilization against the LRA finally led also tensions within the group and 
among Ugandan dissidents in general. In September 1998 the Concerned Parents Association 
appealed to British Prime Minister to close the LRA’s London office and expel all supporters 
from the country. In its response, the LRA representative in London asked the British 
government to refrain from closing down its offices and claimed that the group "is a liberation 
movement that is now observing the tenets of civilized conduct" (All Africa News Agency, 28 
September 1998). In mid-October a section of the LRA declared it would no longer support its 
leadership's attacks on civilians and children and form its own break-away group. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced in late-October that more than 
400,000 Ugandans had been displaced by the ongoing insurgencies in the North and West. 
The organization registered 1,800 Sudanese POWs which are held in 36 Ugandan prisons and 
detention centers. It helped 300 of those detainees to communicate with their families in 
Sudan. The ICRC also continued its practice of monitoring prisons and military barracks 
throughout the country (The Monitor, 27 October 1998).
1,4 In an earlier interview with the BBC at his GuJu headquarters, the reporter concluded that "after one hour of 
discussion (...) I am exhausted by the relentlessness of the president's argument" and quoted him saying: "Well, 
my daughter, (...) now do you agree with my attitude to the North?" (Borzetlo 1998).
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The effects o f regional insecurity on Uganda became even more prominent when Museveni 
ordered in early 1998 his troops to cross into Kabila's Congo. While the Ugandan government 
maintained that it was only pursuing ADF rebels, it soon became apparent that the Ugandan 
contingent also supported the rebellion against Kabila in the Eastern part o f the country. 
Within only one year time, the former allies Museveni and Kabila were unofficially at war 
with each other. In m id-1998, Kabila accused Rwanda and Uganda of backing a rebellion 
against his government, while the two countries alleged that Kabila's troops were responsible 
for a genocide against the Banyamulenge, an ethnic group living in Northern Rwanda. 
Western Uganda and Eastern Congo. The Banyamulenge had been the main victims o f the 
Rwandan genocide and had originally supported Kabila's rebellion. When Angola and 
Zimbabwe entered on the side of Kabila, the conflict was about to turn into a major regional 
war. From the beginning o f the new rebellion sections o f the Rwandan and Ugandan armies 
were deployed as far as 1000 kilometers into Congolese territory. High level Ugandan army 
officers were permanently stationed in the Eastern capital Kisangani.
The Movement System and the 2000 referendum
Despite the 1996 electoral victory and the formalization o f the movement system by way of 
constitutional reform, ’the movement' leadership was faced with a serious crisis o f legitimacy. 
The vacuum left by the conclusion o f its reform agenda and the contradictions contained in 
the new constitution weakened the argumentative basis of the NRM leadership. To the rescue 
o f  the government came the international support from almost all quarters, the international 
financial institutions, Western governments, the general public, but also international human 
rights groups. For different motives, these actors lend support to Museveni, who consequently 
maintained his uncompromising position towards the rebels and showed also less tolerance for 
the civilian opposition.
The international reinforcement for Museveni's hardline stand did not solve his domestic 
problems. The 'movement' not only lacked a clear political agenda, it also faced a generational 
turn-over due to the 1996 elections. The successive enlargement of the parliament and 
elections had brought many new members to parliament and weakened the dominance o f  the 
'movement historical s'. The Young Parliamentarian's Association (YPA), a new pressure 
group within the 'Movement', quickly developed a distinctive profile for its anti-corruption 
campaigns and challenged on several occasions in 1997 and 1998 the old NRM guard. In a
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highly publicized case YPA was part of a motion to censure the former chief o f the Internal 
Security Organization (ISO) and Minister of State, Brig. Jim Muhwezi, in February 1998 for 
alleged corruption. After heated debates, parliament voted overwhelmingly for the motion.
The YPA was also active with regard to the first Movement National Conference held in July 
1998. During the five-day meeting o f 1,600 delegates in Kampala, Museveni was elected 
unopposed as chairman and Hajji Moses Kigongo retained the vice chair o f the National 
Executive Committee (NEC). Prominent multiparty representatives were also invited, but 
boycotted the conference. The Speaker o f the former Constituent Assembly and the current 
parliament, James Wapakhabulo, was elected unopposed the Movement's National Political 
Commissar. Earlier the Northerner Betty Akech had withdrawn her candidacy in favor of 
Wapakhabulo. YPA's favorite candidate, Maj. John Kazoora, had not been nominated by 
Museveni. All other members of the new secretariat were also hand-picked by Museveni. He 
carefully balanced moderates and hardliners and included 'Movement' critics like Winnie 
Byanyima115 (Director of Information) and Obiga Kania who had introduced a unsuccessful 
motion to remove restrictions on party activities during the CA deliberations in June 1995. 
However, the careful orchestration of the movement conference indicated almost complete 
control from above, rather than a democratization from within.
A few days after the conference, Museveni rejected allegations that the 'Movement' was 
slowly turning Uganda in a one-party state. "The Movement isn't a one-party system because 
the decision to allow parties to function fully or not is with the people, that’s the big difference 
between the old one-party system and the movement system. (...) Some people are saying that 
the whole question o f asking people whether or not they want parties is out o f order. Their 
real argument is that parties are a human right, that whether the people want them or not. they 
should be here. (...) Why don't partyists go and convince the people to vote for parties and 
leave me alone" (cited in: The Monitor, 22 July 1998). On 19 August the same group of 
dissenters asked the recently appointed Movement directors to give up their parliamentary 
seats because o f a possible conflict o f interest. After a heated five-hour debate the group could 
only mobilize 39 MPs for its motion.
115 Museveni sacked Byanyima in February 1999 because she continued to speak up on corruption (see Charles 
Onyango-Obbo, "With Byanyima's Ouster, NRM Hardliners are in the rise", East African, 22-28 February 
1999).
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By mid-1998, the 'Movement' leadership had virtually all the international support a govern­
ment could ask for, but had serious problems in translating this support into domestic 
legitimacy. Compared to the overall dominance o f the 'Movement' this might have been 
negligible, but in combination with the serious rebel threats in the North and West as well as 
the beginning military engagement in the Democratic Republic o f Congo, the pressure ema­
nating from the approaching referendum was significant. On the one hand, Uganda displayed 
growing signs o f a one-party state because 'inclusiveness' o f the Movement was a matter of 
definition rather than policy and a single person on top dominated the 'Movement', the 
government, and the army.
On the other hand, the Movement had pushed through its constitutional reform as promised 
during the bush war in the early 1980s. In sharp contrast to other one-party regimes, this has 
led to a sustainable institutionalization of human rights safeguards, economic growth and a 
general improvement o f living conditions in most parts o f Uganda. The Uganda Human 
Rights Commission began its work in 1997 shortly after Margaret Sekaggya wa appointed 
chairperson o f the UHRC in November 1996. It took another two years until it published a 
first human rights report. On 18 August 1998, UHRC published a 68-pages annual survey for 
1997. During that year, UHRC officials visited prison and military facilities and received a 
total of 352 complaints mostly relating to unlawful arrests, detention and torture (The 
Monitor, 10 September 1998). The report detailed many cases o f  torture and some o f  the 
measures taken by UHRC. It criticized that the UPDF and the Internal Security Organ (ISO) 
still detained people, although only the police was allowed to do so. On several occasions 
during the year Sekaggya openly criticized the government on human rights issues (The 
Monitor, 25 August 1998, p. 1). However, compared to other domestic issues and the situation 
in the border regions, the domestic interest in the work of UHRC was relatively low.
In late 1998, Museveni and the 'Movement' system continued to dominate Ugandan politics, 
but its legitimacy had markedly decreased. The political reforms did not make political parties 
a  negligible entity, as expected by many 'Movement' cadres. In contrast, the old political 
parties and new opposition forces gained some ground and began to remind the 'Movement' 
leadership of its human rights promises contained in the new constitution. Museveni himself 
realized that he had to tolerate some dissent because the would-be-multiparyists within the 
Movement represented an important asset in case the 2000 referendum decided against the
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movement system. If  too many defected the 'Movement* prior to the referendum, this would 
seriously threaten its position in the following nation-wide elections in 2001.
The rhetorically strengthened domestic opposition and increasing military threats from the 
outside shifted the balance towards a more hardline stand o f the ’Movement' leadership. 
Senior government advisors and Museveni himself referred to their critics as "traitors" and 
accused them of conspiring with outside enemies (New Vision, 21 October 1998). Apart from 
the press, one of the main target o f government attacks were the members o f a new pressure 
group The Free Movement (TFM). When the former member o f  the Electoral Commission 
and Vice-Chairman o f TFM, Charles Owor, declared at a seminar o f his organization that the 
1996 elections were rigged, Museveni called for his arrest (The Monitor, 28 October 1998). In 
the aftermath of the August bombings o f the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam 
Ugandan security forces arrested and mistreated dozens o f suspects and charged several with 
treason (The Monitor, 27 October 1998). The Ugandan army maintained its presence in 
Eastern Congo, but failed to prevent repeated rebel attacks in Western and Northern Uganda. 
Considering those regional threats to Uganda's internal security, it is doubtful if  the newly 
established human rights safeguards and the non-govemmental sector are capable of checking 
a possible new spiral o f violence.
6.2 Kenya 1992-1998: Crafting Electoral Democracy
The December 1991 decision for multiparty ism relieved some o f the pressure on the Kenyan 
government in exchange for an expansion of an increasingly autonomous media and civil 
society sector. The Daily Nation as dominant national newspaper was now less openly 
censored and used the new opportunities for more critical reporting. Other newspapers and 
weeklies followed suit. A whole set o f new groups organized themselves and began to shift 
the domestic power balance. NGOs and action committees became the most preferred institu­
tional form, which led to the rapid buildup of new groups and organizations working now 
alongside existing societal organizations such as women groups or unions. The latter were 
sidelined by those organizations because they were still largely under direct control o f the 
state. A second reason for the mushrooming of NGOs and similar organizational forms was 
donor funding. NGOs were increasingly preferred by donor institutions which shifted their aid 
packages away from state agencies.
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The more restraint attitude of the Kenyan government towards the civil society sector and the 
almost immediate usurpation of the societal space had its first major consequence when a 
coalition of domestic and international NGOs repulsed governmental attempts to increase 
executive control o f the NGO sector and watered down a law regulating their registration and 
work(Ndegwa 1996: 31-54).
During this crucial period, NGOs did not only mushroom and network horizontally, they also 
increased and solidified institutionalized exchanges with the outside (Widner 1992b: 188). In 
June 1992 the government lifted the ban for representatives of Amnesty International to visit 
the country. In September, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) emerged as the 
first domestic human rights watchdog essentially copying working methods of Amnesty 
International and other international human rights groups. It simultaneously opened offices in 
Nairobi and Boston/USA. Whereas KHRC was officially registered by the government, other 
groups such as 'Release Political Prisoners' (RPP) or the Center for Law and Research 
International (CLARION) were refused registration. While parts o f the opposition were now 
busy establishing themselves in a strengthened civil society, KANU and Moi were able to 
recapture the control o f the overall political process. Moi's decision not only meant greater 
freedom for many new societal forces, but also represented a move that unleashed the race for 
political power. As a result, the opposition coalition which had originally evolved around 
human rights and constitutional reform split even prior to the upcoming elections.
Parallel to the expansion o f civil society, the government still used considerable force to 
repress dissent. Its methods were only slightly modified, most often in order to avoid immedi­
ate international condemnation. Considering the wide range o f instruments originally 
introduced in the 1950s by the British colonial authorities (Kenya Human Rights Commission 
1994: Appendix), the security organs had little difficulties to achieve the same goals with 
different means. These included limited freedom of assembly and speech and included the 
possibility for detention without trial (Preservation of Public Security Act), the requirement to 
obtain a license for any public meeting or fund-raising event (Public Order Act and Public 
Collections Act), sweeping and unchecked powers for the police as well as local representa­
tive o f the provincial administration (Chiefs Authority Act and Administration Police Act), 
and a requirement for all organizations to register with the government (Societies Act). Other 
means to repress opposition were laws against "seditious activities" in the Penal Code, the
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requirement for governmental approval for any performance of a film or play in public (Film 
and Stage Plays Act), and provisions that were used to limit free movement in urban areas 
(Vagrancy Act). Those laws were not only extensively used by the executive during the 1992 
election campaign, but continued to play an important role in repressing the opposition until 
m id -1997 (Ndegwa 1998: 197-201).
After 1991, court cases o f prominent opposition figures were moved far away from Nairobi in 
order to avoid domestic and international media attention. Prominent critics such as Koigi wa 
Wamwere were no longer detained without trial or charged with political offences, but 
evidence for capital crimes was simply fabricated by the police. Opposition figures could now 
'legally' be kept away from the public as long as the government deemed it necessary (African 
Rights 1996: 131; Amnesty International 1995a; Article 19 1995). While the political opposi­
tion was busy positioning itself for the upcoming elections, the government and KANU also 
continued its manipulation of the electoral playing field. Locally, the provincial administra­
tion regularly banned opposition meetings and harassed opposition politicians.
KANU representatives seconded these efforts and mobilized mainly unemployed youths 
under the banner o f 'majimbo' to attack suspected opposition voters (Amisi 1997; Haugerud 
1995: 38). An organization called 'Youth for KANU'92' was created by KANU leaders and 
became infamous for its attacks on opposition politicians and rallies (Lafargue 1996: 228- 
234). The 'ethnic violence' which had started after the first majimbo rallies organized by 
KANU politicians in September 1991 (see chapter 5), continued throughout 1992 (Throup 
1993: 391). They spread from the Western part of Kenya (Nyanza and Western Province) to 
the Rift Valley and mainly affected districts were Kalenjin as well as Maasai lived close to 
Kikuyu and Luo (e.g. Nakuru, Kisumu, Trans-Nzoia, Kisii). For months, the government 
failed to take any decisive measures to end the violence, thus, reaffirming its indirect 
involvement in the clashes.
When hundreds o f people had been killed and thousands displaced, parliament voted on 13 
May to appoint a select committee charged with the investigation o f the clashes. In Septem­
ber, the committee ended its work investigations and concluded "that the ethnic clashes 
invariably pitted the Kalenjin and Maasai in the Rift Valley Province against virtually all 
other ethnic groups residing in Western Kenya. (...) The evidence further received indicates 
that the target or victims at whom the clashes were directed were the ethnic groups o f Kikuyu,
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Luo, Abaluhyia, Abagusii, Teso, who were not only suspected and presumed to be supporters 
o f  the multi-party crusadef but to whom also the main proponents o f  multi-partyism belong 
(Republic of Kenya 1992: 68, emphasis HPS). The so-called Kiliku report also named high- 
level KANU representatives like Nicholas Biwott as responsible for the violence (Lafargue 
1996: 248). In October, the KANU majority in parliament voted against an official recogni­
tion of the findings and the report was shelved. The government maintained that 'only' 365 
people were killed and about 7,000 displaced during the violence. The Kiliku report put the 
numbers at 779 and 54,000 respectively. Church representatives and international human 
rights NGOs claimed that between one and 2,000 were killed and 100,000 to 150,000 
displaced (Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch 1993).
The violent attacks on the opposition distracted attention away from other measures taken by 
the government to secure KANU's electoral victory. While the period for voter registration 
had been more than five months at the last elections in 1988, the government now shortened 
the period to one month. This measure was intended to give KANU an advantage early on in 
the campaign. After sharp opposition protests, the period was extended by ten days only. As a 
result o f the restricted registration, areas controlled by KANU averaged higher levels of 
registration than opposition areas. Moreover, wherever KANU candidates were threatened by 
defeat, trucks brought in KANU supporters from other areas for registration (Throup 1993: 
392). Constituencies in support of KANU were on average smaller than in the opposition 
areas (Fox 1996). Prior to the 1992 elections KANU further increased the number of constitu­
encies in its stronghold areas, while others were left unchanged even when population 
increases would have required changes (Ndegwa 1998: 208). On election day, the opposition 
parties had to gain an average of three to four times more votes than KANU for each 
parliamentary seat (see below). The gerrymandering o f constituencies reaffirmed that 
majimbo was hardly a new idea in Kenyan politics, but already guided official government 
policy.
Moi also appointed all members of the Electoral Commission and used these powers to keep 
the body under his control. The chairman and former judge Zacheaus Chesoni had been twice 
forced to declare bankruptcy and quit judicial positions before Moi appointed him to his new
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position."6 He was a typical representative o f the neopatrimonial system who owed his 
political and economic survival solely to the president. In July 1992, KANU completed its 
efforts to secure its victory prior to election date. A majority in parliament voted for constitu­
tional amendments which made it virtually impossible for the opposition to remove KANU or 
Moi from power. These amendments required the winner to attain a minimum of 25 per cent 
o f the vote in five out o f the eight Kenyan provinces. Furthermore, the elected President was 
only allowed to appoint ministers from his own party. Finally, the maximum tenure for a 
president was limited to two terms in office. The first measure emphasized the representative 
character o f the presidency, but turned this important idea immediately into an advantage for 
Moi. Due to a lack o f neopatrimonial resources, none o f the other major candidates were 
likely to become 'truly' national leaders within the next few months. The second measure was 
even more openly directed against an opposition success, because it outlawed a coalition 
government. The third amendment was the only unambiguous democratizing measure in the 
package. However, it was of little relevance to Moi because he was already over 70 years old. 
Hence, the amendments reflected an exchange of short term gains for a potential long-term 
loss, which could always be taken back.16 17
Although the opposition continued to sharply protest 'ethnic violence' and the bundles of 
measures taken in favor of KANU, it failed to develop a united position to avert the electoral 
defeat. The donor community repeated its general calls for a level playing field and a peaceful 
campaign, but shied away from publicly commenting on any o f those specific issues. Until 
mid-May 1992, the Luhya Martin Shikuku, the Kikuyu Kenneth Matiba, and the Luo Oginga 
Odinga, had officially declared their intention to run as FORD candidates for presidency. The 
former Vice-President and Kikuyu Mwai Kibaki had already announced in January the 
formation o f the Democratic Party (DP). In the next few weeks, intense internal wrangles 
within FORD almost paralyzed its work, because none o f the three was willing to step down. 
Eventually, FORD split into two factions, one led by Martin Shikuku and Kenneth Matiba, 
and the other by Oginga Odinga. Each side made several unsuccessful attempts to remove the 
leadership o f the other group from their respective positions within FORD.
116 In 1997, Moi promoted Chesoni to the position of Chief Justice.
117 In late 1998 and early 1999, Moi's die-hard supporters Sharrif Nassir, Nicolas Biwott and Henry Kosgey 
called for an extension of Moi’s presidency "until God decides his destiny" (Daily Nation, 8 March 1999).
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In October, the Attorney General threatened that FORD would not by allowed to run in the 
elections because of those internal divisions. Shortly thereafter, FORD broke apart and 
Oginga Odinga announced the formation o f FORD-Kenya. Martin Shikuku and Kenneth 
Matiba formed FORD-Asili. The fragile coalition between Luhya, Luo and Kikuyu had 
disintegrated even before election date. While Matiba took parts o f  the Kikuyu community to 
FORD-Asili and faced Kibaki's DP as the main inter-ethnic competitor, the human rights 
activist Paul Muite and the publisher Gitobu Imanyara decided against their ethnic descent 
and joined FORD-Kenya. Secret attempts by Hempstone, Miitzelburg and other donor 
representatives to unite the opposition behind one candidate ultimately failed (Hempstone 
1997: 304). Within moths after the réintroduction of multipartyism, the spectrum o f new 
parties developed along ethnic lines. In December eight parties and candidates contested the 
elections. Apart from KANU and Moi, they included Ford-Kenya (Odinga), Ford-Asili 
(Matiba), the Democratic Party (Kibaki), the Kenya National Congress (Chibule wa Tsuma), 
the Kenya Social Congress (George Anyona), the Kenyan National Democratic Alliance 
(Mukaru Ng'ang'a), and the Party of Independent Candidates for Kenya (John Harun).
Multi-Party-Elections in December 1992
Moi and KANU won the multi-party elections, even though opposition forces accounted for 
about two thirds o f the votes both in the presidential and parliamentary race. Due to the 
gerrymandering o f constituencies, KANU won a majority o f 95 seats in the new parliament 
(53 per cent) with an average of 14,138 votes. FORD-Kenya ended up with only 31 seats, but 
averaged 32,152 votes, while FORD-Asili gained 29 seats with an average of 38,220 votes. 
DP was allotted 23 seats, but the average o f 43,779 indicated that its total number o f votes 
was almost as high as KANUs (Ndegwa 1998: 207)."* A large contingent of foreign observers 
were present during election day and subsequent counting procedures. The authoritative 
Commonwealth Observer Group gave the exercise not an "unqualified rating as free and fair" 
but declared the elections as ultimately an "expression of the will o f the people" 
(Commonwealth Observer Group 1993: 40). 18
118 In the Kisumu constituency (Nyanza Province) more than 140,000 voters decided on one seat, while only 
8,000 were registered in Lamu East (Coast Province) or 10,000 in Ijara (North Eastern Province). While virtu­
ally all the larger constituencies were in the opposition area, KANU dominated smaller constituencies in the 
North East and the Coast Region.
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The opposition’s initial refusal to accept the election results lasted only for a couple o f weeks. 
W estern governments pressed the opposition to acknowledge their defeat (Mair 1994: 122). 
because they feared rising violence if  the opposition would use the issue to mobilize to the 
streets. A full acknowledgment o f the manipulations and a subsequent negative attitude 
towards the elections might have caused a serious domestic crisis. The financial sponsors of 
the election exercise had no interest in taking responsibility for such a scenario. Instead, the 
disintegration o f the opposition continued and resulted in the creation of even more mono- 
ethnical parties and a strengthening of KANU. The Luhya-Kikuyu alliance o f FORD-Asili 
broke apart shortly after the elections and seven FORD-Asili MPs defected to KANU. In 
1993, a total o f 14 opposition MPs (re)joined KANU and were materially rewarded for their 
decisions (Tostensen, Andreassen, and Tronvoll 1998:19).
In early 1993 Oginga Odinga and the Luo establishment within FORD-Kenya made overtures 
towards KANU and began to explore a possible cooperation between both parties. The party's 
younger and more radical members were united against these efforts. This group of so-called 
"young turks" included the Luo James Orengo, Raila Odinga and the Kikuyu Paul Muite as 
well as Gitobu Imanyara. In September, Imanyara left the party and Muite resigned from his 
party offices. After the death of Oginga Odinga in early 1994, FORD-Kenya Vice-Chairman 
and Luhya Michael Kijana Wamalwa was elected as Odinga's successor. As a result, Muite 
and the remaining young turks left the party to lobby for constitutional reforms from an 
independent position. Raila Odinga also quit FORD-Kenya, revived the National Democratic 
Party (NDP) as an exclusively Luo-based affair and became presidential candidate for 1997. 
A t the same time, KANU rejected any offers for cooperation and preferred to buy the support 
whenever necessary.
In 1993, an observer o f Kenyan politics would have to conclude that the results o f  the 
mobilization against Moi's authoritarian regime were dismal. Even the suspension o f financial 
aid to Kenya did not decisively change the domestic balance. To the contrary, Moi and KANU 
emerged strengthened from the multiparty elections which had been forced on them. The 
isolation and confrontation led to a 'rally around the flag' effect, rather than a disintegration o f 
the ruling party in hard- and softliners. The KANU leadership rejected the demands for 
democratization with even greater confidence in 1993 than in 1989. At the same time, all 
hopes that the political opposition would unite its forces to remove Moi were in vain. Instead,
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the new parties were in constant disarray and split along ethnic lines. Still, below the surface 
o f  electoral defeat and unchanged governmental rhetoric the process of strengthening civil 
society actors represented a crucial development with long-term effects on the Kenyan politi­
cal system.
The Growth and Transformation of Kenyan Civil Society
Until 1995/1996, the sceptics’ warnings of continued governmental repression and opposition 
failure were largely vindicated. However, the crucial difference to the pre-1992 period was 
represented by the rise o f  a strengthened civil society, which mobilized domestic and interna­
tional resistance against the regime. The mushrooming of political NGOs during the 1991/92 
period supplemented the activities o f the churches and individual human rights activists in 
pressing for political reforms. While virtually all registered NGOs in the 1980s were active in 
traditional development sectors, this picture entirely changed in the early 1990s. Despite 
efforts by the government to control the sector by legislation the number of registered foreign 
and domestic NGOs sprung up from about 300 in the 1980s to more than 1,000 in the mid- 
1990s.
This increase was paralleled by a profound change of the internal composition of the NGO 
sector and the politicization o f formerly rather apolitical organizations. "A majority tended not 
only to address community development and institution building, but also human rights issues 
with civic education constituting the core o f their activities" (Tostensen, Andreassen, and 
Tronvoll 1998: 33). A wide range of new organizations emerged and joined existing and now 
politically more active organizations such as Kituo Cha Sheria."9 The new groups carried such 
fancy names as Center for Governance and Development (CDG), the Institute for Education in 
Democracy (IED), the Civic Resource and Information Center (CRIC), the Research and 
Civic Awareness Program (RECAP), the Citizen’s Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs), 
or the Center for Law and Research International (CLARION). This transformation and 
strengthening o f a particular section within civil society was almost totally dependent on 
outside material support. 19*
119 Kituo Cha Sheria (Swahili: Legal Advice Center) was formed by European and Asian lawyers in 1973. When
African lawyers slowly took over the organization its character and activities became more political. In 1988 it
began to receive financial support from foreign donors (Ford Foundation), in 1991/92, contributions came from
the British High Commission, the Swedish NGO Fund, and the German church organization Misereor.
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When the parliamentary opposition was paralyzed by internal wrangles and continued disinte­
gration, the thriving NGO sector became in the mid-1990s the major source for a new 
challenge to KANU dominance. The newly formed action coalitions reunited the human rights 
activists which had been the main challengers of Moi's regime in the 1980s and still enjoyed a 
maximum o f contacts with international human rights groups. The human rights lawyer 
Kivutha Kibwana was behind CLARION, Willy Mutunga, a founding member o f KHRC 
formed the 4Cs. Other long time human rights activists such as Paul Muite who had joined 
party politics prior to the 1992 election, now returned to the NGO sector to lobby for 
constitutional reforms. Efforts by the government to contain the (re-)formation o f the 
opposition had little success. While the executive picked CLARION to state an example and 
refused registration, others were registered or simply turned themselves into 'projects' of 
already registered NGOs. The Attorney General Amos Wako warned in a letter that Kituo Cha 
Sheria transgressed its mandate, but did not follow up on the issue. Following the strategic 
usurpation o f a significant section of civil society in 1991/92, the leadership o f those groups 
now moved (back) 'towards politics’ and began to directly challenge Moi and KANU in the 
political arena.
The civil society challenge as well as the ongoing international mobilization paralleled 
continued governmental efforts to repress dissent and delay political reforms. In the inter- 
election period, Koigi wa Wamwere became again the symbol for continued mobilization (see 
chapter 5). He was not only still well connected in Norway, but also in the United States 
where he had studied in the early 1980s at Cornell University. Several NGOs, including the 
Kenya Human Rights Initiative (KHRI), based at Cornell University's Center for Religion, 
Ethics, and Social Policy, constantly lobbied the US administration, Congress, and the 
embassy in Nairobi.130 The organization's home page "Free Koigi" was prominently featured 
in many US newspapers and magazines (Saulnier 1997: 30). For the first time, Kenya became 
now subject to a confidential 1503 investigation by the UN Human Rights Commission. 
Information by human rights NGOs and a defense by the government were presented at its 
49th session in early 1993. After a brief discussion, the members of the commission were 
satisfied with the government's response and the investigation was discontinued without
130 At the height of its activities, KHRI had a mailing of about 1,000 names, including prominent figures such as 
Hillary Rodham Clinton (Saulnier 1997:30).
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further action. When Koigi wa Wamwere was finally released on 19 January 1993 this deci­
sion was aimed at alleviating the international pressure on the Kenyan government.
In contrast to domestic and international human rights groups, the donor community returned 
in late-1993 to business as usual. The World Bank and the IMF were the first to end the aid 
freeze, while other donor governments later followed. Only the US government continued its 
ban o f  aid to government agencies and supported civil society actors only. While the World 
Bank and the IMF, supported by Italy, France, Great Britain and Japan, stuck to a relatively 
narrow understanding of'good governance', Scandinavian countries, Germany and the United 
States preferred stricter criteria (Prunier 1997). World Bank and IMF were satisfied with 
promised anti-corruption measures and the overall political stability in the country. Others 
remained more pessimistic and highlighted continued corruption, the manipulation o f  the 
election process and ongoing human rights abuses. In November 1993 the community pledged 
a total of $ S50 Million US-Dollar (Human Rights Watch 1995: 24).
The donor decision was sharply criticized by domestic human rights advocates, whose efforts 
now concentrated on building even closer ties with the transnational human rights community. 
Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) began in early 1994 to publish Quarterly Repres­
sion Reports which monitored the human rights situation in Kenya four times a year. The 
whole setup of the reports had striking similarity to work done by Amnesty International or 
Human Rights Watch. They invariably invoked international human rights law at the begin­
ning and close with recommendations to the Kenyan government and the international 
community. KHRC was funded by outside donors including the Ford Foundation,121 the 
Swedish NGO Foundation for Human Rights, and the National Endowment for Democracy. 
The information gathered by KHRC were later reproduced in Amnesty reports and the annual 
US State Department report on the human rights situation in Kenya.
The Inter-Election Period
Despite the strengthening o f civil society organizations in the human rights area, direct repres­
sion o f dissent only slowly decreased. In early 1995 the offices of Kituo Cha Sheria were a six
121 From 1993 to 1997 financial support by the Ford Foundation for KHRC grew from $50,000 to $200,000 
annually. The other major recipient in Kenya was the International Commission of Jurists (Kenya Section), 
which got a grant totaling $ 250,000 in 1997. An organization such as Human Rights Watch received between 
one and two Million US-Dollar from the Ford Foundation during that time period.
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time target o f fire-bombings. The organization had to find new offices to rent. Two members 
o f human rights organizations, including a member o f KHRC and the Secretary-General of 
RPP, were killed under mysterious circumstances in 1995 and 1996. In early 1995, the offices 
o f opposition papers systematically raided by the police and unknown attackers. In late April, 
police officers broke into the offices o f Colourprint, the printer o f many opposition papers. 
The officers damaged the presses. The owner, Anil Vidyathi, was charged with sedition and 
appeared no less than 32 times in court in 1995. Similar attacks had occurred in the inter- 
electoral period on Fotoform, another printer of opposition papers.
The repression was accompanied by an unchanged human rights rhetoric of the president and 
continued refusal to accept substantive political reforms. On 24 April 1995, Daniel arap Moi 
addressed the issue of human rights in a statement disseminated by the state-run Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation. "His Excellency President Daniel arap Moi today criticized human 
rights organizations for employing double standards when dealing with human rights issues in 
Kenya. President Moi observed that human rights organizations have made a habit o f  attack­
ing the Kenyan government on human rights violations when the situation in a number of 
countries o f the region was pathetic. The president wondered why Kenya should be criticized 
by such organizations when wanton killing o f innocent people is taking place unabated in 
countries such as Rwanda and Liberia" (FBIS-AFR-95-080,26 April 1995).
Returning from the 31st ordinary session o f the Organization o f African Unity Heads o f State 
in June 1995, Moi defended Kenya’s human rights record upon arrival at Jomo Kenyatta 
Airport. "His Excellency President Daniel arap Moi today defended the country’s human 
rights record, saying that there was no Kenyan refugee who had fled the country to seek 
refuge elsewhere. President Moi noted that some powerful Western countries were accusing 
Kenya o f flouting human rights, because the government had refused to dictated upon" (FBIS- 
AFR-95-126, 30 June 1995, p. 5). Moi was reacting to substantial diplomatic irritation which 
had emerged after the government-sponsored newspaper Kenya Times had accused opposition 
member and former Director o f the Kenyan Wildlife Service Richard Leakey of coordinating 
efforts by British and American businessman as well as the Ku-Klux-Klan to "re-colonize" 
Kenya.
Only eight months after Koigi wa Wamwere had been released in early 1993, he and five of 
his friends were arrested on 22 September 1993 in Nakuru. After an alleged attack on a police
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station, the Attorney General charged the group with murder. The trial against Koigi \va 
Wamwere and his friends commenced in early 1995 and became a major focus of interna­
tional attention during that year. On 20 May 1995 two Norwegian journalists were detained 
and charged with going to police stations without authorization, photographing police 
stations, and resisting arrest. After 13 hours they were released on bail and left the country. In 
July, the Kenyan government censored a BBC report which reported a violent attack on 
Richard Leakey and a BBC reporter in front o f  the court house in Nakuru. In the aftermath, 
President Moi called the British Minister for Overseas Development Administration, Baroness 
Lynda Chalker, a "village headmistress" after she had declared that new aid commitments 
would depend on progress in the area o f  good governance. In an official statement, Moi called 
Chalker's behavior "impolite and contemptuous" because she made the statement before 
talking to Moi about future British aid. Kenya's Information Minister Johnstone M akau122 
declared that the government would not renew the contract with BBC unless the tone o f  BBC 
reports on Kenya changed.
The continued clashes with international media and donor governments threatened to put the 
Kenyan executive back into a precarious position prior to the annual Paris donor meeting on 
24 July 1995. Although an aid freeze was highly unlikely, the Kenyan government resorted to 
another tactical concession. Two days ahead o f the meeting Moi announced the creation o f a 
domestic Human Rights Committee (FBIS-AFR-95-143, p. 4). The donor community raised 
the usual issues o f good governance, but did not press the government further on these issues. 
A few days later, Moi appointed KANU MP Moses Wetangula as head of the newly created 
human rights body. However, in early August, Wetangula declared that there was no national 
human rights body, but only a committee within KANU which would focus henceforth on 
human rights issues. Wetangula said that no one had been appointed apart from him. The 
Daily Nation claimed that Moi's announcement was only meant to pacify the donor commu­
nity and was later buried or shot down by KANU hardliners (Daily Nation, 10 August 1995).
Whereas the donors failed to follow up on the agenda they had been purportedly pushing in 
the early 1990s, transnational human rights groups increased their activities in order to solid­
ify the growing domestic human rights network. Following a new report on widespread
122 Makau defected in early 1991 from KANU and formed the Social Democratic Party. Weeks before the 1992 
elections he returned to KANU and was rewarded with a Cabinet post.
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torture in Kenya (Amnesty International 1995b) published in December 1995, two Amnesty 
delegations visited the country in 1996. In March, the Kenyan government presented a 
detailed response to the allegations and repeated that the use o f torture was illegal in Kenya. 
For the first time, the government admitted problems in this particular area. "These cases of 
torture are not unique to Kenya and should therefore be seen in proper context. (...) In Kenya 
such incidents are treated as criminal offences and (...) if  established, the culprits, be they 
security officers or the ordinary public, are dealt with in accordance with the law" (cited in: 
Daily Nation, 10 January 1997). In his reaction to the report, the Attorney General Amos 
Wako, called the organization "unethical" and the report an "ambush" because Amnesty failed 
"to give a draft copy of the report to the government."
In April 1996, the Government responded for the first time to KHRCs Quarterly Repression 
Reports and a 210-page memorandum "Death Sentence: Prison Conditions in Kenya" also 
published by KHRC (Republic o f Kenya 1996). In contrast to its prior responses to interna­
tional human rights criticism, the unsigned copy was simply dropped off by a vehicle from the 
Office of the Vice-President at a hotel where members o f the opposition held a meeting 
(Economic Review, 13 May 1996). The first sentence admitted that "Kenya, like all countries 
in the world, does not possess a perfect human rights record." The main defending line taking 
in the report indicated growing concern about the human rights image of the country abroad, 
but little appreciation for the emergence of domestic human rights monitors. The authors 
emphasized that Kenya's human rights record should be viewed as comparatively positive 
considering the economic constraints and the situation in neighboring countries. The authors 
also claimed that Kenya faced a number of more important problems including threats 
national unity by tribal clashes.
In their defense o f the government's human rights record, the authors also questioned the 
motives o f  KHRC and attacked their working methods. "Unlike other human rights reports, 
which detail in what respect the State has failed to discharge its responsibilities under interna­
tional human rights instruments, the KHRC Report does not approach the subject as a 
specialized legal subject requiring the creation o f a nexus between the incidence and State 
culpability! It is embarrassing to the sponsors (Western donors, HPS) o f the project and it is 
hoped that they will analyze the professionalism of the KHRC" (Republic o f Kenya 1996: 2). 
KHRCs work was dismissed as an "unprofessional and mediocre propagandist catalogue of
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criminal incidents" to "justify to sponsors that something has been done with the donor 
funds."
The same year, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel S. Rodley (E/CN.4/1996/35: 
23)123 cited the Government of Kenya as having categorically denied that torture was system­
atically used by police because this would be in contradiction to the constitution o f the 
country. In two out o f six individual cases transmitted to the Government o f Kenya replies 
were received, whereas the rest and a number o f cases which had been presented in 1994 
remained without response. Communications from the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions in 1995 have also not been answered by the Kenyan 
government (E/CN.4/1996/4: 69).
Whereas the government became more responsive to international human rights criticism, it 
showed still little tolerance for similar domestic activities. Rude attacks on members of 
Amnesty International, common during the 1980s, were now absent from the government's 
rhetorical repertoire. With the emergence of KHRC and other domestic NGOs in the 1990s, 
some of these attacks were now directed at these groups. However, the human rights criticism 
only partly explains the shift of target. Behind the principled human rights advocacy of 
KHRC and other NGOs, the Kenyan government always suspected a Kikuyu conspiracy. The 
1996 response to KHRCs work also alleged that Maina Kiai, the Executive Director o f  the 
organization had turned KHRC into a "heckling family-incoming-generating venture" 
(Republic of Kenya 1996: 6)
In the midst o f sharp domestic confrontations and unchanged rhetoric, the government contin­
ued its policy o f combining concessions with continued refusal o f  substantive reforms. The 
political opposition remained divided throughout the whole inter-election period, so that the 
civil society sector represented the main domestic force for sustainable regime change. In 
m id-1996 Moi appointed ten individuals mainly from the private sector to form a Standing 
Committee on Human Rights, which reported directly to the President. To date, the commis­
sion's status is not entirely clear and none of their investigations were made public. However,
123 The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances was established in 1980 as the first of its 
kind. In 1982 and 1985 respectively, the post of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions and the Special Rapporteur on Torture were established (Cook 1993; see also International 
Commission of Jurists 1991).
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the Standing Committee began to copy the KHRC practice of compiling so-called quarterly 
reports on the domestic human rights situation.
On the occasion o f the 48th anniversary o f the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 
December 1996, Attorney General Amos Wako announced during a luncheon that the 
government would "implement all the recommendations you [the Standing Committee, HPS] 
made in your first quarterly report which you handed to the president." The invited Executive 
Director of KHRC, Maina Kiai, interrupted Wako and demanded open access to the Standing 
Committee's work. Wako responded with a promise that Kenya would soon begin submitting 
periodic reports on the human rights situation in the country to international organizations. 
The chairman of the committee, Prof. Onesmus Mutungi, replied to Kiai, that "one o f the 
greatest democratic rights is the right to be wrong. Just go and lodge your complaints 
officially and we shall investigate" (Daily Nation, 11 December 1996).
The international and domestic non-governmental human rights community upheld its pres­
sure on the Kenyan government. On 12 December, the Daily Nation carried a Special report 
on the release o f "Kenya: Shadow Justice”, a 300-page human rights report published by the 
London-based NGO African Rights (African Rights 1996).124 The report detailed how the 
Kenyan executive continued to abuse the judiciary and human rights after the 1992 elections. 
On 16 December, the Kenyan chapter o f the International Commission of Jurists followed suit 
and published its annual report titled "State o f the Rule of Law”. It accused the government of 
continued human rights violations and lack of respect for established human rights safeguards. 
According to the report, 69 torture victims were treated in a six-months period in 1995, while 
unreported cases are likely to be much higher (International Commission o f Jurists (Kenya 
Chapter) 1996). The same accusations on continued torture were echoed by a 26-page 
Amnesty report published on 8 January 1997. This report followed up on a December 1995 
report and the response by the Kenyan government in March 1996. The Daily Nation 
reprinted these reports in full length.
124 African Rights was formed by Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, today two of the most outspoken critics of 
the transnational human rights movement The report was written by Lucy Hannan. Omaar and Hannan had been 
previously working for Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch and were responsible for K enya: T aking  L ib e r tie s  in 
1991. Omaar had left Africa Watch following internal disagreements about the response of the established 
human rights NGOs to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
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The failure o f the opposition parties to decisively challenge the KANU government 
represented the background for a renewed domestic and international mobilization for 
political reforms in the mid-1990s. Initially, individual members o f  the opposition had taken 
advantage of a ’window of opportunity' in 1991/92 to set up a whole array o f  non­
governmental organizations. When those groups had consolidated their domestic position 
mainly with the help o f outside financial resources, they began to form new coalitions and 
action committees for constitutional reforms. International human rights groups supported 
these efforts by keeping up the pressure on the Kenyan government. The parliamentary 
opposition as main challenger of KANU was increasingly replaced by those newly established 
extra-parliamentary forces within civil society. In late-1996 and early 1997 the upcoming 
second multiparty elections became a catalyst for further mobilization and a more united 
position of the opposition.
The Mobilization for Constitutional Reforms
The first major success o f the renewed international and domestic mobilization was the 
release of Koigi wa Wamwere on bail and medical grounds on 13 December 1996. It followed 
on 20 December the sudden replacement of Shedrach Kiruki as Police Commissioner. He was 
dismissed by Moi because of persistent human rights violations by the police force. The 
newly appointed Duncan Wachira pledged to fight corruption and misuse of powers within the 
police force. In February 1997, the Kenyan government acceded to the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
It also made financial contributions to the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. 
However, the government and KANU still rejected the idea of substantive political reforms 
prior to the elections. The domestic opposition now used its newly acquired organizational 
capacities to challenge this position.
In January 1997 the wave of mobilization gathered momentum when the government 
attempted to repeat some o f the 1991/92 manipulations of the electoral process. The 
President's Office announced the issuance of new ID cards. The measure aimed at securing a 
KNAU victory based on the unfair distribution of ID cards in opposition and KANU areas. 
Immediately, the National Council of Churches o f Kenya (NCCK) protested the decision with 
advertisements in the national press. The NCCK also demanded minimum constitutional 
reforms prior to the elections, including the reform of the Electoral Commission, equal access
207
to financial resources for all parties, and the protection of all candidates by state security 
forces. One day before the application deadline for new IDs was supposed to end. Moi 
extended the period for another month.
After the Nairobi Law Monthly had published proposals for a model constitution by KHRC, 
the International Commission o f Jurists and the Law Society o f Kenya (No. 51, p. 8-32) in 
early 1995, the opposition and international human rights groups now began to systematically 
mobilize for these reforms prior to election day. In the intensified struggle for political 
reforms the newly established non-govemmental organizations and 'action coalitions' initially 
eclipsed the opposition parties and led the new challenge of KANU's dominant role in domes­
tic politics. As the presentation o f model constitutions indicated, the demands o f these groups 
went well beyond the ideas of the parliamentary opposition. The later were mainly interested 
in an election environment which would secure a change of guards in their favor, preferably 
without even limiting the powers o f the President and the opportunities entailed in a 
functioning neopatrimonial system. Only to the extent that constitutional reforms were 
perceived as increasing their chances to be part of the next government, these politicians were 
in favor o f such a process.
A similar coincidence of principled and self-interested motives pervaded the activities o f the 
civil society groups. This overlap expressed itself on both sides of the political divide during 
the public exchange o f arguments for majoritarian multipartyism and majimbo. This debate 
did not merely pit an authoritarian regime against the "forces o f democracy", but highlighted 
also exclusionary self-interests disguised as different visions o f democracy. Majimbo would 
ensure that the minority groups remained in control o f their home areas and retained at least a 
veto position in national politics. Not the individual but the ethnic group was claimed to be 
the basis o f  democracy. This position was defended by politicians within the ruling coalition.
In contrast, the civil society groups and churches referred to ethnic groups only in the context 
o f violence and non-democratic conduct. Instead, the suggested reforms and the new constitu­
tion was expected to "facilitate the expression o f the will o f All by merely aiming at 
facilitating the exercise of sovereignty by all governed" (cited in Ndegwa 1998: 611). Conse­
quently, the NCCK and others called for a referendum as main mechanism of constitutional 
reform and the application o f majority rules to arrive at important national decisions. In this 
vision, protection against possible state intrusion was extended to individuals but not to ethnic
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groups. While this does reflect liberal values and principled advocacy also promoted on the 
international level, the position was also likely to give an advantage to the larger ethnic 
groups.which, incidentally, dominated the organizations lobbying for constitutional reforms.
The upcoming elections did not only mobilize the vibrant extra-parliamentary realm. Both, 
KANU and the opposition parties also continued to regroup. On 1 January 1997, the opposi­
tion split further when Raila Odinga and many o f his followers left FORD-Kenya and revived 
the dormant National Democratic Party (NDP).125 NDP was now a party representing the Luo 
community in Nyanza, while FORD-Kenya under the leadership o f the Luhya Michael 
Wamalwa was reduced to a regional force in the Western Province. Moi’s preparations for the 
General Elections included the return of the infamous Nicholas Biwott to the center of 
national politics. On 15 January, he was appointed Minister in the Office of the President 
(Daily Nation and Financial Times, 16 January 1997, p. 1 and p. 4; see also chapter 5). The 
Financial Times commented that "Kenya's chances of persuading donors it is tackling official 
corruption took a battering yesterday when a former minister associated with some o f  the 
country's worst scandals was re-appointed to Moi's cabinet" (Financial Times, 16 January 
1997, p. 4).
The National Convention for Constitutional Reform
In spring 1997, efforts to unite the opposition on the issue o f constitutional reforms prior to 
the elections finally bore fruit. From 3-6 April, a coalition of thirteen opposition parties, 
churches and NGOs held the first National Convention for Constitutional Reform in Limuru 
(Daily Nation, 7 April 1997). The organizations formed the National Convention Assembly 
(NCA) and the National Convention Executive Committee (NCEC), which was responsible 
for the daily operations (Ndegwa 1998: 196).126 The meeting reiterated long-standing reform 
demands, but added now the threat o f  mass action if the government would not change its 
position on political reforms. (Tostensen, Andreassen, and Tronvoll 1998: 34). The date for 
the first street demonstration was set for the 31 May, the day before an Amnesty International
125 Oginga Odinga had created the National Democratic Party in October 1990, but later abandoned it again and 
joined other opposition members to form the umbrella organization FORD and later FORD-Kenya.
126 NCA and NCEC originated in a loose cooperation among the opposition parties in late 1995. The Inter- 
Parties Group (IPG) invited in April 1996 the 4Cs to participate in their deliberations. In early 1997 more NGOs 
were asked to join the renamed National Convention Planning Committee (NCPC) and in Limuru the 
cooperation between parties and the civil society was finally institutionalized in the NCA.
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delegation led by the organization's General Secretary Pierre Sane was expected to arrive in 
Nairobi. In the following months, the NCEC became an established domestic political actor 
and the main force behind the demands for constitutional reforms. In turn, the leaders of 
KHRC, the 4Cs and the other political NGOs were the main driving force behind the NCEC. 
These included activists like Gibson Kamau Kuria, Kivuta Kibwana, Paul Muite, and Willy 
Mutunga.
On 8-9 May twenty Kenyan and international human rights groups held a two day meeting in 
Nairobi. Participating organizations included KHRC, the 4Cs, the ICJ (Kenyan Chapter), the 
churches, and the British organization Article 19. The meeting resolved that existing Kenyan 
laws could not secure a level playing field for the elections. The demands echoed the NCEC 
agenda and included a more independent Electoral Commission, the abolition of licenses for 
public rallies, and the opening of the electronic media to the opposition. Amnesty Interna­
tional launched in early May a "Human Rights Manifesto for Kenya" which had been 
developed in cooperation with 17 domestic human rights NGOs. The manifesto reiterated the 
specific demands for constitutional reform and the strengthening of press and judiciary. The 
donor government also followed up on these issues and presented their expectations concern­
ing the upcoming General Elections. The list included, inter alia, a fair resolution o f the ID 
card-issue, registration of all eligible parties, equal access to print and electronic media, and 
transparent counting procedures on election day. Leaders o f  the Catholic and Protestant 
churches added on 22 May an ultimatum to their demands for minimal reforms.
Moi immediately rejected the attempts to press him into political change as "dictatorship" and 
warned the opposition o f "causing chaos to attract coverage by the BBC and other interna­
tional media as a way o f winning sympathy" (Daily Nation, 24 May 1997). However, his 
attitude changed when the visit o f the Amnesty International delegation approached and the 
NCEC's call for demonstrations brought thousands o f protesters to the streets. On 1 June, Moi 
offered to replace the Public Order Act with a Peaceful Assembly Bill, but continued to 
dismiss all demands for minimal reforms prior to the elections. On the second day o f its visit, 
Amnesty representatives welcomed Moi’s willingness to repeal the Public Order Act, but 
pointed to the reality o f human rights conditions and a whole range of repressive laws not 
mentioned by Moi. The same day, the International Bar Association published in London a 
critical report on the state o f the Kenyan judiciary (International Bar Association 1997).
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Within the next two weeks, Human Rights Watch released two additional human rights report 
on Kenya (Human Rights Watch/Africa 1997a; Human Rights Watch/Africa 1997b).
During its visit, the Amnesty delegation held extensive talks with high-level Kenyan govern­
ment officials. A request to meet with President Moi was rejected. Instead, Vice-President 
Saitoti, the Attorney General Amos Wako, the Commissioners for Prisons and Police, and the 
Ministers for Health and Education attended the meetings. Saitoti clarified that his govern­
ment was willing to openly discuss shortcomings, but would reject all recommendations 
"couched in peremptory and prescriptive terms which are usually employed in master-servant 
relationships. The government hopes that Amnesty International will in future be sensitive to 
our national sovereignty." Saitoti requested Amnesty to inform Kenyan government officials 
prior to the release of new reports. He also defended the government’s refusal to go ahead with 
constitutional reforms. "It is a time constraint, rather than unwillingness to embark on the 
constitutional review." Saitoti pointed out that all laws criticized by Amnesty were already 
under review and promised that the Amnesty memorandum would be given to the Standing 
Committee for Human Rights for further consideration (Daily Nation, 6 June 1997).
On 19 June, opposition parliamentarians disrupted the annual budget speech of Finance 
Minister Musalia Mudavadi by chanting "Moi must go" and waving placards in favor of 
political reforms. Opposition and KANU MPs began to punch each other in front o f a 
patiently watching Daniel arap Moi and many Western diplomats. The next day, Moi blamed 
"foreign-funded NGOs" for the chaos in parliament and threatened to de-register them. "There 
are some NGOs such as the ones that have been engaged in feeding famine victims, but there 
are others which have gone against their mandate and are seeking to influence political 
developments in this country. (...) They were not allowed here to play politics, because that is 
how Africa has become the experimental ground for everything" (Daily Nation, 21 June 
1997). In another speech on the same day Moi suddenly indicated a change o f mind on the 
political reform question and announced that he would meet the newly installed Catholic 
Archbishop Ndingi Mwana'a Nzeki to discuss the issue. "I hope that after the meeting he will 
be able to understand my position. (...) I am not an obstacle to peaceful discussions relating to 
the future of Kenya." However, Moi refused to talk to the NCEC, because it was not an 
elected body but just a "congregation o f  self-styled leaders".
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The international and grassroots support for the opposition encouraged the NCEC to announce 
another street demonstration for 7 July, again a highly symbolic day in remembrance o f the 
Saba Saba violence in 1991 (see chapter 5). Hardline government officials such as KANU 
Secretary General Joseph Kamotho declared that no such rallies would be tolerated. When the 
demonstrators began to chant "Moi must go" and "Moi-butu", the riot police used force to 
disperse the crowds and left twelve people dead (Daily Nation, 8 July 1997). Several dozen 
persons were injured when the police stormed Nairobi's All Saints Cathedral during a service, 
threw tear gas canisters, and beat up many parishioners. International and domestic outrage 
flared up again. Once again, the news made it to the headlines o f  international media and the 
Kenyan government had maneuvered itself into international isolation.
Western envoys in Nairobi requested a meeting with President Moi on the next day. During 
the 90-minute encounter at State House, Moi accused the group o f eight envoys'17 o f  being 
"pro-opposition" and rejected all demands for reforms. In response to the documents by the 
Donor’s Democracy and Development Group, the Kenyan government explicitly refused the 
registration of new parties. According to the East African, Moi repeated that he was only 
willing to talk to the Catholic Church about reforms (East African, 8 July 1997). The next day 
riot police stormed the dormitories of Nairobi and Kenyatta Universities after students had 
announced more street demonstrations. The universities were closed. Two executives o f the 
formally independent TV station Kenya Television Network (KTN) were sacked, following a 
critical report and video coverage o f police brutality against the students.
On 10 July, the opposition failed to agree on a proposed election boycott if  the government 
would not give in to demands for minimal constitutional reforms. The parliamentary opposi­
tion rejected such a plan and seemed confident to remove Moi from power this time round. In 
contrast, the more principled extra-parliamentary groups were behind the boycott demands. 
Moi reaffirmed his rejection o f reforms and used the example o f Uganda to accuse Western 
governments of double standards. "Our friends who are telling us about democracy have no 
moral authority to tell us to do things which they do not do. A set of double-standards of 
democracy have been established for each country by the Western world." Moi reacted to a 
statement by US Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright who blamed for the political violence
127 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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in Kenya "not just the Government's unacceptable 'strong arm' tactics, but its failure to take 
the essential steps to create a free and fair electoral climate" (Daily Nation, 11 July 1997). At 
the request o f the Kenyan government, a donor meeting scheduled for late-July in Paris was 
postponed. In two strongly worded editorials, The British Times accused Moi o f being "adept 
at giving just enough ground to split the opposition and placate his international critics, only 
to reclaim it later. (...) The West used to champion Moi, but now it is horrified by the brutality 
meted out over the last weeks (cited in: Daily Nation, 22 July 1997).
Between early 1997 and the aftermath o f Saba Saba the isolation o f  the Kenyan government 
resembled the situation in 1991/92, while the government continued to use violence against 
the opposition and refused to accept substantial political reforms. The NCEC had become the 
leading organization lobbying for reforms within the opposition and mobilizing the people to 
the streets. Not the party leaders, but the domestic allies o f the transnational human rights 
network now led the combined opposition force. They were supported by international human 
rights groups which continued to publish human rights reports and, in the case o f Amnesty 
International, sent a high-level delegation to the country at a time, when crucial confrontations 
between the government and the opposition occurred. After the Saba Saba violence, Moi 
finally agreed in principle to reform talks.
Pressure from Above and Below
In a first hint o f the things to come, Moi declared on 11 July that he would soon convene the 
KANU National Delegates Conference and the Governing Council to deliberate on the issue 
o f constitutional reforms. "I am not a dictator. (...) When they ask me to change the constitu­
tion who am I to change it? I was elected by Kenyans and it is them who must give me the 
mandate to change the constitution" (Daily Nation, 12 July 1997). The last time these two 
bodies met together in December 1991, Moi used the occasion to announce the repeal of 
section 2A o f the constitution which declared Kenya a one-party state. On 14 July, the Euro­
pean Parliament called upon the Commission "to suspend financial co-operation for structural 
adjustment programs under the Lomé Convention with Kenya, in the event the Kenyan 
government persists in not respecting human rights." The same day, the Permanent Secretary 
in the Foreign Ministry, Sally Kosgei, flew to the United States to reassure the Clinton 
administration o f the Kenyan government's democratic commitment. She held meetings with 
Undersecretary Secretary o f State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering, Assistant Secretary
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o f  State for Human Rights John Shattuck, nominated Assistant Secretary of State for Africa 
Susan Rice, and various Members of Congress. Kosgei defended Kenya’s human rights record 
and said it was portrayed unfairly in the Western press (East African, 23 July 1997). Important 
individual donor governments such as Germany and Great Britain officially declared that they 
had to review their aid commitments.
On 15 July Moi met 17 religious leaders on the question of political reforms. During the 
meeting Moi agreed that "a comprehensive review of the administrative and legislative 
framework" was needed, but left the time-table open. The following day, Moi made the first 
major concession and announced that licenses for public rallies would now be granted 
automatically. "KANU and opposition politicians are expected to apply and only under 
special circumstances will they be denied licenses. The reasons for denial will be explained to 
the applicant" (Daily Nation, 17 July 1997). This finally followed up on his promise to replace 
the Public Order Act. After a one-day meeting, the KANU National Executive Council 
announced on 17 July that it recommended the immediate establishment of a commission to 
review the constitution and certain other acts. It insisted that only representatives from the 
parties represented in parliament should be members of the commission. KANU Secretary 
General Kamotho refused talks with NCEC echoing Moi's arguments that it was not elected 
by the Kenyan people.
The conditional offer for talks split the opposition. The group dominating the NCEC (c.g. 
Kivutha Kibwana, Gibson Kamau Kuria etc.) demanded all-inclusive talks about constitu­
tional reforms which would also recognize the contributions of the civil society sector. 
Subsequent efforts by extra-parliamentary groups and church representatives to unite the 
opposition against the KANU conditions failed. While the main leaders of the opposition 
parties (Mwai Kibaki/DP, Michael Wamalwa/FORD-Kenya, and Martin Shikuku/Ford-Asili) 
saw this as an opportunity to come back into the political game and agreed to the conditions 
set out by KANU, the leadership of the NCEC rejected the offer as "piecemeal negotiations*'. 
The NCEC called for a general strike on 8 August to press for the inclusion of the civil society 
groups. During the next week, the government acknowledged the reception of several reform 
proposals, including one written by opposition member James Orengo for the NCEC.
On 30 July, the Kenyan Ambassador to the United States Benjamin Edgar Kipkorir defended 
the Kenyan human rights record in front to the US Senate Sub-Committee on African Affairs
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which held a hearing on "Kenya: Election Crisis". Kipkorir presented several documents 
purportedly proving the governments willingness to implement serious political reforms. 
However, one o f the documents, which carried all the name o f Amos Wako, was not from the 
government, but the NCEC proposal for constitutional reforms. The NCEC memorandum 
included the release of political prisoners, the resettlement o f victims o f ethnic violence, the 
registration of all parties, and equal access to the media for all parties.121 One day later, 
Attorney General Amos Wako declared that Kipkorir had mixed up documents.
On 31 July, the IMF suspended a $220 Million low-interest loan saying that the Kenyan 
government had not taken the previously agreed steps to combat corruption and strengthen 
management in the energy sector. Kenya became the first victim o f new IMF guidelines on 
corruption which were approved by the IMF board on 5 August. An IMF official declared that 
there was "absolutely no political motivation in consideration of the decision." A few days 
later, the Daily Nation reported that Finance Minister Mudavadi had originally agreed to the 
conditions of the IMF one day shy o f the deadline, but that Moi himself withdrew this letter 
the next day. Moi claimed that the conditions were political rather than economic. The 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs was completely kept off the issue. Similar to the 1990 decision to 
break diplomatic relations with Norway, Moi and a small number o f  advisers around him were 
responsible for this decision (Daily Nation, 3 August 1997). A few days later the World Bank 
followed suit and cited corruption as a reason for withholding about $70 million in aid.
The general strike on 8 August brought more violence and led to the death of three Kenyans, 
although it was hardly followed by the population. Without the support from popular political 
leaders, the NCEC's strategy of mass mobilization failed, because its leaders were much better 
known in Western capitals than in Kenyan rural villages. However, the growing pressure on 
the government did finally mobilize the 'majimbo' faction within the ruling coalition. One 
week later after the general strike, unknown attackers raided a police station in Likoni close to 
Mombasa and killed six police officers. Within the next few days, leaflets appeared in the 
coastal region, which demanded that "non-coastal people" should leave the area. During the 
next months about 100 people were killed and thousands o f Kenyans fled the region south of
121 On 4 August, Kipkorir was removed as ambassador. It turned out, that the NCEC document bore Attorney 
General Amos Wako’s name, because the NCEC hoped Wako would approve and simply forward the document 
to parliament.
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Mombasa (Kenya Human Rights Commission 1997).
By the end o f August, the government and the NCEC exchanged increasingly hostile accusa-
«i
tions. Moi and his ministers claimed that the NCEC was "backed by foreigners to start a 
revolution in Kenya" (Daily Nation, 31 August 1997). The president warned that the NCEC 
was about to stage a "civilian coup" and intended to subvert the elected government. This 
statement followed the Limuru II meeting held from 25 to 28 August where the NGO repre­
sentatives decided to constitute the NCEC as a parallel government if  KANU did not finally 
enter serious dialogue. The meeting also resolved to call for two other major rallies on 9 
September (Tisa Tisa) and 10 October (Kumi Kumi). Moderate sections within the KANU 
government now became more active and tried to prevent further violent confrontations.
Negotiating Minimal Constitutional Reforms
Vice-President Saitoti led an effort to break the deadlock and called on the closing day o f 
Limuru II for a meeting of KANU and opposition MPs. He invited the opposition MPs to 
form the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) which would be charged with kicking off 
the constitutional reform process. Within a few days, the group agreed on minimum legal 
reforms, including a reform of the Electoral Commission and the deletion o f the ban on 
forming a coalition government. The IPPG created three committees on legal and administra­
tive issues (1), the electoral reform (2), and problems o f domestic security (3). KANU and the 
opposition parties would be represented on the committees with half of the seats each. The 
NCEC reacted to its exclusion from the reform talks by reaffirming its call for demonstration 
on 9 September. However, similar to the failed general strike in August, the demonstration 
failed again. At the same time, the moderate opposition accepted KANU’s refusal to admit 
non-elected NCEC representatives at the negotiating table.
On the day o f the first IPPG talks, Amnesty International launched its six month campaign 
"Kenya-The quest for Justice" which continued its cooperation with several domestic human 
rights groups. During the entire period, joined Amnesty-RPP groups visited all major 
European countries and briefed government representatives, parliamentarians, and the general 
public on the human rights situation in Kenya. However, domestic affairs were now 
completely dominated by the surprising pace of the reform process. Within only two months 
time, the committees completed their work and the reforms were tabled by Attorney General 
Amos Wako in parliament. After only three weeks the committees had reported their results
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back to the IPPG and the offices of the Attorney General were charged with translating the 
agreements into bills. Amnesty International cautiously welcomed the progress made on 
constitutional reforms, but maintained that many issues were still unresol ved.129
The IPPG talks came briefly under stress when police officers harassed and arrested 
prominent opposition MPs, including the leader of the Democratic Party, Mwai Kibaki and 
NDP chairman Raila Odinga. After the issue was raised in parliament, Vice-President Saitoti 
apologized for the attacks and reassured that opposition rallies will "never again be disrupted. 
(...) I am saying in no unmistakable terms that this will never happen again. I've never made 
this kind o f statement o f reassurance to fellow MPs and recanted the next day. Investigations 
will commence immediately and action will be taken against those wrho perpetrated it" (Daily 
Nation, 8 October 1997). In contrast to those well-intentioned statements, hardliners within 
the executive and KANU rejected political change and even the imminent minimal reforms. 
The Office of the President continued to refuse registration of Safina, a party created by 
members of the NCEC and led by Paul Muite and Richard Leakey. The responsible 
authorities stated that the name of the party was "undesirable" and suspected that its "purposes 
[were] prejudicial to or incompatible with peace, welfare or good order in Kenya."
On 30 October, parliament voted with more than the required two-thirds majority in favor o f 
the IPPG package (156 in favor, 26 against, one abstention). On the same day, Moi appointed 
ten new members to the enlarged Electoral Commission. They were added to the eleven 
existing commissioners and were all proposed by the opposition in parliament. One week 
later, Moi signed the IPPG proposals into law (Daily Nation 8 November 1997). Apart from 
the strengthening and enlargement of the Electoral Commission, the constitutional reforms 
included:
1. Insertion of a new section 1A in the constitution, stating that "The Republic o f  Kenya shall 
be a multi-party democratic state."
2. Amending o f the constitution to enable coalition governments.
3. Nomination o f 12 MPs in proportion to the strength of parties.
4. Addition o f "sex" to race, tribe, color, etc. in the provisions on anti-discrimination.
129 My more optimistic reading of the IPPG deal contrasts with Ndegwa’s verdict that the reform pact "actually 
undermined the possibility for democratic consolidation" (Ndegwa 1998: 193). Similar pessimism is expressed 
by Rok Ajulu, who maintained that "Kenya demonstrates that it is possible to have multiparty elections every 
five years without changing anything" (Ajulu 1998:283).
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The statutory law reform included measures intended to create a more level playing field for 
the upcoming General Elections:
i t
1. Abolition o f licensing requirements for public rallies contained in the Public Order Act.
2. Abolition of'detention without trial' in the Preservation o f Public Security Act.
3. Deletion o f all references to "sedition" in the Penal Code. Henceforth, bans on publications 
w ere only possible on grounds of morality and health.
4. Curbs on the powers of local administrators in the Chiefs Authority Act.
5. Amendments to the Police Act which explicitly stated that the police force shall be 
impartial and neutral in all political matters.
6. Dissolution o f the Administrative Police.
7. Amendments to the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act which required KBC to give 
equal coverage to all political standpoints. The Electoral Commission was given powers to 
m onitor KBC.
The compromise also provided that all pending applications for broadcasting licenses should 
be processed within 30 days. The government was also called upon to register all political 
parties seeking to compete in the upcoming elections. Finally, the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission Bill set up a commission which would undertake a comprehensive 
review of the constitution immediately after the elections.110
The NCEC reacted to its exclusion from the whole process by rejecting the compromise as 
insufficient. On 11 September the NCEC stated that "the recommendations o f the IPPG Sub- 
Committee change NOTHING whatsoever of real substance concerning reforms towards free 
and fair election in Kenya" (cited in Tostensen, Andreassen, and Tronvoll 1998: 37). Similar 
statements followed from critical church representatives. Later, the NCEC published a 
document which listed the democratic deficiencies of the IPPG package and compared it with 
their own proposals. However, an initial resolution by the NCEC to boycott and disrupt the 
elections was shelved on 11 November "pending public feedback".
The fast and successful completion of the IPPG talks would not have been possible without 
the presence o f an opposition divided in a moderate and radical section. The latter presented a 130
130 For an overview see the special sections in the Daily Nation, 12 September 1997.
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constant threat o f mass action to the government, which strengthened the moderates at the 
negotiation table. As a result, hardliners on the side of the government decided for the time 
being to remain in the background. On die side o f the opposition the NCEC was excluded as a 
result o f the government's insistence on the participation o f elected representatives only. 
Hence, the beginning o f constitutional reforms in Kenya highlighted the almost classical 
emergence of hard- and softliners on both sides o f the political divide.
The December 1997 elections
On 10 November, three days after the enactment o f the IPPG reforms, Moi dissolved parlia­
ment and set the date for the general elections in late-December. KANU rejected a move by 
opposition MPs to have parliament discuss the exact implementation o f the reforms prior to 
the elections. Immediately, suspicions arouse that the government would now renege on some 
of the promised reforms and simply not implement them. Indeed, the government still refused 
to register Safina and the mass media coverage o f the already ongoing campaign remained 
biased (Tostensen, Andreassen, and Tronvoll 1998: 42). The executive also refused to look 
into the issue o f licensing more private TV and radio stations. While opposition rallies were 
now largely tolerated by the provincial administration, there was still no level playing field. 
Nonetheless, the donor community was satisfied with the progress and agreed to finance large 
parts o f the electoral exercise and the monitoring. Donors gave about $1.5 million to the 
National Council o f Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, 
and the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED) which deployed about 27,000 volunteers 
as poll watchers. Following the prior mixed experiences with charging foreign observers, the 
donors now concentrated their resources to enable indigenous monitoring effort.
A total 32 MPs defected from their parties prior to the 1997 elections. Most of these defec­
tions took place within the opposition parties (Tostensen, Andreassen, and Tronvoll 1998: 19- 
22). FORD-Asili split into three sections: the remaining FORD-Asili led by Martin Shikuku, 
the Asili-Saba Saba led by Kenneth Matiba (who eventually boycotted the elections) and 
FORD-People headed by Kimani wa Nyoike. FORD-Kenya had already lost Paul Muite and 
his comrades who now played a major role in the NCEC and had formed Safina. Raila Odinga 
also quit FORD-Kenya and took the Luo community into the National Development Party 
(NDP). Finally, a third group around Peter Anyang' Nyongo left FORD-Kenya for the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP). They were joined by the Kamba Charity Ngilu, who defected from
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the Democratic Party and took the Kamba vote to become the presidential candidate for SDP. 
In the end, the vast majority o f opposition parties represented one ethnic group only. 26 
parties, fifteen presidential candidates (1992: eight each), and about 900 candidates for 210 
parliamentary seats were eventually cleared by the Electoral Commission, including the long­
time political prisoner Koigi wa Wamwere.131 On 26 November, the government belatedly also 
registered Safina party. Wako declared that the allegations for the original decision to refuse 
registration might still be valid, but he was "giving the said individuals the benefit o f  doubt 
over the allegations" (Daily Nation, 27 November 1997).
On 29 December, the elections nearly flopped because of widespread mismanagement by the 
Electoral Commission. While the IPPG compromise gave the EC complete control o f the 
electoral process, the state did not allocate sufficient funding to the EC to fulfil this task. 
"Ironically, the managerial problems might also be traced to the barring o f the Provincial 
Administration, for obvious political reasons, from any involvement in the electoral process" 
(Tostensen, Andreassen, and Tronvoll 1998: 53). Many ballot boxes did not arrive on time or 
were misdirected. Voting papers and even election officials were often missing so that poll 
watchers at about half of the polling stations reported that the voting exercise could not start 
on time. The presidential candidate Charity Ngilu found heaps of voter cards in her Kitui 
district. In light o f the general chaos, the Electoral Commission extended the elections for an 
additional day. Eight people were killed in election-related violence.
Despite those difficulties, voter participation was high. The final joined statement o f the 
Kenyan non-governmental organizations observing the elections concluded that "the results 
do on the whole reflect the wishes of Kenyan voters." However, it also held in its conclusions 
that the "institutional bias in favor of KANU, such as domination of the state media and unfair 
delineation of electoral constituencies, needs to be seriously addressed" (cited in: Tostensen, 
Andreassen, and Tronvoll 1998: 75). The 1997 elections were not yet free and fair, but they 
showed clear improvements compared to the 1992 exercise. "In summary it may be said that 
neither the 1992 nor the 1997 elections were fair. (...) However, the belated IPPG reform 
package no doubt made the electoral environment measurably fairer than it had been five 
years ago" (Tostensen, Andreassen, and Tronvoll 1998: 53). Serious irregularities were identi­
131 On 19 November the state dropped all charges against wa Wamwere, which enabled him to run for the 
presidency. However, he attracted only 0.14 per cent of the vote and even failed to win a parliamentary seat.
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fied in nine out o f the 210 constituencies. Subsequently, a number o f candidates contested the 
results in court, but none of those applications were successful.
While the opposition was able to blame KANU manipulations of the 1992 election process for 
its failure to remove Moi from power, these arguments were less convincing in 1997. There 
was still no level playing field, but the continued fragmentation o f the opposition had made a 
defeat of KANU even more unlikely. In the presidential race, Moi was re-elected in the first 
round with 40,4 per cent o f the total vote (1992: 37 per cent). He also gained more than the 
required 25 per cent in five out of the eight provinces (Coast, Eastern, North-Eastern, Rift 
Valley, and Western). Mwai Kibaki (DP) came in second with 31 per cent of the vote (1992: 
19 per cent). The remarkable increase was mainly due to Matiba's boycott. The Kikuyu vote 
now went almost entirely to Kibaki who was also the only candidate, apart from Moi, attract­
ing voters outside of his home province (Central: 89, Nairobi: 44, Eastern: 28, Rift Valley: 21, 
North-Eastern: 21). Three other candidates won their home provinces, but remained largely 
insignificant outside (except for the 'melting-pot' Nairobi). Raila Odinga (NDP) took the Luo 
vote in Nyanza (nationwide: 10,8 per cent), Michael Wamwala (FORD-Kenya) mobilized the 
Luhya in Western (8.1 per cent nationwide), and Charity Ngilu (SDP) the Kamba in Eastern 
(nationwide 7.9 per cent). All other candidates remained below one per cent.
In the parliamentary vote, the race between KANU and opposition was undecided until weeks 
after the elections. After both sides had added their nominated MPs, the ratio was 113 KANU 
to 109 opposition MPs. The Democratic Party now led the opposition with 41 seats, NDP 
followed with 22, FORD-Kenya with 18, and SDP with 16. Despite its late registration Safina 
was able to gain six seats, while FORD-People ended up with three MPs. FORD-Asili, the 
Kenya Social Congress (KSC) and Shirikisho (SPK) won one seat each. DP had been 
strengthened by uniting the Kikuyu vote, FORD-Kenya was reduced to a Luhya party and 
NDP emerged as the most successful newcomer based on the Luo vote in Nyanza Province. 
Only SDP and Safina could claim ethnic diversity within their ranks, although the former 
drew almost all its strength from the Kamba vote. From the larger ethnic groups, the Kamba, 
Kisii and Luhya were split and voted both for KANU and opposition candidates.
All opposition parties and the NCEC initially rejected the election results as seriously flawed. 
KHRC, other advocacy NGOs, and the Catholic Church called on 2 January for the immediate 
formation of a coalition government which would also include religious and civil society
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organizations (Daily Nation, 3 January 1998). After the NGO observers had announced on 3 
January that the elections reflected the will of the Kenyan people, Michael Wamwala and 
Raila Odinga declared their acceptance o f Moi’s victory. The president was swom in for his 
fifth and final term on 5 January. Mwai Kibaki continued to reject the results but said his 
party would cooperate in parliament. On 8 January Moi announced his new cabinet, but left 
the crucial position o f the Vice-President open. Its former occupant Saitoti was demoted to the 
Ministry o f Planning and National Development.
Return to 1991/92?: Ethnic Violence, State Repression, and Reform Pressure
Two days after the major opposition parties had agreed to accept the election results, 'ethnic 
violence' returned to the Rift Valley. Until late-January more than one hundred people were 
killed in Laikipia and Njoro areas, most of them Kikuyu. In the elections the people in both 
areas overwhelmingly supported DP and Mwai Kibaki, and prior to the elections KANU 
leaders in the area promoted thinly veiled ideas of 'ethnic cleansing' under the majimbo label 
(see above). Similar to the outbreak of violence in the Coast region, existing animosities over 
land and other issues were exploited by interested politicians. The response by the govern­
ment as well as the provincial administration and police force was extremely slow. The head 
o f the Church o f the Province o f Kenya (Anglican Church) Archbishop David Gitari 
suspected that "the government does not seem to have the will to end these clashes at the 
earliest moment possible" and demanded an independent investigation by the UN Human 
Rights Commission (Daily Nation, 9 February 1998).
The NCEC claimed that its constant warnings about the real intentions o f the government 
were proven right once more.131 Six human rights NGOs, including KHRC, RPP, and Kituo 
Cha Sheria demanded the resignation o f Police Commissioner Duncan Wachira. The parlia­
mentary opposition threatened to boycott the opening session o f the new parliament and the 
constitutional reform process. Western diplomats noted in a joint statement "with deep 
concern" the new clashes and the slow response o f the law enforcement agencies. It also held 
that the clashes send "a very negative message to the rest o f  the world" which threatened to 
"undo the recent progress in democratization" (East African, 2 February 1998). NCEC repre­
132 NCEC spokesman Kivutha Kibwana had been abducted in front of his home on 19 January. He was released 
the same night, after the plan to hand him over to another group apparently failed. One of the unknown kidnap­
pers told Kibwana that they came "to kill him" (Daily Nation, 15 February 1998).
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sentatives (re-) joined with popular political leaders and repeated their demands for an all- 
inclusive Constitutional Conference.
After remaining silent for weeks, Moi declared on 29 January that law enforcement agencies 
had been instructed to "firmly" deal with the instigators of the violence. He blamed DP 
leaders for the new violence. The government imposed a curfew on the affected areas and 
dispatched additional security forces to calm down the situation. When the eighth parliament 
held its first session on 3 February, opposition MPs used the occasion to protest the violence, 
waved placards and chanted the usual "Moi must go", "No peace, no Bunge" (parliament), and 
"Hatutaki Majimbo" (We don't want federalism). After student riots on campus and sit-ins on 
Nairobi streets, Kenyatta University was closed down again. On 8 February, US special envoy 
Jesse Jackson, arrived in Kenya and immediately visited hospitalized victims o f  the clashes. 
He asked the government to use all its resources to end the violence. Moi declined an 
invitation to join Jackson and the US ambassador on a tour to the affected areas. However, 
when Jackson asked Moi directly to show "personal presence and touch" the latter agreed to 
visit the Rift Valley. On 10 February, the government announced that it was ready to form a 
commission o f inquiry to probe the reasons for the recent violent clashes.
In response to queries in the House o f Commons, British Minister o f State for African Affairs, 
Tony Lloyd, said on 5 February that "concerns over police brutality in Kenya" had led to a 
"rejection o f recent applications for various categories o f riot-control equipment for the 
Kenyan police." He clarified that this was not "new policy" directed at Kenya only but in 
accordance with British Foreign Secretary’s Robin Cook's statement on a new ethical foreign 
policy in late 1997. Lloyd defended his government against accusations from transnational 
human rights organizations that it had recently taken a softer line towards the Kenyan 
government. Lloyd said that his government was "particularly concerned about the persistent 
police brutality and the evidence of torture and extra-judicial killings. The Kenyan 
government is bound under international obligations to end such practices. We will play a full 
part in ensuring that pressure for such progress is maintained" (Daily Nation, 7 February 
1998). After the 1997 Saba Saba violence, the British Section o f Amnesty international had 
been lobbying its government, not to sell anti-riot equipment to Kenya.
Two weeks after the opening of the Kenyan parliament, KANU formed its first informal 
coalition with Raila Odinga's NDP. Odinga declared that the last five years showed a need for
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change to break the gridlock in the political arena.'“ This move enlarged the KANU majority 
in parliament from only four to 26 seats. On 19 February, the Catholic and Protestant leader­
ship held that the new government had "no moral legitimacy to lead," In a joint statement they 
supported the NCEC's rejection of the IPPG package and the demands for a Constitutional 
Conference. NCCK Secretary-General Mutuva Musyimi appealed to Western governments to 
support the idea o f "all-party constitutional conference." Moi reacted immediately to the 
demands and said that "a Philippine-like revolution would not succeed in Kenya." He accused 
the church leaders o f joining "the many shady and illegal groupings opposed to the formation 
o f  a Constitutional Review Commission" (Daily Nation, 21 February 1998). The Kenyan 
government took particular exception to the call for foreign pressure. However, NCCK and 
NCEC continued to reject the commission and demanded the formation of a more broad-based 
body, whose members would not be appointed by Moi and would enjoy full security of 
tenure. While Moi argued that parliament should be at the center o f the constitutional review 
process, the NCEC demanded full participation of the extra-parliamentary forces.
On 25 February, the London-based NGO Article 19 repeated its accusations of "endemic 
torture" and other human rights abuses. The organization asked the Commonwealth Ministe­
rial Action Group (CMAG) "to add Kenya to its list o f serious and persistent human rights 
offenders" (currently Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia) at its 2-3 March meeting in 
London. CMAG did not follow the request. An IMF field mission assessing government 
spending since the suspension o f the ESAF in late July 1997 concluded in late February that 
the measures taken by the government were insufficient. It decided that the aid program 
would not be resumed until the government has lived up to the original agreements. The IMF 
mission criticized budgetary indiscipline which led to a deficit o f 3.9 per cent of GDP instead 
o f the agreed 2.4 per cent. The group also mentioned 12 specific cases where the Kenyan 
Customs Authority should recover substantial amounts of duty from individuals closely linked 
to the government.
Domestic NGOs as well as the parliamentary opposition continued to clash verbally with the 
government. Moi repeated his accusations that DP politicians were responsible for the ethnic
133 Raila's father Oginga had already toyed in June 1993 with the idea of cooperating with the government. In 
September 1993 newspapers speculated on an imminent coalition between FORD-Kenya and KANU. After 
Odinga's death in February 1994, Moi distanced himself again from the idea.
224
violence in the Rift Valley. He also threatened NGOs supporting the "illegal" NCHC with de- 
registration and advised activists to "join the legally constituted parties if they wish to engage 
in politics". In its reaction, the NCEC called upon the population to strike on 3 April, 4 and 5 
May, a full week in June, and indefinitely from 1 July. Government ministers accused the 
NCEC of preparing a coup "at the behest o f foreign governments" (Daily Nation, 27 March 
1998). Other KANU politicians repeated majimbo-inspired statements and warned NCEC 
activists that "they would regret it if  they dared to set a foot in Nakuru, Kapsabet or Eldoret 
towns."
On 1 April, the Attorney General Amos Wako announced the creation of a 25-member Inter- 
Party Parliamentary Committee (IPPC) to supervise the constitutional reform process. Twelve 
o f its members were opposition, thirteen KANU MPs. Two days later, the general strike called 
by the NCEC flopped. Only the international human rights groups remained firmly behind 
their domestic partners and the demands o f the NCEC. On 8 April, Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch and Article 19 declared in a joint statement read to the press in Nairobi 
that "the government's divide-and-rule tactics" had turned the country into a "powder keg 
waiting to explode" (AI Index 32/10/98). During a tour o f the country, the NGO representa­
tives had interviewed more than 200 individuals on the current human rights situation. The 
group also met with Onesmus Mutungi, the chairman of the Standing Committee on Human 
Rights.
Splits within KANU?
The failure o f the general strike convinced the NCEC to withdraw further plans for mass 
action. Nonetheless, the Kenyan government and its dominant KANU hardline faction was 
increasingly pressed to accept substantial refiorms. Moi suddenly found himself excluded 
when US government, World Bank, and the German Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation invited 
donors, government officials, and all MPs to a forum aimed at addressing Kenya's economic 
problems (Daily Nation, 24 April 1998). While Moi roundly rejected the meeting and its 
recommendations, 160 MPs (including 82 from KANU), many key cabinet ministers and 
ambassadors followed the invitation. In his key note address, Finance Minister Nyachae 
frankly admitted that "Kenya was broke and corruption was rampant." Nyachae echoed many
o f the international demands for economic and administrative reforms in Kenya*114
In an official statement two days later, Moi declared that the meeting was "inconsequential" 
because it pretended that there was "no constitutionally elected government in Kenya." He 
alleged that "the donors are aligning themselves with the NCEC, an organization that is out to 
create chaos" (Daily Nation, 28 April 1998). The president also declared that he would inten­
sify cooperation with Raila Odinga's NDP in parliament to combat "illegal" domestic groups 
and foreign intrusion. Subsequently, members of the Luo community were appointed to senior 
government positions. Moi still refused to name a Vice-President and call KANU party 
elections, because both issues would focus attention on the question o f his successor and 
potentially threaten his current position. The KANU-NDP alliance served both sides well. In 
the following months, Raila's NDP became a more reliable partner for Moi than some MPs 
from his own party. While Moi became less dependent on his own party and prevented a 
rapprochement between Kikuyu and Luo elites, Odinga successfully bargained for economic 
benefits which were now channeled towards his home region.
When Moi convened a KANU meeting on the question of economic reforms, several MPs 
openly challenged Moi's position on the economic forum. In a parliamentary group meeting, a 
majority rejected a proposal in which KANU wrould have officially distanced itself from the 
recommendations o f the seminar. An anonymous source attending the meeting told the Daily 
Nation that defiant KANU MPs declared towards Moi: "It was not lost to us that while the 
Mombasa seminar was on, you and Mr. Odinga were in Nyanza celebrating the marriage 
between their parties" (Daily Nation, 29 April 1998). Only a few days later, Moi gave in and 
agreed to economic reforms which were essentially in line with the donor expectations and the 
Mombasa recommendations. The continued refusal o f the IMF to resume aid had certainly 
contributed to that development. The president also followed his Finance Minister's assertions 
and acknowledged a serious fiscal crisis. He announced austerity measures which would 
substantially cut public spending, in particular with respect to civil servants and teachers. 
However, in a closed meeting with over 20 envoys at State House Moi insisted that such steps 
must be taken under the leadership o f KANU and no one else (East African, 7 May 1998).
114 In February 1999, Moi used the affair around the Kurdish leader Ocalan to remove Nyachae from his post. 
Nyachae declined to take over a lower-level ministry and quit the government (East African, 25 February 1999).
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The second major defeat for Moi occurred a few days later in parliament, when the opposition 
prevailed over KANU in a motion to set up a commission investigating human rights abuses 
and the causes for the ethnic violence since 1991. Although KANU MPs outnumbered their 
opposition colleagues, the motion for the commission won a 54 to 49 majority. KANU MPs 
had deliberately abstained or voted in favor o f the opposition proposal. On 1 July President 
Moi appointed Justice Akilano Molade Akiwumi as head of the Judicial Commission of 
Inquiry into tribal clashes between 1991 and 1998. Akiwumi had already participated in the 
1990/91 investigation o f the Ouko murder. The deadline set for reporting its results was the 
end of 1998. The terms o f references included the investigation o f the causes o f the clashes 
(1), and the actions taken by the law enforcement agencies (2).
Moi’s negative attitude towards the participation o f civil society groups in the process of 
constitutional review was now also challenged from within KANU. The KANU members 
within the IPPC agreed to organize a day-long seminar o f 400 political, religious and NGOs 
leaders on the constitutional reform process. This partially fulfilled the long-standing NCEC 
demands for an inclusion of extra-parliamentary groups. Attorney General Amos Wako 
chaired the meeting at 'Bomas of Kenya' on 11 May. During the seminar, NCEC and KANU 
representatives sharply disagreed on the role of the IPPC. While KANU defended the status 
quo, the NCEC demanded its replacement with a new, all-inclusive body. NCEC representa­
tives Gibson Kamau Kuria and Kivutha Kibwana repeatedly walked in protest out o f  the 
meetings. In the end, the participants only agreed on the continuation of the dialogue.
Before the second round o f the Bomas talks planned for 8-9 June, 36 participating groups led 
by the Catholic Church, the NCEC and the NGO Council threatened to boycott the meeting if 
their demands for greater inclusiveness were not met. They were supported by 42 MPs 
including five from the ruling party. Apart from civil society participation, the demands 
included the complete implementation o f the IPPG package as well as security o f tenure and 
financial independence o f  any body concerned with the issue of constitutional reform. Catho­
lic Archbishop Ndingi Mwana'a Nzeki declared during a sermon in Iate-May that the 
government would "waste its time if  it did not expand the committee on constitutional 
reform". The following day, Moi gave in to the continued pressure and announced an 
expansion o f the review committee. During his annual Mandaraka Day speech he declared 
that "the stakeholders should make the appointments and my role should only be to formally
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sign on” (Daily Nation, 2 June 1998). Moi also asked all dissidents within KANU to leave the 
party and repeated his rejection o f any foreign intrusion. A few days later, Moi announced a 
coopetation with FORD-Kenya by telling KANU followers that the FORD-Kenva leader 
Wamalwa "is not your enemy. Your enemies are within the party" (Daily Nation, 5 June 
1998). KANU now officially cooperated with FORD-Kenya and NDP.
Amnesty International released on 16 June a report on the joined mission by Amnesty, Human 
Rights Watch and Article 19 in March and April. Similar to earlier reports, the human rights 
watchdog remained highly critical of the Kenyan government and warned of "waning interna­
tional attention to the continuing human rights abuses". On 22 June 33 civil organizations and 
all political parties met to decide on the future of the constitutional reform process. The 
NCEC was now officially included in the talks. During the meeting, KANU representatives 
suggested to enlarge the IPPC on the basis of district representation, a modus which would 
have secured continued KANU dominance. The NCEC rejected the plan as "tribalist" and 
demanded representation based on existing civil society organizations. After intensive 
debates, both sides agreed one week later to set up a three-tiered structure with the led by a 
Constitutional Review Commission. One of the two other bodies would consist o f representa­
tives from the 65 districts, while the other would bring in a broad range of politically active 
domestic organizations. Until the next meeting a twelve-member drafting committee was 
charged with working out the details of the compromise.
A week after the concessions by Moi had provided a window of opportunity for sustainable 
political reforms, domestic and international outrage engulfed again the Kenyan executive. On 
10 July the government banned the newspaper Star and the magazines Finance and Post on 
Sunday. Editors and owner o f the Star were arrested and charged in court for publishing 
articles which are likely to "cause fear". An editorial in the Nation called the measure a 
"heinous, intimidatory and retrogressive tactic used only by undemocratic regimes" (11 July 
1998). KANU Secretary General defended the measure saying that "malicious and irresponsi­
ble journalism undermines press freedom." On 15 July, the Nation management complaint 
about increasing attempts to intimidate its reporters, in particular the journalists developing 
Internet services. The statement highlighted threats to journalists investigating corruption 
cases and a recent clash between the Nation and members o f  Raila Odinga’s NDP. 17 MPs 
from the party had publicly threatened to stop the circulation of the newspaper in their
~ ii .........................
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constituencies in Nyanza District. The management also demanded from the government to 
fulfil its promises contained in the IPPG package and process the Nation's Group application 
for a radio and TV license.135 The same day, 25 envoys condemned the press ban in a joint 
statement.
The Akiwumi commission commenced on 20 July its hearings on the ethnic clashes. A police 
officer explained in the first hearing that the "Kalenjins, who mainly supported KANU, did 
not understand multi-party politics and did not want neighboring communities to vote for the 
opposition." The chairman o f the Law Society o f Kenya (LSK), Nzamba Kitonga, said that 
senior politicians were behind the Coastal violence. He alleged, that they misused the 
majimbo debate to recruit unemployed youths from the area for attacks on upcountry 
communities, which had come to the Coast because o f employment opportunities in the 
tourism industry. A member of KHRC also presented evidence based on their own investiga­
tions to the commission. Finally, the chairman o f the Standing Committee for Human Rights, 
Onesmus Mutungi, confirmed the political nature of the clashes. He said that in both cases 
unemployment and ethnic animosity prepared a fertile ground for political violence related to 
upcoming elections (Daily Nation, 21 July 1998). Mutungi argued that the responsible circles 
mobilized unemployed youths to attack upcountry people because they were likely supporters 
o f the opposition. According to Mutungi, the plan for 'ethnic violence' in the pre-poll period 
was developed to secure a Moi and KANU victory in the area. During the following months, 
the Daily Nation regularly published summaries and full-length transcripts from the hearings 
in the Rift Valley and the Coast region.
The hardliners within KANU refused to accept the compromise on the three-tiered constitu­
tional reform process and tried to revert the decision. On 21 July, Moi sought to reunite 
KANU MPs in defense of the territorial principle as the only basis for representation. Moi 
repeated his rejection o f civil society participation holding on to his often-repeated line that 
"Kenyans are represented by their MPs". The president declared that he was only willing to 
accept the various church organizations as partners in the constitutional debates. This position 
was immediately rejected by the entire opposition movement in and outside o f parliament. 
Consequently, 50 opposition MPs threatened to boycott the next round of talks. The imminent
135 More than seven years after the first application, the Nation group was finally awarded TV and radio frequen­
cies in December 1998 (see also chapter 2).
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stand-off between the opposition and the government was delayed after bomb explosions 
ripped through Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam on 7 August, three days before the scheduled 
negotiations.
The bomb explosions targeted the US embassies in both east African capitals and killed an 
estimated 250 people, the vast majority in Nairobi. In the wake o f the tragedy, the meeting on 
the constitutional reform issue was rescheduled for 24 August. In the course o f the meeting. 
President Moi gave up his negative position towards NGO participation and his insistence on 
district representation. Moi also agreed that the new constitution should significantly limit the 
powers o f the executive and that the executive played only a minor role in the review process. 
Thus, the prior agreements between KANU and the opposition were reinstated and could now 
serve as the basis for final agreement about the formal side of the constitutional review. The 
participants agreed on the proposed three-tiered structure, consisting o f a 25-member Review 
Commission, a National Constitutional Consultative Forum (NCCF) and at the grassroots the 
District Consultative Forum (DCF). In contrast to Moi's original preferences, NGO represen­
tatives and religious leaders would also be part of the NCF. The president will only endorse 
the commissioners suggested by the respective parties or organizations and receive the final 
Constitution of Kenya Bill.
The compromise highlighted the profound changes Kenyan domestic politics had undergone 
since the early 1990s. "The fact that ’radicals' such as Prof. (Kivutha, HPS) Kibwana were 
sitting on the same committee with Mr. Sunkuli, an ultra-right wing KANU politicians shows 
ju s t how much transformation Kenyan Politics has undergone over the past few months" 
(Githongo 1998). However, most of the envisioned substantial steps towards democratization 
were still not yet agreed upon or implemented. The compromise was only about the formal 
conditions under which reforms would take place. While the DCF secured representation 
according to the majimbo ideas advanced by the incumbent minority groups supporting the 
government, the NCCF represented the liberal ideas o f the civil society sector. The former 
preferred constitutional reform based on ethnic communities and their representation in 
parliament because the current status quo secured an overrepresentation not only o f KANU, 
but also o f the smaller ethnic groups. In contrast, the NCEC as a group representing principled 
liberal values but also more narrow personal or ethnic interests, advocated a process based on 
national citizenship (referendum) and majority rules or at least the participation o f the civil
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society sector in order to counter the KANU dominance.
The drafting committee was now charged with working out the details o f this compromise and 
presented a draft bill to a final session on 5 October. One day before the meeting, the NCEC 
and the SDP withdrew their support and declared that the whole process was controlled by 
Moi and KANU. NCEC officials threatened again with mass action. The other participants 
went ahead and agreed on the composition of the Constitutional Review Commission. O f the 
25 members, thirteen were supposed to be chosen from the parties in parliament and twelve 
from religious, women and other civil society organizations. Within the parties' contingent, 
KANU would receive five seats, DP three, NDP two, and SDP as well as FORD-Kenya one 
each. The smaller parties in parliament were asked to fill the last seat with one joint represen­
tative. The compromise also held that the main Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic 
organizations would nominate one member each. Women organizations were supposed to 
send five commissioners elected by the Kenya Women's Political Caucus, while the National 
Council of NGOs was asked to forward four names which would represent the 'civil society' at 
large (Daily Nation, 31 October 1998).
Last minute efforts by KANU hard-liners to remove government-critical organizations such as 
the protestant NCCK or the Women Political Caucus from the commission failed. The KANU 
Assistant Minister and hardliner Julius Sunkuli actually removed the NCCK and women 
organizations from the draft version of the compromise without informing the other partici­
pants. When he was challenged he argued that some of the organizations included were not 
representative. KANU moderates and the opposition participants rejected these claims. On 8 
December, the Constitutional Review Bill was passed in parliament. Repeated efforts by 
KANU MPs to change the bill in their favor failed (Daily Nation, 9 December 1998). The 
parties and civil society organizations were now asked to nominate their representatives for 
the review commission.
On 9 October, Finance Minister Simon Nyachae returned from the annual IMF/World Bank 
meetings declaring that both organizations had agreed to re-open talks about the suspended 
aid. While the government had now broadly met the IMF conditions, domestic resistance 
against cuts in salaries o f civil servants grew. On 5 October, the Kenya National Union of 
Teachers (KNUT) called a strike which was widely followed by members throughout the 
country. About 200,000 teachers demanded a 200 per cent pay increase instead o f pay cuts.
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This increase had been promised by the government prior to the 1997 elections. The police 
sealed off the union's offices and broke up peaceful street demonstrations. The opposition in 
parliament protested the violent response o f the security organs to an essentially non-violent 
labor dispute. One day later, students of various universities joined the teachers to express 
their solidarity. A call by President Moi to end the strike was initially rejected by KNUT 
officials. Moi claimed that there was currently no money available to satisfy the teacher's 
demands. When church officials asked teachers to return to schools, KNUT called off the 
strike two weeks after it had commenced.
Following its rejection o f the constitutional reform compromise, the NCEC reiterated its call 
for the formation o f  a coalition government (Daily Nation, 11 October 1998). President Moi 
immediately retorted "today they are clamoring again for a coalition government. In a democ­
racy, it is the winning party that forms the government and when the time comes, others take 
over. (...) Our overseas friends have been giving us condition after condition and the gutter 
press has been telling lies about everything" (Daily Nation, 15 October 1998). Another 
KANU hardliner, Cabinet Minster Shariif Nassir, seconded two days later and declared that 
his party will no longer tolerate "insults from the press. (...) We shall set their printing presses 
on fire. We shall make sure that no vendor will touch their papers." On 21 October, the NGO 
Reporters Sans Frontiers sent an open letter to Moi (and copies to the UN, embassies, etc.) 
asking him to "ensure that journalists be allowed to do their job freely and without feat in your 
country." The same day, the owners of the Nation wrote to the famous columnist Wahome 
Mutahi that they would no longer print his articles if he would continue to satirize the Head of 
State.
On 12 October, the Akiwumi commission continued its hearings in Mombasa. A police 
officer claimed that the MP Emmanuel Maitha admitted in a written that he had organized the 
clashes in the Rift Valley in late 1997 while he was working for the president's personal 
assistant Joshua Kulei and nominated MP Rahid Sajjad. Allegedly, both senior politicians 
assured Maitha that Moi himself ordered attacks on opposition rallies. The following day, 
Maitha denied these accusations and claimed that he had never met the officer before. In his 
second testimony on 13 October, the chairman of the Human Rights Committee, Onesmus 
Mutungi, claimed that "the administrative authorities must have been aware or should have 
been aware of the impending clashes." His committee had found out that persistent denial of
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prior knowledge by the security organs was not credible. "Given the security of the country, it 
is not possible for 10 people to meet for a period o f time without the security personnel 
knowing." Mutungi stated that his commission was unable to get minutes from the pertinent 
security meetings on the provincial and district levels because "they did not exist" (Daily 
Nation, 14 October 1998). Mutungi explicitly rejected explanations advanced by the local 
administration which tried to downplay the political nature and blamed "dissatisfied youths". 
According to Mutungi, these explanations failed to account for the organized character o f the 
violence.
The Akiwumi commission heard Rashid Sajjad on 22 October. He admitted that he spent 
about 17 Million Kenyan Shilling (about $300,000) prior to the 1997 elections to "buy votes, 
feast people, pay school fees for people and give some to the elders to take to their families." 
Sajjad defended the practice as "common" to secure a KANU victory. However, he denied 
that the money was handed out to start violent attacks on suspected opposition voters (Daily 
Nation, 23 October 1998). The same day, Binaifer Nowrojee from the Africa Watch/Human 
Rights Watch office in New York also testified in front of the commission. She reiterated the 
findings of her organization which identified government officials close to President Moi as 
ultimately responsible for the outbreaks of violence. On 30 October the commission ordered 
ten current Cabinet ministers and 15 former minister to testify on the series of pro-govemment 
rallies in September 1991 (see chapter 5) which had preceded the outbreak of violence in the 
Rift Valley. Nation journalists covering these rallies also testified on the content o f the 
respective speeches (Daily Nation, 31 October 1998).
In late November 1998, the first authorized biography on Moi was published by Andrew 
M orton.136 Predictably, an apologetic Morton rejected the dominantly negative reporting on 
Kenya and claimed that Moi had always been "more sinned against that sinning." Morton also 
asked the press to see the "real Kenya" outside o f Nairobi and listen less often to "Kikuyu 
with an agenda" (Daily Nation, 29 November 1998). This public relations effort had much 
less domestic and international impact than the first-ever official admission that torture was 
widespread within the Kenyan security forces (Amnesty International, AFR 32/32/98). During 
a human rights workshop organized by KHRC and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commis-
136 Morton had previously written on Lady Di and published in March 1999 the 'real story' by Monica Lewinsky.
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sion, Assistant Police Commissioner Stephen Kimenchu officially apologized to former 
victims of police brutality, including the alleged members of Mwakenya. He explained that 
this violence was not in the interest of the police force, but invariably followed orders from 
above (Daily Nation, 11 December 1998).
W hen the deadline for the nomination of representative for the constitutional review commis­
sion approached in mid-February 1999, KANU reneged on its original stand to take five out 
o f  the 13 seats allotted to parties and claimed seven instead. Consequently, negotiations 
between KANU and opposition parties failed. Similar problems during the selection process 
occurred within civil society groups, most prominently within the Women's Political Caucus. 
W hen no compromise was found and the stakeholders sent a total o f 41 instead o f 25 names to 
the office o f the Attorney General, Amos Wako called for a consultative meeting with two 
representatives from each of the 19 nominating parties and organizations. On 18 February, 
this meeting failed because KANU sent 21 delegates including eleven ministers (Daily 
Nation, 19 February 1999). The opposition accused KANU of sabotaging the reform process 
over and over again. During the following weeks, the ten parties began to hold behind-the- 
door negotiations to break the deadlock.
More than ten years after the first major governmental concessions Kenya remains an attrac­
tive subject for international human rights mobilization. On 4 March 1999, Suba Churchill 
Meshack was chosen in the United States for the 'Reebok Human Rights Award'. His profile 
identified him as a member of RPP and the youth representative within the NCEC. In 1996, 
Amnesty International had started a campaign to bring charges against the security agents 
which tortured him following a total of eight arrests (East African, 8 March 1999).
6.3 Comparison
Transnational human rights mobilization remains an important factor for domestic political 
change, even after a change of government or a substantial change in policies. However, these 
changes in government and policies create lasting feed-backs on the international level, lead­
ing to changing levels o f mobilization (Uganda) or strategies (Kenya). During the 1990s, the 
Western media hype in favor o f Museveni contrasted sharply with the construction o f  Moi as 
a narrowly surviving authoritarian leader. This last chapter described some o f the long-term 
effects of non-governmental human rights activism. While decreasing mobilization in Uganda 
between 1986 and 1995 caused a general slow-dowm o f  reforms, the Kenyan situation during
W IinU UUU IM KJlJUg
234
the same period was marked by continuously high levels o f mobilization, at first, on the 
international level only and after 1991/92 spreading to the domestic level. Most recently, the 
internationally most well connected sections within civil society and organized within the 
NCEC became the main challengers o f the government on the issue o f constitutional reforms. 
However, their domestic legitimacy remains weak and their principled opposition was mixed 
with ethnic and personal power interests.
The counter-mobilization by KANU representatives based on a revived majimbo-agenda 
brought ethnicity back to the forefront. Despite the apparent abuse o f  federalist ideas, the calls 
can not be reduced to an authoritarian backlash intended to recapture control o f the constitu­
tional reform process. The majimbo debate raises valid questions about the future role of 
different ethnicities in Kenyan politics which were conveniently ignored by the moderate and 
radical opposition. Unfortunately, the principled international human rights movement has not 
yet adapted to the changing domestic circumstances which would require a more nuanced 
approach taking into account the role o f human rights rhetoric in advancing certain narrow 
ethnic and personal interests.
A similar picture appears with respect to Uganda, although the human rights situation here is 
today much more dependent upon the developments in the Great Lakes region. Only Amnesty 
International followed up in earnest on the Ugandan human rights situation after 1986. In the 
early 1990s, even this organization ended its practice of publishing comprehensive human 
rights reports. In 1995/96, the international human rights movement focused again on the area 
and began to report on gross human rights violations committed by rebel groups active in 
Northern and Western Uganda. This new mobilization coincided with strategic interests o f  the 
United States in the region. While the issue o f child abduction was a major public relations 
success for the international human rights community and organizations such as UNICEF, this 
mobilization has also solidified the government's preference for a military solution and 
allowed it to link the civilian opposition to so-called 'outside enemies.’ Consequently, the 
domestic situation prior to the 2000 referendum remains precarious, because the political 
opposition is increasingly capable to challenge the Movement government on the basis o f its 
reform agenda. I f  the leadership continues to resort to increasing domestic repression, this will 
bring it in open conflict with its own original reform agenda and the transnational human 
rights movement which legitimized its ascendancy to power in 1986.
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Conclusions
In the concluding chapter I will return to the theoretical discussions of the first and second 
chapter. In two sections, I will discuss the implications of the case studies for the literature on 
democratization in Africa and theories of regime change in general.
T h e  Contribution to the Analysis of Regime Transitions in Africa
To date, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle presented the most comprehensive analy­
sis o f recent "democratic experiments" in Africa (Bratton/van de Walle 1997). Based on 42 
cases they bring the continent's recent experience with democratic procedures into the main­
stream of the regime transition literature. Their main thesis held that "the institutional heritage 
o f  neopatrimonial rule has shaped regime transitions in much of Africa" (269). In my conclu­
sions I will compare the results from the two case studies with the ideas advanced by 
Bratton/van de Walle. Considering that these results are based only on Kenya and Uganda the 
claims can only be modest. However, the effort to compare the results of a larger synthesizing 
study with more in-depth case study material can make an important contribution and offer 
suggestions for further research.
—^S T he two main disagreements with Bratton/van de Walle concern, on the dependent variable, 
their electoral bias and on the explanatory side their neglect of international factors and the 
role o f civil society. These disagreements are embedded in a number of shared assumptions 
with respect to the definition of regime transitions and democracy as well as the recognition o f 
domestic institutions as important factors shaping transition paths. First and foremost, 
Bratton/van de Walle give preference to a minimalist and procedural definition of democracy 
and reject more substantive claims about what a democracy should yield to citizens. Second, 
Bratton/van de Walle follow Rustow’s claim that "the factors that keep a democracy stable 
may not be the ones that brought it into existence" (Rustow 1970:346).
Like many other theorists, Bratton/van de Walle draw two conclusions from these insights. 
First, they introduce a distinction between the period of early transition and the subsequent 
phase o f consolidation^Second, they champion elections as the most central feature both 
indicating and furthering democratization in an early stage. "We do not wish to commit the 
’fallacy of electoralism’ by ignoring that the consolidation o f democracy in the long run 
involves the permanent establishment o f many other valued institutions, such as civilian
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control over the military, independent legislatures and courts, viable opposition parties and 
voluntary associations, plus a free press. But no other democratic institution precedes 
elections, either in timing or importance. In our view, elections are the principal and necessary 
condition o f democracy, the first step without which democracy cannot be otherwise bom" 
(13). The case studies presented here support the former, but not the latter claim. While I do 
not dispute the general importance of free and fair elections in regime transitions, I question 
here the special status given to elections as opposed to other features o f  democracy.
Based on the Ugandan case, I argue that significant and sustainable steps towards democrati­
zation can be accomplish even in the temporary absence of Western-style elections. Moreover, 
the 1980 elections have done little to end the spiral o f violence which dominated the country 
between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s. Elections will also hardly solve the current problems 
o f discredited opposition parties and weak civil society actors. The most recent problems in 
the Ugandan path were mainly caused by external factors rather than being an intrinsic feature 
o f the choice to extend participation prior to electoral competition. The Kenyan case study 
shows the ambiguous effects of multipartyism on the overall process o f regime transition. In 
the absence of an independent judiciary and domestic forces which could prevent widespread 
gerrymandering of constituencies, elections imposed from the outside had many adverse and 
only a few positive effects on the Kenyan transition process in the 1990s. Not the elections, 
but the emergence o f the civil society sector with its transnational connections was the single 
most important factor keeping the Kenyan transition process alive. This development was in 
itself not unproblematic, because the transnational human rights mobilization was mainly used 
by members o f a single ethnic group which pursued more narrow economic and political 
interests. Again, elections are unlikely to solve the underlying competing claims to national 
power in Kenya in a peaceful way.
With regard to the explanation of transition processes, Bratton/van de Walle proceed along 
three dichotomies which juxtapose structure and agency (1), international and domestic 
explanations (2) as well as political and socioeconomic factors (3). From these debates within 
the democratization literature they develop a politico-institutional approach which gives 
precedence to human agency (as opposed to impersonal structural forces), domestic institu­
tions and political forces. In order to avoid the danger o f excessive voluntarism in an agency- 
based approach they introduce the type o f the outgoing authoritarian regime as a central
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independent variable to explain transition results. Using Dahl’s basic distinction of participa­
tion and contestation, Bratton/van de Walle develop five ideal types of modal regimes for the 
time between political independence and 1989 (78). In the following, they conclude that 
regimes with some prior experience o f democratic rule make more modest, but also more 
sustainable advancements towards democracy, while countries with an highly authoritarian 
history tend to democratize more quickly, but are likely to fall behind again in the long run.
I argue here that institutions are indeed an important factor which contributes to a improved 
explanation of regime transitions in Africa and elsewhere. However, based on the two case 
studies I claim that institutions with relevant effects on processes o f democratic change do not 
only exist on the domestic but also on the international level. International norms o f demo­
cratic governance represent an increasingly coherent set o f guidelines for the domestic 
conduct o f governments. Norms make only a difference if concrete agents not only reproduce, 
but actively seek to promote them. In so far, Bratton/van de Walle are correct in claiming that 
"international (...) forces promote regime transition in Africa mainly when manifested through 
domestic politics" (273). Although the authors held that "international factors (...) should not 
be excluded from overall explanations" (271), they ultimately reject this proposition because 
"major explanatory variables intervene between the international context and the transition 
process" (30).
This study focused precisely on the interactions between the domestic and the international 
level and questions an exclusionary conceptualization of both realms. Although Bratton/van 
de Walle are correct in claiming that a mere "synchronicity o f events" does not prove the case, 
their requirement that "political outcomes would also have to be consistent" (30) across cases 
insinuates a determining role of international factors. A similar dichotomizing position has 
been taken by Ruth Collier, who suggested three basic avenues for the inclusion o f  interna­
tional factors (Collier 1993: 23). First, international factors can make a domestic analysis 
spurious (rival explanation). Second, both sets of explanations can push into the same direc­
tion. In such a case, international factors possibly affect the timing, intensity, or variation of 
internal changes. Third, if  the two sets appear to push into different directions, the internal 
dynamics might deflect the international influence.
This study presented evidence for a theoretical position which includes international factors as 
significant, but not necessarily rivaling force in processes o f  democratic change. In disaggre-
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gating the wide range o f possible international influences, I have focused on international 
norms of democratic governance and their promotion by non-governmental actors. The aim of 
this study has been to highlight mainly long-term international influences on domestic change 
without "making local actors little more than the pawns o f outside forces" (Smith 1986: 35-6).
To integrate such influences into an overall picture of regime change does not question the 
relative autonomy of domestic politics, simply because domestic and international influences 
produce a complex and for each country singular transition process. When both authors argue 
against a significant role o f international factors by claiming that the "trajectory of political 
transitions is most directly affected by domestic factors such as the relative strength and 
cohesion of incumbent and opposition forces" (33), the two cases studies here suggest that 
precisely this relative strength and cohesion can be the result o f domestic-international inter­
actions o f the kinds described in the empirical chapters. Domestic actors are not necessarily 
stuck with domestic institutions, but they can tap into international material and non-material 
sources to strengthen their voices and further their cause. As argued above, this position also 
questions the claim o f Bratton/van de Walle that civil society actors matter most during the 
onset of transitions while in later stages political parties are likely to push civil society into 
the background. The long-term activities o f transnational human rights groups represent more 
than a simple "occasion" (32) such as the end o f the Cold War, but should be included into a 
causal argument on regime change.
Initiation o f  Regime Change
The Kenyan and Ugandan case studies confirms Bratton/van de Walle’s observation that 
international pressure for reforms is likely to increase domestic resistance as the targeted 
government starts a 'rally around the flag' campaign (32). However, this should not be 
understood as an argument against the role o f international influences. First, human rights 
norms are taken up by the domestic opposition to challenge the government from within. 
While governments try to disqualify those domestic critics by claiming that they had a foreign 
inspired agenda, this argument was ultimately unconvincing because those critics presented 
universal values. Whereas this rhetoric was itself deeply enmeshed with a self-interest in 
attaining political offices, the fact that universal human rights norms were introduced into the 
domestic political debate affected the formation of interests and subsequent behavior. In 
Uganda, the pressure delegitimized the human rights violating governments to the point o f a
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revolution from below, while in Kenya the Moi government survived reforms from above by 
skillfully exploiting the opportunities o f neopatrimonial rule.
Second' the consistently negative reactions of authoritarian leaders such as Milton Obote or 
Daniel arap Moi to outside pressure shows that the government felt threatened, even if 
accusations are brought forward by materially weak non-govemmental organizations. While 
Bratton/van de Walle rightly expose much o f the political rhetoric of African leaders as mere 
window dressing to pacify an outside audience (32), they too easily dismiss those discourses 
as inconsequential for processes of domestic regime change. Political leaders are concerned 
about their international image, even in the absence of a Great Power, and activities of 
transnational human rights actors continuously remind those leaders o f the gap between 
rhetoric and reality. In the long run, those politics o f shaming raise the costs o f sustaining 
such a gap and create incentives for elites (or parts o f it) to narrow the gap. These continuous 
and principled interventions are precisely not the kinds of "shifting winds o f change that blow 
in intermittently from abroad" (32), which Bratton/van de Walle reject as unreliable sources of 
regime change.
Kenya
In Kenya, those groups and individuals with significant international ties successfully resisted 
governmental intrusion between 1984 and 1989 and largely preserved their institutional 
independence. These were mainly the church organizations as well as the Law Society o f 
Kenya or the International Commission of Jurists (Kenya Chapter) and other individual 
lawyers which became a target of repression when they defended alleged members o f  subver­
sive groups in courts. The universities, their lecturers and various student bodies served 
during this period as major recruitment source for the opposition. Other societal groups such 
as women's or youth organizations and trade unions with little or no international contacts 
were invariably streamlined and ended up as instruments of executive control over the Kenyan 
society. In contrast to the lawyers church organizations such as the NCCK as the most ardent 
critic o f the government relied also on a strong domestic base and had a history o f close 
cooperation with the newly independent Kenyan state. The NCCK introduced in the 1950s a 
liberal theology and a distinct political agenda which brought it into frequent conflict with the 
state apd even its member churches. Instead of reproducing the largely apolitical positions of 
the traditional Kenyan churches and without organic connections to the local environment, the
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NCCK became a major transmission belt for the diffusion o f universal liberal ideas into the 
Kenyan context. When members of the universities and the law profession became the first 
victims of growing government repression, the NCCK became the most significant societal 
institution to put up resistance.
This explanation of early domestic mobilization against authoritarian rule in Kenya includes 
references to Bratton/van de Walle's institutionalist argument as well as the modernization 
paradigm. The prominent role o f university lecturers and students in the domestic confronta­
tions o f the mid-1980s confirms the role of economic modernization and subsequent societal 
differentiation. The ability o f church organizations and the Law Society of Kenya to resist 
government control is partly explained by their institutional and economic independence. 
Prior to the 1980s the NCCK had developed a distinct political profile which now came 
increasingly into conflict with government policies. Bratton/van de Walle's institutionalist 
argument about the role o f prior experiences with democratic governance can also partly 
account for the reluctance o f the Kenyan government to root out all societal dissent. Moreo­
ver, the significant post-independence cooperation between the state and the NCCK also 
contributed to this reluctance on the side o f the government. Total repression of the kind 
experienced by the Ugandan population for many years was simply not part o f the political 
repertoire.
However, institutionalism and modernization theory can only be used to identify groups 
which are the most likely target of government repression and might, consequently, put up 
resistance against it. Hence, they account for the existence o f those organizations and groups. 
Beyond these questions, both tend to neglect the question why certain groups and individuals 
become active in the struggle for human rights and regime change. I argue here that the inter­
national contacts of those individuals and organizations as well as internationally based 
universal norms of human rights and their non-govemmental promoters are the key to under­
standing why the challenge to authoritarian rule came from these comers and at that particular 
point in time. By introducing international human rights institutions as a new reference point 
which transcends the domestic realm, it is possible to identify a source o f change. While this 
remains generally within an institutionalist logic, it conceptualizes regime change not mainly 
as determined by pre-existing institutional arrangements, but highlights the conflict between 
those domestic institutions and international institutions representing universal values.
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After 1989/90, the existence o f those scattered voices domestic dissent and their strong inter­
national resonance, encouraged others to join the ranks of the opposition. The government 
critics became now more pro-active in their demands for political reforms and slowly gained 
not only transnational non-govemmental but also donor support. Indeed, the donor reaction to 
freeze aid in November 1991 was heavily influenced by the constant transnational lobbying 
against the Kenyan government in the previous years. Although it is tempting to use the donor 
decision as the ultimate prove for the relevance of international factors, such an argument 
would ultimately carry not much weight. Instead, I propose here to initially analyze the donor 
decision as dependent variable and perceive of the transnational human rights mobilization as 
a major part for its explanation. The decision would hardly be possible without the changes in 
Eastern Europe, but this can hardly explain why it was Kenya which became an early target 
for the emerging global consensus labeled 'good governance'.
Uganda
Uganda is not simply another case with a similarly strong international and domestic mobili­
zation for regime change during the last ten years. The rise o f authoritarian rule in Uganda led 
to genocide and civil war. When the NRM took over power in 1986, the country's infrastruc­
ture was basically non-existent and the situation could almost be described as an institutional 
tabula rasa. Hence, it seems not surprising that both countries have taken very different paths 
of regime change. The comparison can take maximum advantage of these circumstances, 
because it prevents the observer from simply reproducing the results of the other case and, 
thus, merely increasing "overly anectodal evidence" (Bratton/van de Walle 1997:269).
In Uganda, the international mobilization for human rights was an important factor in 
delegitimizing the Amin dictatorship and the second Obote regime. In the early 1980s, the 
NRM under the leadership o f Yoweri Museveni sidelined all other rebel groups and finally 
took over national power in early 1986. The single most important feature o f the Ugandan 
struggle for national power was the pervasive use o f military violence by virtually all parties 
involved. However, the military victory o f the NRM was not merely a result o f its superior 
military capabilities. Between 1981 and 1985, the NRM became the dominant rebel force, 
because it could mobilize domestic and international support based on a political agenda 
which centered on issues o f human rights. None o f the vast array o f other rebel groups which 
had been active throughout the post-independence history o f Uganda were ever able to
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mobilize significant domestic support beyond the ethnic group o f the leadership. What 
distinguishes these groups from the NRM is precisely the issue o f a coherent political agenda 
which had the potential to simultaneously transcend ethnic differences and muster interna­
tional support. The NRM and Yoweri Museveni took full advantage o f the growing 
institutionalization of human rights on the international level and strengthened their domestic 
base by a serious effort to enforce minimal human rights standards whenever NRM soldiers 
came in contact with the local population. In 'liberated' areas, the NRM replaced the tradi­
tional chief system with democratically elected resistance councils.
Transition Path
In chapter 5 I have argued that Kenya and Uganda have taken different paths o f regime 
change. While the Kenyan government first agreed to multipartyism in 1991 and refused to 
negotiate constitutional reforms aimed at curtailing executive powers, Uganda embarked after 
1986 on an ambitious process of grassroots mobilization and constitutional reform. At the 
same time, the movement government barred parties from operation and delayed presidential 
and parliamentary elections until after the end of these reforms in late 1995. When the first 
nation-wide elections on a national level were only held in 1994 and served to create a 
constituent assembly. In contrast, the multiparty elections in Kenya were from the beginning 
aimed at giving legitimacy to the elected political leadership. When the constitutional reform 
process came finally underway in 1997, a whole new set o f non-elective institutions were 
formed and charged with the negotiations. Both transitions can be qualified as democratic, 
although they entail different sets of opportunities and hazards for further consolidation. How 
can we explain the difference in paths and what is the role o f international factors?
Kenya
Once the donor decision was made, it had a profound but ambiguous impact on the Kenyan 
transition process. On the one hand, it was effective enough to consolidate the re-expansion of 
the civil society sector, although this was not the main intention o f  the measure. After 1992, a 
whole plethora o f  independent (and mainly foreign funded) non-governmental organizations 
in the areas o f  human rights and democratization emerged and considerably increased the 
pressure for reforms from within. In the long term perspective, this unintended consequence 
had the most positive effect on the transition process, because it forced the government in 
1997/98 into negotiations and compromise about political reforms. On the other hand, the
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decision failed to achieve its major short-term objectives. Without openly acknowledging it. 
many donor governments hoped that the measure would lead to the downfall o f Daniel arap 
Moi and KANU. Nothing like that happened. Instead, the logic o f attaining political power by 
all imaginable means remained dominant and was now merely channeled through the institu­
tion o f multiparty elections. This logic also pervaded the opposition ranks and led to the 
creation o f a multitude o f political parties and a shift away from the focus on universal values 
and constitutional reforms.
In 1992, the government had little difficulties to manipulate the electoral process. In 1997, the 
menu for election fraud was considerably smaller. However, in light of a further divided 
opposition it provided still sufficient tools for Moi and KANU to secure the desired outcome. 
At the same time, hardline supporters o f the ruling coalition felt sufficiently threatened by the 
rising opposition movement and revived not only the majimbo debate but also instigated 
ethnic violence in various parts o f the country. If it had not been for the principled opposition 
which reanimated the campaign for constitutional reforms in 1995/96, the 1997 elections 
would have been hardly different from the first multiparty elections five years earlier. I argue 
here that it is not so much a dormant institutional legacy of scattered democratic experience in 
Kenya which accounts for slow but significant regime change in Kenya since 1991 until 
today, but the conflict between a coalition of domestic and international actors mobilizing for 
universal principles and the supporters o f the ruling authoritarian regime and their neopatri- 
monial system increasingly loosing the benefits of Jackson's 'negative sovereignty regime'. 
The same lawyers and church representatives who had put up the initial resistance against the 
Moi regime in the mid-1980s reappeared after 1995 on the political scene and were now 
responsible for the formation o f the NCEC and its successful challenge of the government on 
political reforms prior to the December 1997 elections. International contacts and the contin­
ued mobilization o f universal values against the Moi regime were a necessary albeit not 
sufficient condition for the success. I will now move to the question of how these transna­
tional forces materialized in the domestic realm.
A full explanation o f the current state o f  regime change in Kenya requires an understanding of 
the interaction between domestic and international forces. Kenyan lawyers and church repre­
sentatives and the transnational actors they regularly mobilized for support played a crucial 
role in changing the rules o f the political game in the country. However, institutional legacy
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and existing distributions of domestic power resources played not only an important role in 
deciding the multiparty elections, but also shaped the confrontation between the authoritarian 
regime*and its more principled challengers. While the resistance o f the opposition in the mid- 
and late 1980s was mainly a question o f protecting oneself against an increasingly repressive 
regime, the formation o f  the NCEC and the call for constitutional reforms in the mid-1990s 
was a very different ball game. As the domestic position o f those groups was now consoli­
dated, their international contacts served no longer as a protective shield for individual 
activists but had a more ambiguous and long-term effect on the position of the intellectual 
avantgarde as a whole in the domestic political struggle. In a certain sense, the international 
contacts which were necessary to push for regime change in the first place became increas­
ingly a liability for parts o f the opposition movement. Moreover, the fact that many o f the 
newly created domestic NGOs and pressure groups in the area o f political reforms were 
dominated by Kikuyu became now more significant than during the late 1980s when protest 
against torture and unlawful arrests was sufficient to qualify as a principled supporter of 
universal values.
The radical part of the opposition movement succeeded in creating the NCEC as an umbrella 
movement for constitutional reforms, but its internationally well connected intellectual leader­
ship had little local connections. Whenever it was necessary to mobilize people to the streets 
in order to push the government into sitting at one table with the opposition, the international 
contacts were o f no help. Instead, the success was mainly predicated upon the ability o f the 
NCEC leadership to mobilize opposition politicians with a large ethnic following, preferably 
in the slums o f Nairobi and other larger towns. In the protracted negotiation process about the 
question of constitutional reforms, KANU and the opposition parties dominated simply 
because NCEC leaders had no domestic constituency. An appeal to the international public 
can possibly protect from arrest and torture, but it can not automatically secure prominent 
participation in national reform talks.
Still, the fast and successful completion o f the IPPG talks would not have been possible 
without the presence o f  an opposition divided in a moderate and radical section. The latter 
presented a constant threat of mass action to the government, which strengthened the 
moderates at the negotiation table. As a result, hardliners on the side of the government 
decided for the time being to remain in the background. On the side of the opposition the
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NCEC was excluded as a result o f the government's insistence on the participation of elected 
representatives only. Hence, the beginning o f constitutional reforms in Kenya highlighted the 
almost classical emergence of hard- and softliners on both sides o f the political divide. With 
regard to their respective relations to the outside world, governmental softliners and opposi­
tion hardliners share relatively high levels of international exchanges in contrast to their 
respective counterparts. The agreement about the formalities o f the reform talks reached in 
late 1998 is an important step towards further democratization.
While it is true that in most African countries, including Kenya and Uganda, the state is still 
the main avenue for material wealth accumulation, this does not necessarily make compro­
mises and pacts impossible. Bratton/van de Walle claim that "because the stakes of political 
struggle are the state and its enormous resources, transition struggles are hard and bitterly 
fought, leading to zero-sum outcomes rather than compromises and pacts" (269). I argue here 
that African transitions are not exceptional with regard to the ’bitterness' o f the political 
struggle. No matter in what context, the stakes for the parties involved are always high and a 
usually well-entrenched elite is threatened with a loss o f material resources and power. Hence, 
compromises and pacts are not so much impeded by pre-existing institutional conditions, but 
by the respective threat perceptions of the concerned elites.
Uganda
When Museveni became president in January 1986 he transferred this curious mix o f a top- 
down and grassroots approach to the national level. Until the early 1990s, the movement 
system was genuinely broad-based and offered to many Ugandans previously unknown 
opportunities to participate in local affairs. Despite the ban on party activities, the top-down 
transition o f the NRM genuinely democratized the country on all levels of society. After 1992 
the political system became less open and the NRM's concern for the mobilization o f genuine 
grassroots input virtually ended. With the advent o f national level elections, moderate opposi­
tion members gave up their positions in the government while tolerance for political dissent 
generally decreased. Despite very different circumstances compared to Kenya, I come here to 
a similar conclusion: the introduction o f  more Western-style elections in the mid-1990s had a 
rather ambiguous effect on the transition process in Uganda. While it certainly strengthened 
democratic institutions such as the parliament, those elections decreased incentives for the 
ruling government to pursue more inclusive and grass-roots oriented policies. In contrast to
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Bratton/van de Walle’s claims, elections were not the first step toward democracy in Uganda 
and the reform steps taken between 1986 and 1992 can not be dismissed as insignificant for 
the overall transition process.
During the thirteen years o f NRM government transnational human rights groups and their 
domestic counterparts played a different and much less significant role than in Kenya. This is 
not surprising, because Uganda witnessed in 1986 a fundamental change of guards while no 
such change has occurred so far in Kenya. Nonetheless, Amnesty International as the main 
international human rights watchdog continued its observation o f the Ugandan situation and 
published regular and highly critical reports until about 1992. In contrast to Kenya, these 
reports had more direct effects on the further institutionalization o f domestic human rights 
safeguards as the government had already committed itself to the cause of human rights. The 
formation o f ministerial human rights desks or the Uganda Human Rights Commission were 
not a tactical concession to appease the international public, but part and parcel of the long­
term reform program of the NRM government. While the main international-domestic 
interaction involved in Kenya at that time transnational human rights groups and their domes­
tic counterparts, it centered in Uganda on more direct communication between the former and 
the government. In the short term this was more effective, but in the long run such a top-down 
approach prevented the development o f strong independent watchdogs to control the govern­
ment.
The main problem of the transition process in Uganda are three mutually reinforcing trends. 
First, thirteen years o f  Movement rule indicate a growing entrenchment o f the ruling elite. 
Second, societal mobilization for universal values such as human rights remains weak. To be 
effective, international pressure for such values needs domestic counterparts, preferably 
outside of the government quarters. Third, the domestic political situation is generally threat­
ened by uncontrolled violent conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Despite the problematic 
entrenchment o f  the movement system (but because o f the regional situation), international 
support for Museveni has always increased. Moreover, recently transnational human rights 
groups have returned target now rebel groups in the North for their practice o f  child abduc­
tions and senseless killings of the civilian population. The unintended consequence o f this 
activism is an alliance with the US government's objectives in the region and additional 
support for the hard-line standpoint o f the Museveni regime towards the rebel problem.
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Continued insurgencies supported by the Sudanese government and Ugandan revenge 
operations prevents a peaceful solution o f the conflict in the North. This inhibits not only the 
badly needed extension o f the transition process throughout the Northern part o f Uganda, but 
represents a constant threat to all the political reforms since 1986.
A similar threat emerged since 1997 with regard to the former Zaire. When the relations to the 
new Kabila government turned sour and Kabila's rebel coalition broke apart, Ugandan troops 
remained in Eastern Congo and supported the new enemies and former allies o f the Kabila. 
Apart from the huge costs of this military adventure, the existence of a second front in the 
West represents another potential threat to the reform process in Uganda. Hence, Uganda’s 
current involvement in regional conflicts and their domestic repercussions indicate one o f the 
main differences between the two case studies.
The Contribution to the General Literature on Regime Transitions
The results of the two case studies can also be used to evaluate other general hypotheses 
developed within the existing regime transition literature. I have argued in chapter 1 that the 
.—^>agency-based turn within this sub discipline of comparative politics represents the current 
state of the art. The case studies confirm this result. There is no correlation between regime 
changes and economic development which would strengthen the arguments of the moderniza­
tion paradigm. Both countries are well below any of the thresholds one can find in this 
literature and can not be expected to enter a sustainable process o f democratization any time 
soon. In order to confirm the modernization argument, one would have to reject the regime 
changes in both countries as insignificant.
Within the agency-based tradition I have identified the work o f Adam Przeworski and his 
^  application of rational choice models to regime transitions as the most coherent and consistent 
research program. The explanation for regime change derived from such a perspective is 
extremely attractive because it claims that political uncertainty - one of the main features of 
electoral democracy - leads elites to adopt democratic rules in a process o f rational choice. 
Only democracy features regular as well as free and fair elections which guarantee all groups 
(organized in political parties) to return one day to power. Democracy is "permitted by 
accidents of history that leave a balance of power or stalemate - a dispersion o f  force and 
resources that makes it impossible for any one leader or group to overpower all o f the others" 
(Olson 1993: 573). It is the only institutional setting which, at the same time, is a  constant
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source o f hope for everyone’s strife for power and guarantees limits to the exercise o f power 
after a possible change in national leadership. The introduction o f  democracy is initially 
possible without democrats.
^  I concluded in chapter 1 that an institutionalist perspective offers the most promising supple­
ment to an agency-based analysis (and vice versa), because institutions are generally ’closer’ to 
agents than impersonal structural features o f  societies. This avenue has also been taken by 
Bratton/van de Walle and let them to develop their politico-institutional approach to democ­
ratization. In a perspective of structured contingency (Bratton/van de Walle 1997: 276-8; see 
also Karl/Schmitter 1991: 270/1), the authors argued that "inherited rules and institutions 
impose limits on the range of alternatives available to political actors” (276), while, at the 
same time, "existing organizations may suffer from such weak performance capacities or 
internal contradictions that they cannot propagate, instead spawning demands for the intro­
duction of new sets o f rules and institutions" (277). While this study confirms the general 
validity of agency-centered institutionalism in explaining democratic transitions, it claims that 
both, a rational choice perspective and Bratton/van de Walle’s institutionalist supplement, 
ignore crucial variables which cause and influence processes o f regime change.
A rational choice explanation assumes that domestic elites suddenly find themselves in a 
situation were domestic power resources are dispersed thus causing overall uncertainty about 
the future for all political actors. In such a situation, the introduction o f democratic institutions 
is a rational choice. This is indeed a highly elegant argument because an intrinsic feature of 
democracy itself - namely uncertainty - serves as cause for its emergence. Nothing but rational 
interest calculation has to be added and democracy emerges almost like a self-enforcing 
mechanism. I argue here that changes in the domestic distribution o f power resources is a non­
trivial assumption whose explanation is crucial for an understanding o f processes o f regime 
change. Only once we know why a given ruling elite feels threatened to the point that it makes 
substantive concessions, we will be able to understand the subsequent process of regime 
change. Bratton/van de Walle offered an institutionalist answer to the puzzle and argued that 
internal contradictions cause disillusionment with existing domestic institutions. However, 
their simultaneous use o f  domestic institutions to account for continuity and change (277) is 
problematic, simply because it remains ultimately unclear why actors and actor groups 
suddenly perceive of one institutional ensemble as inefficient and seek to remove it, while
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another remains untouched and subsequently shapes itself a transition process.
I argue here that a rational choice explanation leaves no and Bratton/van de Walle's institu­
tional argument little theoretical space for the question of how alternatives become organized 
(Przeworski 1986: 53) and where actors could possibly be infused with a positive inspiration 
for action. Based on the two case studies, I propose an agency-centered institutionalist answer 
to the puzzles which explicitly integrates the international realm into the analysis. The basic 
conflict causing regime change emerges between domestic institutions of authoritarian rule 
and international institutions representing universal values of human rights and democracy. 
Transnational human rights actors play a crucial role in transporting those values and norms 
into a domestic context.
In this process, strategies such as the ’shaming* of a human rights violating government 
account for shifts in the domestic power distribution. Opposition groups openly supporting a 
human rights agenda will emerge and/or grow in strength. Even i f  actors in control o f major 
power resources or veto positions misuse universal language for purely instrumental purposes 
this leads to greater recognition o f those norms. In the empirical part of this study I showed 
that both, the process of international institutionalization and the transfer o f norms in a 
domestic context, exhibit such developments. Instrumental reference to norms opens 
window of opportunity for norms-driven entrepreneurs to engage state actors in a discourse 
that exposes gaps between rhetorical claim and action as well as the instrumental character of 
their arguments. Under the condition that such an entrepreneur can appeal to a sufficiently 
interested audience, material power asymmetries become less relevant and even powerful state 
actors are forced to either change their arguments or the behavior. Once a purely instrumental 
self-obligation is embedded in universal norms, it is hard for actors to reverse to a non-univer- 
sal language.
^ h \  contrast to Bratton/van de Walle, such a perspective identifies two clearly separate sets of 
institutions and analyzes the conflict between actors which identify with either of these. It 
adds international human rights institutions as a distinct power resource in domestic struggles 
for political change. The efforts of transnational human rights groups to transport this basic 
conflict into the domestic realm interact with the historically grown institutional arrangements 
and actor relationships. While domestic considerations become more prevalent after the onset 
o f a transition process, international factors remain relevant in its later stages. The contingen-
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cies of a transition process are indeed structured, as argued by Bratton/van de Walle and 
others, but they are not only structured by domestic but also by international factors.
Are the Reforms significant and sustainable?
The general wisdom on the prospects for the consolidation o f democracy in Africa is highly 
skeptical. Indicative new labels for the state o f affairs in Africa, but also other regions in the 
world include "delegative democracy" (O'Donnell 1994), "informal polyarchy" (O'Donnell 
1996), "transitions without consolidation" (Sandbrook 1996), or "virtual democracy" (Joseph 
1997; Joseph 1998). What is usually meant by these labels is that many countries "are deliber­
ately contrived to satisfy prevailing international norms of'presentability'" (Joseph 1998: 4), 
but fail to make substantial progress in terms o f overall democratization. More precisely, 
authors increasingly argue that the third wave produces a new form of "illiberal democracy" 
(Zakaria 1997) where constitutionalism is deliberately divorced from the concept of 
democracy.137 As early as 1986, Terry Lynn Karl had identified the "fallacy o f electoral ism" 
(Karl 1986: 34). In her and many other affirming accounts, authors argued that elections were 
simply integrated in the system of authoritarian rule.
In the African context, authors have taken this position even from a descriptive to a proscrip­
tive stage. Donors recent preferences for good governance are justified as a consequentialist 
replacement o f democracy which can not be fully developed anyway because o f cultural or 
economic restrictions. Bratton/van de Walle remain also pessimistic about African transition 
processes, mainly because the underlying "institutional logic o f patronage and clientelism" 
(278) has hardly changed during recent years. Hence, the authors follow the general trend in 
the literature and claim that "democracy can be installed without democrats, but it cannot 
consolidated without them" (279). Here, modernization theory and cultural pessimism creep 
back in through the backdoor when the consolidation o f democracy is predicated upon the 
existence of a "literate middle class" and "favorable underlying economic and social 
structures" (274). Is the third wave for the majority of cases best described as an instance of 
p lus ça change, plus c'est la même chose?
137 Ottemoeller recently used survey data to argue that the current Ugandan political system corresponded with a 
prevalent "illiberal definition of democracy" within the population (Ottemoeller 1998: 123).
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Considering the state o f economic development in Kenya and Uganda, both represent 'easy' 
cases for a negative outlook on the prospects o f further democratization. In contrast, the case 
studies presented here reveal substantive changes with respect to institutional traditions of 
competition and participation. This perspective does not ignore the very real hazards of these 
processes of transition, but as extremely unlikely cases for significant change the results pose 
a serious challenge for conventional wisdom. The general argument does neither ignore the 
problems of the transition processes in Kenya and Uganda nor claim that the activities of 
international human rights groups are the only solution to these problems. Instead, it is argued 
that the inclusion o f international factors such as human rights norms embedded in interna­
tional institutions and advanced by non-governmental actors further advances our 
understanding of transition processes in the selected countries and beyond.
The argument that democratic procedures can emerge based only on rational interest 
calculation, but is unlikely to lead to successful consolidation forces its proponents either into 
a pessimistic position or an argumentative predicament concerning the later stages o f the 
transition process. If  the transition process remains incomplete, the pessimistic position seems 
vindicated. However, such a retreat to plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose is intellectu­
ally dissatisfying and puts the own effort to introduce new theoretical concepts into a 
defensive position. The overall predicament can be further exemplified with reference to the 
assumed role of the so-called middle class. On the one hand, Bratton/van de Walle and others 
base their pessimism about the future o f democracy in Africa on the assumption that a literate 
middle class and industrialization are prerequisites for the consolidation of democracy. On the 
other hand, they are aware of the ambiguous role such middle classes have historically played 
in many struggles for democracy. Hence, in the case of fundamental regime change these 
arguments have to assume some external source o f change which actually 'makes’ a middle 
class (or other societal actors) prefer democratic institutions over authoritarian ones. Hence, 
generally pessimistic and/or rational choice perspective prevent the explicit recognition of 
root causes for change. Ultimately, Bratton/van de Walle are at the end still left with the 
question why democracy became an issue all over Africa in the first place.
This contradiction can only be solved if  we acknowledge norms and ideas as possible sources 
influencing the formation o f preferences and interests o f individuals and groups. Instead of 
Bratton/van de Walle's vague suggestions to "solidify, revive, or create institutional traditions
m \ \ \
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o f political participation and competition" (278), this study presented international norms of 
human rights and democracy as a point of reference for social movements. I argue here that 
prior to and during all stages of a transition process, at least some actors value democracy and 
human rights for its own sake. Only if we take serious the strategies of those actors to 
influence others we will have identified an important root cause o f regime change. These 
norms are certainly not self-enforcing and their effects vary according to pre-existing domes­
tic filters. They depend on entrepreneurs which can device more or less successful strategies 
for their promotion. Here, and not in social and economic prerequisites one will find an expla­
nation for the successes and failures o f  democratic transitions.
As one o f result o f this, domestic and international observers as well as transnational human 
rights groups themselves will have to take a much closer look at the effects o f their interven­
tions in a given domestic context. While principles may suffice to seek protection for 
individuals from immediate repression, a long-term engagement requires a much more elabo­
rate analysis of domestic politics. In Kenya, the current struggle for human rights and 
constitutional reform is intertwined with an ethnically framed conflict originating in the 
period right before and after the attainment o f political independence. In Uganda, the conflict 
in the North is not only a matter of shaming and fighting particularly vicious rebel groups, but 
an issue of reuniting the country after almost twenty years o f civil war as well as deciding the 
fate o f the notoriously famine-stricken Southern region of neighboring Sudan.
The results o f this study reaffirm both main claims contained in Ndegwa's "Two Faces of 
Civil Society" (Ndegwa 1996: 3). First, civil society is not an unambiguously positive 
stakeholder in advancing democratization, because outside support tends to distract activists 
from actively seeking a broad domestic legitimacy. Second, activities outsiders associate with 
civil society do not necessarily empower citizens on the grassroots level. In both cases, 
outside material support went largely to organizations in the capitals representing more 
narrow interests of educated elites. While this has led in Kenya to significant changes in state- 
society relations during the 1990s, the sustainability of the improvements is doubtful.
Transition paths and sustainability: Pacts or mass mobilization - competition or participa­
tion?
I have argued that the reform steps taken in Kenya and Uganda since the early 1990s and 1986 
respectively are significant. Moreover, I have shown that both countries have taken very
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different paths o f regime change. While Kenya took the more 'classical' road of extending 
competition first, Uganda put clear emphasis on the issue of participation. Based on these 
assumptions I can now raise the question about the comparative sustainability of the reforms 
in both countries. Again, the literature is fairly united in following Robert Dahl’s argument, 
that a historical sequence where competition precedes inclusiveness is more likely to lead to 
polyarchy than the other way around (Dahl 1971: 203). Bratton/van de Walle echo this 
position and hold that elections must come first before participation can be extended. 
Moreover, they use the basic distinction o f competition and participation to describe different 
types o f authoritarian rule, whose differing institutional legacy is used as a crucial explanatory 
variable for regime change. Based on their main institutionalist argument, they claim that 
valid predictions about the path and result o f regime change can best be derived from the prior 
mode o f neo-patrimonial rule.
In this logic, Kenya represented from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s a competitive one-party 
system, while competition and participation sharply decreased between 1986 and 1990/91. 
The one-party system became now more plebiscitary. After 1992, Kenya joined formally the 
ranks o f multiparty democracies, but only in 1997/98 a reform process was started which aims 
at leveling the playing field for all political actors. Uganda went from a plebiscitary one party 
system in the late 1960s to a military oligarchy and became a competitive one-party system in 
the early 1990s. Therefore, one can predict that the Kenyan transition process is more likely to 
be sustainable than in neighboring Uganda, because o f the much higher level of political 
competition in earlier periods.
Based on cases in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Karl/Schmitter developed a 
related argument with greater emphasis on the transition process itself (Karl/Schmitter 1991 
and Figure 4). Instead of modal regimes, Karl/Schmitter link the dependent variable 'consoli- 
dation/transition path' to so-called modes of transition. While Bratton/van de Walle used 
Dahl's basic distinction of 'competition' and 'participation' to identify regime types, 
Karl/Schmitter distinguished modes o f transition with reference to 'actors' (masses or elites) 
and 'strategies' (compromise or force). Karl/Schmitter concluded, that transitions from below 
are less likely to be successfully especially under a reform mode with "long-term peaceful 
pressure from below." Transitions by pact or imposition are the most likely modes which will 
eventually yield democracy, albeit usually in a restricted form. Whereas the Kenyan process
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displayed mass mobilization and later elite compromise with plenty o f pressure from below, 
the Ugandan case went from revolution to imposition from above. Hence, Karl/Schmitter 
would be more optimistic about the Ugandan process than Bratton/van de Walle, while they 
would discount the role o f pressure from below in Kenya and focus on the most recent nego­
tiations between various elite factions.
The results of the case studies confirm the important role o f institutional legacy, but support 
Karl/Schmitter’s argument for greater attention towards the modes o f transition. While 
Bratton/van de Walle and Karl/Schmitter both use "structured contingency" as a central 
descriptor for regime changes, the former tend to emphasis historically grown institutions as 
determinants o f human action. The latter lean more towards the contingencies o f a transition 
process. Both agree that mass-driven action might be good for getting transitions started, but 
subsequently inhibits further progress towards democracy. This is in line with the general 
academic wisdom on the ’third wave', which tends to emphasis elite pacts and the ’crafting’ of 
democracy. The Ugandan path of extending participation prior to political competition as well 
as the Kenyan experience with elections during the 1990s represents food for thought for the 
conventional wisdom that regime change towards democracy should be kicked off (or even is 
completed) with the installation of multipartyism.
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Abstract
This thesis brings together recent research on the role o f international institutions in domestic 
politics and the current literature on regime change in Africa. Empirically, it presents a com­
parative evaluation o f regime changes in Kenya and Uganda from the mid-1980s until today. 
The thesis follows the recent emphasis within the democratization literature on the role of 
political actors and institutions in bringing about and shaping regime change. It adds to this 
literature a specific concern for international human rights institutions and actors as potential 
sources of change. I argue that the international institutionalization o f human rights norms 
represents an opportunity structure for international and domestic human rights actors. They 
use those norms and institutions to challenge the prevalent norm o f  state sovereignty and 
succeed in delegitimizing human rights violating regimes.
The thesis evaluates the role o f those international factors, first, in causing regime change and, 
second, in shaping the subsequent transition path. Variation in the results expressed by the 
mode o f initial transition is explained for the onset o f regime change by the dominant form o f 
neopatrimonial rule. Whereas cohesive clientelist networks solidified in Kenya over almost 
20 years, the bases for such a system in Uganda were destroyed by the Amin dictatorship and 
subsequent civil war. The dominance o f positive integration by resource allocation in Kenya 
contrasted with a prevalent logic of violence and indiscriminate mass killings in Uganda. 
When transnational human rights mobilization affected both countries, the international- 
domestic interaction produced in Uganda a revolution from below (1986) and in Kenya 
limited reforms from above (1990/1991).
Variation in subsequent transition paths is mainly accounted for by the named initial mode o f  
transition which affects the international and domestic mobilization. When the Kenyan 
government chose an electoralist transition path international human rights pressure remained 
strong and slowly eroded the governmental efforts to limit the effects of the reform process. 
By contrast, the new Ugandan government initially emphasized a different transition path and 
engaged in elaborate constitutionalist reforms. A decline in human rights activism explains 
why this reform process was delayed. Rather than limiting institutions to the role of 
constraints upon actor's choices, this argument highlights the enabling role of institutions and 
identifies the potential conflict between norms embedded in different institutional settings as a 
source o f social and political change.
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